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Title: Thomas Jefferson
       The Apostle of Americanism

Author: Gilbert Chinard

Release Date: November 21, 2011 [EBook #38073]

Language: English

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  [Transcriber's note: The second edition is still under copyright,
  but contained a few corrections. The quote attributed to Jefferson
  on pages 80-82 is from Thomas Paine and has a different plate.
  The text on pages 82-85 and in the introduction were significantly
  revised. The last paragraph on page 375 was reworded to be less
  critical of John Adams.

  The original text includes Greek characters, which have been replaced
  with transliterations for this text version. Also, certain words use
  "oe" ligature in the original. Carat (^) character has been used to
  represent subscript in this text version.]




  THOMAS JEFFERSON

  _The Apostle of Americanism_




  Books by Gilbert Chinard

    VOLNEY ET L'AMÉRIQUE
    JEFFERSON ET LES IDÉOLOGUES
    LES RÉFUGIÉS HUGUENOTS EN AMÉRIQUE
    THE COMMONPLACE BOOK OF THOMAS JEFFERSON
    LES AMITIÉS FRANÇAISES DE JEFFERSON
    THE LITERARY BIBLE OF JEFFERSON




  [Illustration: BUST OF THOMAS JEFFERSON BY HOUDON

  _In the possession of the New York Historical Society_]




  THOMAS
  JEFFERSON

  THE APOSTLE OF AMERICANISM

  _By_

  GILBERT CHINARD


  _With Illustrations_

  BOSTON
  LITTLE, BROWN, AND COMPANY
  1929


  _Copyright, 1929_,
  BY LITTLE, BROWN, AND COMPANY

  _All rights reserved_

  Published September, 1929

  PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA




INTRODUCTION


This study of Jefferson's mind is the indirect outcome of an ambitious
undertaking on which I launched about ten years ago. My original purpose
had been to determine more exactly than had heretofore been done the
contribution of the French thinkers to the political philosophy of
Thomas Jefferson.

The points of similarity were obvious: the parallelism between the
theory of natural rights and the _Déclaration des droits de l'homme_ is
patent; the American statesman shared with the French "doctrinaires" the
same faith in the ultimate wisdom of the people, the same belief in the
necessity of a free press and religious freedom. Many of his utterances
had a sort of French ring and countless Gallicisms could be discovered
in his letters. He spent in France the five years immediately preceding
the Revolution of 1789; he knew Madame d'Houdetot, Madame Helvétius,
Lafayette, Condorcet, Cabanis, Du Pont de Nemours, l'Abbé Morellet and
Destutt de Tracy. He was accused of bringing back from France the
"infidel doctrines" of the philosophers and to some of his
contemporaries he appeared as the embodiment of Jacobinism. How could
such a man have failed to be influenced by the political, social and
economic theories which brought about the great upheaval of the end of
the eighteenth century?

A rapid survey of the Jefferson papers in the Library of Congress and in
the Massachusetts Historical Society soon convinced me that the subject
had scarcely been touched, notwithstanding the controversy that had been
raging about the origin of Jefferson's political ideas for more than a
century. Hundreds of letters written to Jefferson by French
correspondents were preserved in the precious archives, and had
apparently never been consulted. Many days were spent in the rotunda of
the Manuscript Division, turning the leaves of the two hundred and
thirty volumes of the Jefferson papers. Documents after documents threw
a new light on the mind of the great American--letters hastily written,
rough drafts corrected and recorrected, press copies blurred and hardly
decipherable, yellowed scraps of paper crumbling to pieces but piously
restored; more letters in a regular, precise hand, the hand of a man who
had been a surveyor and who drew rather than wrote. Fifty years of the
most eventful period of American history, told by the chief
participants, rose from the old documents, and day by day was revealed
more clearly the clean-cut figure of Jefferson the American.

First of all, the tall, lanky boy, born in a frame dwelling by the
Rivanna,--not a farmer boy by any means, but the son of an ambitious,
energetic and respected surveyor, a landowner and a colonel in the
militia, and of a mother in whose veins ran the best blood of Virginia.
The stern and pious education received in the family, the reading of the
Bible and Shakespeare, the lessons of Reverend Maury, the son of a
Huguenot who took the boy as a boarding student, the years at William
and Mary College in the brilliant, animated, but small capital of
Virginia, the conversations with Mr. Small, Mr. Wythe and Governor
Fauquier, the Apollo tavern, the first love affair, and the long
roamings in the hills surrounding Shadwell. More years as a student of
law and as a law practitioner, quickly followed by his marriage with a
Virginia "belle", and Thomas Jefferson had settled down, a promising
young man, a talented lawyer, a respectable landowner, an omnivorous
reader who culled from hundreds of authors moral maxims, bits of poetry,
historical, legal and philosophical disquisitions and copied them in a
neat hand in his commonplace books. But curiously enough during these
formative years, the direct influence of the French philosophers was
almost negligible. He knew Montesquieu's "Esprit des Lois" and
Voltaire's "Essai sur les moeurs", but he used both books as
repertories of facts rather than as founts of ideas. His masters were
the Greeks of old, Homer and Euripides, then Cicero and Horace, finally
Bolingbroke and above all the historians of the English law in whose
works he studied the principles, development and degeneration of free
institutions.

The choice of the abstracts made by this young Virginian who was still
in his twenties already reveals an extraordinary capacity for absorbing
knowledge and a most remarkable independence of thought. As he had
planned to build a house according to his own plans, he had likewise
decided to construct for himself, with material just as carefully
chosen, the intellectual house in which he intended to live. Had not the
Revolution intervened, Thomas Jefferson would probably have spent his
years in his native colony, become a successful member of the Virginia
bar, perhaps a judge learned and respected, a wealthy landowner adding
constantly to the paternal acres. He had no ambition and little
suspected his own latent genius, and yet, during all these years which
he might have passed in leisurely and pleasant idleness, he never
ceased, unknowingly as it were, to prepare himself for the great part he
was to play.

When the call came he was ready. The ideas expressed in the Declaration
of Independence were common property, but their felicitous wording was
not due to a sudden and feverish inspiration. The young Virginian
expressed only the definite conclusions he had slowly reached in reading
the historians and the old lawyers. The principles there proclaimed were
not abstract and _a priori_ principles; they were distinctly the
principles that had directed his Saxon forefathers in their "settlement"
of England. They were the legitimate inheritance of their descendants
and continuators who had brought over with them to America the rights
of their ancestors to settle in sparsely inhabited land, there to live
freely and happily under institutions chosen by themselves. To go back
to a primitive past, to the good old times, had been the dream of many
political philosophers; but Jefferson's vision of that ancestral past
was no dream, for it had originated in the only part of the inhabited
earth where it could become a reality. This was the true background of
the Declaration of Independence, the background of Jeffersonian
democracy--a curious justification of the pioneer spirit by a student of
history who cared little for abstract reasoning and philosophical
constructions.

Thus far the national consciousness of Thomas Jefferson had been
somewhat hazy. Born in Virginia and intensely devoted to the Old
Dominion, he had never left his native habitat until he was sent as a
delegate to Congress. There only did he realize the divergences of the
different colonies and the imperious necessity for them to organize
their life and to agree to some sort of a permanent compact. No dealings
with foreign nations could be transacted, no efficient measures of
protection against the common foe could be devised, unless the several
States were held together by some sort of a common bond and had achieved
some sort of a unity. While the Articles of Confederation were being
discussed, he puzzled over the essence and meaning of these "natural
rights" so often mentioned in the different committees on which he sat,
and he preserved the result of his meditations in an unpublished
document I had the good fortune to discover in the Library of Congress.
First of all, he was led to establish a distinction between the
fundamental natural rights, which the individual can exercise by
himself, and another class of rights which cannot be safely enjoyed
unless society provides adequate protection. In forming a society and in
accepting a social compact, the first rights were to be reserved and to
remain inalienable; rights of the second class, on the contrary, were
partly given up in exchange for more security. This very simple
distinction enabled the young delegate to do away with the old antinomy
so perplexing to many political philosophers and to solve the difficulty
against which Rousseau had vainly struggled in his _Contrat social_. The
individual remained in full possession of certain rights; society was
granted only part of the others, a part to be determined strictly in
forming a social compact: the citizen no longer had to sacrifice all his
rights on the altar of the country; he remained sovereign in a sovereign
society.

What was true of individuals was true of the States coalescing to form a
union or confederation. Each individual State remained sovereign and
yielded only part of certain rights in order to obtain more security
against foreign aggressors. To the right of expatriation for the
individual corresponded the right of secession for the State. But from
this recognition of the right to denounce the compact, it did not follow
that Jefferson would have encouraged either the individual or the States
to withdraw from the society thus formed in order to resume a precarious
life by themselves. Even if he had been an anarchistic instead of being
a truly "socialistic" political thinker, a few meetings of the
committees on which he sat would have sufficed to demonstrate that, to
the necessity of society for the individuals, corresponded the necessity
of a union for the individual States. The Virginian had developed into a
true American. Jefferson was thinking nationally and not sectionally; he
was ready for the great rôle he was about to assume.

His five-year stay in Europe confirmed him in the opinion that there
existed in America the germ of something infinitely precious, if
somewhat precarious, and he realized that his country had really become
the hope of the world. He was too fond of good music, good architecture,
good dinners, good wines and long conversations not to appreciate fully
the good points of life while in Paris. He praised the French for their
achievements in the arts and sciences, and formed with many of them
long-enduring friendships; but neither France, nor England, and even
less Italy or Spain, were countries toward which men could turn their
eyes when looking for a political "polar star." Traditions were too
deeply rooted, prejudices of too long standing, class distinctions too
sharply defined to leave room for any hope of ever seeing them establish
within a reasonable time a tolerable form of government. On the
contrary, unhampered by such hoary traditionalism and free to shape her
destinies, America, provided she carefully avoided the dangers under
which Europe was laboring, could not only establish the best possible
form of government, but set an example to be followed by the rest of
mankind.

These dangers were patent; they resulted from the existence of
privileged classes or hereditary aristocracies, of State religions,
censorship of the press and books, centralization and concentration in a
few hands of all the financial and economic resources of the country.
Anything that smacked of the European system was to be fought with the
utmost energy, not only for the sake of America, but for the sake of the
world. Such were the real reasons that justify the fight waged by
Jefferson after his return from Europe against the tendencies
represented by Hamilton. Not out of any sympathy for the Jacobins did he
seem to favor the French Revolution; but, since America herself had
become the battlefield of two opposed ideals, he sided with the one
which, in his opinion, presented the smaller danger for the existence of
his country.

Throughout the long-drawn-out battle, he remained convinced that only by
avoiding any entanglement with European politics could America fulfill
her destiny. The great obstacle to such an isolation was foreign
commerce, for Jefferson clearly understood that economic and commercial
bonds or dependence would necessarily entail political bonds and
political dependence. America was to live in her own world, to pay her
debts as soon as possible, to become industrially independent of
Europe, to manufacture at home enough for her own consumption "and no
more." She was also to seize every opportunity to eliminate dangerous
neighbors, not that she really coveted any territory or colony held by
foreign powers, not that she needed new land for a surplus of
population; but she could not keep out of European politics if Europe
remained at her doors and used her colonies as a "fulcrum for her
intrigues." Spain was so weak that nothing had to be feared directly
from her, but her colonies could be seized at any time by more powerful
enemies; France should not be permitted again to set her foot on the
American continent. As to England, she was to be expelled from her
continental dominions whenever America would be strong enough to enforce
the "_American jus gentium_", and the sea was to be neutralized.

Having removed all causes for foreign frictions and aggressions, America
would be free to develop along her own lines. She was to remain for long
years to come an agricultural nation; she would grow towards the west by
attaching to herself new territories as their population increased. The
Federal Government was to retain a minimum of power and attributions. It
was to be carefully and constantly watched for fear of concentrating too
much power in a few hands and in one place. Federal legislation was to
be kept down, for the more laws, the worse the republic--"_plurimae
leges, pessima republica_." There was nothing intangible, however, in
the government which had been hastily put together at the close of the
Revolution. It was desirable and necessary to preserve the main
principles embodied in the Constitution in so far as they expressed the
permanent and inalienable rights of the people and the States, but each
generation had a right to determine anew the details of the legislation
and how they chose to be governed. The different articles adopted in
1787 were not to be considered as sacred as the Tables of the Law, they
were the work of fallible and changing human beings, and the essence of
the American government did not rest on a written document but on the
dispositions of the individual citizens and on enlightened public
opinion.

This being the case, it became necessary to prepare each citizen for the
part he was called upon to play in the life of the country. The great
mass of the American people had a "cool common sense" and a certain
degree of instruction which fitted all of them to do certain things, but
not everything. A farmer could not overnight and by virtue of the
popular choice become qualified to judge of fine legal points, to settle
complicated economic problems, or to conduct difficult diplomatic
negotiations with foreign courts. All this required more than ordinary
common sense and ordinary education: the country needed leaders and
experts to be carefully trained in special institutions--in a national
university or, if this proved impossible, in State universities. As to
the great mass of the common people, they could be trusted to judge of
facts and to sit on a jury; they were also good judges of men and
properly could choose between candidates for the different offices. A
free press would keep them informed of the conduct of the men thus
selected; primary and secondary schools would help in the diffusion of
knowledge, and enlightened self-interest would prevent them at any time
from making grievous mistakes.

Such a system constituted the best form of government ever established
by man; but it did not ensue that it was immediately to be adopted by
all the nations of the earth. It embodied certain permanent principles
susceptible of general application, for they did nothing but express the
unalienable rights of man. All men, however, were not to be intrusted at
once with the full enjoyment of their rights. There were certain
countries which for generations had been priest-ridden and king-ridden
and in which men unaccustomed to use their judgment were swayed by
emotions, hatreds and prejudices. A time might come when the sacred
contagion of liberty would spread to these unfortunate populations, but
it would take many revolutions, much bloodshed and a slow and painful
process of education to enable them to shake off their shackles and to
enjoy the full benefits of self-government. America, on the contrary,
because of her geographical remoteness from Europe, because of the
quality of the people who had settled in the English colonies, had
fought, not to destroy an old order of things, but to preserve and to
extend already existing liberties. Among the nations of the world she
stood as an example and a hope. She was the living evidence that under a
free government a large nation could grow prosperous and powerful,
simply by existing, and without preaching any new gospel she fulfilled
her duty to mankind.

Whatever may be the shortcomings of this political philosophy, it was
distinctly an American doctrine; one cannot imagine it to have
originated in any European country, for what would have been a Utopian
and chimerical dream in the Old World was within the reach of man in
America. Whether it corresponds to present conditions is still another
question; it is nevertheless true that by emphasizing the uniqueness of
America and the political superiority of his native land for more than
fifty years, Thomas Jefferson did more than any other man of his
generation to formulate the creed of Americanism. The man who was
accused of being denationalized stands as the most integrally and truly
American among his contemporaries.

This does not mean, however, that Jefferson did not occasionally depart
from the policies he had thus drawn. No man can remain in public life
for half a century without ever falling into contradictions and
inconsistencies. Only "closet politicians" and mere theorists never
accept any compromise, and Jefferson was a very practical politician
with a keen sense of possibilities and realities. Trained as a
small-town lawyer, then placed on many committees in Congress, forced to
wrest war measures out of a reluctant Assembly, even managing to hold
his own with the resourceful diplomats of Europe, Thomas Jefferson knew
how to handle men and how "to take things by their smooth handle." There
was nothing quixotic about him and he never tried to fight against
windmills, nor did he break his head against blank walls. But he was
singularly apt to bide his time, to wait for a favorable opportunity
and, whenever he saw a chance, he never failed to come back to his
original line of conduct and to his original policies.

He seldom indulged in undue display of emotions and personal feelings,
but he was no mere thinking machine. In his youth he loved and suffered;
later he was perplexed by the riddle of the world; he studied the old
philosophers in order to find the moral props which religion could no
longer give him and, in his older age, came back to the morals of Jesus.
His encyclopedic curiosity and the versatility of his mind won for him
the admiration of his contemporaries, and, in that sense--the
eighteenth-century sense--he was truly "a philosopher." But he was too
practical-minded to waste much time in mere theorizing or in theological
and metaphysical "disquisitions." Firmly convinced that the business of
life was with matter, he considered science as an instrument and a tool
to master the blind forces of nature. He was more interested in
applications than in disinterested research, and in that respect, as in
many others, he was not only an American, but, above all, an
eighteenth-century man. Intensely nationalistic as he was when it came
to politics, he was truly cosmopolitan in the realm of intellectual
achievements, and thus was created the legend of a denationalized
Jefferson; for the popular mind, fond of generalizations, is unable to
recognize such distinctions. Among his friends he counted all the
leading scientists of the time and through them--particularly through
his French friends of the Museum--he exerted an influence of which he
himself was perhaps not fully aware. To his European correspondents he
appeared the embodiment of what was best in the American character. His
influence on the development of liberalism and democratic ideas
throughout the world can hardly be estimated, and separate
investigations will have to be carried out before his exact contribution
to the growth of democracy can be rightly estimated. Through his letters
he encouraged his friends to keep their faith, but better still he
demonstrated that self-government and democracy, as he understood it,
were practical and workable schemes and not the idle dreams of
philosophers shut in their closets.

I hardly dare mention here the names of the many friends and colleagues
who gave me most generously their assistance and encouragement. To
Doctor J. C. Fitzpatrick, untiring, most patient and helpful in his
suggestions, I owe a particular debt. Mr. W. C. Ford afforded me all
possible facilities for consulting the letters of Jefferson in the
Jefferson Coolidge Collection of the Massachusetts Historical Society. I
discussed more than once with Professors Willoughby, Latané and Lovejoy
and with President Goodnow of the Johns Hopkins University the
perplexing problems that confronted me, and submitted several hypotheses
to the History of Ideas Club of the University. Doctor L. P. Shanks gave
me his time and friendly assistance in the revision of the manuscript.
But none of my counselors and friends are to be held responsible for the
ideas here expressed, some of which they would probably refuse to
indorse.

In the course of this investigation I consulted too many books to list
them all. Randall is still very useful and has not been completely
superseded by more modern biographies. I found the books of Beveridge
fascinating though having somewhat of a tendency, and could not
completely agree with Mr. Beard on the economic origins of the
Jeffersonian democracy. I naturally made use of Mr. Becker's study of
the Declaration of Independence. I read the biography of Mr. Hirst with
great interest, though our points of view were very different, and I
almost decided to abandon my undertaking when the more recent work of
Mr. Nock appeared. Incomplete and unsatisfactory as they are in some
respects, the Ford Edition and the Memorial Edition are very useful
tools, the best available at the present time. Much to my regret, I had
to omit many documents still unpublished which are preserved in the
Jefferson papers.

The collections of the Library of Congress and the Massachusetts
Historical Society constitute the richest treasure house of historical
information ever left by a single man. It would take several lives and a
fortune to edit them properly; but since Monticello has now become again
a national shrine and will be safely preserved, it may not be out of
place to express the wish that the day will soon come when a national
association will undertake to publish an integral edition of the
Jefferson papers,--a most fitting monument to the greatest political
philosopher of America and one of her greatest sons.

                                                     GILBERT CHINARD




CONTENTS


INTRODUCTION

BOOK ONE: _The Virginian_

    I A VIRGINIA BOYHOOD                                     3
   II AN AMERICAN DISCIPLE OF GREECE AND OLD ENGLAND        19
  III A VIRGINIA LAWYER                                     34

BOOK TWO: _Jefferson and the American Revolution_

    I THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE                       59
   II THE REVISION OF THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA                  86
  III GOVERNOR OF VIRGINIA--THE "NOTES ON VIRGINIA"        108
   IV A STATESMAN'S APPRENTICESHIP                         137

BOOK THREE: _An American View of Europe_

    I SOCIETY AND TRAVEL                                   159
   II GALLO-AMERICAN COMMERCE AND THE DEBT QUESTION        176
  III UNION AND ISOLATION                                  194
   IV JEFFERSON AND THE FRENCH REVOLUTION                  215

BOOK FOUR: _Monocrats and Republicans_

    I THE QUARREL WITH HAMILTON                            245
   II JACOBIN OR AMERICAN?                                 274
  III MONTICELLO--AGRICULTURE AND POLITICS                 298
   IV "THE DICTATES OF REASON AND PURE AMERICANISM"        321
    V POLITICAL LEADER AND STRATEGIST                      343

BOOK FIVE: _The Presidency_

    I "ALL REPUBLICANS, ALL FEDERALISTS"                   379
   II PROTECTIVE IMPERIALISM AND TERRITORIAL EXPANSION     396
  III "SELF-PRESERVATION IS PARAMOUNT TO ALL LAW"          425
   IV "PEACE AND COMMERCE WITH EVERY NATION"               440

BOOK SIX: _The Sage of Monticello_

    I "AMERICA HAS A HEMISPHERE TO ITSELF"                 467
   II DEMOCRATIC AMERICA                                   489
  III THE PHILOSOPHY OF OLD AGE                            513

  INDEX                                                    533




ILLUSTRATIONS


  BUST OF THOMAS JEFFERSON BY HOUDON                      _Frontispiece_
    _In the possession of the New York Historical Society_

  A PAGE OF JEFFERSON'S REFLECTIONS ON THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION  80
    _From the manuscript in the possession of the Library
    of Congress_

  A PAGE FROM JEFFERSON'S "COMMONPLACE BOOK"                         102
    _From the manuscript in the possession of the Library
    of Congress_

  LAFAYETTE                                                          206
    _After a lithograph from the portrait by Grevedon_

  ALEXANDER HAMILTON                                                 256
    _From the painting by John Trumbull in the possession
    of the Essex Institute, Salem, Mass._

  THOMAS JEFFERSON                                                   290
    _From the portrait by Rembrandt Peale_

  MONTICELLO AS IT APPEARS TO-DAY                                    314

  THOMAS JEFFERSON                                                   468
    _From the portrait by Kosciuszko_




BOOK ONE

_The Virginian_




CHAPTER I

A VIRGINIA BOYHOOD


The peoples of the Old World worship at the birthplaces of their
national heroes and bury their mortal remains in splendid mausoleums,
pantheons or Westminster Abbeys. By a significant and symbolic contrast,
the memories of Washington and Jefferson are enshrined in no ancestral
homes, but in the mansions planned with loving care, in which they so
expressed themselves that their very spirit seems to haunt the deserted
rooms of Mount Vernon and Monticello. They are buried according to their
wishes on their own land, at the very center of the acres they had
themselves surveyed and reclaimed from the wilderness, close to nature
and Mother Earth. However great may be their debt to the past and their
remote ancestors, they stand by themselves at the threshold of America's
national history,--master builders who wrestled with gigantic tasks and
first thought of their country as the future home of unborn millions.

The boy who was born on April 2, 1743, in the recently erected farmhouse
at Shadwell, on the bank of the Rivanna, never gave much thought to his
lineage in his later life. Yet Virginians of good stock were always
proud of their ancestry, and more than once he was told by his mother
that the Randolphs could "trace their pedigree far back in England and
Scotland." Jefferson's mother and John Marshall's grandmother were
descended from William Randolph and Mary Isham, both of the English
gentry, and Jane Randolph, issued from the best blood in the Old
Dominion, had married when she was nineteen a man without means, whose
education had been neglected, but sturdy and industrious and belonging
to one of the proudest and most aristocratic lines of old Virginians.

Of his mother, Jefferson has told us very little either in his letters
or in his "Autobiography." We may surmise she had the refined, modest,
unobtrusive and yet efficient qualities so marked in the Virginia girls
of the Colonial days and so often noticed by travelers. Sons are apt to
mold their feminine ideal on the memory of their mother, and Jefferson
may have been thinking both of her and of his wife when, many years
later, he contrasted French frivolity with Virginian virtues:

  In America, the society of your husband, the fond cares for the
  children, the arrangements of the house, the improvements of the
  grounds, fill every moment with a useful and healthy activity....
  The intervals of leisure are filled by the society of real friends,
  whose affections are not thinned to cobweb, by being spread over a
  thousand objects. This is the picture, in the light it is presented
  to my mind.[1]

The fond cares for her children would have been ample to fill all the
minutes of Jefferson's mother. Large families were the rule in Virginia;
fifteen children were born to Thomas Marshall and Mary Keith, and
Jefferson's family was no exception to the rule. Between 1740 and 1755,
Jane Randolph gave ten children to Peter Jefferson; Thomas was the third
child and the first son.

What information he gave about his father has to be completed from other
sources. The tradition in the family was that "the first paternal
ancestor came from Wales, and from near the mountain of Snowdon, the
highest in Great Britain." Peter Jefferson, landowner, practical
surveyor, of gigantic stature and strength, had the sturdy qualities and
ambition of the pioneer. He received a colonelcy in the militia, became
a member of the House of Burgesses in 1755, and in 1749 had been chosen
with Joshua Fry, professor of mathematics in William and Mary College,
to continue the boundary line between Virginia and North Carolina. "He
was afterwards employed with the same Mr. Fry to make the first map of
Virginia which was ever made." Besides his association with Fry, from
whom he drew the theoretical knowledge of mathematics in which he was
lacking, Peter Jefferson improved himself by much reading, not novels,
but the serious and sound books which constituted the ordinary family
library in colonial Virginia,--historians, essayists, and most of all
Shakespeare. For in Virginia as well as in New England, Shakespeare and
the Bible were the two books found in every household, the two richest
springs of the modern English language. Religion took up as much of
their life as in New England. Prayers were said three and sometimes four
times a day, and from his earliest infancy, Jefferson became familiar
with the liturgy of the Church of England, and had stamped in his memory
the strong old words, vigorous phrases and noble speech of King James'
version.

He was only five years old when his father, already planning to give him
the education of which he himself had been deprived, decided to send the
boy to the best school in the neighborhood. He stayed two years at the
English school; then, when nine, he went to the school of Mr. Douglas, a
Scotch clergyman, who taught him French and the rudiments of Latin and
Greek. Most of his childhood was spent away from home, as a boarding
student, and the silence maintained by Jefferson with reference to his
parents is thus easily explained. It explains also the lack of
spontaneity and the awkwardness which always prevented him from
expressing freely his emotions and sentiments. What may seem in him a
national characteristic was largely a matter of training and early
discipline.

He was fourteen when his father died, with a last recommendation that
his son be given a classical education. Still a mere boy, Thomas
Jefferson had become the oldest living male of the family and to a
certain extent its head. Whether he was at first fully aware of his new
responsibility is very doubtful. He could not remember without a
retrospective fear in his later years how close he had come to wasting
his whole life:

  When I recollect that at fourteen years of age, the whole care and
  direction of myself was thrown on myself entirely, without a relation
  or friend, qualified to advise or guide me, and recollect the various
  sorts of bad company with which I associated from time to time, I am
  astonished I did not turn off with some of them, and become as
  worthless to society as they were.[2]

The next two years were spent as a boarding student with Reverend Mr.
Maury, "a correct classical scholar"--probably not a very inspiring one,
if we interpret rightly the adjective used by Jefferson. We may well
imagine him at sixteen, a tall, slim boy, with auburn hair and clear
eyes, fond of fowling, horse-riding and outdoors, fond of reading also,
but disposing of very few books; for his father's library was not large
and, if the Reverend Mr. Maury followed the tradition of many old
schoolmasters, he seldom opened his library to his students. Still, he
knew his Bible, had read a few English classics, was well grounded in
Greek and Latin, and had perfected his knowledge of French; but it is
doubtful whether he was acquainted with any French writer except the old
standard authors--"Télémaque", Berquin, perhaps "Gil Blas" and Pascal's
"Pensées." But, even at that age, Jefferson necessarily knew something
of the many duties of a landowner; for the slaves he was the young
master, and during the summer he had to become somewhat acquainted with
the management of a large estate. The education he had received was not
exactly a frontier education with the usual connotations of that word.
He had not been brought up in a log cabin, he had never engaged in
back-breaking tasks of felling trees or of splitting rails; he probably
had never put his hand to the plow except as an experiment.

He had heard his father tell of long journeys in the wilderness and of
treacherous Indians, but no Red Men roamed the forests near Shadwell.
The only Indians he knew were peaceful, almost romantic characters who
stopped at the house of Colonel Jefferson on their way to Williamsburg.

  I knew much--he said--of the great Ontasseré, the warrior and orator
  of the Cherokees; he was always the guest of my father on his
  journeys to and from Williamsburg. I was in his camp when he made
  his great farewell oration to his people, the evening before his
  departure for England. The moon was in full splendor, and to her he
  seemed to address himself in his prayers for his own safety on the
  voyage, and that of his people during his absence; his sounding
  voice, distinct articulation, animated action, and the solemn silence
  of his people at their several fires, filled me with awe and
  admiration.[3]

This youthful impression left an indelible mark on his mind and was not
without some influence on the "Notes on Virginia" as well as on the
letters he wrote to Indian chiefs when he was President.

Nor was Shadwell exactly in the "howling wilderness", even if there was
no large city near it. It was located on the road to Williamsburg, and
many travelers stopped at the house on their way to the capital.
Hospitality to friends and strangers was a sacred rite and most
scrupulously observed. Much visiting was done in Virginia, and men
particularly spent considerable time traveling from house to house;
slaves were put up, horses were sent to the stable, while the best was
spread on the table for the master. During the summer months, when roads
were not made impassable by deep mudholes, one visitor had hardly left
when another came. They had to be entertained, sometimes at a
considerable expense, always at a considerable loss of time. Young
Jefferson soon realized, after returning to Shadwell, that he would
never amount to much and would probably become an idler, if he stayed on
the estate like so many of his young friends. The wasting of precious
moments irritated and disturbed him when he wanted to do some reading or
some study, and he felt that the condition of the estate hardly
warranted such a generous hospitality. He therefore decided to leave,
and the letter he wrote on this occasion to his guardian, Mr. John
Hervey of Bellemont, shows him fully aware of his responsibilities and
perfectly definite in his plans.[4]

In the spring of 1760, the young man, then exactly seventeen, went to
Williamsburg and enrolled in the College of William and Mary. Quite
possibly it was his first visit to the capital of Virginia, his first
contact with urban life. It was, for the time, a place of very
respectable size and considerable activity. Old Professor Hugh Jones, a
man much traveled and much read, described it enthusiastically in his
"Present State of Virginia", published in London in 1724:

  Williamsburg is a market town, and is governed by a mayor and
  aldermen. It is a town well stocked with rich stores, all sorts of
  goods, and well furnished with the best provisions and liquors. Here
  dwell several good families, and more reside here in their own houses
  at publick times. They live in the same neat manner, dress after the
  same modes, and behave themselves exactly as the Gentry in London;
  most families of note having a coach, chariot, Berlin, or chaize....
  Thus they dwell comfortably, genteely, pleasantly, and plentifully in
  this delightful, healthful, and (I hope) pleasant city of Virginia.

Great occasions were receptions given by the Governor, meetings of the
Assembly, occasional performances by regular companies from New York,
semi-professional players and later, by the Virginian Company of
Comedians. Horse races attracted every year a large concourse of
people, for every true Virginian is a lover of horseflesh. Betting was
active and large sums of money changed hands, particularly for the
four-mile heat race given each year on the course adjoining the town.

Ladies in all the glory of their imported dresses, gentlemen in
brilliantly colored knee breeches and coats, with elegantly chased
swords at their sides and the best beaver hats made in London under
their arms, attended the receptions, the dances, the theater, and more
than once adjourned to the famous Apollo room in the Raleigh Tavern,
where they indulged in much drinking of "punch, beer, Nantes rum,
brandy, Madeira and French claret." The first time young Jefferson went
to the Raleigh he was probably shown the largest punch bowl in the
house, which had played a part in the purchase of Shadwell, for had not
Colonel Jefferson bought the site from William Randolph of Tuckahoe, for
"Henry Weatherbourne's biggest bowl of arrack punch"?

The college itself was no less an attraction than the town. Built
originally on the plans of Christopher Wren, it had unfortunately been
remodeled after a fire, "a rude, misshapen pile, which but it had a roof
would be taken for a brick-kiln", wrote Jefferson in his "Notes on
Virginia." Such as it was, however, with the Capitol, of much better
style, it was the first large building and monument the young man had
ever seen and he probably admired it at the time as much as most
Virginians did.

It was by no means a university, not even a real college. Like most
institutions of learning in the colonies, it had been established "to
the end that the church of Virginia may be furnished with a seminary for
ministers of the gospel, and that the youth may be piously educated in
good letters and manners, and that the Christian faith may be propagated
amongst the Western Indians, to the glory of the Almighty."

The lack of preparation of the students, the fact that the sons of the
wealthiest were sent to England to finish their education, perhaps also
an aristocratic scorn for specialized and intensive learning among the
gentry of Virginia, all had contributed to keep down the standards of
the institution. Much to his disgust, Jefferson found

  ... that the admission of the learners of Latin and Greek had filled
  the college with children. This rendering it disagreeable and
  degrading to young gentlemen, already prepared for entering on the
  sciences, they were discouraged from resorting to it, and thus the
  schools for mathematics and moral philosophy, which might have been
  of some service, became of very little. The revenues, too, were
  exhausted in accommodating those who came only to acquire the
  rudiments of the sciences.[5]

Thus the problem of caring for the many, the danger of keeping together
in college the prepared and the unprepared students, which is still with
us, existed already in America one hundred and fifty years ago.
Evidently Jefferson considered himself as one of those young gentlemen
who were prepared for entering upon the study of the sciences; he was
certainly more mature for his years than most of his fellow students and
looked down upon them as well, we may surmise, as upon the teachers
themselves. On the other hand, the town offered many temptations and he
probably yielded to some of them. He was often thrown into the society
of horse-racers, card-players, fox-hunters, and at the end of his first
year in college it appeared to him that he had spent more than his share
of the income of the estate. He therefore wrote to his guardian to
charge his expenses to his share of the property: "No," Colonel Walker
is reported to have said,--"if you have sowed your wild oats thus, the
estate may well afford to pay the bill."

We possess no precise information upon the amount spent by Jefferson nor
any account book for that year, but we may surmise that Colonel Walker
would not have been so lenient if the total sum had been spent in
reprehensible dissipations. Williamsburg boasted of a large bookstore,
and in 1775 Dixon and Hunter published a list of more than three hundred
titles in their stock. Book lovers are born and not made. Jefferson had
never been able to satisfy fully his passion for books, and as the
college library offered him only very meager resources, he must have
plunged with delight in the bookshop of Williamsburg and bought
extravagantly, an expense the estate "could well afford to pay." But the
fact remained that what he had learned he had learned by himself, and
that college life had not furnished him the guidance and direction he
was looking for.

It was at this juncture that Doctor Small, professor of mathematics, was
appointed _ad interim_ professor of philosophy and soon developed an
interest in the young Virginian. Jefferson himself paid a grateful
tribute to the man who just in time rescued him from his frivolous
companions and brought back to his mind the serious purpose he had
entertained when he entered William and Mary.

  It was my good fortune and that probably fixed the destinies of my
  life, that Doctor William Small of Scotland was then Professor of
  Mathematics, a man profound in most of the useful branches of
  science, with a happy talent of communication, correct and
  gentlemanly manners, and an enlarged and liberal mind. He, most
  happily for me, became soon attached to me, and made me his daily
  companion when not engaged in the school; and from his conversation I
  got my first views of the expansion of science, and of the system of
  things in which we are placed. Fortunately, the philosophical chair
  became vacant soon after my arrival at college, and he was appointed
  to fill it _per interim_: and he was the first who ever gave, in that
  college, regular lectures in Ethics, Rhetoric and Belles-Lettres.[6]

For Jefferson Doctor Small was the prime awakener and inspirer. Through
him the young man was introduced to George Wythe who soon accepted him
as a student of law, and through him again he was received by Governor
Fauquier.

Such were the first really cultured men with whom Jefferson ever came in
contact: William Small, the mathematician and philosopher, would not
have been a true Scot if he had not had that passionate love for
discussion and logic which seems the innate gift of so many sons of the
Highlands. Francis Fauquier, "the ornament and delight of Virginia",
generous, liberal, elegant in his manners and requirements, was the son
of Doctor Fauquier of Floirac, near Bordeaux, who had worked under
Newton in the mint and become a director of the Bank of England. His
early biographer Burke, the Virginia historian, has chiefly emphasized
his propensity to gaming. But Fauquier was an economist of no mean
distinction and had written an important tract on the basis of taxation.
He was interested in physics or natural philosophy and had become a
Fellow of the Royal Society. He was a student of natural phenomena and
sent to the Society the description of a hail-storm in Virginia.
Finally, there was George Wythe, whose virtue was of the purest tint,
his integrity inflexible, and his justice exact. Last and most important
of all his qualities, perhaps, was the characteristic peculiarity
mentioned by Jefferson in the sketch he wrote after the death of his old
master: "he was firm in his philosophy, and neither troubling, nor
perhaps trusting any one with his religion."

Such were the true masters of Thomas Jefferson, and from their
conversations around the table, after bottles of port had been brought,
he learned more than any student at William and Mary ever acquired in
college. It was a rare privilege for a young man of Jefferson's age to
be admitted to the "_parties carrées_", and he must have already given
singular promise to have been invited at all into the society of these
three luminaries of Virginia. What topics were discussed among them can
easily be imagined. Fauquier would speak of old England, the theaters of
London, the monuments and works of art, of his colleagues of the Royal
Society, or discuss a problem of taxation or a recent meteorological
phenomenon. A man of the world, a friend of Admiral Anson whom he had
met after his circumnavigation of the globe, a director of the South Sea
Company, he would speak of ships, strange lands, and reveal to the young
man the existence of a world extending far beyond his native Virginia.
Thus was born in Jefferson that ardent desire to travel and most of all
to see England which appears in some letters written in the early
sixties.

Philosophical and religious subjects perhaps were introduced, although
that is rather doubtful, in my opinion. The passage on George Wythe,
already quoted, mentions his reticence on religion. Whatever may have
been the propensity of Fauquier to gaming, he was never accused by his
contemporaries of being a religious libertine. It is also very doubtful
whether any of the group would naturally have discussed such subjects,
particularly in the presence of a young student whose education had been
deeply religious. Finally it must be remembered that in Virginia, as
well as in New England, there always existed some "reserved questions",
that it was not good form to criticize established institutions and
current beliefs. It is quite possible that Fauquier may have lent to
Jefferson certain volumes of Shaftesbury and Bolingbroke, but in spite
of the contrary opinion expressed by some biographers of Jefferson, it
seems very unlikely that any of the three older men should have
undertaken to shake the foundations of his faith. The "_parties
carrées_" could not have lasted very long, since William Small went back
to Scotland in 1762. But Jefferson's acquaintance with Fauquier and
Wythe was continued for many years after the departure of the
philosopher and, in both cases, until the death of the older men.

The master of Shadwell had sown his wild oats; he had had his brief
flight of dissipation and had reformed; but he had by no means become a
hermit. He had not entirely given up attending horse races and fox
hunts.

  Many a time--he wrote in 1808--have I asked myself, in the
  enthusiastic moment of the death of a fox, the victory of a favorite
  horse, the issue of a question eloquently argued at the bar, or in
  the great councils of the nation. Well, which of these kinds of
  reputation would I prefer? That of a horse jockey? a fox hunter? an
  orator? or the finest advocate of my country's rights?[7]

What young man has not thus dreamed of serving his country and devoting
himself to some noble cause, what student preparing for the bar has not
pictured himself winning a difficult case, forcing the judge's attention
and swaying a reluctant jury? The ambition to become an orator may have
been awakened in his mind by the acquaintance he had made of the
"uncultured Demosthenes" of the Old Dominion. In the winter of
1759-1760, he had met at the house of Mr. Dandrige, in Hanover, a tall,
ascetic-looking fellow, rather disdainful of finery and careless in his
wearing apparel, but "with such strains of native eloquence as Homer
wrote in"--"I never heard anything that deserved to be called by the
same name with what flowed from him," wrote Jefferson later, "and where
he got that torrent of language is unconceivable. I have frequently shut
my eyes while he spoke, and, when he was done, asked myself what he had
said, without being able to recollect a word of it. He was no logician.
He was truly a great man, however--one of enlarged views."

His name was Patrick Henry. Far less uncultured than Jefferson's
portrait would lead us to believe, related to very good families,
although poor and a complete failure as a merchant, Patrick Henry had
suddenly decided to enter the legal profession, and after borrowing a
"Coke upon Littleton" and a "Digest of the Virginia Acts", he had
appeared after six weeks' preparation before the board of examiners. He
won his diploma through logic, clear presentation and common sense
rather than through his knowledge of the law, and commenced practicing
in the fall of the same year. Whenever a case appeared before the
General Court sitting at Williamsburg and consisting of the Governor and
his council, "he used to put up" with Jefferson, borrowing books which
he seldom read, always ready with stories of the backwoods. Fame came to
him soon after, when his fiery eloquence in the "parson's case" drew
down upon him clerical hostility and public admiration. "Instead of
feeding the hungry and clothing the naked," he cried out in the
courtroom, "these religious harpies would, were their powers equal to
their will, snatch from the hearth of their honest parishioner his last
hoe-cake, from the widow and her orphan children their last milch cow,
the last bed, nay, the last blanket, from the lying-in woman."[8] Not
even in the days of the Convention did the halls of Paris echo with more
vehement vituperations and more indignant denunciations. A magnetic
power, an emotional appeal to elementary passion, to a sense of justice
in the mass rather than to the letter of the law fitted him for
political life. He was soon to have his opportunity; in the meantime he
awoke in Jefferson a revolt against clerical usurpations that was to
bear its fruit in time. Usually passed over by Jefferson's biographers,
the plea made by Patrick Henry in the "parson's case" seems to have been
the incident that called the young man's attention to the position
occupied by the established Church in its relations to the civil power.
It started in him the train of thought that culminated in the "Bill for
religious freedom."

It has been sometimes said that Jefferson used to spend fourteen hours a
day in study when he was at Williamsburg; his correspondence with John
Page shows him in a very different light. He was not in any sense a
bookworm, even though he read enormously, but he played as strenuously
as he studied. A good horseman, a good violin player, a good dancer, he
was a much-sought-after young man. He had a keen eye for the ladies, and
very early in 1762 he had fallen in love with Miss Rebecca Burwell, the
_Bell-in-day, Belinda, campana in die, Adnileb_ of his letters to Page.
The young lady had given him her profile cut in black paper which he
carried in his watch case. Far from her, life lost all interest: "all
things appear to me to trudge in one and the same round: we rise in the
morning that we may eat breakfast, dinner and supper, and to go to bed
again, that we may get up the next morning and do the same, so that you
never saw two peas more alike than our yesterday and to-day." He had in
mind to go back to Williamsburg, to propose, receive his sentence and be
no longer in suspense: "but reason says, if you go, and your attempts
prove unsuccessful, you will be ten times more wretched than ever."[9]
Spring, then summer came, and he could not muster up enough courage to
declare himself. Madly in love as he was, he was not intending to marry
at once. He had formed great plans for traveling. He was dreaming of
hoisting his sail and visiting England, Holland, France, Spain, Italy
(where I would buy me a good fiddle), and Egypt, and return home through
the British provinces to the northward. This would take him two or three
years. Was it fair to ask Belinda to wait so long for him? And yet he
could not leave without speaking and remain in suspense and cruel
uncertainty during the whole trip. "If I am to meet with a
disappointment, the sooner I know it, the more of life I shall have to
wear if off ... If Belinda will not accept of my service, it will never
be offered to another. That she may I pray most sincerely: but that she
will, she never gave me reason to hope."[10]

When college opened again at the beginning of October, he had made up
his mind to make his position clear. A dance was to be given in the
Apollo room of the Raleigh Tavern. He dressed up in all his finery, he
rehearsed in his head such thoughts as occurred to him and made a
complete fiasco. "A few broken sentences, uttered in great disorder, and
interrupted with pauses of uncommon length were the too visible marks of
my strange confusion" (October 7, 1763). Belinda did not say a word to
relieve him in his embarrassment, did not manifest in any way that she
understood his purpose, and several months were to elapse before
Jefferson had another opportunity to express himself. This time he had
learnt his piece perfectly, and from what we know of him already it is
probable that he made a very clear presentation of his case, too clear
and too logical even, for he concluded by saying that the decision
rested with her and that a new interview would not serve any purpose. A
strange lover indeed, apparently as madly in love as a young man could
be, and yet too respectful of the free will of his beloved to attempt to
sweep her off her feet by too frequent interviews and too passionate
pleas! Belinda listened attentively but did not give any indication that
Jefferson's speech had convinced her and won her heart. A few weeks
later the bashful suitor heard indirectly of her answer when she
announced her marriage to Mr. B ... Whether it was "for money, beauty,
or principle will be so nice a dispute, that no one will venture to
pronounce", wrote Jefferson at the time. To crown the joke, his happy
rival, who evidently had been kept in blissful ignorance of Jefferson's
sentiments, asked him to act as a best man at the wedding. A more
ironical trick of fate could scarcely be imagined; but, all considered,
Belinda was not altogether to blame.

Thomas Jefferson did not think of committing suicide, he did not swear
revenge, nor did he curse the ungrateful one in any of his letters. We
have some reason to believe, however, that his affair with Belinda
marked a decisive turn in his life. It killed whatever romantic strains
may have existed in his heart; it matured him, and it was probably at
that time that the long-belated metaphysical crisis took place, the
disappointed lover evolving a certain philosophy of life which he was to
retain to the end of his days.




CHAPTER  II

AN AMERICAN DISCIPLE OF GREECE AND OLD ENGLAND


Until very recently the material for a study of the formative years of
Thomas Jefferson was very scanty. Many of his earliest letters have
disappeared and he always felt a strong disinclination to analyze
himself in writing. It was also contrary to his training and to the
customs of his milieu to discuss personal matters too frankly and too
openly. An American Jean-Jacques Rousseau baring his heart to posterity
would have been as out of place as a man from the moon in New England or
Virginia. But what he did not express as his personal feelings, he
copied from the philosophers and poets he read during his studious
nights or when resting under a tree on one of the hills surrounding
Shadwell. The two commonplace books I have recently published, written
by Jefferson during his student days and consulted by him throughout his
life, could rightly be called "Jefferson self-revealed."[11] They enable
us at any rate to determine with a fair degree of certainty the
sentimental and intellectual preoccupations that filled his mind when
examining the problems of society and the universe.

It does not seem that, until 1764, that is to say until the unfortunate
ending of his love affair with Belinda, Jefferson had ever been touched
by any religious doubt. When, in July, 1763, he foresaw the possibility
of being rejected, he wrote to Page a long letter in which he appears
still strongly marked by the Christian training he had received in his
family and at the hand of Mr. Douglas and the Reverend Mr. Maury:

  Perfect happiness, I believe, was never intended by the Deity to be
  the lot of one of his creatures in this world; but that he has very
  much put in our power the nearness of our approaches to it, is what I
  have steadfastly believed.

  The most fortunate of us, in our journey through life, frequently
  meet with calamities and misfortunes which may greatly afflict us;
  and, to fortify our minds against the attacks of these calamities and
  misfortunes, should be one of the principal studies and endeavors of
  our lives. The only method of doing this is to assume a perfect
  resignation to the Divine will, to consider that whatever does
  happen, must happen; and that, by our uneasiness, we cannot prevent
  the blow before it does fall, but we may add to its force after it
  has fallen. These considerations, and such others as these, may
  enable us in some measure to surmount the difficulties thrown in our
  way; to bear up with a tolerable degree of patience under this burden
  of life; and to proceed with a pious and unshaken resignation, till
  we arrive at our journey's end, when we may deliver up our trust into
  the hands of him who gave it, and receive such reward as to him shall
  seem proportioned to our merit. Such, dear Page, will be the language
  of the man who considers his situation in life, and such should be
  the language of every man who would wish to render that situation as
  easy as the nature of it will admit. Few things will disturb him at
  all: nothing will disturb him much.[12]

This note of Christian stoicism is exactly what might be expected from a
young Protestant whose mind was not particularly perturbed by
metaphysical problems. At that time Jefferson did not even conceive that
there might exist a code of ethics resting on a different basis. If
Doctor Small had helped him to find his exact relation to "the system of
things in which we are placed", he was satisfied that complete
resignation to Divine Will was the only wisdom. It may be safely
assumed that three years after meeting Governor Fauquier, Thomas
Jefferson had retained intact the faith of his youth.

What brought a change in his attitude and disturbed his equilibrium is
certainly not the influence of the "infidel French philosophers." The
volume of extracts which I published under the title of "The Literary
Bible of Thomas Jefferson" does not contain a single quotation from
Voltaire, Diderot, or Rousseau, and French literature is represented
only by a few insignificant lines from Racine. It is more likely that
the first doubts were injected into his mind by the reading of
Bolingbroke. He did not even need the assistance of Fauquier to lead him
to the English philosopher. The catalogues of the old libraries of
Virginia frequently mention Shaftesbury's "Characteristics" and
Bolingbroke's "Works."[13]

Whether it was from the town bookstore or from Fauquier's own library,
the fact remains that sometime, when still a student, but certainly
after 1764, Jefferson obtained a copy of Bolingbroke and came to
question the authenticity of the Bible as a historical document. It may
have been due to the sentimental shock he had suffered, or simply to the
critical attitude developed in him by his study of legal texts and
decisions, but there is little doubt that he put into practice at that
time the advice he gave later to Peter Carr, when he told him to
"question with boldness the existence of a God; because, if there be
one, he must more approve of the homage of reason, than that of
blindfold fear. You will naturally examine first, the religion of your
own country. Read the Bible, then, as you would read Livy or
Tacitus."[14] He therefore went systematically through Bolingbroke,
learned from him methods of historical criticism and scientific doubt,
weighed the evidence with a legal mind and came to very definite
conclusions. At this decisive turn in his life, Jefferson might easily
have become a sceptic and a cynic, like so many men of the eighteenth
century. As a matter of fact, a careful study of his "Literary Bible"
indicates that at least for a time he was extremely cynical in his
attitude towards women. This may have been due to the cruelty of
Belinda, but it was more than a passing mood, for as late as 1770, two
years before his marriage, he scribbled on the margin of his account
book a Latin doggerel clearly indicating his distrust of the female
kind:

  _Crede ratem ventis, animum ne crede puellis
  Namque est foeminea tutior unda fide.
  Foemina nulla bona est, sed si bona contigit ulla
  Nescio quo fato mala facta bona est._

From Euripides particularly he collected with a sort of waggish pleasure
the strongest denunciations of women in the old poet and repeated with
him "Mortals should beget children from some other sources, and there
should be no woman-kind: thus there would be no ill for man"--and again,
"O Zeus, why hast thou established women, a curse deceiving men, in the
light of the sun?"

In Milton he found an echo of Euripides' misogynism and from "Paradise
Lost" and "Samson Agonistes", he compiled a pretty set of accusations
against female usurpations. His conclusion at that time was probably
that of the old English poet, and he affirmed his superiority over the
treacherous sex by repeating after him:

  Therefore God's universal law
  Gave to man despotic power
  Over his female in due awe.[15]

His outlook on life must have been very gloomy, if we are to trust
certain quotations from Greek and Latin authors. To matters of
mythology, descriptions of battles, and grandiose comparisons in Homer,
Jefferson apparently paid no attention. He saw in the old poet a
repository of ancient wisdom and the ancient philosophy of life. From
him he collected verses in which he found expressed views on human
destiny,--a courageous, stoic, yet disenchanted philosophy, summed up in
two lines from Pope's translation:

  To labour is the lot of man below
  And when Jove gave us life, he gave us woe.

When he read from Cicero's "Tusculanae" he selected passages with a view
to confirm the deistic and materialistic principles towards which he was
leaning at the time: "All must die; if only there should be an end to
misery in death. What is there agreeable in life, when we must reflect
that, at some time or other we must die." This particular piece of
reasoning seems to have struck Jefferson quite forcibly, for he repeated
it again and again fifty years later in his letters to John Adams: "For
if either the heart, or the blood, or the brains, is the soul, then
certainly the soul, being corporeal, must perish with the rest of the
body; if it is air, it will perhaps be dissolved; if it is fire, it will
be extinguished."[16]

It was then that he copied and evidently accepted the statement of
Bolingbroke that "it is not true that Christ revealed an entire body of
ethics, proved to be the law of nature."

The "law of nature"--what was meant by the word? Was it the Epicurean
maxim of Horace,--"enjoy to-day and put as little trust as possible in
the morrow?" If such had been the conclusion reached by Jefferson he
could have followed the line of least resistance and enjoyed the good
things of life, the good wines of the Raleigh Tavern, the pretty girls
and all the social dissipations of many of his contemporaries. Such
would have been Jefferson's destiny, had he been born in the Old World.
Had he been made of weaker stuff he would have become one of the
fox-hunters, horse-racers and card-players of the Virginian gentry. But
he was saved by his aristocratic pride and the stern teaching of the old
Stoics.

He was conscious that he was of good stock, and he had read in Euripides
that "to be of the noble born gives a peculiar distinction clearly
marked among men, and the noble name increases in lustre in those who
are worthy."[17]

To be ever upright and to be worthy of one's good blood, this was the
simplest, most obvious and most imperious duty. It would have been very
difficult for Jefferson to believe any longer that "at the end of the
journey we shall deliver up our trust into the hands of him who gave it
and receive such reward as to him shall seem proportionate to our
merit", which was his belief in 1763. There was not even much to obtain
in our life as a reward, for most societies are so organized that
"whenever a man is noble and zealous, he wins no higher prize than baser
men."[18] Still the fact remained that, after the collapse of all the
religious superstructure, the foundations of morality were left
unshaken, so Jefferson undertook to rebuild his own philosophy of life
according to Bolingbroke's advice, with the material at hand. For it was
evident that "a system thus collected from the writings of ancient
heathen moralists, of Tully and Seneca, of Epictetus, and others, would
be more full, more entire, more coherent, and more clearly deduced from
unquestionable principles of knowledge."[19]

But he would take nobody's word for it, he would accept the teachings of
no professor of moral philosophy; every man had to think for himself and
to formulate once for all his own philosophy. When writing to his
nephew, who he thought might go through the same crisis, Jefferson
declared some forty years later that:

  Man was destined for society. His morality, therefore, was to be
  formed to this object. He was endowed with a sense of right and
  wrong, merely relative to this. This sense is as much part of his
  nature, as the sense of hearing, seeing, feeling; it is the true
  foundation of morality and not the TO KALON, truth, etc. as fanciful
  writers have imagined. The moral sense, or conscience is as much a
  part of man, as his leg or arm.

But this is the Jefferson of 1808, the mature man, almost the aged sage
of Monticello. How far he was from having reached that poise and that
clear vision of the moral world, appears in the confusion and
contradictions of the abstracts collected in the "Literary Bible." Yet
when he read Homer, Euripides, Cicero, Shakespeare, and even Buchanan,
Jefferson had a clear and single purpose. He was reading more for profit
than for pleasure, to gather material with which to build anew, by
himself and for himself, a moral shelter in which he could find refuge
for the rest of his days. He was not thinking then of devoting his life
to his country; if he had any patriotism, it was dormant, and if he had
any sense of abstract justice it is nowhere manifest. And yet, quite in
contrast with the general run of quotations in the "Literary Bible" are
some maxims scribbled in one of his unpublished Memorandum books under
the year 1770. He had already levelled the top of the hill on which he
was to build Monticello and was digging the cellar. But one day, after
noting carefully that "4 good fellows, a lad and two girls, of about 16
each, have dug in my cellar a place in 8 hrs. 1/2, 3 feet deep, 8 feet
wide and 16½ feet long," he stopped to recapitulate the most striking
maxims by which he intended to regulate his life:

  ... no liberty no life--endure and abstain--_bonum est quod honestum,
  macte virtute esto, nil desperandum, faber suae quisque fortunae,
  fari quae sentiat_, what is, is right--_ex recto decus_--_ne cede
  malis sed contra audientior ito_--long life, long health, long
  pleasure and a friend--_non votum nobis sed patriae_--_fiat justitia
  ruat coelum_.

Clearly between the time he compiled his "Literary Bible" and this entry
in the Memorandum book, a considerable change had taken place in
Jefferson's mental world. What was dormant had been awakened, what was
non-existent had been created. Let those who are looking for influences
hunt for pale reflections of these maxims in the writings of the French
philosophers. I cannot perceive any. I would even say that there is no
distinct influence of Bolingbroke, for Jefferson borrowed from
Bolingbroke methods of approaching certain problems rather than definite
ideas. The young Virginian made use, for a short time only, of the
critical reasoning employed by the English philosopher, but when it came
to building anew, he gathered all the material, stone by stone and maxim
by maxim, from the old Greek Stoics. It was a pessimistic yet courageous
philosophy of life, far different from eighteenth-century optimism. By a
strange anomaly, the son of the pioneer, the young man supposedly
brought up under frontier influence, felt more kinship with Greece and
republican Rome than with the philosophers of London, Paris or Geneva.
During this early period of his life and when he had rejected the
Christian system of ethics, the young Virginian found the moral props he
needed in Homer's simple code of honor and friendship; in echoes from
the Greek Stoics discovered in Cicero; and through them also was
revealed to him a conception of patriotism and devotion to public duty
which was to mold the rest of his life.

In the transformation that took place in Jefferson's attitude towards
life, it would be unjust to leave out the influence exerted by Patrick
Henry. The young student was present when Henry delivered his famous
speech in the House of Burgesses in 1765 and ended the speech with the
defiant declaration, "If this be treason make the most of it." "He
appeared to me," wrote Jefferson, "to speak as Homer wrote; his talents
were great indeed, such as I never heard from any man." From Henry he
did not receive any particular political philosophy, but from him he
learned the value of those striking formulas which remain in the memory
of men, become mottoes and battle cries of political campaigns. He liked
the vehemence and completeness of Henry's affirmation and when, in 1770,
he wrote in his memorandum that maxim of all revolutionists and radicals
of every age--_fiat justitia ruat coelum_, let there be justice, even
if the heavens should crumble down--he was thinking as much of the
Virginia orator as of the Romans of old.

A last item in the same memorandum book of 1770 may justify the
supposition that still another influence had entered Jefferson's life.
By that time he had forgotten the fickle Belinda who had played with his
heart, but he was no longer a woman-hater. When he quoted from Pope "the
sleepy eye that speaks to the melting soul", he was already thinking of
the young and attractive widow he was to marry two years later.

In the meantime he had been pursuing assiduously his law studies and his
readings of political philosophers. Very early after entering college,
he had decided that he would not be satisfied with the study of
belles-lettres, or the life of a gentleman managing a large country
estate. The clergy and the law were the only two professions open to a
young man of distinctly aristocratic tendencies. He chose the law and
began his training under the direction of Mr. Wythe. This training was
markedly different from the instruction he would have received in
Europe. There was no regularly organized law school at Williamsburg;
candidates for the Bar had to prepare themselves under the direction of
an old practitioner; they attended the sessions of the court and
prepared briefs for their master; they studied by themselves and
consequently were much more familiar with the practice than with the
theory of jurisprudence. No examination was given by a regular faculty;
but a license to practice law and to hang out his shingle was obtained
by the candidate after appearing before a special board of examiners. In
the case of Patrick Henry, the examiners had been John Randolph,
afterward Attorney-general for the Colony, Peyton Randolph, Mr. Wythe
and perhaps Robert C. Nicholas. If Henry "got by" after six months'
study, thanks to his phenomenal fluency and "aplomb", it took Jefferson
six years before he considered himself sufficiently prepared to appear
before the examiners. A large part of his time however was spent at
Shadwell in agricultural pursuits and independent study; but he came
regularly to Williamsburg to consult Mr. Wythe, to attend the sessions
of the Court, to buy books, and also to attend during the winter the
many functions given by the brilliant society of the capital of
Virginia. These years, the most important of all in the formation of
Jefferson's political theories, can now be studied in the "Commonplace
Book", long thought destroyed, which even Randall had not been able to
find, but which is now safely deposited in the Library of Congress. It
is a most revealing compilation and throws an unexpected light on the
origin of Jefferson's political doctrines.

It contains first of all no less than five hundred fifty-six articles
analyzing special cases from the Reports of Cases in the King's Bench,
George Andrews, Robert Raymond, William Salkeld and Coke's "Institutes",
for in a colony where no attempt had been made to codify the body of
existing laws, and where the common law was the supreme law of the land,
the first prerequisite to becoming a good lawyer was to assimilate an
enormous number of cases and precedents. Jefferson proceeded, like all
the law students of his time, to dig in "Coke upon Littleton" and
others, putting down in his "Commonplace Book" decisions, discussions,
definitions, matters of importance to a country lawyer, such as wills,
devises, commercial contracts, cases on larceny, trespassing, debts,
damages, bankruptcy, leases, libels; and he did it with his customary
thoroughness and clarity. A detailed study of the "Commonplace Book"
would be most illuminating for those who, in spite of all evidence to
the contrary, still maintain that Jefferson was an impractical
philosopher, interested only in abstract principles and in theory. On
the other hand, he was not simply a country lawyer, either. If he had
not seemed to manifest any interest in the abstract study of the
principles of law, in what he used to call "metaphysical disquisitions",
he was keenly interested in the historical development of the legal
structure on which rested modern society and particularly the colonial
society of Virginia.

He carefully went through Lord Kames' "Historical Law Tracts" and
studied from him the history of criminal law, promises and covenant,
property, securities upon land, courts, briefs. It is in Kames that he
found a definition of society which he could have written himself and
which expresses his political individualism and subordination to law:

  Mutual defence against a more powerful neighbor being in early times
  the chief, or sole motive for joining society, individuals never
  thought of surrendering any of their natural rights which could be
  retained consistently with their great aim of mutual defence.

This is elaborated upon in the passage quoted from the "History of
Property":

  Man, by his nature, is fitted for society, and society by its
  conveniences is fitted for man. The perfection of human society
  consists in that just degree of union among the individuals, which to
  each reserves freedom and independency, as far as is consistent with
  peace and good order. The bonds of society where every man shall be
  bound to dedicate the whole of his industry to the common interest
  would be of the strictest kind, but it would be unnatural and
  uncomfortable, because destructive of liberty and independence;
  so would be the enjoyment of the goods of fortune in common.

I am perfectly aware of the undeniable influence of Locke upon the
theory of Kames; and it would be very unlikely that Jefferson had not
read at that date Locke's "Treatise on Civil Government." The fact
remains, however, that neither Locke, nor so far as I know any political
thinker of the period, had yet so clearly defined that particular
combination of individualism and respect for peace and order so
characteristic of American democracy. We shall see in one of the
following chapters how Jefferson, elaborating on this statement of
Kames, derived from it all his conception of natural rights. The
Scottish Lord was for him a master and a guide.

In Sir John Dalrymple, author of an "Essay Towards a General History of
Feudal Property", in Francis Stoughton Sullivan's "An Historical
Treatise of the Feudal Laws and the Constitution of the Laws of
England", Jefferson studied the history of primogeniture and of entails
and came to the conclusion that both of them had foundation neither in
nature nor in law, and certainly did not appear in England before the
Norman Conquest. He reached to the same finding in his long dissertation
on the original common law, and thus we can trace directly through the
"Commonplace Book" the sources of the Bill on Primogeniture, of the Bill
for Religious Freedom, and of the Law to Abolish Entails, which
Jefferson considered as forming a system "which would eradicate every
fibre of ancient or future aristocracy and lay a foundation for a
government truly republican."

Some of the entries in the "Commonplace Book" were evidently made after
the period with which we are dealing in this chapter, although most of
them can be dated before 1776. We have no means of determining whether
Jefferson had undertaken a systematic study of federative governments
when he was still a student, or at what time he copied the many extracts
and quotations from Montesquieu. Nor can we enter here into a detailed
discussion of all the articles. One or two facts, however, stand out
even after a superficial glimpse of this repertory of ideas on
government and society. The first is that Jefferson at that date, and
indeed during most of his life, was not interested in abstract
principles or in theoretical discussions. His was eminently the mind of
a lawyer, and it is not for a lawyer to arrive at a definition of
justice but to determine what the law says on a particular point. Yet in
a country where law is not codified and the common law is the basis of
the legal structure, it is impossible to find out what the law is
without undertaking a historical study of the cases at hand in the
different repertories. Men are either fallible or dishonest, false
interpretations creep in, texts are distorted from their original
meaning, and thus it becomes necessary to apply to legal decisions the
rules of historical evidence formulated by Bolingbroke.

After undertaking such a study, Jefferson arrived at a very curious
conclusion; that at a time which was not buried in a mythological past,
the Anglo-Saxons had lived under customs and unwritten laws based upon
the natural rights of man and permitting the individual to develop
freely, normally and happily. In the course of time, these free
institutions deteriorated through the nefarious influences of several
agencies. Unwritten law became written law and jurists succeeded in
concealing under their sophistry and verbiage the primitive intent of
natural legislation. Priests, striving to extend their domination over a
realm which primitively was foreign to them, introduced religious
prescriptions into civil laws and thus diminished the rights of the
individual. Conquerors and a long lineage of hereditary kings further
modified primitive institutions in order to provide an apparently legal
foundation for their usurpations, until the people, no longer able to
withstand patiently the evils of tyranny, arose and recovered at least
some of their rights.

Such a conspectus of the history of England was neither new nor
original; it was one of the favorite contentions of English jurists
during the eighteenth century, and nowhere perhaps is it more forcibly
developed than in the last chapter of Blackstone's "Commentaries", "Of
the rise, progress and gradual improvements of the laws of England." It
is fundamentally also the doctrine of Jefferson, who went much farther
than any of the English political thinkers in his revindication of the
Saxon liberties.

One may see already how such a conception differs from the theories of
Rousseau and the French philosophers, and indeed from those of the
English philosophers. And this is easily explained, even if too seldom
realized. Born in the eighteenth century, Jefferson is in some respects
a man of the eighteenth century, but no greater mistake could be made
than to apply to him the same standards that apply to European political
thinkers. The very fact that he was born and grew up in a remote colony
prevented him from joining any particular school of political
philosophy. He had comparatively few books at his disposal, certainly
fewer gazettes, and only faint echoes of the philosophical battles
raging in Europe reached the capital of Virginia. During the long winter
evenings at Shadwell, he had ample time to think, to sift from the books
he was reading, not matter of passing interest, but matter of practical
value and principles susceptible of being applied to the society which
he knew and in which he lived. He could not have the cosmopolitan and
universal outlook of thinkers who had traveled and met with
representatives of many nationalities. His "Literary Bible", as well as
his "Commonplace Book", contains many examples which might be used to
illustrate his provincialism or, if one prefers, his regionalism.

No man can become genuinely interested in things he has never seen and
cannot imagine. He had never seen the English countryside and so, when
he copied from Thomson's description of spring, he selected only
passages that could apply as well to the landscape of Virginia as to the
scenery of old England. Even when he read Horace he eliminated verses
with too much local color, unknown plants, unfamiliar dishes and
beverages, until the descriptions of a Roman farm by the old poet would
fit a typical Virginia plantation with the slaves singing in the great
courtyard after the day's work is done. He knew Latin and Greek, French
and Italian, and perhaps even German; for the time and place his library
was rich and varied. He had read Milton, Shakespeare, Dryden, Buchanan,
Thomson, Thomas Moss; he had studied Kames, Pelloutier, Stanyan, Eden,
Baccaria, Montesquieu and possibly Voltaire's "Essai sur les Moeurs",
but from each of these he had culled facts and definitions rather than
principles and theories. He had read some books of travel and listened
with enjoyment to Fauquier's accounts of his long voyages. He was
dreaming of visiting England, the continent and the Mediterranean, but
the only form of society he knew was the colonial society of Virginia.
No cosmopolitan tendencies would develop in such surroundings. Superior
as he was in intelligence and culture to his fellow students and to the
young gentry of Williamsburg, Jefferson, at the age of twenty-five, was
not yet an American; he was distinctly a Virginian.




CHAPTER III

A VIRGINIA LAWYER


In 1767, Thomas Jefferson, then twenty-four years of age, was "led into
the practice of the law at the bar of the General Court" by his friend
and mentor, Mr. Wythe. He was the owner of a substantial estate
inherited from his father, and he managed the family property of
Shadwell, but he had already formed plans for an establishment of his
own and begun preparations to build Monticello on the other side of the
Rivanna. The only future open to him seemed to be that of any young
Virginian of his social class. He occasionally joined them in
fox-hunting and attended the races, enjoyed a dance, a concert, and a
good play at the theater. The following year was particularly brilliant
at Williamsburg. The governor held stately receptions and the Virginian
Company of Comedians presented a rich program: "The Constant Couple or a
Trip to Jubilee", a farce called "The Miller of Mansfield", "The
Beggar's Opera", "The Anatomist or Sham Doctor", besides the ordinary
plays of the repertory, were given during the spring and summer of that
year.[20]

Jefferson had his share of all these social pleasures, together with
others, but there were also simpler and more austere occupations. First
of all he had to look after his plantation. Agriculture, so long a
haphazard and empirical affair, was making great strides in Europe,
particularly in England. Treatises on the subject and special magazines
were read eagerly in Virginia; the choice of cultures, the improvement
of seeds, the introduction of new crops greatly concerned the minds of
progressive planters like Colonel Washington and the young master of
Shadwell.

The "Garden Books" kept by Jefferson and now published only in part,
reveal him as a forerunner of modern efficiency engineers. Fences,
walls, roads and bridges had to be built on the 1900-acre estate left
him by his father; trees had to be planted and vegetables raised for the
large family at Shadwell, for the slaves and for the many travelers and
visitors who continued to drop in. If all the seeds planted in
Jefferson's vegetable garden and orchards did well, he must have had an
extraordinary variety of produce, considerably larger than is to be
found on the best appointed farms of to-day. For he was not satisfied
with the staple vegetables which appear on the American table with
clocklike regularity; he sowed "salsifia, peppergrass, sorrel, salmon
radishes, nasturtium, asparagus, all sorts of lettuce, cresses, celery,
strawberries, snap-beans, purple beans, white beans, sugar beans,
cucumbers, watermelons, cherries, olive stones, raspberries, turnips",
and--horrors!--garlic. He was led into many such experiments by his
neighbor and friend Philip Mazzei, formerly of Tuscany and now of
Albemarle County, for many of the entries in the Garden Book are in
Italian and "_aglio de Terracina_ (_vulgo_ garlic), _radiocchio di
Pistoia_ (succory or wild endive), _cavolo broccolo Francese di Pisa,
fragole Maggese_ (May strawberries)" and dozens of other imported
varieties appear in his garden lists. Then there were the horses, for,
true to the Virginia tradition, Jefferson kept no less than half a dozen
blood mares of good pedigree. Above all, the regular crops of wheat,
corn and especially tobacco had to be looked after; for tobacco was the
only crop that could be marketed for solid cash or sent to London to be
exchanged for books, furniture, fine clothes, musical instruments, and
the choice wines of Europe. As a practical farmer Jefferson was rather
successful, since during these early years his land brought him an
average return of two thousand dollars. This was ample for his needs.
But his main resources were procured from the practice of law.

He kept a complete memorandum of all the cases in which he appeared
before the courts of Virginia and opposite each case entered the fee
received for his professional services.[21] These fees would seem very
moderate to the least ambitious practitioner of our days. In many cases
no fee is mentioned at all, and we are at liberty to suppose that
Jefferson took some charity cases, or that the defendants were not
always scrupulous in paying their bills. Yet, altogether, the total
averaged close to three thousand dollars a year, a nice fat addition to
the income from Shadwell and Monticello. Starting with one hundred and
fifteen cases in 1768, Jefferson was retained as attorney or counsel in
no less than four hundred thirty cases in 1771, and it is no
exaggeration to state that no day passed during the twelve years he
remained engaged in the practice of law without his giving considerable
time to his profession. The moderate amount of these fees and the large
number of cases indicate the kind of practice in which Jefferson was
employed. Trespassing of cattle on a neighbor's field, destruction of
fences, robbery committed by a clerk, wills, administration of estates,
interest, quarrels between two goodwives, with a lively exchange of
actionable words, assault and battery, all the seamy, sordid, petty side
of life, constituted for these twelve years the daily practice of Thomas
Jefferson, an apprenticeship of life and a training in the knowledge of
human nature enjoyed by very few abstract philosophers.

In the old days of the bar, one of the earmarks of most lawyers was a
fluency of speech, unsurpassed except perhaps by the ministers. But
words never came easily to Jefferson, or in great abundance. His voice,
pleasant and modulated in ordinary conversation, "sank in his throat",
if raised higher, and became husky. He was clearly a business lawyer,
an office lawyer, whose clear, precise, meticulous presentation of facts
fitted him particularly for appearing before a court of appeals like the
General Court, rather than for moving and emotionally convincing a jury
of twelve men good and true.

His scorn for oratory, long sentences, images, apostrophes may have been
a case of sour grapes, for in his youth he admired tremendously Patrick
Henry. As we have seen, he was wise enough not to aim higher than he
could reach. Not only did he never crave the fame of the popular orator,
but, conscious of his limitations, he always showed a real repugnance to
addressing a large assembly. Particularly brilliant in conversation, he
was destined to be a committee man, to win his ends by the pen rather
than by the silver tongue of the politician. Yet if he had been fond of
rhetoric, rhetoric would have found its way into his writings, but no
man of the period wrote less figuratively, employed fewer artifices of
style; metaphors, comparisons were unknown to him. Ideas remained ideas
and were never clad in the flowing garments of mythology; facts remained
facts and never became allegories. Liberty never appeared before his
eyes and was never represented by him as a goddess, and neither America
nor Britannia were majestic figures of heroic size that passed in his
dreams. He was neither emotional nor imaginative, yet his eyes were keen
and quick to note and establish distinctions between different varieties
of plants or animals. His mind was alert and always on the lookout for
new facts to add to his store of knowledge, after proper cataloguing.
Surely he was not the man to make startling discoveries in the realm of
natural history, or to propose a new system of the universe, nor was he
one to conceive, in a moment of inspiration, a new political gospel and
a new system of society; when he took up the practice of law in
Williamsburg, the greatest future that destiny had in store for him,
promising as he was, seemed to become as upright and sound a lawyer as
Mr. Wythe, and a legal authority as good and learned as Mr. Pendleton.

He was admitted to the Bar in 1767, and two years later was chosen as a
member of the House of Burgesses and placed on the committee appointed
to draw up an answer to the Governor's speech. His draft was rejected,
however, and Colonel Nicholas' address substituted.[22] A few days later
Governor Botetourt, unable to endorse the spirited remonstrance to the
King on the subject of taxation, dissolved the Assembly.

  The next day--wrote Jefferson--we met in the Apollo of the Raleigh
  Tavern, formed ourselves into a voluntary convention, drew up
  articles of association against the use of any merchandise imported
  from Great Britain, signed and recommended them to the people,
  repaired to our several counties, and were re-elected without any
  other exception than of the very few who had declined to follow our
  proceedings.[23]

A spirit of discontent was abroad and had spread throughout the
colonies, but it was neither disloyalty nor rebellion. Easily satisfied
with this gesture, which for many remained a mere gesture, the
Virginians paid little attention to public affairs during the next two
years. In the words of Jefferson "nothing of particular excitement
occurring for a considerable time, our countrymen seemed to fall into a
state of insensibility and inaction." His private life was more
eventful. The first of February, 1770, the house at Shadwell in which he
lived with his mother, his brother and his unmarried sisters, was burnt
to the ground, and with it every paper he had and almost every book.

On reasonable estimate--he wrote to Page--I calculate the _cost_ of the
books burned to have been £200 sterling. Would to God it had been the
money, then it had never cost me a sigh. To make the loss more sensible,
it fell principally on my books of Common law, of which I have but one
left, at that time lent out. Of papers too of every kind I am utterly
destitute. All of these whether public or private, of business or of
amusement, have perished in the flames.

The disaster had not been quite so complete as Jefferson indicates. His
"Commonplace Book" was saved, his account books, garden books and many
memoranda and family papers escaped the flames and were discovered again
in 1851 at the bottom of an old trunk.[24] Even as far as books were
concerned, the loss was not altogether irretrievable. Jefferson wrote at
once to Skipwith for a catalogue of books, sent orders to London, and
two years later he could proudly enter in a diary not yet published that
his library consisted on August 1, 1773, of twelve hundred and fifty
books, not including volumes of music or "his books in Williamsburg." A
very substantial store of printed matter for the time.

Another event of quite a different order took place in his life.
Jefferson had lost a home, but he was building another, soon to be ready
for occupancy, on the hill of Monticello, and he already knew that the
house would not be left long without a mistress. On the third day of
December, 1771, he filled out a formal application for a marriage
license in the court of Charles City County and on the first of January
he was married to Martha Skelton, widow of Bathurst Skelton, and
daughter of John Wayles, then twenty-three years old. John Wayles of
"The Forest" was a lawyer with a large practice, a man of worth if not
of eminence, a boon companion welcomed in every society, who had amassed
quite a large fortune. His daughter Martha, a true type of Virginia
girl, of medium height and well-formed figure, had been well educated
and possessed all the social accomplishments of the time. She danced
gracefully, played the harpsichord and the spinet, was well read and,
above all, was a very efficient housekeeper, for she knew how to manage
the slaves and care for them in their illnesses, knew how to keep
accounts and to arrange for a reception. If the family tradition is
true, she was receptive to music, for Jefferson had won out over two
rivals because of his talent on the violin and his ability to sing
duets. It was a _mariage de raison_, to be sure, and two years later
Jefferson noted with undisguised satisfaction that, following the death
of his father-in-law, the portion that came to Martha was equal to his
own patrimony and consequently "doubled the ease of our circumstances."
But it was also a marriage of love, not without romantic color, with a
wedding trip from Charles City to Monticello through a snowstorm, and a
late arrival at night in the cold new house. Jefferson did not take any
of his friends into his confidence and did not celebrate his connubial
bliss; but at the very end of the pages given to Milton in his "Literary
Bible", as an afterthought and a recantation from his misogynism, are
found the following lines copied, we may surmise, during his honeymoon:

  Nor gentle purpose, nor endearing smiles
  Wanted, nor youthful dalliance, as beseems
  Fair couple, linkt in happy league
  Alone as they....[25]

Belinda had been forgotten, and the young woman-hater had found his fair
conqueror.

But death again took its toll and cast its cloud over Monticello. With
Page, Dabney Carr, Jefferson's fellow student at William and Mary, had
been his closest friend. Carr, a frequent visitor at Shadwell, had
married in 1764 Jefferson's sister Martha. Not a wealthy man, he was
described by his brother-in-law as living in a very small house, with a
table, half a dozen chairs, and one or two servants, but the happiest
man in the universe.[26] He died when hardly thirty and Jefferson had
him buried beneath the shade of their favorite tree at Monticello under
which they had so often read, dreamed and discussed; and such was the
origin of the little cemetery in which Jefferson was to bury so many of
his dear ones before he joined them himself in his last sleep. For Carr
he went to his "Literary Bible", as he himself felt unable to write a
fitting tribute, and copied from Mallet's "Excursion" an inscription to
nail on the tree, by the grave of the friend "who of all men living
loved him most."

Honored by the Royal Government and made by Botetourt "Lieutenant of the
County of Albemarle, and Chief Commander of all His Majesty's Militia,
Horse and Foot in the said county of Albemarle"; honored also by his
Alma Mater and appointed by the President of William and Mary "Surveyor
of Albemarle County",[27] a member of the Assembly, one of the richest
landowners of his county, one of the most successful lawyers of
Virginia, happily married, busy with his estate, his books, his violin,
his law practice, Jefferson could look forward to a long, quiet and
moderate life, the ideal life of a farmer, a gentleman and a scholar.
For a man who took his duties seriously it was by no means an existence
of idleness, in nowise to be compared with the life of an English
gentleman farmer. Every planter was to some extent a captain, and every
plantation was to a large extent self-sufficient and self-supporting. In
the case of Jefferson, who had recently increased his domain,
difficulties and new problems requiring inventiveness, resourcefulness
and ingenuity arose every day. Slaves had to be taught new trades and
trained, the wilderness had to be reclaimed. Thus were developed
qualities of leadership and qualities of class pride. A young planter
related to the best families of the colony felt that he belonged to a
ruling class, above which could only exist the remote power of the
British Parliament and the majesty of the king represented by a governor
who never really belonged, and who in spite of his exalted position,
always remained a stranger.

An English tourist, Burnaby, traveling in Virginia in 1760, had already
noted signs of impatience and restlessness among the colonists of
Virginia. "They are haughty," he wrote, "and jealous of their liberties;
impatient of restraint and can scarcely bear the thought of being
controlled by superior power. Many of them consider the Colonies as
independent states, not connected with Great Britain otherwise than by
having the same common King."[28]

When the delegates from Virginia were sent to the first Continental
Congress, Silas Deane noted that "the Virginia, and indeed all the
Southern delegates appear like men of importance...they are sociable,
sensible, and spirited men. Not a milksop among them."[29]

They were aristocrats wont to give orders and resentful of any
interference; they were lords and almost supreme rulers on their
plantations; they were owners of many slaves and they had been
accustomed to call no man master; and Jefferson was one of them.

The change in the situation had come very abruptly. It is not the
purpose of this book to present an elaborate discussion of the causes of
the American Revolution, whether they were economic or political or
philosophical, or whether they were of mixed motives, varying with each
colony and in each colony with every man, did not impel the colonies to
revolt against the mother country. I am aware of the present tendency to
attribute most of the agitation preceding the revolution to purely
economic causes; it must be remembered however, that, if the ulterior
motives of the promoters of the American Revolution were selfish and
interested, Jefferson was one of those who were moved by entirely
different considerations, as were, as a matter of fact, most of the
members of the First Continental Congress.

While life was still moving easily and happily in Virginia, where in
1772 the theatrical season had been particularly brilliant, things were
coming to a head in New England. News of the Bill closing the Port of
Boston on the first of June, 1774, reached the Virginia Assembly during
the spring session; how it was received had better be told in the words
of Jefferson. As so often happens in history at the decisive turn of
events, the leadership was taken by a very small group of men who made
up their minds at once, assumed responsibility and changed the course of
the ship of state. So far no strong protest had been made by Virginia to
the British Government. Dunmore was far from being tyrannical; the order
imposing duties on many English products had been largely rescinded,
except on tea, but it may not be sacrilegious to state that the Virginia
gentry were more partial to French wines, Madeira and Nantes rum than to
the English national beverage. If Virginia had not declared at that
particular time her solidarity, if Jefferson and his friends had not
taken the right steps and found the right words to "arouse the people
from the lethargy into which they had fallen", even New England
steadfastness and stanchness of heart would have been unequal to the
task. It was on this occasion, rather than on the Fourth of July, 1776,
that the fate of the British colonies of America was decided.

According to Jefferson's own statement, leadership in these subjects was
no longer left to the old members of the Assembly, but Patrick Henry, R.
H. Lee, F. L. Lee, three or four other members and he himself met in the
library after agreeing that they must take "an unequivocal stand in the
line with Massachusetts." They decided that the best means of calling
the seriousness of the situation to the attention of the public was to
appoint a day of general fasting and prayer, quite an unprecedented
measure in Virginia; but they rummaged in old books "for revolutionary
precedents and forms of the Puritans", and they finally "cooked up a
resolution, somewhat modernizing their phrases, for appointing the 1st
day of June on which the port-bill was to commence, for a day of
fasting, humiliation, and prayer, to implore Heaven to avert from us the
evils of civil war, to inspire us with firmness in support of our
rights, and to turn the hearts of the King and Parliament to moderation
and justice."[30] Clearly the day of fasting and prayer did not appear
to any of the members of the unofficial committee as springing from a
profound religious sentiment, but they knew how strong over the people
was the power of the Church, and how impossible it was to unite them
except by giving a religious appearance to a purely political
manifestation. These young Virginia lawyers knew their people and were
not totally unacquainted with mass psychology; they knew how to play the
game of practical politics, despite their high and disinterested ideal.

The next day Governor Dunmore pronounced the usual English remedy in
such circumstances: the dissolution of the Assembly. Once more the
members met in the Apollo room, and "they agreed to an association, and
instructed the committee of correspondence to propose to the
corresponding committees of the other colonies to appoint deputies to
meet in Congress at such place _annually_ as would be convenient, to
direct, from time to time, the measures required by the general
interest."

This passage in the "Autobiography" has led historians into a spirited
controversy as to whether the proposal to form a Congress originated in
Virginia or in Massachusetts, and whether such a plan had not been
discussed in Boston as early as 1770. Whatever the case may be, the most
important part of the resolution passed in the Raleigh Tavern was not
the establishment of a coördinating organism; it was the declaration
recorded by Jefferson, "that an attack on any one colony should be
considered as an attack on the whole." This last part was not a simple
administrative provision, it was more than a promise of a union; it was
the constitution of a new society, since according to Kames as quoted by
Jefferson in his "Commonplace Book" "mutual defence against a more
powerful neighbor is in early times the chief, or sole motive for
joining society."

The deputies went back home and, on the first of June, met the
assemblies of the people "to perform ceremonies of the day and to
address to them discourses suited to the occasion. The people met
generally, with anxiety and alarm in their countenance, and the effect
of the day, through the whole colony was like a shock of electricity,
arousing every man and placing him erect and solid on his centre."[31]

As a result of the train of thought started by the meeting, the
freeholders of Albemarle County adopted on June 26 a series of
resolutions evidently written by Jefferson. Here for the first time
Jefferson declared that:

  The inhabitants of the several States of British America are subject
  to the laws which they adopted at their first settlement, and to such
  others as have been since made by their respective Legislatures, duly
  constituted and appointed with their own consent. That no other
  Legislature whatever can rightly exercise authority over them; and
  that these privileges they as the common rights of mankind, confirmed
  by the political constitutions they have respectively assumed, and
  also by several charters of compact from the Crown.

The originality of this theory cannot be determined without comparison
with the resolutions adopted a few days before by the Assembly of
Fairfax County presided over by Colonel George Washington. These came
from the pen of George Mason and they stated with equal emphasis the
contractual theory of the government of the British colonies. Whether
Jefferson knew them or not, the similarity with the views expressed by
the freeholders of Albemarle is most striking.

The first article averred the principle also found in Jefferson's
"Commonplace Book" that "this colony and Dominion of Virginia cannot be
considered as a conquered country, and as it was, that the present
inhabitants are not of the conquered, but of the conquerors." It added
that:

  Our ancestors, when they left their native land, and settled in
  America, brought over with them, even if the same is not confirmed by
  Charters, the civil constitution and form of Government of the
  country they came from and were by the laws of nature and nations
  entitled to all its privileges, immunities and advantages, which have
  descended to us, their posterity, and ought of right to be as fully
  enjoyed as if we had still continued with the realm of England.

The second article enunciated the most essential and "fundamental
principle of government", that the people "could be governed by no laws
to which they had not given their consent by Representatives freely
chosen by themselves."

The third article declared that the colonies had some duty to fulfill
towards the mother country and admitted that the British Parliament
might, "directed with wisdom and moderation", take measures to regulate
"American commerce", although such action was in some degree repugnant
to the principles of the Constitution.[32]

Whether or not Jefferson had received the Fairfax resolutions before
writing the Albemarle declaration, this is the capital difference
between the two documents and the two doctrines. On the one hand, George
Mason accepted the theory that the first settlers had brought over with
them the civil constitution and form of government of the mother
country, and consequently admitted a permanent connection between the
colony and the metropolis. Jefferson, on the contrary, asserted with
great strength and clarity the complete independence of the colonists
from the British constitution. They were subject to no laws except those
they had freely adopted when they had consented to a new compact and
formed a new society. He was perfectly justified when he declared in his
"Autobiography":

  Our other patriots, Randolph, the Lees, Nicholas, Pendleton, stopped
  at the half-way house of John Dickinson, who admitted that England
  had a right to regulate our commerce, and to lay duties on it for the
  purpose of regulation, but not of raising revenue. But for this
  ground there was no foundation in compact, in any acknowledged
  principles of colonisation, nor in reason; expatriation being a
  natural right, and acted on as such by all nations, in all ages.

This was really the core of the question. Jefferson had reached that
conclusion, not from following a certain line of abstract reasoning, but
after studying the history of the Greek colonies in Stanyan, and the
history of the Saxon settlement of Great Britain in many authors, as may
be seen in his "Commonplace Book", and he was soon to reaffirm the
doctrine of expatriation as the fundamental principle on which rested
all the claims of the American colonies.

The Virginia Convention was to meet at Williamsburg on August 1, to
select delegates to a General Congress of the colonies. With all his
books at hand, all his legal authorities, the precious "Commonplace
Book" and all the repertories he had gathered in his library, Jefferson
proceeded to draft a project of instructions for the future delegates.
He was taken ill on his way to Williamsburg but forwarded the plan to
Peyton Randolph and Patrick Henry. Henry never mentioned it; Randolph
informed the convention that he had received such a paper from a
member, prevented by sickness from offering it, and laid it on the table
for perusal. It was read generally by the members, approved by many,
though thought too bold for use at that time; but they printed it in
pamphlet form, under the title of "A Summary View of the Rights of
British America."

In some respects it is a more original and more important document than
the Declaration of Independence itself. With the detailed account of the
grievances enumerated by Jefferson we cannot deal here. A few points,
however, deserve special attention. The difficulties that had arisen
between the colonies and the home government had occasioned the
publication of many pamphlets dealing with the situation. Most of
Jefferson's predecessors, however, had attempted to define _in jure_ the
rights of the British colonies. Thus George Mason had made his
"Extracts" from the Virginia charters, "with some remarks on them" in
1773, and he had come to the conclusion already given in the "Fairfax
resolves", that "the ancestors of the colonists when they had left their
native land and settled in America had brought with them, although not
confirmed by Charters, the civil government and form of government of
the country they came from."[33] But he had gone back no farther in
history and had not formulated the principles of the "constitution" of
England. Not so with Jefferson, who emphatically denied that the
colonists had anything to do with the British constitution or with its
form of government. He had studied the history of the settlement of
England in Molesworth, in Pelloutier, in Sir William Temple, in
Dalrymple, and had come to the conclusion enunciated in the "Rights of
British America":

  That our ancestors, before their emigration to America, were the free
  inhabitants of the British Dominions in Europe, and possessed a right
  which nature has given to all men of leaving the country in which
  chance, not choice, had placed them, and of seeking out new
  habitations, and there establishing new societies, under such laws
  and regulations as, to them, shall seem most likely to promote public
  happiness.

  That their Saxon ancestors had, under this universal law, in like
  manner, left their native wilds and woods in the North of Europe,
  possessed themselves of the Island of Britain, then less charged with
  inhabitants, and established there a system of laws which has been so
  long the glory and protection of that country.

On another and not less important point, Jefferson was indebted to his
"Commonplace Book." He had taken great care to determine through
historical and judicial authorities the origin of land tenures in the
kingdom of England and he had found that in the good old Saxon times,
"upon settling in the countries which they subdued, the victorious army
divided the conquered lands. That portion which fell to every soldier he
seized as a recompense due to his valour, as a settlement acquired by
his own sword. He took possession of it as a freeman in full property.
He enjoyed it during his own life and could dispose of it at pleasure,
or transmit it as an inheritance to his children." It was not until
after the fifth century that the king, because as general he was thought
fittest to distribute the conquered lands to each according to his
merits, assumed to himself and was quietly allowed the entire power of
the partition of lands. This abominable system however was not
introduced into England before the Norman Conquest, and thus was spread
the false notion that all lands belonged to the crown.[34] Against this
last claim, which he believed to rest on a false conception of history,
Jefferson raises an emphatic protest. Backed by his knowledge of the
gradual encroachment of the feudal system on the natural rights of his
Anglo-Saxon ancestors, he claimed for the American colonists the same
rights as belonged in the good old Anglo-Saxon days to those who had
acquired a settlement by their own sword.

  It is time for us to lay this matter before his Majesty, and to
  declare, that he has no right to grant lands of himself. From the
  nature and purpose of civil institutions, all the lands within the
  limits, which any particular party has circumscribed around itself,
  are assumed by that society, and subject to their allotment; this may
  be done by themselves assembled collectively, or by their
  legislature, to whom they may have delegated sovereign authority;
  and, if they are alloted in neither of these ways, each individual of
  the society, may appropriate to himself such lands as he finds
  vacant, and occupancy will give him title.

According to this theory, one of the mainstays of the doctrine of
Americanism, of which Jefferson made himself the advocate, is the right
of conquest. But here Jefferson would have introduced a distinction
borrowed from Lord Kames, for "the northern nations who overran Europe
fought not for glory or dominion but for habitation" and invaded only
countries which were sparsely populated.[35] Whether such a position was
tenable historically is quite another matter. The important point
maintained by Jefferson is that when the first settlers left Great
Britain for the shores of America, they were not colonists but free
agents. By the mere fact of expatriating themselves they had severed all
ties with the mother country, they had recovered full possession of all
their natural rights and were at liberty to agree on a new social
compact; they derived their rights of property not from the king but
from their occupancy of a new and unsettled territory. All considered,
this curious doctrine was nothing but a sort of sublimation and legal
justification of the pioneer spirit.

This historical and legal demonstration, in which Jefferson had gone
back to the very beginnings of Anglo-Saxon society, transcended all
contemporary discussions on the Rights of the British Parliament.
Jefferson was perfectly aware of its originality and not a little proud
of it. It was in his opinion

  the only orthodox or tenable doctrine--that our emigration from
  England to this country gave her no more rights over us, than the
  emigration of the Danes and Saxons gave to the present authorities of
  the mother country, over England. In this doctrine, however, I have
  never been able to get any one to agree with me but Mr. Wythe. He
  concurred in it from the first dawn of the question, What was the
  political relation between us and England?

Once the question was clearly put, Jefferson went at it with the methods
used by a lawyer to prove the title to a piece of property. The first
point to be settled was to determine who was the legitimate owner of the
territory occupied by the American "colonists", the king or the
colonists themselves; thus presented, the question became very simple:

  For it is thought that no circumstance has occurred to distinguish
  materially, the British from the Saxon emigration. America was
  conquered, and her settlements made and firmly established, at the
  expense of individuals, and not of the British public. Their own
  blood was spilt in acquiring lands for their settlement, their own
  fortunes expanded in making this settlement effectual. For themselves
  they fought, for themselves they conquered, and for themselves alone
  they have a right to hold.

This was the keystone of Jefferson's social system at that time. It is
not unimportant to note that it was a doctrine that could apply only to
Anglo-Saxon colonies, more particularly to American colonies, and not a
doctrine susceptible of universal application. Whether or not the
principle might also be advanced by other peoples or nations, Jefferson
did not state and did not care. His was not a mind to generalize and to
extend universally any given principle. For the present, at least, he
was satisfied to claim for the American settlers not the rights of man,
but the rights of their Saxon ancestors. His position was legal and
historical, not philosophical.

It was also to some extent an aristocratic position. Since the land was
theirs by right of conquest, it almost necessarily ensued that only
landowners, or to use the old colonial word, freeholders, were entitled
to the rights, privileges, and happiness of self-government. The
consequence was not expressed but it was implied. The analogy with the
doctrine of the Physiocrats strikes one at first; but this analogy is
only superficial. True enough, only freeholders are really worth
considering and can raise a legitimate protest; but in a country as new
and as extensive as America, it is within the power of every inhabitant
to become a freeholder. For it is another iniquity to suppose that the
Crown has the right to give grants of land:

  It is time for us to lay this matter before his Majesty, and to
  declare, that he has no right to grant lands of himself. From the
  nature and purpose of civil institutions, all the lands within the
  limits, which any particular party has circumscribed around itself,
  are assumed by that society, and subject to their allotment; this may
  be done by themselves assembled collectively, or by their
  legislature, to whom they may have delegated sovereign authority;
  and, if they are alloted in neither of these ways, each individual of
  the society may appropriate to himself such lands as he finds vacant,
  and occupancy gives him title.

Thus spoke the pioneer, a pioneer who had studied law and history and
could express in clear and forcible terms what the pioneers had felt
only confusedly. Unless I am much mistaken, it is the first enunciation
of one of the cardinal principles of Americanism; but, as far as
Jefferson is concerned, it did not rest upon any political philosophy,
either Hooker's or Locke's. The American settlers resumed and
resurrected on a new soil the tradition interrupted by Parliamentary and
kingly usurpations. By a sort of curious primitivism they renounced
their immediate and degraded British forbears to claim as their true
ancestors the Saxon conquerors of the British Isles. Can any one imagine
anything farther from the theory of Rousseau in the "Discourse on the
Origin of Inequality", or in the "Social Contract", anything farther
from the universal humanitarianism of the French philosophers? In a last
analysis, American society as it existed, and as it expressed its will
to exist through its young spokesman, rested essentially not on an _a
priori_ principle but on the right of conquest, or more exactly, of
discovery.

The best student of William and Mary, the young artist who wanted to
make Monticello a thing of beauty, the lover of the literature of Greece
and Rome, proclaimed loudly that "our ancestors who migrated hither were
laborers, not lawyers." His was not a political philosophy dealing with
"fictitious principles", it was the harsh, hard-headed, practical and
fierce determination of the pioneer who stakes out a piece of land in
the wilderness, ready to hold it against all claim jumpers.

The Virginia convention dominated by "Randolph, the Lees, Nicholas,
Pendleton" was not ready to go so far as the young master of Monticello.
The instructions to the delegates finally adopted and printed in an
appendix to Jefferson's own "Autobiography" were exceedingly tame, but
his declaration was printed, widely circulated among the people, and
even reached England. It was just what was needed to set afire the
public mind, for no people will rise, fight and die for an economic
doctrine or in defense of its commercial interests. They have to be
provided with mottoes which appeal to their imagination, they have to be
raised above the ordinary trend of things; they must have a banner, a
flag and a battle cry, and such was the object of Jefferson's
peroration, which no Pendleton and no Lee could have written:

  That these are our grievances, which we have just laid before his
  Majesty, with that freedom of language and sentiment which becomes a
  free people claiming their rights as derived from the laws of nature,
  and not as the gift of their Chief Magistrate. Let those flatter, who
  fear: it is not an American art. To give praise where it is not due
  might be well from the venal, but it would ill beseem those who are
  asserting the rights of human nature. They know and will, therefore,
  say, that Kings are the servants, not the proprietors of the people.

Congress assembled at Philadelphia on September 4, 1774, under the
presidency of Peyton Randolph of Virginia and adjourned in October, not
without a recommendation "to discountenance every species of
extravagance and dissipation, especially all horse racing, all kinds of
gaming, cock-fighting, exhibitions of shows, plays and other diversions
and entertainments."[36] The colonies were girding their loins for the
fight, society life came to a standstill; the brilliant days of the
little capital of Virginia were over.

When the counties organized committees of safety, Jefferson was at the
top of the list of appointees in his county. He was again sent to the
second convention of Virginia as representative from Albemarle. The
convention met in Richmond, March 20, 1775, and it was then that Patrick
Henry poured out in a fierce outburst the famous speech ending with the
war cry of "Give me liberty or give me death." The resolution to arm
passed with a decided majority and a plan of defense was adopted.
Collisions threatened between the militia and the regulars on several
occasions. But when Lord North's "Conciliatory Proposition" was
received, Lord Dunmore convened the House of Burgesses on the first of
July to take it into consideration. Peyton Randolph was then recalled
from Congress and Jefferson appointed to succeed him. He did not leave,
however, before an answer to the proposition had been drafted. The
Virginians did not close the door to a compromise, but insisted that the
final answer did not depend on them, for they considered that they were
"bound in honor as well as interest, to share their general fate with
their sister Colonies, and should hold themselves base deserters of that
Union to which they had acceeded, were they to agree to any measure
distinct and apart from them."

A few days later Lord Dunmore left the city and took refuge on board a
man-of-war lying at York, declaring he had taken this step for his
safety. Jefferson departed from Williamsburg for Philadelphia on the
eleventh of June, 1775, and reached the capital of Pennsylvania on the
twentieth. The national rôle of the young Virginia lawyer and landowner
was about to begin.




BOOK TWO

_Jefferson and the American Revolution_




CHAPTER I

THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE


When Thomas Jefferson arrived in Philadelphia and took lodgings with
"Ben Randolph" on Chestnut Street, he was only thirty-three years old,
"the youngest member of Congress but one." But he was already known as
the author of the "Summary View of the Rights of British America", he
was bringing with him Virginia's answer to Lord North's "Conciliatory
Proposition," and he had been appointed to succeed as delegate the
former President of Congress. Most of all he had behind him, not only
the first colony in population, but also, to a large extent, all the
Southern colonies, which were bound to follow the course of Virginia.

Unassuming and straightforward, he was at once welcomed with open arms
by the New England leaders, and years later John Adams still remembered
the first impression he made upon him:

  Mr. Jefferson came into Congress in June 1775, and brought with
  him a reputation for literature, science and a happy talent of
  composition.... Though a silent member in Congress, he was so prompt,
  frank, explicit and decisive upon committees and in conversation--not
  even Samuel Adams was more so--that he soon seized upon my heart.

Five days later, he was placed on the committee appointed to draw up a
"Declaration of the Causes of Taking Up Arms." Through deference for the
authority of Dickinson, leader of the conservative party, he withdrew a
draft he had prepared and in the final text he claimed as his only the
last four paragraphs. But these last paragraphs contained some of the
sharply coined sentences that impress themselves on the mind, the final
expression of so many ideas ever since repeated in political speeches
whenever an attempt is made to define America's ideal policies. To a
certain extent Jefferson, as well as most of his contemporaries, may
have been influenced by Thomas Paine, whose "Common Sense", a pamphlet
addressed to the inhabitants of America, had taken the city by fire. For
the first time the colonists had been told that "the cause of America is
in a great measure the cause of all _Mankind_. Many circumstances, have
and will arise, which are not local, but universal, and through which
the Principles of all lovers of mankind are affected and in the event of
which this affection is interested." It also contained a rather vague
plan for a confederation, a "Continental charter", but Paine's pamphlet
was essentially an eloquent appeal to elemental feelings; it exalted the
cause of the colonists calling on them as the last defenders of
oppressed liberty; it had all the fire and passion of an evangelical
message:

  O ye that love mankind! Ye that dare oppose not only the tyranny, but
  the tyrant, stand forth. Every spot of the old world is over-run with
  oppression. Freedom hath been hunted around the globe. Asia and
  Africa have long expelled her.--Europe regards her like a stranger;
  and England hath given her warning to depart. O receive the fugitive,
  and prepare in time an asylum for mankind!

But greatly as he admired Paine's eloquence, Jefferson did not try to
emulate it; impassioned as it was, his appeal to the inhabitants of the
British colonies sounded more like the summing-up of a lawyer before the
jury than an emotional sermon.

  Our cause is just. Our union is perfect--our internal resources are
  great.... We fight not for glory or for conquest. We exhibit to
  mankind the remarkable spectacle of a people attacked by provoked
  enemies, without any imputation or even suspicion of offense. They
  boast of their privileges and civilization, and yet proffer no milder
  condition than servitude or death.

Thus was the uniqueness of America's position emphasized and called to
the attention of her own people. Nor was it forgotten that the country
was particularly favored by God, for it declared that:

  We gratefully acknowledge, as signal instance of the Divine towards
  us, that His providence would not permit us to be called into this
  severe controversy, until we were grown up to our present strength,
  had been previously exercised in warlike apparatus, and possessed of
  the means of defending ourselves.

Finally, Jefferson reiterated once more his favorite contention, the
theory which has become one of the fundamental axioms of the doctrine of
Americanism: that America did not owe anything to the older civilization
of Europe, and was a self-made country:

  In our native land, in defence of the freedom that is our birthright,
  and which we ever enjoyed until the late violation of it; for the
  protection of our property, acquired solely by the honest industry of
  our forefathers and ourselves, against violence actually offered, we
  have taken up arms. We shall lay them down when hostilities shall
  cease on the part of the aggressors, and all danger of their being
  renewed shall be removed, and not before.

Then came a perfunctory appeal to conciliation, and a final religious
note strictly nonsectarian; for of his religious faith the young
delegate had retained the form and the tone which scarcely concealed his
deism:

  With an humble confidence in the mercies of the supreme and impartial
  Judge and Ruler of the Universe, we most devoutly implore his divine
  goodness to conduct us happily through this great conflict, to
  dispose our adversaries to reconciliation on reasonable terms, and
  thereby to relieve the empire from the calamity of civil war.

No wonder this "Declaration" was read amid thundering huzzas in every
market place and amid fervent prayers in nearly every pulpit in the
colonies. With an extraordinary "felicity of expression", with a unique
sense of fitness, Jefferson had struck every chord susceptible of
response in every American heart. He had drawn for the people an ideal
picture of the nation and themselves, he had portrayed them as they
yearned to be looked upon by posterity and the nations of the world: he
had formulated the creed of Americanism.

Far more judicial in tone was the neat state paper prepared by Jefferson
to answer Lord North's "Conciliatory Proposition." The committee
appointed consisted of Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Jefferson, John Adams
and Richard H. Lee. The youngest member of the committee was chosen to
draw up the document, the answer of the Virginia Assembly he had brought
with him having been approved. Not for nothing had Jefferson attended
the courts of justice of Albemarle County and Williamsburg for more than
ten years and listened to decisions from the bench. The answer strives
to be a cold, dispassionate enumeration of facts, with its short
paragraphs beginning: "we are of opinion"--recalling the "Whereases" of
legal documents. But there is an undertone of indignation, cropping up
in every sentence, which belies the studied reserve. The conclusion, one
might call it a peroration, is a genuine specimen of revolutionary
eloquence:

  When it considers the great armaments with which they have invaded
  us, and the circumstances of cruelty with which these have commenced
  and prosecuted hostilities; when these things, we say, are laid
  together and attentively considered, can the world be deceived into
  an opinion that we are unreasonable? Or can it hesitate to believe
  with us, that nothing but our own exertions may defeat the
  ministerial sentence of death or abject submission?

Truly Jefferson might have become a great orator had he chosen to
correct his handicap in speech and train his voice. Historians who
attribute much importance to racial traits and inherited characteristics
may believe that this was due to the Welshman that reappeared in him at
times; but the Welsh temperament was suppressed and checked by the
puritanical restraint of Mr. Small, Mr. Maury, the judicial reserve of
Mr. Wythe, the example of Mr. Peyton Randolph; and, carried away as he
was by Patrick Henry's oratory, Jefferson saw in him impulsive and
emotional qualities to be admired but to be shunned. More than any of
his contemporaries, however, he was unconsciously influenced by
reminiscences of speeches he had read and memorized in Livy, Cicero and
perhaps Demosthenes. These sentences have a classical ring; his true
models were the Greek and Latin orators, and if a critical edition of
Jefferson's early papers were ever attempted, a careful investigation
could not fail to bring to light the classical sources of his
inspiration.

The report was adopted on July 31, and Congress adjourned the next day.
Jefferson returned at once to Monticello, to stay in Virginia until the
opening of Congress. In spite of the fiery tone of the answer to Lord
North's proposition, it seems that neither he nor any of his friends
seriously entertained nor even considered the possibility of the
colonies separating entirely from the mother country. War had already
begun, but it was a civil war. There still remained some hope that an
"everlasting avulsion from Great Britain would be avoided." Yet it could
be avoided only on one condition: that the British Government should
accept, without reservation or restriction, the minimum terms of
Congress. Jefferson then wrote to his friend, John Randolph, who had
decided to remove to England:

  I would rather be in dependence on Great Britain, properly limited,
  than on any nation upon earth, or than on no nation. But I am one of
  those, too, who, rather than submit to the rights of legislation for
  us, assumed by the British Parliament, and which late experience has
  shown they will so cruelly exercise, would lend my hand to sink the
  whole island in the ocean.[37]

The manuscript letter in the Library of Congress is not the one that was
used in the different editions of Jefferson's "Works." It is a much
corrected and written-over draft, containing several passages which have
disappeared in the published text.[38] It contained particularly a
request to John Randolph who was going to "the hub of literature", to
buy him "books of parliamentary learning." It also included a request to
Randolph to sell him his fine violin, to which Randolph acceded,
averring that "Tho we _may politically_ differ in sentiments, yet I see
no reason, why _privately_ we may not cherish the same esteem for each
other which formerly I believe subsisted between us. We both of us seem
to be steering opposite courses: the success of either lies in the womb
of Time."[39]

Such letters are very significant, for they express better than long
dissertations the state of mind of the leading men of the day. The
question at issue was still a political question; it was a question of
internal politics on which men could differ without necessarily becoming
enemies or losing each other's esteem and affection. Less than a year
before the Declaration of Independence, independence seemed to Jefferson
the worst possible solution, to be delayed and avoided if it were
possible.

Chosen again as delegate to Congress, but delayed by the illness and
death of his second child, Jefferson reached Philadelphia on September
25, twenty days after the opening of the session. He stayed only until
the twenty-eighth of December, and resumed his seat on May 13 of the
following year. In the meantime events were moving rapidly. Congress had
been advised of the king's refusal even to notice their second petition;
and Jefferson, writing a second time to John Randolph, could declare:

  Believe me, my dear sir, there is not in the British empire, a man
  who more cordially loves a union with Great Britain than I do. But
  by the God that made me, I will cease to exist before I yield to a
  connection on such terms as the British Parliament propose; and in
  this I think I speak the sentiment of America. We want neither
  inducement nor power, to declare and assert a separation. It is will
  alone which is wanting, and that is growing apace under the fostering
  hand of our King.[40]

On the sixth of December, a declaration was adopted repudiating
allegiance to the king, and the British Constitution was proclaimed "our
best inheritance." Four days previously Jefferson had drafted a
declaration concerning Ethan Allen, when news arrived of his being
arrested and sent to Britain in irons to be punished for pretended
treason. For the first time the delegate from Virginia referred to the
British as "our enemies" and called upon them to respect "the rights of
nations."

At this juncture and shortly after being appointed on an important
committee, Jefferson abruptly left Congress and set out for home. The
reason for his sudden departure has never been satisfactorily explained.
It may have been due to news of the bad health of his mother: she died
on March 31, 1776, and this is the only explanation that Randall could
offer. It was more probably due to his anxiety about the fate of his
family. Communications with Virginia were rare and difficult. He wrote
home regularly every week, but on October 31 he had not yet received a
word "from any mortal breathing", and on November 7 he repeated:

"I have never received the script of a pen from any mortal in Virginia
since I left it, nor been able by any inquiries I could make to hear of
my family. I had hoped that when Mrs. Byrd came I could have heard
something of them. The suspense under which I am is too terrible to be
endured. If anything has happened, for God's sake let me know it!" Two
weeks later he urged his wife to keep herself "at a distance from Ld.
Dunmore", and he was planning to meet Eppes "as proposed."

There seems to be very little doubt that he yielded to his anxiety and
to the entreaties of Eppes who seems to have urged him to come back. He
had left at Monticello a sick mother, his sisters, a wife who had
recently lost a child and had hardly recovered from the blow, and he was
in constant fear that a raid from the British troops, who had already
burnt Norfolk, should endanger the lives of his dear ones. Furthermore
he believed that his presence in Philadelphia was not indispensable; for
he was never one who overrated himself. Finally, a document overlooked
by his biographers informs us that on September 26, 1775, he had been
appointed by the Committee of Safety for the Colony of Virginia,
Lieutenant and Commander in chief of the Militia of the County of
Albemarle.[41] In view of Lord Dunmore's impending attacks his presence
was evidently required to organize local forces. All these are reasons
enough to explain why he left Philadelphia. We do not even know that he
hesitated at all or experienced any conflict of duties. National
patriotism was still limited by family duty, and local patriotism was
stronger in him than obligations to a country which did not yet exist.

So it happened that the man who wrote the Declaration of Independence
was to miss many of the preliminary steps and discussions that preceded
it. He did not resume his seat in Congress until May 14, 1776. Five days
before, a resolution framed by Adams and R. H. Lee had been adopted,
instructing the colonies to form governments. It was passed the very day
Jefferson arrived in Philadelphia. Not only had he come back rather
reluctantly, but he was anxious to return to Virginia in order to
participate in the work of the Colonial Convention, as appears from his
letter to Thomas Nelson, Junior:

  Should our Convention propose to establish now a form of government,
  perhaps it might be agreeable to recall for a short time their
  delegates. It is a work of the most interesting nature and such as
  every individual would wish to have his voice in.... But this I
  mention to you in confidence, as in our situation, a hint to any
  other is too delicate however anxiously interesting the subject is to
  our feelings.

With all his attention turned towards the Old Dominion and in his
anxiety to participate in establishing a model form of government for
his "country", he then decided to send to Pendleton, President of the
Assembly, the draft of a proposed constitution for Virginia, or rather,
as he termed it, "A Bill for new modelling the form of government and
for establishing the Fundamental principles of our future
constitution."[42] This is a capital document for the history of
Jefferson's political thought. For the first time he had the opportunity
to develop fully his views on society and government. How clear in his
mind were the theories of which he later became the advocate will be
easily perceived. The draft started with a recital of the grievances of
the colony against "George Guelph King of Great Britain", which
Jefferson was to utilize in the Declaration of Independence. It declared
that "The Legislative, Executive, and Judiciary shall be forever
separate" and continued with a description of the three branches of
government. For the Legislative, Jefferson proposed a bicameral system,
consisting of a House of Representatives and a Senate. The House was to
be elected by "all male persons of full age and sane mind having a
freehold estate in (one fourth of an acre) of land in any town or in 25
acres of land in the county and all persons resident in the colony who
shall have paid scot and lot to government the last two years." The
Senate was to be appointed by the House of Representatives. The death
penalty was abolished for all crimes except murder and offences in the
military service; torture was abolished in all cases whatsoever. Some of
these provisions were incorporated later in the "Bill for Apportioning
Crimes and Punishment." The Administrator was to be appointed by the
House of Representatives, as well as the Attorney-general and the Privy
Council. Judges were to be appointed by the Administrator and Privy
Council; the High Sheriffs and Coroners of counties were to be elected
annually by the voters, but all other officers, civil and military, to
be appointed by the Administrator. The bill proposed that "descents
shall go according to the laws of Gavelkind, save only that females
shall have equal rights with males."--"All persons shall have full and
free liberty of religious opinion; nor shall any be compelled to support
or maintain any religious institution." "Printing presses shall be free
except so far as by commission of private injury cause may be given of
private action. There shall be no standing army but in time of actual
war." The introduction of slaves into the State was forbidden. Finally
provisions were made for the revision of the Constitution.

Truly most of the reforms advocated by Jefferson are already contained
in this document, not implicitly but explicitly: religious freedom,
freedom of the press, abolition of slavery, the laws of descent and the
bill to abolish entail, the "Bill for Proportioning Crimes and
Punishment" are all here. It was a bold and radical proposal, and no
wonder the young delegate from Virginia was anxious to go home in order
to defend it before his colleagues of the Assembly. The delegates, after
much wrangling, had come to practical agreement on the most important
points. It was too late and they were too "tired" of the subject to
resume the discussion. From Jefferson's plan they simply borrowed the
long recital of grievances which became the preamble to the Virginia
Constitution.[43]

As finally adopted, the Constitution was far less liberal than the plan
proposed by Jefferson, and this may explain his severe criticism of it
in his "Notes on Virginia" (Query XIII). It embodied, however, some of
the same essential principles; it proclaimed the separation of powers
and established two Chambers. It retained the name of governor, redolent
of the English régime, instead of "administrator"; it made no mention of
slavery, entails, descents and freedom of the press, but in some
respects it was even more democratic than the Jefferson plan since both
houses were directly elected. In the meantime things were coming to a
head in Philadelphia, and on June 7 certain resolutions concerning
independence being moved and adopted, it was

  _Resolved_, That these United Colonies are, and of right ought to be,
  free and independent States, that they are absolved from all
  allegiance to the British Crown, and that all political connection
  between them and the State of Great Britain is, and ought to be,
  totally dissolved.

  That it is expedient forthwith to take the most effectual measures
  for forming foreign Alliances.

  That a plan of confederation be prepared and transmitted to the
  respective Colonies for their consideration and approbation.[44]

On June 10, it was

  _Resolved_, That the consideration of the first resolution be
  postponed to this day, three weeks (July 1), and in the meanwhile,
  that no time be lost in case the Congress agree thereto, that a
  committee be appointed to prepare a declaration to the effect of the
  said first resolution.

  The next day it was resolved, That the committee to prepare the
  declaration consist of five members: The members chosen, Mr. [Thomas]
  Jefferson, Mr. J[ohn] Adams, Mr. [Benjamin] Franklin, Mr. [Roger]
  Sherman, and Mr. R[obert] R. Livingston.[45]

Jefferson's biographers have indulged in a great many discussions about
the reasons which determined the selection of the committee. Jefferson
certainly did not seek the honor, and little did he dream at the time
that it would bring him such fame. Without renewing the old controversy
on the participation of the other members of the committee in the
drawing up of the famous document, a few facts have to be considered.
First of all it was not an improvisation. The committee appointed on
June 10 reported only on June 28. A written draft was submitted to Adams
and Franklin, whose advice could not be neglected, and they suggested
several modifications, additions and corrections. Furthermore, Jefferson
was too good a harmonizer not to discuss many points with his colleagues
of the committee, so as to ascertain their views before writing down the
first draft. Even the desirability of having a declaration was a highly
controversial question, and Jefferson himself, in the detailed notes he
took of the preliminary discussion, indicates that when the committee
was appointed "the colonies of New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Delaware and South Carolina were not yet matured for falling from the
parent stem."[46]

On June 28, the committee appointed to prepare a declaration brought in
a draft which was read and "_Ordered_ to lie on the table." On July 2,
Congress resumed the consideration of the resolution agreed to by and
reported from the committee of the whole; and the same being read, was
agreed to as follows.

  _Resolved_, That these United Colonies are, and, of right, ought to
  be Free and Independent States; that they are absolved from
  allegiance to the British crown, and that all political connexion
  between them, and the state of Great Britain, is, and ought to be,
  totally dissolved.

Properly speaking this is, as Mr. Becker has remarked, the real
Declaration of Independence. But the principle once adopted, it remained
to proclaim and explain the action taken by Congress not only to the
people of the Free and Independent States, but to the world at large.
Congress then resolved itself into a committee of the whole, only to
decide that it was too late in the day to take up such a momentous
question. The discussion continued on the next day but Harrison reported
that the committee, not having finished, desired leave to sit again. On
July 4, Congress resolved itself into a committee of the whole to take
into further consideration the Declaration; and after some time, the
president resumed the chair. "Mr. (Benjamin) Harrison reported, that the
committee of the whole Congress have agreed to a Declaration, which he
delivered in. The Declaration being again read, was agreed to." Congress
then ordered that the Declaration be authenticated and printed, and the
committee appointed to prepare the Declaration "to superintend and
correct the press."

Such is briefly told from the "Journals of Congress" the story of the
momentous document in its external details. It has been too well related
by Mr. Becker and Mr. Fitzpatrick to leave any excuse for a new account.
Writing many years later, John Adams declared "there is not an idea in
it but what had been hackneyed in Congress two years before," and
replying to Adams' insinuations, Jefferson admitted that:

  Pickering's observations, and Mr. Adams' in addition, that it
  contained no new ideas, that it is a commonplace compilation, its
  sentiments hacknied in Congress for two years before ... may be all
  true. Of that I am not judge. Richard H. Lee charged it as copied
  from Locke's treatise on Government ... I only know that I turned to
  neither book nor pamphlet while writing it. I did not consider it as
  any part of my charge to invent new ideas altogether and to offer no
  sentiment which had never been expressed before.

In another letter to Lee, written in 1825, a year before his death,
Jefferson had given, as his last and final statement on the subject:

  Not to find out new principles, or new arguments, never before
  thought of, not merely to say things which had never been said
  before; but to place before mankind the common sense of the subject,
  in terms so plain and firm as to command their assent.... Neither
  aiming at originality of principles or sentiments, nor yet copied
  from any particular and previous writing, it was intended to be an
  expression of the American mind.... All its authority rests on the
  harmonizing sentiments of the day, whether expressed in conversation,
  in letters, printed essays, on the elementary books of public right,
  as Aristotle, Cicero, Locke, Sidney, etc.

Two phrases in this letter deserve particular notice, "an expression of
the American mind" and "the harmonizing sentiments of the day." This is
truly what Jefferson had attempted to express in his "felicitous
language"--the confused yearnings, the inarticulate aspirations, the
indefinite ideals of the speechless and awkward masses. He did it in
words so simple that no man could fail to understand it, in sentences so
well balanced and so rhythmic that no artist in style could improve upon
them. The Declaration of Independence is not only a historical document,
it is the first and to this day the most outstanding monument in
American literature. It does not follow, however, that Jefferson had no
model. Mr. Becker in his masterly study has demonstrated that it was the
final development of a whole current of thought, the origins of which
can be traced back in history even farther than he has done. The
Declaration of Independence is essentially of Lockian origin, but it
does not ensue that Jefferson had memorized Locke, nor even that he was
conscious, when he wrote the document, that he was using a Lockian
phraseology. As a matter of fact, even if he remembered Locke, it is
more than probable that reminiscences from two other more modern
expressions of the same idea haunted his mind. The first was a pamphlet
of James Wilson, written in 1770, published in Philadelphia in 1774 and
entitled "Considerations on the Nature and Extent of the Legislative
Authority of the British Parliament." Mr. Becker has pointed out the
similarity between a passage in Wilson and the preamble. Since then I
have found that, in his "Commonplace Book", Jefferson copied passages
from Wilson's pamphlet, although for reasons which I could not determine
he omitted the very passage which presents the most striking
resemblance:

  All men are, by nature, equal and free: No one has a right to any
  authority over another without his consent: All lawful government is
  founded on the consent of those who are subject to it: Such consent
  was given with a view to ensure and to increase the happiness of
  the governed above what they could enjoy in an independent and
  unconnected state of nature. The consequence is, that the happiness
  of the society is the First law of every government.

A Lockian theory to be sure, but Wilson in the footnote to this
paragraph quoted Burlamaqui to the effect that "This right of
sovereignty is that of commanding finally but in order to procure real
felicity; for if this end is not obtained, sovereignty ceases to be
legitimate authority." But this is not all! The Declaration of Rights of
1774 ("Journal of Congress", I, 373) stated in somewhat similar terms
the rights of the inhabitants of the English colonies. Finally the
"Virginia Bill of Rights" written by George Mason, adopted by the
Virginia Assembly on June 12 and necessarily forwarded to the delegates
in Congress, contained articles resembling more closely those of the
Declaration of Independence:

  I. That all men are by nature equally free and independent, and have
  certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of
  society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive their posterity;
  namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of
  acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining
  happiness and safety.

  II. That all power is vested in, and consequently derived from the
  people; that Magistrates are their trustees and servants, and at all
  times amenable to them.

  III. That government is or ought to be, instituted for the common
  benefit, protection and security of the people, nation, or community;
  of all the various modes and forms of government, that is best, which
  is capable of producing the greatest degree of happiness and safety,
  and is most effectually secured against the danger of
  mal-administration; and that when any government shall be found
  inadequate or contrary to these purposes, a majority of the community
  has the undubitable, unalienable right, to reform, alter, or abolish
  it, in such manner as shall be judged most conducive to the public
  weal.[47]

This time it is no longer a question of analogy, or similarity of
thought--the very words are identical, "Unalienable rights" is the
expression which finally replaced "undeniable" in the final form--and
"pursuing and obtaining happiness" has become the well-known "pursuit of
happiness." Does it mean that Jefferson should be accused of plagiarism?
Not in the least, since, as the French author said, "_l'arrangement est
nouveau_", and, in a work of art, "_l'arrangement_" constitutes true
originality, according to the formula of the classical school.
Furthermore, it was clearly Jefferson's rôle and duty as a delegate from
Virginia to incorporate in the Declaration as much as he could of the
"Bill of Rights" recently adopted by his native dominion. The only fault
that could be found is that he did not more clearly acknowledge his
indebtedness to George Mason. But his contemporaries, and particularly
the Virginians, could not fail to recognize in the national document the
spirit and expression of the State document. Jefferson had expressed the
American mind but he had above all expressed the mind of his fellow
Virginians.

Whether the doctrine enunciated in the Declaration of Independence is
founded in fact and is beyond question "undeniable", is a problem which
cannot even be touched upon here. We cannot dismiss it, however, without
mentioning a feature which seems to have escaped most American students
of political philosophy, probably because it has become such an integral
part of American life that it is not even noticed. I do not believe that
any other State paper in any nation had ever proclaimed so emphatically
and with such finality that one of the essential functions of government
is to make man happy, or that one of his essential natural rights is
"the pursuit of happiness." This was more than a new principle of
government, it was a new principle of life which was thus proposed and
officially indorsed. The most that could be asked from governments of
the Old World was to promote virtue and to maintain justice; honor,
"_amor patriae_" and fear were the essential principles on which rested
the governments described by Montesquieu. But in spite of the eternal
and unquenchable thirst for happiness in the heart of every man, what
European, what Frenchman particularly, could openly and officially
maintain that the "pursuit of happiness" was a right, and that happiness
could be reached and truly enjoyed. This quest of happiness had been the
main preoccupation of French philosophers during the eighteenth century,
but in spite of their philosophical optimism, they were too thoroughly
imbued with pessimism ever to think that it was possible to be happy;
the most they could hope for was to become less unhappy. The whole
Christian civilization had been built on the idea that happiness is
neither desirable nor obtainable in this vale of tears and affliction,
but as a compensation Christianity offered eternal life and eternal
bliss. The Declaration of Independence, on the contrary, placed human
life on a new axis by maintaining that happiness is a natural right of
the individual and the whole end of government. To be sure, the idea was
not original with Jefferson, it had been mentioned more than once in
official or semi-official documents, it was in James Wilson, as in the
Bill of Rights, but I cannot quite conceive that such a formula could
have originated in New England. I cannot conceive either that it could
have been proclaimed at that date anywhere except in a new country where
the pioneer spirit dominated, where men felt that they could live
without being crowded or hampered by fierce competition, traditions, and
iron-bound social laws.

In his plan for a _Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen_,
Lafayette some twelve years later included "_la recherche du bonheur_",
in memory of the American Declaration of Independence, but "_la
recherche du bonheur_" disappeared in the committee and was never
mentioned again in any of the three Declarations of the French
Revolution. The nearest approach to it is found in the first article of
the Declaration of June 23, 1793; but it simply states that the aim of
society is common happiness--and this is quite a different idea. Whether
it was right or not, Jefferson, when he reproduced the terms used by
George Mason in the Virginia Bill of Rights, gave currency to an
expression which was to influence deeply and even to mold American life.

In that sense, it may be said that the Declaration of Independence
represents the highest achievement of eighteenth-century philosophy, but
of one aspect of that philosophy that could not develop fully in Europe.
Trees that are transplanted sometimes thrive better under new skies than
in their native habitat and may reach proportions wholly unforeseen.

Thus the Declaration of Independence written to express the sentiments
of the day probably shaped the American mind in an unexpected manner. It
was essentially a popular document planned to impress the masses, to
place before the young nation at its birth a certain ideal and a certain
political faith, but it was also a legal and judicial document intended
to make more precise the reasons why the united American colonies had
finally resolved to separate from the mother country.

For this part of the Declaration Jefferson drew largely from the
"Constitution" he had drafted for Virginia and sent to Randolph by Mr.
Wythe. He was his own source--the more so as he substantially repeated
many of the grievances enumerated two years earlier in the "Rights of
British America." But here again he markedly improved the first version,
which was a monotonous recital of dry facts, starting with a legal
"Whereas" and beginning each article with a clumsy participle. "By
denying his Governor permission:... By refusing to pass certain other
laws ... By dissolving Legislative Assemblies," became in the
Declaration the dramatic presentation of facts by a prosecuting attorney
and not the summing-up of a case by a judge. But the final renunciation
of the mother country has an unsurpassed dignity, a finality more
terrible in its lofty and dispassionate tone than any curse:

"We must, therefore, acquiesce in the necessity, which denounces our
Separation, and hold them, as we hold the rest of mankind, Enemies in
War, in Peace Friends." There again one is reminded of the well-known
French formula: "_beau comme l'antique_." Twice in its history the
supposedly young and uncultured people had the rare fortune to find
spokesmen who, without effort and laborious preparation, reached the
utmost heights. The Declaration of Independence, with its solemn
renunciation of ties of consanguinity, reminds one of the tone of the
Greek tragedy; while the only parallel to the Gettysburg address is the
oration pronounced by Pericles over the warriors who had laid down their
lives during the first war of Peloponnesus.

Such heights can only be reached if the author is moved to his innermost
depths. Singularly unimaginative in ordinary circumstances, for once in
his life Jefferson was superior to himself: the student of Greece, the
refined Virginian, became truly the voice of the people. But great
effects often have small causes. We may wonder if he would have spoken
with that same suppressed emotion, fiercely burning and yet controlled,
if at that very time he had not been laboring under an emotional stress
that never recurred in his life.

While he was in Philadelphia, writing the first draft in which he opened
to the people of America "the road to glory and happiness", he could
well wonder whether his personal happiness was not about to be
destroyed.--His mother had recently died, he had just lost a child and
had left in Monticello a beloved companion dangerously ill. "Every
letter brings me such an account of the state of her health, that it is
with great pain I can stay here," he wrote to Page (July 20, 1776), and
for those who knew how reserved he was in the expression of personal
feelings, the restraint in his expression hardly conceals the anxiety
and distress by which he was torn.

There were also other reasons for his desiring to go home. Jefferson had
always understood that as a delegate to Congress his duty was not so
much to make a record for himself as to voice the _sentiments of the
people he represented and to carry out their instructions_.[48] He was
much worried about his standing with the Virginia Convention and
suspected that some members were trying to knife him in the back. The
Convention had just proceeded to elect delegates for the next Congress.
Harrison and Braxton had failed to be reappointed, and Jefferson was
"next to the lag."--"It is a painful situation," he wrote to William
Fleming, on July first, "to be 300 miles from one's county, and thereby
opened to secret assassination without a possibility of
self-defence."[49]

A week later, he wrote to Edmund Pendleton to decline his new
appointment as a delegate to Congress:

  I am sorry that the situation of my domestic affairs, renders it
  indispensably necessary that I should solicit the substitution of
  some other person here in my room. The delicacy of the House will not
  require me to enter minutely into the private causes which render
  this necessary. I trust they will be satisfied. I would not urge it
  again, were it not unavoidable.[50]

On July 8 he announced to R. H. Lee that he would return to Virginia
after the eleventh of August. It was not until September 2 that, his
successor having arrived, he considered himself as free to go. His final
reason, possibly not the least important, is given by Jefferson himself
in his "Autobiography":

  Our delegation had been renewed for the ensuing year, commencing
  August 11; but the new government was now organized, a meeting of the
  legislature was to be held in October, and I had been elected a
  member by my county. I knew that our legislation, under the regal
  government, had many vicious points which urgently required
  reformation, and I thought I could be of more use in forwarding that
  work. I therefore retired from my seat in Congress on the 2d of
  September, resigned it and took my place in the Legislature of my
  State, on the 7th of October.

"My state," wrote Jefferson in 1818, but in his letters to William
Fleming he was speaking of Virginia as his "country", and at that time
constantly referred to the colonies and not the United States.

The necessity of some sort of a union or confederacy had been keenly
realized for a long time, but the ways and means were far from receiving
unanimous support. As a matter of fact, union had been obtained just on
the point of secession, or as Jefferson had it "avulsion from Great
Britain"; but the consciousness of solidarity, the community of ideals
and interests which constitute an essential part of patriotism hardly
existed at that date. Thus the man who had just been the voice of
America probably felt himself more of a Virginian than of an American,
for local patriotism was very strong, while national patriotism was
still in a larval stage. Curiously enough the independence of the
_United States_ had been proclaimed before the Articles of
Confederation, which really constituted the United States, had been
adopted or even reported. When they were drafted the name "colonies" was
used and this was not changed to "states" until the second printing.[51]
The only official bond that united the colonies was loyalty to the
Crown. That bond once severed, each of them became a separate unit and
returned to a sort of "state of nature." For a student of government
this was the most fascinating situation that could be devised, since he
was going to witness the actual formation of a new society and the
signing of a social compact. Jefferson attended all the meetings of
Congress in which the Articles of Confederation were discussed, without
actively participating in the debates. He took copious notes and
inserted them in his "Autobiography" but for reasons presently to be
seen, he refrained from expressing his own opinion on the matter. Only
when he was back in Virginia could he collect his ideas and formulate to
his own satisfaction a theory on the formation of society. He then sat
at his table and sent to a friend his reflections on the debates he had
just attended. I had the good fortune to discover this document in the
Library of Congress. It is of such importance that it must be given here
in full.

[Illustration: A PAGE OF JEFFERSON'S REFLECTIONS ON THE ARTICLES OF
CONFEDERATION

_From the manuscript in the possession of the Library of Congress_]

  After I got home, being alone and wanting amusement I sat down to
  explain to myself (for there is such a thing) my Ideas of natural and
  civil rights and the distinction between them--I send them to you to
  see how nearly we agree.

  Suppose 20 persons, strangers to each other, to meet in a country not
  before inhabited. Each would be a sovereign in his own natural right.
  His will would be his Law,--but his power, in many cases, inadequate
  to his right, and the consequence would be that each might be
  exposed, not only to each other but to the other nineteen.

  It would then occur to them that their condition would be much
  improved, if a way could be devised to exchange that quantity of
  danger into so much protection, so that each individual should
  possess the strength of the whole number. As all their rights, in the
  first case are natural rights, and the exercise of those rights
  supported only by their own natural individual power, they would
  begin by distinguishing between these rights they could individually
  exercise fully and perfectly and those they could not.

  Of the first kind are the rights of thinking, speaking, forming and
  giving opinions, and perhaps all those which can be fully exercised
  by the individual without the aid of exterior assistance--or in other
  words, rights of personal competency--Of the second kind are those of
  personal protection of acquiring and possessing property, in the
  exercise of which the individual natural power is less than the
  natural right.

  Having drawn this line they agree to retain individually the first
  Class of Rights or those of personal Competency; and to detach from
  their personal possession the second Class, or those of defective
  power and to accept in lieu thereof a right to the whole power
  produced by a condensation of all the parts. These I conceive to be
  civil rights or rights of Compact, and are distinguishable from
  Natural rights, because in the one we act wholly in our own person,
  in the other we agree not to do so, but act under the guarantee of
  society.

  It therefore follows that the more of those imperfect natural rights,
  or rights of imperfect power we give up and thus exchange the more
  securely we possess, and as the word liberty is often mistakenly put
  for security M^r Wilson has confused his Argument by confounding the
  terms.

  But it does not follow that the more natural rights of _every kind_
  we resign the more securely we possess,--because if we resign those
  of the first class we may suffer much by the exchange, for where the
  right and the power are equal with each other in the individual
  naturally they ought to rest there.

  M^r Wilson must have some allusion to this distinction or his
  position would be subject to the inference you draw from it.

  I consider the individual sovereignty of the States retained under
  the Act of Confederation to be of the second Class of rights. It
  becomes dangerous because it is defective in the power necessary to
  support it. It answers the pride and purpose of a few men in each
  state--but the State collectively is injured by it.

Unless I am much mistaken we have here the key to the whole democratic
system of government evolved by Jefferson and the solution of the
apparent contradictions often pointed out in his system. Starting from
the hypothesis of Hobbes that in a state of nature men are free agents
and have no other law but their own will, Jefferson attributes to the
surrounding dangers the urge to form some sort of a society, a theory
also found in Locke. But what follows is more original: in forming a
social compact, men do not abdicate all their sovereignty as in the
hypothesis of Rousseau; they do not even abdicate a certain portion of
all their rights. On the contrary, they reserve entire a certain class
of rights, all those they can exercise fully without the aid of exterior
assistance, and they exchange for more security those they cannot
exercise themselves. Thus the social compact is no longer a _pactum
subjectionis_. It is no longer a question of deciding whether in a
society the individual or the society are sovereign, since both are
sovereign in their respective domains. How far Jefferson was from being
a demagogue is clearly indicated by the sentence in which he refers to
James Wilson. Liberty, except liberty of speech and thought, cannot be
unlimited and unrestricted in any society; it is a matter of bargain and
exchange. Thus Jefferson proposed a definition of liberty entirely
different from the French conception as found in Rousseau and reproduced
in the "Déclaration des droits de l'homme" of May 29, 1793: "_La liberté
consiste à pouvoir faire tout ce qui ne nuit pas à autrui._" With him,
on the contrary, liberty consists in the free enjoyment of our will
except in certain specific cases, to be enumerated at the time we form a
social compact. Hence the necessity of a Bill of Rights, in which the
individual accepts certain limitations in order to obtain a
corresponding amount of security, and specifically denominates those of
his natural rights he means to keep integrally and wholly.

This explains clearly why Jefferson, who is represented as the champion
of State rights, not only accepted the abridgment of State sovereignty
but declared that the retention by the States of certain rights was
dangerous and illogical. One of the first cases arises when dealing with
foreign nations. Here the individual State is clearly unable to protect
itself against foreign aggressions and foreign encroachments, and
foreign policies must properly be placed in the hands of the Federal
Government. This applies not only to questions of protection, but to
questions of commerce, and for two reasons, both of them practical and
not theoretical. Commerce is one of the great causes of war. In order to
protect the confederation the government has the right to levy taxes,
and the most convenient form is that of imposts or taxes on
importations. Secondly, the Federal Government is evidently in a better
situation than the individual States for obtaining favorable treatment
of their commerce by foreign nations. Hence the insistence of Jefferson
throughout his life on the prerogatives of the Federal Government in all
matters referring to foreign policies, and his reiterated declarations
in favor of State rights.

Incidentally, this document explains two otherwise unexplainable
incidents in Jefferson's career.

The Declaration on Violation of Rights adopted by the First Continental
Congress had specified the rights of the inhabitants of the British
colonies:

"_Resolved_, That they are entitled to life, liberty, & property, and
they have never ceded to any sovereign power whatever, a right to
dispose of either without their consent."[52] The Virginia Bill of
Rights had similarly declared that among the inherent natural rights
was the means of acquiring and possessing property.

Now, in the preamble to the Declaration of Independence, which follows
so closely the Bill of Rights, the word "property" does not appear,
while the other rights are reasserted.

Nor was this an unintentional omission, for when Lafayette submitted to
Jefferson his "Déclaration des droits de l'homme", Jefferson put in
brackets the words "droit à la propriété", thus suggesting their
elimination from the list of natural rights.

Yet he was not in any way a communist, and it would be a serious error
to see in that systematic omission the influence of Rousseau's "Discours
sur l'Origine de l'Inégalité." The fact is that, with his mind
accustomed to draw fine legal distinctions, he had come to the
conclusion that the right of possessing and acquiring property had to be
protected by society in order to be enjoyed securely. It is one of those
rights which are at the same time abridged and made more secure by
society, since in any society it may be found necessary to levy taxes on
the property of any citizen and even to condemn his property in the
interests of the community.

Such a philosophy of natural rights had never before been expressed by
any political philosopher I have been able to refer to, with one
possible exception. While Locke had said that one divests oneself of his
liberty in assuming the bonds of civil society--while Rousseau had
declared that man sacrifices all his natural rights on the altar of
society--a Scottish jurist had maintained that "Mutual defence against a
more powerful neighbor being in early times the chief, or sole motive
for joining in society, individuals never thought of surrendering any of
their natural rights which could be retained consistently with their
great aim of mutual defence." Not only had Jefferson read Kames, but he
had copied extensively from his "Historical Law" tracts in his
"Commonplace Book", where this very passage is to be found. He had also
seen in the tract on history of property the fine distinction
established by Kames between possession and property, the two terms
being coextensive among savages, while in more refined society the
relation of property was gradually evolved and disjoined from
possession.[53]

Thus if Jefferson borrowed from any one the main principles of his
philosophy, it was not from any of the eloquent and famous thinkers of
France and England. Locke he had certainly read, he had abstracted
Montesquieu, he may have known Rousseau's theory, although this is
doubtful, but he had read and summarized the tracts of a Scottish jurist
whom he had probably discovered through Doctor Small. His conception of
the social compact is not the conception of a philosopher; it is
essentially the conception of a jurist and a lawyer. The social compact
is not a metaphysical hypothesis, nebulous and lost in the night of
ages, it is a very specific and very precise convention to be entered
into or to be denounced by men who retain their "rights inherent and
unalienable", who remain free and yet agree to submit themselves to
certain rules and a certain discipline in order to obtain more security.
And thus was evolved and defined by Jefferson a combination of liberty
and order, individualism and discipline which lies at the basis of
American civilization, an object of wonder to most foreigners, often
discussed but never so satisfactorily elucidated as in the document
written by Jefferson when, "wanting amusement", he sat down to explain
to himself his ideas of natural and civil rights and the distinction
between them.




CHAPTER II

THE REVISION OF THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA


At the meeting of July 4, 1776, Congress, after adopting the Declaration
of Independence,

  "_Resolved_, That Dr. Franklin, Mr. J. Adams and Mr. Jefferson, be a
  committee, to bring in a device for a seal for the United States of
  America."[54]

Among the several suggestions made in the committee, the one proposed by
Jefferson, according to John Adams, deserves particular attention: "Mr.
Jefferson proposed, the children of Israel in the wilderness led by a
cloud by day, and a pillar by night--and on the other side, Hengist and
Horsa, the Saxon chiefs, from whom we claim the honor of being
descended, and whose political principles and form of government we have
assumed."

None of the suggestions made by the committee, or their final report,
was ever adopted, but the device proposed by Jefferson is a significant
indication that his thoughts were still running in the same channel.
"The children of Israel" would remind one of the favorite contention of
the settlers, piously preserved by their descendants to this day, that
they were a chosen people; but the other side of the seal reminds one
that Jefferson's great ambition at that time was to promote a
renaissance of Anglo-Saxon primitive institutions on the new continent.
Thus presented, the American Revolution was nothing but the reclamation
of the Anglo-Saxon birthright of which the colonists had been deprived
by "a long trend of abuses." Nor does it appear that there was anything
in this theory which surprised or shocked his contemporaries; Adams
apparently did not disapprove of it, and it would be easy to bring in
many similar expressions of the same idea in documents of the time.

The principle once established, there remained to put it into effect,
and to make a beginning in Virginia. This was the thought uppermost in
Jefferson's mind when he went back to the Old Dominion. "Are we not the
better for what we have hitherto abolished of the feudal system," he
wrote to Edmund Pendleton. "Has not every restitution of the ancient
Saxon laws had happy effects? Is it not better now that we return at
once into that happy system of our ancestors, the wisest and most
perfect ever yet devised by the wit of man, as it stood before the 8th
century?"[55] This is the true foundation of Jefferson's political
philosophy. No greater mistake could be made than to look for his
sources in Locke, Montesquieu, or Rousseau. The Jeffersonian democracy
was born under the sign of Hengist and Horsa, not of the Goddess Reason.

On September 26, 1776, Congress proceeded to the election of
commissioners to the Court of France, and the ballots being taken, Mr.
Benjamin Franklin, Mr. Silas Deane, and Mr. Thomas Jefferson were
chosen. This was a signal recognition of the prestige of the young
author of the Declaration of Independence. An express was sent at once
to Jefferson to inform him of his appointment. For the first time he was
offered an opportunity to visit the Old World. His desire to go was so
strong that he remained undecided for three days before he made up his
mind to decline the nomination and to send his refusal to Hancock. In
the letter he then wrote, he alleged that "circumstances very peculiar
in the situation of my family, such as neither permit me to leave nor to
carry it compel me to ask leave to decline a service so honorable and at
the same time so important to the American cause."[56] His biographer
Randall observes on this occasion that "the private causes" were the
precarious situation of his wife's health. The family record contains
the following entry: "a son born May 28th, 1777, 10 h. P.M."[57] The
true reason, however, is to be found in the "Autobiography", as given
before.

The very day Jefferson answered Hancock, he was put on several
committees, and the next day he obtained leave to bring in a bill "To
enable tenants in taille to convey their land in fee simple." The Bill
to Abolish Entails was reported on October 14, and after discussion and
amendments passed by the House on October 23, and approved by the Senate
on November first.

The bill was no improvisation and Jefferson intended by it "to strike at
the very root of feudalism in Virginia." On August 13, 1776, he had
already written to an anonymous correspondent, probably Edmund
Pendleton:

  The opinion that our lands were allodial possessions is one which I
  have very long held, and had in my eye during a pretty considerable
  part of my law reading which I found always strengthened it.... This
  opinion I have thought and still think to prove if ever I should have
  time to look into books again.... Was not the separation of the
  property from the perpetual use of lands a mere fiction? Is not it's
  history well known, and the purposes for which it was introduced, to
  wit, the establishment of a military system of defense? Was it not
  afterwards made an engine of immense oppression?... Has it not been
  the practice of all other nations to hold their lands as their
  personal estate in absolute dominion? Are we not the better for what
  we have hitherto abolished of the feudal system?[58]

It was the first great blow at the landed hereditary aristocracy of
Virginia. The abolition of patrimonial estates, rendering them subject
to all the obligations of personal property "susceptible to be sold,
conveyed, seized, exchanged and willed" as ordinary property, meant the
rapid abolition of that refined class of Virginia planters which
constituted such a distinguished feature of colonial life. It was a bold
step to take, since it meant the antagonism of a powerful class, the
beginning of hatred that pursued Jefferson during his whole life and
long after his death. Yet he had the courage to do it and was no little
proud of it.[59] He was opposed by both Mr. Pendleton and Patrick Henry,
"but the bill passed finally for entire abolition."

With the Bill to Abolish Entails Jefferson introduced another bill on
the naturalization of foreigners, containing an expressed recognition of
the right of expatriation already defended in the "Summary View" of
1774,--another remarkable instance of Jefferson's persistency and
relentless efforts to win his point by legal means.

Simultaneously a committee on religion had been appointed "to meet and
adjourn from day to day, and to take into their consideration all
matters and things relating to religion and religious morality." Besides
Jefferson, there were seventeen members on the committee, including
Fleming, Page, and Nicholas. Being in a minority, Jefferson began the
struggle which was to end in the famous Bill for Religious Freedom,--a
long hard fight of which more will be said later. For the time being,
however, Jefferson had to be satisfied with a partial success:

  We prevailed so far only, as to repeal the laws which rendered
  criminal the maintenance of any religious opinions, the forbearance
  of repairing to church, or the exercise of any mode of worship; and
  further, to exempt dissenters from contributing to the support of the
  established church; and to suspend, only until next session, levies
  on the members of that church for the salaries of their own
  incumbents.[60]

Yet this was a very significant victory since, from the days of Sir
Walter Raleigh, there had been an express proviso that the laws of the
colony "should not be against the true Christian faith, now professed in
the Church of England." Dissenters as well as members of the Established
Church were assessed for the support of the Anglican ministers, and
although other denominations, particularly Presbyterians, had succeeded
in gaining more than a foothold in some parishes, a majority of
dissenters were still obliged to pay for the support of the minority.

But important as they were, these constituted only minor points. The
whole structure of laws had to be remodelled to fit new conditions; a
new legal monument had to be erected. Jefferson's practice of law had
convinced him of the obscurities, contradictions, absurdities, and
iniquities of the assemblage of English laws on top of which had been
superimposed local regulations. The Bill for a General Revision of the
Laws passed October 26. The fifth of November five revisors were
appointed by ballot in the following order: Thomas Jefferson, Edmund
Pendleton, George Wythe, George Mason, Thomas Ludwell Lee. As this is a
more important contribution of Jefferson, we may omit here the part he
played on many committees of the House, drafting and reporting on
"Declaring what shall be treason"; bills "For raising six additional
battalions of infantry", "For establishing a Court of Appeals", "For
establishing a High Court of Chancery", "For establishing a General
Court and Courts of Assize", "For establishing a Court of Admiralty",
"For better regulating the proceedings of the County Courts." He plunged
into the work of the complete reorganization of the State judicial
machinery, with all the enthusiastic zeal of a born jurist, and his
capacity for precise, minute work was once more brought into play.

The committee of revisors met at Fredericksburg to determine on a manner
of procedure and to distribute the work between the five members. First
of all a question of methods had to be settled: "It had to be determined
whether we should propose to abolish the whole existing system of laws,
and prepare a new and complete Institute, or preserve the general
system, and only modify it to the present state of things."

Pendleton and Lee stood for the former methods, Wythe, Mason, and
Jefferson for the latter, and this was the procedure finally adopted.
Rather than the account given by Jefferson in his "Autobiography" we
shall follow the contemporary account drawn up at the time by George
Mason.

  Plan settled by the committee of Revisors in Fredericksburg, January,
  1777.

  (1) The common law not to be meddled with, except where alterations
  are necessary. The statutes to be revised and digested, alterations
  proper for us to be made; the diction where obsolete or redundant, to
  be reformed; but otherwise to undergo as few changes as possible. The
  acts of the English Commonwealth to be examined. The statutes to be
  divided into periods; the acts of Assembly made on the same subject
  to be incorporated into them. The laws of other colonies to be
  examined, and any good ones to be adopted.

In the margin is here written:

  General rules in drawing provisions &c., which would do only what the
  law would do without them, to be omitted. Bills to be short; not to
  include matters of different natures; not to insert an unnecessary
  word; nor omit a useful one. Laws to be made on the spur of the
  present occasion, and all innovating laws to be limited in their
  duration.[61]

Truly an admirable plan! Not the scheme of rash reformers, of _a
priori_-minded legislators, deriving a code of laws from a certain
number of abstract principles. It was not their purpose to make a
_tabula rasa_ of the old structure which had slowly grown stone by
stone, statute by statute and to rebuild entirely on new plans. The old
house resting on solid Anglo-Saxon foundations was still substantial
and safe and it could serve its purpose if only a few partitions were
torn down, a few useless annexes demolished, and better ventilation
provided. Nothing was farther from the mind of the committee than to
erect in Virginia a Greek or Roman temple of Themis.

The statutes were divided into five parts. Jefferson was to take "the
first period in the division of statutes to end with 25th, H. 8th";
Pendleton the second period "to end at the Revolution"; Wythe the third
"to come to the present day"; G. Mason the fourth, "to consist of the
residuary part of the Virginia laws to which is added the criminal law
and land law." The fifth, attributed to Lee, "to be the regulation of
property in slaves, and their condition; and also the examination of the
laws of the other colonies."[62] Mason soon retired, "being no lawyer",
and Lee having died, the work was redistributed which explains the
somewhat different allotment indicated by Jefferson in the
"Autobiography." On the other hand, he seems to have claimed for himself
in the "Autobiography" an honor and an attitude that really belonged to
the committee:

  I thought it would be useful, also, in new draughts to reform the
  style of the later British statutes, and of our own arts of Assembly;
  which, from their verbosity, their endless tautologies, their
  involution of case within case, and parenthesis within parenthesis,
  and their multiplied efforts at certainty, by _saids_ and
  _aforesaids_, by _ors_ and by _ands_, to make them more plain, are
  really rendered more perplexed and incomprehensible, not only to
  common readers, but to the lawyers themselves.

The notes taken by G. Mason leave no doubt that this was also the
attitude of the committee and their definite policy. It was a slow,
painstaking, meticulous task, requiring common sense, good judgment, a
good sense for words and erudition. To make laws intelligible and clear
is no small achievement. But certainly it was not the sort of work that
an _a priori_ philosopher, fond of generalizations and universal
principles, would have relished, or would have been willing to submit
himself to for more than two years. If in some political matters
Jefferson differed from Mr. Pendleton, he admired him and later paid him
a handsome tribute in the "Autobiography." Pendleton--cool, smooth and
persuasive, quick, acute and resourceful--was a remarkable debater.

  George Mason, a man of the first order of wisdom, of expansive mind,
  profound judgment, cogent in argument, learned in the lore of our
  former constitution, and earnest for the republican change on
  democratic principles ... his virtue was of the purest tint; his
  integrity inflexible, and his justice exact; of warm patriotism, and,
  devoted as he was to liberty, and to the natural and equal rights of
  man, he might truly be called the Cato of his country without the
  avarice of the Roman.[63]

When the preliminary work was done, the reviewers met at Williamsburg in
February, 1779, and "day by day" they examined critically their several
parts, sentence by sentence, scrutinizing and amending, "until they had
agreed on the whole." "The Revised Laws", comprehending one hundred and
twenty-six bills, were reported to the General Assembly June 18, 1779;
bills were taken out occasionally from time to time, and because of
Madison's efforts fifty-six out of the one hundred and twenty-six were
after amendments made laws at the sessions of 1785, 1786. Among the
bills reworded or initiated by Jefferson several stood out
conspicuously.

The Bill for Proportioning Crimes and Punishments is a particularly good
example of the methods used by Jefferson in rewriting the old
legislation. On sending it to George Wythe he wrote:

  I wished to exhibit a sample of reformation in the barbarous style
  into which our modern statutes have degenerated from their ancient
  simplicity. In its style, I have aimed at accuracy, brevity,
  simplicity, preserving however the words of the established law,
  wherever their meaning had been sanctioned by judicial decision, as
  rendered technical by usage.[64]

The transformation undergone by the old statutes can more easily be
observed because Jefferson was careful to indicate in footnotes his
authorities from the old texts, in Latin, and even in French and
Anglo-Saxon. But the very title of the bill indicates that Jefferson's
purpose went farther than a mere codification of the old law. He could
not be entirely satisfied with the scale of punishments determined by
the committee; he regretted particularly the maintainance of the _Lex
Talionis_, "an eye for an eye and a hand for a hand" (Section XV), and
he attempted to restrict the penalty of death to a few limited cases,
for it was "the last melancholy resource against those whose existence
is become inconsistent with the safety of their fellow citizens." His
preamble reflects to a large extent the views of Montesquieu and
Beccaria which he copied in the "Commonplace Book." But it could hardly
be called humanitarian in the modern and sometimes derogatory sense of
the word. The provisions of the code itself are far from showing any
weakness or sentimentality: the death penalty is provided for treason
against the Commonwealth and for whomsoever committeth murder by way of
duel; manslaughter, previously "punishable at law by burning in the
hands, and forfeiture of chattels", is punished by hard labor for seven
years in the public works, and the murderer "shall forfeit one half of
his lands and goods to the next of kin of the person slain, the other
half to be sequestered during such times, in the hands, and to the use,
of the commonwealth." Rape, polygamy, or sodomy "shall be punished if a
man by castration, if a woman by boring through the cartilage of her
nose a hole of one half inch in diameter at least." Witchcraft,
conjuration, or sorcery "shall be punished by ducking and whipping, at
the discretion of a jury, not exceeding fifteen stripes", and, most
extraordinary for modern readers, "Whenever sentences of death shall be
pronounced against any person for treason or murder, execution thereof
shall be done on the next day but one, after such sentence, unless it be
Sunday, and then on Monday following" (Section XIII). Truly enough the
law of nature is once mentioned in a footnote to the effect that if a
prisoner tries to escape from prison he shall not be considered as a
capital offender. "The law of nature impels every one to escape from
confinement; he should not therefore be subjected to punishment. Let the
legislature restrain his criminal by walls, not by parchment." If there
is "philosophy" in this statement it is common sense and certainly not
sentimentality.

The Bill for the more General Diffusion of Knowledge is far more
philosophical in its terms. There for the first time will be found a
picture of democracy as Jefferson pictured it to himself at that date.
The general statement at the beginning may be an echo from Montesquieu;
but while the French philosopher had not indicated any remedy for such a
situation, Jefferson was interested in it only in so far as it could be
amended.

  Experience has shewn, that even under the best forms, those entrusted
  with power have, in time, and by slow operations, perverted it into
  tyranny; and it is believed that the most effectual means of
  preventing this would be, to illuminate, as far as practicable, the
  minds of the people at large, and more especially to give them
  knowledge of those facts, which history exhibiteth,... and whereas it
  is generally true that people will be happiest whose laws are best,
  and are best administered, and that laws will be wisely formed, and
  honestly administered, in proportion as those who form and administer
  them are wise and honest; whence it becomes expedient for promoting
  the publick happiness that those persons, whom nature hath endowed
  with genius and virtue, should be rendered by liberal education
  worthy to receive, and able to guard the sacred deposit of the
  rights and liberties of their fellow citizens, and that they should
  be called to that charge without regard to wealth, birth or other
  accidental condition or circumstance; but the indigence of the
  greater number disabling them from so educating, at their own
  expence, those of their children whom nature hath fitly formed and
  disposed to become useful instruments for the public, it is better
  that such should be sought for and educated at the common expence of
  all, than that the happiness of all should be confined to the weak or
  wicked.

Is this a democratic view in the modern sense of the word? At any rate
it is not the democratic phraseology of a modern politician. There is no
protest at all in the name of immanent justice against the unequality of
conditions, there is no desire to give every boy a fair chance in life,
no indication that men being born equal, all children should have equal
opportunities. We are perfectly free to believe that Jefferson
entertained such sentiments at that date. Historically, however, there
is no evidence that he did so. All we have here is a hard-headed
proposition with the corrective that, under the new system, a child of
genius or great talent was to be given an opportunity to develop his
native qualities, for it was both the duty and the interest of society
to prevent such a waste of intellectual potentialities. Furthermore,
Jefferson was manifestly of the opinion that no man could properly
participate in the government of society unless he had been rendered
worthy to receive and able to guard the _sacred_ deposit of the rights
and liberties of his fellow citizens. Neither wealth, birth, nor
accidental circumstances should determine who is fit for public office,
but education should be the criterion. As he was doing his utmost to
abolish the last privileges and prestige of the landed hereditary
aristocracy of Virginia, Jefferson was striving to constitute and to get
recognition for another aristocracy, an aristocracy of learning and
intelligence, a true ruling class, or more exactly a governing and
legislative class; for he was persuaded that the business of the
legislator cannot be learned in a day, that it requires, besides native
qualities of mind, a certain expert knowledge of the subject.

The provisions of the bill are most extraordinary for the time.
Jefferson provided for the division of the State into a certain number
of districts or hundreds; in each hundred a schoolhouse was to be built
and so located that all the children within it might daily attend the
school.

  In each of the schools shall be taught reading, writing, and common
  arithmetick, and the books which shall be used therein for
  instructing the children to read shall be such as will at the same
  time make them acquainted with Graecian, Roman, English and American
  history. At these schools all the free children, male and female,
  resident within the respective hundred, shall be entitled to receive
  tuition gratis for the term of three years.

In addition, the bill provided that a certain number of grammar schools
would be erected, "their situation to be as central as possible for the
inhabitants of the said counties, the schools to be furnished with good
water, convenient to plentiful supplies of provision and fuel and above
all things that it be healthy." In all of these grammar schools, which
shall receive boarders

  shall be taught the Latin and Greek languages, English Grammar,
  geography, and the higher part of numerical arithmetick, to wit.,
  vulgar and decimal fractions, and the extrication of the square and
  cube roots. In order to provide proper facilities for children of
  particular ability, the overseer of the hundred schools (one for ten
  schools) shall appoint from among the boys who shall have been two
  years at the least at some one of the schools under his
  superintendance and whose parents are too poor to give them farther
  education some one of the best and most promising genius and
  dispositions to proceed to the grammar schools.

At the end of the first year one third of the boys shall be discontinued
as public foundations after examination; "all shall be discontinued at
the end of two years save one only, the best in genius and disposition,
who shall be at liberty to continue there four years longer on the
public foundation, and shall thence forward be deemed a senior."
Finally, "the visitors will select one among the said seniors of the
best learning and most hopeful genius and disposition who shall be
authorized by them to proceed to William and Mary College; there to be
educated, boarded, and clothed three years: the expense of which shall
be paid by the Treasurer."

This rigorous selective process looks very familiar to any one
acquainted with the modern French system of free elementary schools,
boarding _colléges_ and _lycèes_, and the system of competitive
scholarships and fellowships of the French. But it was not fully
developed in France before the Third Republic and it was not even
dreamed of before the Revolution. Many times the French have been
criticized for the undemocratic features of an educational system which
reserves secondary education to those who are able to pay and to the
small number of children who win scholarships. There is no possibility
that this scheme was ever borrowed by Jefferson from any French
theorician, and there is, on the contrary, some reason to believe that
in France it owes its beginning to the publication of Jefferson's plan
in the "Notes on Virginia" printed in Paris and in French in 1786.

The educational structure of the State would not have been complete if
Jefferson had not provided for a reorganization of William and Mary
College. Such is the purpose of the next bill (Bill LXXX) in the Report
of the Committee of Revisors. There he was more ruthless and more
radical. After a first section which recounts the foundation of the
college and its history, Jefferson concluded that "the said college,
thus amply endowed by the public has not answered their expectation, and
there is reason to hope, that it would become more useful, if certain
articles in its constitution were altered and amended." By one stroke
of the pen, Jefferson abolished the school of theology, took the
administration out of the hands of the former trustees to place it in
the hands of visitors appointed by the Legislature and "not to be
restrained in their legislation by the royal prerogatives, or the laws
of the kingdom of England, or the canons of the constitution of the
English Church, as enjoined in the Charter." The president and faculty
were to be dismissed, and six professorships created; to wit, one of
moral law and police; one of history, civil and ecclesiastical; one of
anatomy and medicine; one of natural philosophy and natural history; one
of the ancient languages Oriental and northern; and one of modern
languages.--

  A missionary will be appointed to the several tribes of the Indians,
  whose business will be to investigate their laws, customs, religion,
  traditions, and more particularly their languages, constructing
  grammar thereof, as well as may be, and copious vocabularies, and on
  oath to communicate, from time to time, to the said President and
  Professors the material he collects.

Thus the college was to become the training school in which "those who
are to be the future guardians of the rights and liberties of their
country may be endowed with science and virtue, to watch and preserve
the sacred deposit." It was not a democratic institution, but the
finishing school of the future legislators and experts in the science of
government.

As to disinterested "researches of the learned and curious", they were
to be encouraged by the establishment at Richmond of a Free Public
Library with yearly appropriation of two thousand pounds for the
purchase of books and maps.

One may state here without any fear of contradiction that no system so
complete, so logically constructed and so well articulated had ever been
proposed in any country in the world. It already embodied the ideas for
which Jefferson stood during all his life, it preceded by more than
fifteen years the plans of the French Convention. As the first charter
of American public education it is an astonishing document and deserves
more attention than it has hitherto received.

The Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom in Jefferson's opinion
ranked in importance with the Declaration of Independence. It was not
intended to be a revolutionary document, but simply a common-sense
adjustment of the situation brought about by the repeal of several
provisions of the old Virginia laws. Jefferson took care to explain the
true purpose of the bill in the "Notes on Virginia" (Query XVII). The
Virginia Bill of Rights had proclaimed "it to be a truth, and a natural
right that the exercise of religion should be free." On the other hand,
no mention of it had been made in the Convention and no measure had been
adopted to protect religious freedom. The Assembly, however, had
repealed, in 1776, "all _acts_ of Parliament which had rendered criminal
the maintaining any opinion in matters of religion", and suspended the
laws giving salaries to the clergy. This suspension was made perpetual
in October, 1779. But religious matters still remained subject to common
law and to acts passed by the Assembly. At Common Law, heresy was a
capital offence, punishable by burning, according to the writ _de
haeretico comburando_. Furthermore, by an act of the Assembly of 1705,
"if a person brought up in the Christian religion denies the being of a
God, or the Trinity, or asserts there are more gods than one, or denies
the Christian religion to be true, or the Scriptures to be of divine
authority, he is punishable on the first offence by incapacity to hold
any office or employment ecclesiastical, civil, or military: on the
second by disability to sue, to take any gift or legacy, to be guardian,
executor, or administrator, and by three years' imprisonment without
bail."[65]

This being the situation, the article of the Bill of Rights concerning
religious freedom remained a dead letter until provisions could be made
to take religious matters out of the jurisdiction of the Common Law.

Historians seem to have been somewhat misled both by the lofty and
philosophical tone of the Bill for Religious Freedom and the comments
made by Jefferson in the "Notes on Virginia", specially written by him,
as we always must remember, for a group of French philosophers and the
French public. A philosopher he was, but before all he was a purist and
a historian of law. For him the main question was first to determine
whether the jurisdiction of the Common Law in matters of religion was
founded in law. He had already studied minutely the history of Common
Law and made copious extracts in his "Commonplace Book"; he had noticed
in Houard's "Coutumes Anglo-Normandes" that some pious copyist had
prefixed to the laws of Alfred four chapters of Jewish law. "This
awkward Monkish fabrication makes the preface to Alfred's genuine laws
stand in the body of the Work; and the very words of Alfred himself form
the frauds, for he declares in that preface that he has collected these
laws from those of Ina, of Offa, Ethelbert, and his ancestors, saying
nothing of any of them being taken from the scripture." Consequently the
pretended laws of Alfred were a forgery.

  Yet, palpable as it must be to a lawyer, our judges have piously
  avoided lifting the veil under which it was shrouded. In truth, the
  alliance between Church and State in England, has ever made their
  judges accomplices in the frauds of the clergy; and even bolder
  than they are: for, instead of being contented with these four
  surreptitious chapters of _Exodus_, they have taken the whole leap,
  and declared at once, that the whole Bible and Testament, in a lump,
  make part, of the Common law.... Finally in answer to Fortescue
  Aland's question why the Common law of England should not now be a
  part of the Common law of England? We may say that they are not,
  because they never were made so by legislative authority; the
  document which imposed that doubt on him being a manifest
  forgery.[66]

[Illustration: A PAGE FROM JEFFERSON'S "COMMONPLACE BOOK"

_From the manuscript in the possession of the Library of Congress_]

Bolstered up with his texts, references, and authorities, Jefferson
could now, if need be, confute the redoubtable Mr. Pendleton in the
Committee of Revisors, but such a legal technical presentation of the
facts would evidently not appeal either to the Assembly at large or to
the public. These had to be approached in an entirely different way; for
to speak of frauds, forgeries, and monkish fabrication would not do at
all in a public document and, on the contrary, might create a revulsion
of feeling. It became necessary to present the reform in an entirely
different light and Jefferson did so in the first section of the bill.

The phrasing of these lofty principles is well known; still it may not
be out of place to reproduce them once more:

  Well aware that the opinions of belief of men depend not on their own
  will, but follow involuntarily the evidence proposed to their minds;
  that Almighty God hath created the mind free, and manifested his
  supreme will that free it shall remain by making it altogether
  susceptible of restraint; that all attempts to influence it by
  temporal punishments, or burthens, or by civil incapacitations, tend
  only to beget habits of hypocrisy and meanness ... to compel a man to
  furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which
  he disbelieves and abhors, is sinful and tyrannical;... that our
  civil rights have no dependance on our religious opinions, any more
  than our opinions in physics or geometry;... that the opinions of men
  are not the object of civil government.

In Section II, after that preamble, the religious independence of the
individual was proclaimed:

  We the General Assembly of Virginia do enact that no man shall be
  compelled to frequent or support any religious worship, place, or
  ministry whatsoever, nor shall be enforced, restrained, molested,
  or burthened in his body or goods, or shall otherwise suffer, on
  account of his religious opinions or beliefs; but that all men shall
  be free to profess and by argument to maintain, their opinions in
  matters of religion, and that the same shall in no wise diminish,
  enlarge, or affect their civil capacities.

Furthermore, in the first section, Jefferson gave the first and final
expression of his understanding of freedom of thought:

  That it is time enough for the rightful purposes of civil government
  for its offices to interfere when principles break out into overt
  acts against peace and good order; and finally, that truth is great
  and will prevail if left to herself; that she is the proper and
  sufficient antagonist to error, and has nothing to fear from the
  conflict unless by human interposition disarmed of her natural
  weapons, free argument and debate; errors ceasing to be dangerous
  when it is permitted freely to contradict them.

It is not surprising that the bill was savagely attacked in the Assembly
and did not pass until 1786. It simply shows that the Church of England
had more supporters than Jefferson led us to believe, when he wrote in
the "Notes on Virginia" that "two-thirds of the people had become
dissenters at the commencement of the present revolution." The remaining
third, if such was the proportion, were at least well organized and
offered a strong resistance. This bill marked the beginning of the
accusations of impiety and infidelity so often launched at Jefferson.
Whatever his private sentiments on the matter may have been, he was not
the man to discriminate against any one because of religious beliefs;
and at the very time when he was engaged in preparing his bill, he took
the initiative of starting a subscription towards the support of the
Reverend Mr. Charles Clay of Williamsburg. The document, never before
published, is entirely written in his hand and is of such importance
that I may be permitted to reproduce it here:

  Whereas, by an act of General assembly, freedom of Religious opinion
  and worship is restored to all, and it is left to the members of
  each religious society to employ such Teachers they think fit for
  their own Spiritual comfort and instruction and to maintain the same
  by their free and voluntary contributions. We the subscribers
  (professing the most Catholic affection for other religious sectaries
  who happen to differ from us in points of conscience,) yet desirous
  of encouraging and supporting (a church in our opinion so truly
  Apostolick as) the Protestant Episcopalian Church, and of deriving to
  ourselves, through the ministry of it's teachers, the benefits of
  Gospel-knowledge and Religious improvement, and at the same time of
  supporting those, who, having been at considerable expence in
  qualifying themselves by regular education for explaining the holy
  scriptures, have dedicated their time and labor to the service of the
  said church (and moreover approving highly the conduct of the rev^d
  Charles Clay, who early rejecting the tyrant and tyranny of Britain,
  proved his religion genuine by its harmony with the liberties of
  mankind and conforming his public prayers to the spirit and the
  injured rights of his country, addressed the god of battles for
  victory to our arms, while others impiously prayed that our enemies
  might vainquish and overcome us) do hereby oblige ourselves our heirs
  executors and administrators on or before the 25th day of December in
  this present year 1777, and likewise on or before the 25th day of
  December in every year following until we shall withdraw our
  subscription in open vestry, or until the legislature shall make
  other provision for the support of the said clergy, to pay to the
  (reverend) said Charles Clay of Albemarle his executor or
  administrators the several sums affixed to our respective names: in
  Consideration whereof we expect that the said Charles Clay shall
  perform divine service and preach a sermon in the town of
  Charlottesville on every fourth Sunday, or oftener, if a regular
  rotation with the other churches that shall have put themselves under
  his care will admit a more frequent attendence.

  And we further mutually agree with each other that we will meet at
  Charlottesville on the 1^{st} day of March in the present year, and
  on the second Thursday in ---- in every year following so long as we
  continue our subscriptions and there make choice by ballot of three
  wardens to collect our said subscriptions, to take care of such books
  and vestments as shall be provided for the use of our church, to
  call meetings of our Congregation when necessary, and to transact
  such other business relating to our Congregation as we shall
  hereafter confide to them.

  Th. Jefferson, six pounds; Jno Harvie, four pounds; Randolph
  Jefferson, two pounds ten schillings; Thos. Garth, fifteen
  schillings; Philip Mazzei, sixteen schillings eight pence.[67]

Far more important than the local reception of the revised laws, since
most of them were adopted only years later, and thanks to the efforts of
Madison, during the sessions of 1785 and 1786, is the fact that
Jefferson had already formulated at that time for himself and his fellow
citizens the most essential principles of his doctrine. He was not
unaware of this, and stated it himself in his "Autobiography" when he
declared: "I considered four of these bills, passed or reported as
forming a system by which every fibre would be eradicated of ancient or
future aristocracy; and a foundation laid for a government truly
republican."[68]

The ideal government he had in mind at the time could perhaps be
described as a democracy, but he did not use the word himself, not even
many years later in his "Autobiography" where he simply spoke of "a
government truly republican." He was much opposed to the perpetuation of
an hereditary landed gentry, but I do not see that he would have
approved or even conceived the possibility of a government placed
entirely under the control of unenlightened men. The Bill for the more
General Diffusion of Knowledge makes clear that only through a liberal
education can men be "rendered worthy to receive and able to guard the
sacred deposit of the rights and liberties of their fellow citizens",
and the Bill for Amending the Charter of William and Mary proclaims
even more emphatically that the old college must "become the seminary,
in which those who are to be the future guardians of the rights of
liberty of their country may be endowed with science and virtue, to
watch and preserve the sacred deposit." Jefferson was a friend of the
people, but no admirer and no flatterer of the "plain people", nor did
he entertain any illusion about their participation in all the forms of
government. For the present it was enough, as he wrote in the
"Autobiography", if they were qualified through elementary education "to
exercise with intelligence _their_ parts in self-Government." If he
rebelled against aristocracy of wealth, he would have reacted with equal
vehemence against mob tyranny. Neither was he radical enough to admit
_propagandistes par le fait_ and to forbid society the right to
intervene "when principles break out into overt acts against peace and
good order." (Bill for Religious Freedom.) For freedom of speech does
not entail freedom of action: and the civil rights or rights of compacts
are necessarily subject to civil regulations.

It is easily seen now that Jefferson so far remained perfectly
consistent, and followed in practice the distinction between natural
rights and rights of compact he had established in order to clarify his
own mind, in the meditation quoted at the end of the preceding chapter.
If this theory is accepted, it is evident that society being founded
upon a legal compact, the ideal form of government is one in which both
parties, the individual on the one hand and society on the other,
scrupulously live up to its terms. A breach of contract can no more be
condoned in the individual than in society. On the other hand, natural
rights remain always truly "inalienable" and apart from civil rights.
When any individual comes to the conclusion that the sacrifice he has
made of certain rights in order to enjoy more security is not
compensated for by sufficient advantages, he has the right to denounce
the compact: hence the right of expatriation always so energetically
maintained by Jefferson. This is the very reason why Jefferson could not
and did not blame John Randolph for going to England in August, 1775,
since "the situation of the country had rendered it not eligible to him
to remain longer in it." Thus the conflict seen by so many political
philosophers between man and society disappears entirely. The individual
cannot stand against society when he is free to break the social bond at
any time--nor can society oppress the individual without endangering its
very existence. Such a theory was more than a "philosophical
construction." It was largely based upon facts and observation; it
expressed the current political philosophy of the colonies. It was
eminently the juridistic explanation of the pioneer spirit.

Granting what is undoubtedly true, that Jefferson aroused antagonism and
enmities in the Assembly, he certainly had also his admirers and
followers. If the prophet had preached in the desert, he would not have
gained the prompt recognition that came to him when he was chosen
Governor of Virginia, the first of June, 1779, to succeed Patrick Henry.
He was then thirty-six years old.




CHAPTER III

GOVERNOR OF VIRGINIA--THE "NOTES ON VIRGINIA"


Jefferson served two years as Governor of the Commonwealth and when he
wrote his "Autobiography" he gave only a short paragraph to this episode
of his eventful career, referring for more details to Girardin's
continuation of Burk's "History of Virginia." The student of law, the
erudite jurist, and classical scholar was by the choice of the Assembly
entrusted with the duties and responsibilities of a war chief, and it
cannot be said that Jefferson enjoyed the experience. The duties of
governor were not only exacting but almost impossible to fulfill
satisfactorily. For more than two years, Virginia, without money, with a
poorly equipped militia reënforced with an inadequate number of Federal
troops, had been overrun by the enemy and had known all the atrocities
of the war. The governor had to honor the continuous requests of the
general in chief for more ammunition, more equipment and provision, and
at the same time had to keep under arms, and as much as possible in
fighting condition, militiamen anxious to go back to their farms for the
harvest or the plowing, so as to protect the territory of the State
against the raids of the invader and prevent Indian uprisings on the
western border. Last, but not least, he had to take into consideration
the general attitude of the people of the State and the measures adopted
by the legislature. Jefferson's correspondence with Lafayette during the
first months of 1781 is most illuminating in this respect. When, after
Arnold's treason, Lafayette was sent by Washington to apprehend the
traitor and give some assistance to the Old Dominion, he found that
there were neither boats, wagons, nor horses to carry his equipment from
Head of Elk to the siege of operations. The treasury was empty, the
Assembly most chary in granting impressment warrants, and practically
all the governor could offer in the way of help was his unlimited good
will. Lafayette had to use oxen for his artillery and to mount cannon on
barges; but even after powers of impressment were granted to the
Marquis, Jefferson had to remind him of the necessity of not impressing
stallions or brood mares, so as not to kill the "goose with the golden
eggs."[69]

Jefferson's attitude in these critical circumstances reveal his true
character to a degree, and without entering into a detailed account of
the campaign, a few illustrations may be included here. It may be
remembered that four thousand British troops, taken prisoners at the
battle of Saratoga, had been ordered by Congress to Charlottesville. The
problem of housing and feeding them soon became acute, and Jefferson was
called upon to assist in finding a proper solution. The life imposed
upon the captive soldiers was comparatively mild. Barracks were erected,
while the officers, well provided with money, rented houses in the
vicinity of the camp and bought some of the finest horses in Virginia.
For most of them the Charlottesville captivity was a very pleasant
_villégiature_. On the other hand, some of the inhabitants did not view
without alarm this sudden increase in the population of the county, and
application was made to Governor Patrick Henry to have at least part of
the prisoners removed to another section of the State. This, according
to Jefferson, would have been a breach of faith, since the articles of
capitulation provided that the officers should not be separated from
their men. On this occasion he wrote a very vehement letter to the
governor, March 27, 1779, protesting that such a measure "would suppose
a possibility that humanity was kicked out of doors in America, and
interest only attended to." Yet the governor could not entirely neglect
interested consideration, and Jefferson once more revealed that curious
mixture of high principles and hard, practical common sense, to which we
already called attention. He was aware that the circulation of money was
increased by the presence of these troops "at the rate of $30,000 a week
at least." The rich planters, "being more generally sellers than
buyers", were greatly benefited by these unexpected customers, although
the poor people were much displeased by inroads made by them upon the
amount of supplies and provisions available in the county.

Never were prisoners better treated or made more welcome, and if
Jefferson reflected the feelings of his neighbors there was no animosity
against the soldiers in the field:

  The great cause which divides our countries is not to be decided by
  individual animosities. The harmony of private societies cannot
  weaken national efforts. To contribute by neighbourly intercourse and
  attention to make others happy is the shortest and surest way of
  being happy ourselves. As these sentiments seem to have directed your
  conduct, we should be as unwise as illiberal, were we not to preserve
  the same temper of mind.[70]

Truly this was a war of philosophers and gentlemen, and the courtly
generals of Louis XV would not have expressed more elegantly their
consideration for the enemy. Jefferson's declaration was no mere
gesture, for he struck up lasting friendships with several of the
prisoners. He was particularly interested in a young German officer,
Louis de Unger, who showed a remarkable talent for philosophy, in Baron
de Geismer with whom he kept up a correspondence for more than ten
years,[71] and in Major General Baron de Riedesel who, with his wife,
was a frequent guest at Monticello. To many of them Jefferson opened
his house, his library, and his dining room. He discussed philosophy and
agriculture with them, played duets on his violin, and sincerely
regretted the loss of that pleasant society when he had to leave after
his appointment as governor.[72]

Yet a sterner trait in his character was soon to be revealed. While the
British prisoners were described as "having thus found the art of
rendering captivity itself comfortable, and carried to execution, at
their own great expense and labor, their spirits sustained by the
prospect of gratifications rising before their eyes", the American
prisoners and noncombatants were receiving harsher treatment at the
hands of the British. War had become particularly atrocious after Indian
tribes had been encouraged to attack the insurgents, and this was an
offense that Jefferson could not condone. When Governor Hamilton of
Kaskakias, with his two lieutenants, Dejean and Lamothe, who had
distinguished themselves by their harsh policy, surrendered to Clark and
were brought to Virginia, Jefferson ordered them confined in the dungeon
of the public jail, put in irons and kept incommunicado. On General
Philips' protest Jefferson wrote to Washington to ask him for advice,
but added that in his opinion these prisoners were common criminals and
that he could "find nothing in Books usually recurred to as testimonials
of the Laws and usages of nature and nations which convicts the opinion
I have above expressed of error."[73] To Guy Carleton, Governor of
Canada, he answered that "we think ourselves justified in Governor
Hamilton's strick confinement on the general principle of National
retaliation", and no punishment was too severe for a man who had
employed "Indian savages whose known rule of warfare is an
indiscriminate butchery of men, women and children."[74]

When a few weeks later, upon Washington's request, the irons were taken
from the prisoners and a parole offered to them, Jefferson obeyed very
reluctantly and informed the general that "they objected to that part of
it which restrained them from _saying_ anything to the prejudice of the
United States" and insisted on "freedom of speech"; they were in
consequence remanded to their confinement in the jail, "which must be
considered as a voluntary one until they can determine with themselves
to be inoffensive in words as well as deeds."[75]

Even when the prisoners were freed, Jefferson wrote again to Washington:

  I shall give immediate orders for having in readiness every engine
  which the Enemy have contrived for the destruction of our unhappy
  citizens captivated by them. The presentiment of these operations is
  shocking beyond expression. I pray heaven to avert them: but nothing
  in this world will do it but a proper conduct in the Enemy. In every
  event I shall resign myself to the hard necessity under which I shall
  act.[76]

Writing the same day to Colonel George Mathews, Jefferson defined with
more precision what he understood by these "operations" when he declared
that "iron will be retaliated by iron, prison ships by prison ships, and
like for like in general."[77]

The faults of his own people did not find him any weaker, for he
declared: "I would use any powers I have for the punishment of any
officer of our own who should be guilty of excesses injustifiable under
the usages of civilized nations." He was not slow either in punishing
mutineers, in having the ringleaders seized in their beds "singly and
without noise" and in recommending cavalry, "as men on horseback have
been found the most certain Instrument of public punishment."[78]

This trait of Jefferson's character, hardly ever noticed, was no passing
mood. It was little apparent in ordinary circumstances, but it was to
reappear with the same stern inflexibility during the prosecution of
Aaron Burr twenty-five years later. The dreamer, the theorist, the
"philosopher" does not appear in the letters written by Jefferson during
his governorship. He was punctual, attentive to details and careful to
abide by the measures taken by the legislature. Yet he was subjected to
bitter criticism and a sort of legend grew up about his lack of
efficiency. He was approaching the end of his second term, which expired
on June 2, 1781, and the legislature, feeling that the present danger
required desperate action, was thinking of appointing a temporary
dictator. Although most decidedly opposed to the creation of such an
office, Jefferson believed that the appointment of a military leader was
highly desirable (Letter to Washington, May 28), and according to his
wishes General Nelson in command of the State troops was elected in his
place. But before the Assembly could come to a decision an unexpected
incident happened. It has been related at great length, and I am afraid
with some embellishments, by Randall, who reconstructed it from
Jefferson's papers and from the family traditions. Virginia was
literally overrun by the enemy, and the raids of the British cavalry
were a common occurrence. During one of these raids Tarleton attempted
to capture the legislature and almost succeeded in taking the governor.
The account of the incident, as I found it written by Jefferson, is far
less picturesque, but probably more reliable than the highly colored
narration of the biographer:

  This was the state of things when, his office having expired on the
  2^d June, & his successor not yet in place, Col. Tarlton, with his
  regiment of horse, was detached by L. Cornwallis, to surprise him
  (supposed to be still governor) & the legislature now sitting in
  Charlottesville, the Speakers of the two houses, & some other members
  of the legislature, were lodging with him at Monticello. Tarleton,
  early in the morning of June 4. when within 10 miles of that place,
  detached a company of horse to secure him & his guests, & proceeded
  himself rapidly with his main body to Charlottesville, where he hoped
  to find the legislature unapprised of his movement. notice of it
  however had been brought both to Monticello & Charlottesville about
  sunrise, by a Mr Jouett from Louisa, who seeing them pass his
  father's house in the evening of the 3.^d and riding through the
  night along by-ways, brought the notice. The Speakers, with their
  Colleagues returned to Charlottesville, & with the other members of
  the legislature, had barely time to get out of the way.[79]

A few days later Jefferson left Amherst and returned to Monticello which
he found practically undamaged; it was then that, riding to Poplar
Forest, he was thrown from his horse and so seriously hurt that he could
not ride horseback for several months. Shortly afterwards he learned
that some members of the legislature, probably irked by the humiliation
of having fled before the British raiders, not once, but several times,
were not unwilling to accuse the governor of having neglected to take
proper measures of defense. As I have found nowhere any indication to
contradict Jefferson's account of the incident, it had better be given
here in his simple words:

  I returned to Monticello July 26. & learning some time after that Mr
  George Nicholas, than a young man, just entered into the legislature
  proposed to institute some enquiry into my conduct before the
  legislature, a member from my county vacated his seat, & the county
  elected me, in his room, that I might vindicate myself on the floor
  of the house. thro' the intervention of a friend, I obtained from Mr.
  Nicholas a written note of the charges he proposed to bring forward &
  I furnished him in return the heads of the answers I should make. on
  the day appointed for hearing his charges he withdrew from the house;
  & no other undertaking to bring them forward, I did it myself in my
  place, from his paper, answering them verbatim to the house. the
  members had been witnesses themselves to all the material facts, and
  passed an unanimous vote of approbation, which may be seen on their
  journals. Mr. Nicholas was an honest and honorable man, & took a
  conspicuous occasion, many years after, of his own free will, & when
  the matter was entirely at rest, to retract publicly the erroneous
  opinions he had been led into on that occasion, and to make just
  reparation by a candid acknowledgment of them.[80]

This unfortunate incident revealed another fundamental trait of
Jefferson's character,--his total incapacity to accept public criticism
with equanimity. It was not until December 19, 1781, that he had the
opportunity of presenting his case before the legislature and of
receiving the vote of thanks intended "to obviate and remove all
unmerited censure." In the meantime, and because he did not wish to
leave a free field to his enemies, he had to decline a new appointment
from Congress, when on the fifteenth of June he was designated to join
the four American plenipotentiaries already in Europe. The letter was
transmitted through Lafayette, and to Lafayette alone Jefferson confided
his deep mortification at having to

  lose an opportunity, the only one I ever had and perhaps ever shall
  have, of combining public service with public gratification, of
  seeing countries whose improvements in science, in arts and
  civilization it has been my fortune to admire at a distance but never
  to see and at the same time of lending further aid to a cause which
  has been handed on from it's first organization to its present stage
  by every effort of which my poor faculties were capable. These
  however have not been such as to give satisfaction to some of my
  countrymen & it has become necessary for me to remain in the state
  till a later period, in the present year than is consistent with an
  acceptance of what has been offered me.[81]

A letter written to Edmund Randolph hints at other considerations which
"that one being removed, might prevent my acceptance." The family
record shows that Mrs. Jefferson was then expecting a child who was born
on November, 1781, and died in April of the following year. Jefferson
himself was far from being well and had not yet recovered from his
accident; but there is little doubt that he would have gladly seized the
opportunity to fulfill one of his earliest dreams and to visit Europe,
had he been free to go. However this may be, it was on this occasion
that he reiterated once more, but not for the last time, his wish to
return entirely and definitively to private life:

  Were it possible for me to determine again to enter into public
  business there is no appointment whatever which would have been so
  agreeable to me. But I have taken my final leave of everything of
  that nature. I have retired to my farm, my family and books from
  which I think nothing will evermore separate me. A desire to leave
  public office with a reputation not more blotted than it deserved
  will oblige me to emerge at the next session of our assembly &
  perhaps to accept of a seat in it, but as I go with a single object,
  I shall withdraw when that has been accomplished.[82]

I must confess that Jefferson's determination can scarcely be understood
or excused. He was not yet forty and, for a man of that age, his
achievements were unusual and many, but he had by no means outlived his
usefulness or fulfilled the tasks he had mapped out for himself. Even
supposing he had done enough for the United States and did not feel any
ambition to return to Congress, there was much to be done in Virginia.
For one thing the war was not over and the situation of his native
State, his "country", as he still called it, was as precarious as ever.
Even supposing the war to be of short duration and destined to end in
victory, the work of reconstruction loomed considerable upon the
horizon. Not only had plantations been burned, houses destroyed, cattle
killed off, Negroes decimated in many places, but the financial
resources of Virginia were nil, the currency depreciated and valueless.
Above all, republican institutions were far from secure, Jefferson was
not at all satisfied with the Constitution as adopted, there remained
many bills on the Revised Laws to be presented, defended, and approved.
The laws adopted so far might have laid the foundations of true
republican government, but the task was still enormous. Was Jefferson
irritated and despondent at the ingratitude of his fellow citizens who
had not rejected at once the charges made by Nicholas? Was he so alarmed
by the health of his wife that he did not feel that he could leave her
even for a few days? Was he not rather a victim of overwork and
overexertion? He had been severely shaken by his accident and seems to
have suffered at the time a sort of nervous breakdown, for on October
28, 1781, when writing to Washington to congratulate him on Cornwallis'
capitulation at Yorktown he deplores the "state of perpetual
decrepitude" to which he is unfortunately reduced and which prevents him
from greeting Washington personally.

Several of his best friends were unable to understand or condone his
retirement. Madison himself wrote to Edmund Randolph:[83]

  Great as my partiality is to Mr. Jefferson, the mode in which he
  seems determined to revenge the wrong received from his country does
  not appear to me to be dictated either by philosophy or patriotism.
  It argues, indeed, a keen sensibility and strong consciousness of
  rectitude. But his sensibility ought to be as great towards the
  relenting as the misdoings of the Legislature, not to mention the
  injustice of visiting the faults of this body on their innocent
  constituents.

Monroe, ardent friend and admirer of Jefferson's, was even more direct
when writing to acquaint his "master" with the criticism aroused by his
retirement. To which Jefferson answered with a letter in which he poured
out the bitterness of his heart. He first recited all his different
reasons for making his choice; the fact that after scrutinizing his
heart he had found that every fiber of political ambition had been
eradicated; that he had the right to withdraw after having been engaged
thirteen years in public service; that his family required his
attention; that he had to attend to his private affairs. But the true
reasons came only in the next paragraph:

  That however I might have comforted myself under the disapprobation
  of the well-meaning but uninformed people, yet that of their
  representatives was a shock on which I had not calculated.... I felt
  that these injuries, for such they have been since acknowledged, had
  inflicted a wound on my spirit which only will be cured by the
  all-healing grave.

The man who wrote these lines had an epidermis far too sensitive to
permit him to engage in politics and least of all in local politics.
Jefferson in these particular circumstances forgot the lesson of his old
friends the Greek and Latin philosophers--truly he was no Roman.

Yet we cannot regret very deeply Jefferson's determination to retire
from public life at that time, since to his retirement we owe his most
extensive literary composition, one of the first masterpieces of
American literature. During the spring of 1781 he had received from the
secretary of the French legation, Barbé-Marbois, a long questionnaire on
the present conditions of Virginia. During his forced inactivity, he
drew up a first draft which was sent to Marbois, but extensively
corrected and enlarged during the following winter. A few manuscript
copies were distributed to close friends, but the "Notes on Virginia"
were not published until 1787 and after they had been rather poorly
translated into French by Abbé Morellet.[84]

No other document is so valuable for a complete conspectus of
Jefferson's mind and theories at that time. But two important
observations must be made at the very outset. First of all the "Notes"
were not intended for publication, and as late as 1785 Jefferson wrote
to Chastellux that:

  the strictures on slavery and on the constitution of Virginia ... are
  the parts I do not wish to have made public, at least till I know
  whether their publication would do most harm or good. It is possible
  that in my own country these strictures might produce an irritation
  which would indispose the people towards the two great objects I have
  in view, that is the emancipation of their slaves & the settlement of
  their constitution on a firmer and more permanent basis.[85]

The second point is that the "Notes" were written for the use of a
foreigner of distinction, in answer to certain queries proposed by him.
Jefferson, therefore, is not responsible either for the plan of the
work, or the distribution into chapters, and he necessarily had to go
into more details than if he had written solely for his fellow
countrymen.

The twenty-three Queries cover such an enormous range of information and
contain such a mass of facts that it would have been physically
impossible for any one to complete the work in so short a time, if it
had been an impromptu investigation. We can accept without hesitation
the statement of the "Autobiography" on the methods of composition
employed in the "Notes":

  I had always made a practice whenever an opportunity occurred of
  obtaining any information of our country, which might be of use
  in any station public or private to commit it to writing. These
  memoranda were on loose papers, bundled up without order, and
  difficult of recurrence when I had occasion for a particular one.
  I thought this a good occasion to embody their substance, which I
  did in the order of Mr. Marbois' queries, so as to answer his wish
  and to arrange them for my own use.

The book was printed in France, in England, in Germany, and went through
many editions in America. It probably did more than any other
publication to propagate the doctrine of Americanism, for, in his
retreat of Monticello, Jefferson formulated the creed and gave final
expression to the hopes, aspirations, and feelings that were to govern
his country for several generations. It also gives a complete picture of
the mind of Jefferson at that date, when he thought he had accomplished
the task assigned to him and felt he could stop to take stock, not
merely of his native "country", but of the whole United States of
America.

Unimaginative, unpoetical, unwilling to express personal emotions as he
was, he had always been deeply moved by certain natural scenes. His
description of the Natural Bridge, the site of which he owned, is well
remembered.

  You involuntarily fall on your hands and feet, creep to the parapet,
  and peep over it. Looking down from this height about a minute, gave
  me a violent head ache. If the view from the top be painful and
  intolerable, that from below is delightful in an equal extreme. It is
  impossible for the emotions arising from the sublime to be felt
  beyond what they are here; so beautiful an arch, so elevated, so
  light, and springing as it were up to heaven, the rapture of the
  spectator is really indescribable!

The "passage of the Patowmac through the Blue ridge" is even more
famous, and the broad, peaceful, almost infinite scene is painted by the
hand of a master:

  It is a true contrast to the foreground. It is as placid and
  delightful as that is wild and tremendous. For the mountain being
  cloven asunder, she presents to your eye, through the cleft, a small
  catch of small blue horizon, at an infinite distance in the plain
  country, inviting you, as it were, from the riot and tumult roaring
  around, to pass through the breach to the calm below.

Only Bartram a few years later, and Chateaubriand at the beginning of
the next century, with much longer and more elaborate descriptions,
could equal or surpass these few strokes of description. Jefferson was
truly the first to discover and depict to Europeans the beauty of
American natural scenery, and to proclaim with genuine American pride
that "this scene is worth a voyage across the Atlantic--and is perhaps
one of the most stupendous in nature." It matters little that he
followed Voltaire in the origin of fossils, to decide timidly in 1787
that we must be contented to acknowledge that "this great phenomenon is
as yet unsolved." I shall not even remark on the completeness and
exactness of his list of plants, "medicinal, esculent, ornamental or
useful for fabrication", of which he gives the popular names as well as
the _Linnæan_, "as the latter might not convey precise information to a
foreigner", or on his list "of the quadrupeds of North America"; nor
shall I mention his long dissertation on "the bones of Mamoths" found on
the North American continent and his refutation of Buffon. Far more
interesting is his protest against the assertion of the great French
naturalist that "the animals common both to the old and new world are
smaller in the latter, that those peculiar to the new are in a smaller
scale, that those which have been domesticated in both have degenerated
in America." He composed with much tabulation a complete refutation of
Buffon's error, and demonstrated that plants as well as animals reached
a development hitherto unknown under the new conditions and the
favorable circumstances of the American climate.

When it came to the aborigines, he had little to say of the South
American Indians, but of North American Indians he could speak "somewhat
from his own knowledge" as well as from the observations of others
better acquainted with them and on whose truth and judgment he could
rely.

  Not only they are well formed in body and in mind as the _homo
  sapiens Europaeus_, but from what we know of their eloquence it is of
  a superior lustre.... I may challenge the whole orations of
  Demosthenes and Cicero, and of many more prominent orators, if
  Europe has furnished any more eminent, to produce a single passage,
  superior to the speech of Logan, a Mingo chief, to Lord Dunmore when
  Governor of this State.

But his temper was thoroughly aroused when he discovered that Abbé
Raynal had undertaken to apply the theory of Buffon to the white men who
had settled in America.

  If this were true and if climateric conditions were such as to
  prevent mental and physical growth there would be little hope for the
  newly constituted country to ever become a great nation. Nature
  itself pronouncing against the Americans what chance could they have
  to be able to ever come up to the level of the older nations.
  Sentenced to remain forever an inferior race, this struggle to
  conquer independence would have proved futile, and sooner or later,
  they would fall the prey of superior people.

Never before had Jefferson been so deeply stirred and moved, never
before had he felt so thoroughly American as in his spirited answer to
Raynal, when he claimed for the new-born country not only unlimited
potentialities, but actual superiority over the mother country:

  "America has not yet produced one good poet." When we shall have
  existed as a people as long as the Greeks did before they produced a
  Homer, the Romans a Virgil, the French a Racine and Voltaire, the
  English a Shakespeare and Milton, should this reproach be still true,
  we will inquire from what unfriendly causes it has proceeded, that
  the other countries of Europe and quarters of the earth shall not
  have inscribed any name in the roll of poet. But neither has America
  produced "one able mathematician, one man of genius in a single art
  or science." In war we have produced a Washington, whose memory will
  be adored while liberty shall have votaries, whose name will triumph
  over time, and will in future ages assume its just station among the
  most celebrated worthies of the world, when that wretched philosophy
  shall be forgotten which would have arranged him among the
  degeneracies of nature. In Physics we have produced a Franklin, than
  whom no one of the present age has made more important discoveries,
  nor has enriched philosophy with more, or more ingenious solutions of
  the phaenomena of nature.... As in philosophy and war, so in
  government, in oratory, in painting, in the plastic arts, we might
  show that America, though but a child of yesterday, has already given
  hopeful proofs of genius, as well as of the nobler kinds, which
  arouse the best feelings of man, which call him into action, which
  substantiate his freedom, and conduct him to happiness, as of the
  subordinate, which serve to amuse him only. We therefore suppose that
  this reproach is as unjust as it is unkind: and that, of the geniuses
  which adorn the present age, America contributes her full share....
  The present war having so long cut off all communications with Great
  Britain, we are not able to make a fair estimate of the state of
  science in the country. The spirit in which she wages war, is the
  only sample before our eyes, and that does not seem the legitimate
  offspring either of science or civilization. The sun of her glory is
  fast descending to the horizon. Her Philosophy has crossed her
  channel, her freedom the Atlantic, and herself seems passing to that
  awful dissolution whose issue is not given human foresight to scan.

This is the fullest and most complete expression of national
consciousness and national pride yet uttered by Jefferson. The American
eagle was spreading her wing and preparing to fly by herself. The
American transcended the Virginian and looked confidently at the future.

In Query VIII, we come again to a question of national importance. The
country being what it is, it would take at least one hundred years for
Virginia to reach the present square-mile population of Great Britain.
The question then arises whether a larger population being desirable,
the State should not encourage foreigners to settle in as large numbers
as possible. To unrestricted immigration, Jefferson, fearful for the
integrity of the racial stock, fearful also for the maintenance of
institutions so hardly won and yet so precariously established, was
unequivocally opposed. In a most remarkable passage he stated the very
reasons that after him were to be put forth again and again, until a
policy of selective and restrictive immigration was finally adopted. I
would not say that he was a hundred and fifty years ahead of his time,
but a hundred and fifty years ago he formulated with his usual "felicity
of expression", feelings and forebodings which existed more or less
confusedly in many minds. When he spoke thus he was more of a spokesman
than a prophet of America:

  Every species of government has its specific principles. Ours perhaps
  are more peculiar than those of any other in the universe. It is a
  composition of the freest principles of the English constitution,
  with others derived from natural right and natural reason. To these
  nothing can be more opposed than the maxims of absolute monarchies.
  Yet from such we are to expect the greatest number of immigrants.
  They will bring with them the principles of the governments they
  leave, imbibed in their early youth; or, if able to throw them off,
  it will be in exchange for an unbounded licentiousness, passing, as
  is usual, from one extreme to another. It would be a miracle were
  they to stop precisely at the point of temperate liberty. These
  principles, with their language, they will transmit to their
  children. In proportion to their numbers, they will share with us the
  legislation. They will infuse into it their spirit, warp and bias its
  directions, and render it a heterogeneous, incoherent, distracted
  mass.... Is it not safer to wait with patience 27 years and three
  months longer for the attainment of any degree of population desired
  or expected? May not our government be more homogeneous, more
  peaceable, more durable? Suppose 20 millions of republican Americans
  [were] thrown all of a sudden into France, what would be the
  condition of that kingdom? If it would be more turbulent, less happy,
  less strong, we may believe that the addition of half a million of
  foreigners to our present numbers would produce a similar effect
  here.... I mean not that these doubts should be extended to the
  importation of useful artificers.... Spare no expence in obtaining
  them. They will after a time go to the plough and to the hoe; but in
  the mean time they will teach us something we do not know.

Everything is there! That America is essentially and should remain an
Anglo-Saxon civilization; the fear that unassimilated immigration may
corrupt the institutions of the country and bring into it uneradicable
germs of absolutism; the admission even that America needs a certain
class of immigrants, of specialists to develop new arts and new
industries. In 1781, Jefferson was not only an American, but a hundred
per cent. American, and the sentiments he expressed then were to reëcho
in the halls of Congress through the following generations whenever the
question was discussed.

The government as it was presently organized was far from perfect--it
even had "very capital defects in it." First of all, it was not a truly
representative government since, owing to the representation by
counties, it happened that fourteen thousand men living in one part of
the country gave law to upwards of thirty thousand living in another; in
spite of the theoretical separation of powers, all the powers of
government, legislature, executive, and judiciary, were vested in the
legislative body. "The concentrating these in the same hands is
precisely the definition of despotic government." Assuming that the
present legislators of Virginia were perfectly honest and disinterested,
it would not be very long before a change might come, for "mankind soon
learn to make interested uses of every right and power which they
possess, or may assume."

  "With money we will get men," said Caesar, "and with men we will get
  money." ... They should look forward to a time, and that not a
  distant one, when a corruption in this, as in the country from which
  we derive our origin, will have seized the heads of the government,
  and be spread by them through the body of the people; when they will
  purchase the voices of the people, and make them pay the price. Human
  nature is the same in every side of the Atlantic and will be alike
  influenced by the same causes. The time to guard against corruptions
  and tyranny, is before they shall have gotten hold of us.

Before proceeding any further, it may be well to pause, in order to
analyze more carefully these statements of Jefferson's. It will soon
appear that they do not form a perfectly logical construction and are
not part of an _a priori_ system. He had proclaimed his faith in the
ultimate recognition of truth, but he did not believe that unaided truth
should necessarily prevail, for human nature being very imperfect, very
narrow and very selfish, the best institutions have a permanent tendency
to degenerate. Jefferson had already clearly in mind the famous maxim
"eternal vigilance is the price of liberty." It is this curious
combination of unshakable faith in the ultimate triumph of truth and
healthy pessimism as to the present possibilities, that distinguishes
Jefferson from the "closet politicians" and theoretical philosophers. It
is an alliance of the contraries which seems absurd to many Frenchmen,
but is often found in English statesmen, and is probably more common in
America than in any other nation. In this respect as in many others
Jefferson was typically American.

His criticism of the legislature came clearly from two different
motives. He attempted first of all to demonstrate to himself that the
Assembly that had listened to charges against him was not a truly
representative body, not only because the attribution of two delegates
to each county, irrespective of the population, was iniquitous, but also
because, owing to emergencies, the Assembly had come to decide
themselves what number would constitute a quorum. Thus an oligarchy or
even a monarchy could finally be substituted for a regular assembly by
almost imperceptible transitions. "_Omnia mala exempla a bonis orta
sunt; sed ubi imperium ad ignaros aut minus bonos pervenit novum illud
exemplum ab dignis et idoneis ad indignos et non idoneos fertur._"

This is nothing but a re-affirmation of the aristocratic doctrine of the
"Literary Bible." Once more, the aristocrat of mind revolts, for "when
power is placed in the hands of men who are ignorant or not so good, it
may be taken from those who are deserving and truly noble to be
transferred to unworthy and ignoble men." This is the constant
undercurrent which runs through Jefferson's political theories and
unexpectedly reappears at the surface from time to time. A government of
the best minds, elected by a populace sufficiently enlightened to select
the best minds,--such is at that time Jefferson's ideal of government.

On the other hand his attitude towards dictatorship, as it appears in
the "Notes on Virginia", is no less significant for a true estimate of
his character. Unless the views expressed there are carefully considered
and kept well in mind, we might fall into the common error of
attributing to some mysterious influence of the French Revolution and
the French philosophers the opinions expressed by Jefferson on
presidential tenure, during the debate on the Constitution and his
famous quarrel with Hamilton. As a matter of fact, he had expressed the
very same views already and even more emphatically on a previous
occasion, when George Nicholas had proposed in the Assembly "that a
Dictator be appointed in this Commonwealth who should have the power of
disposing of the lives and fortunes of the Citizens thereof without
being subject to account"; the motion seconded by Patrick Henry "been
lost only by a few votes."[86] One may even wonder if the accusation of
inefficiency against Jefferson had not been introduced by the same
George Nicholas, in order to clear the way for the appointment of a
dictator. Hence the impassioned tone of Jefferson's refutation. Deeply
stirred and deeply hurt in his _amour-propre_, Jefferson incorporated in
the "Notes on Virginia" the speech he would have made on the occasion
had he been an orator.

  How must we find our efforts and sacrifices abused and baffled, if
  we may still, by a single vote, be laid prostrate at the feet of
  one man. In God's name, from whence have they derived this power?
  Is it from any principle in our new constitution expressed or
  implied? Every lineament of that expressed or implied, is in full
  opposition to it.... Necessities which dissolve a government, do not
  convey its authority to an oligarchy or monarchy. They throw back
  into the hands of the people the powers they had delegated, and leave
  them as individuals to shift for themselves. A leader may offer, but
  not impose himself, nor be imposed on them. Much less can their necks
  be submitted to his sword, their breath be held at his will or
  caprice.... The very thought alone was treason against the people;
  was treason against mankind in general; as rivetting forever the
  chains which bow down their necks, by giving to their oppressors a
  proof which they would have trumpetted through the universe, of the
  imbecillity of republican government, in times of pressing danger, to
  shield them from harm. Those who assume the right of giving away the
  reins of government in any case, must be sure that the herd, whom
  they hand on to the rods and hatchet of the dictator, will lay their
  necks on the block when he shall nod to them. But if our assemblies
  supposed such a resignation in the people, I hope they mistook their
  character.... Searching for the foundations of this proposition, I
  can find none which may pretend a colour of right or reason, but the
  defect before developed, that there is no barrier between the
  legislative, executive, and judiciary departments.... Our situation
  is indeed perilous, and I hope my countrymen will be sensible of it,
  and will apply, at a proper season, the proper remedy; which is a
  convention to fix the constitution, to amend its defects, to bind up
  the several branches of government by certain laws, which, when they
  transgress, their acts shall become nullities; to render unnecessary
  an appeal to the people, or in other words a rebellion, on every
  infraction of their rights, on the peril that their acquiescence
  shall be construed into an intention to surrender those rights.

This is much more than an occasional outburst written under a strong
emotional stress. Jefferson had discovered in his own country the
existence of a group of men stanchly opposed to the republican form of
government, ready in an emergency to go beyond the powers that had been
delegated to them--not necessarily dishonest men, but dangerous because
they did not have a correct conception of their rights and duties. All
the controversy with the Federalists already exists in germ, in this
declaration, and Jefferson from the very first had taken his position.
The immediate effect was to sever the last bonds which still tied him to
the aristocratic spirit of the social class to which he belonged by
birth, and to make him raise a protest against the fact that, "the
majority of men in the state, who pay and fight for its support are
unrepresented in the legislature, the roll of freeholders entitled to
vote, not including generally the half of those on the roll of militia,
or of the tax gatherers."

"It has been thought that corruption is restrained by confining the
right of suffrage to a few of the wealthier people"; but experience has
shown, irrespective of any consideration of justice or right, that a
truly republican form of government is not safe in their hands. What
will be the conclusion? That suffrage must be extended so as to become
universal. The people themselves are the only safe depositories of
government. "If every individual which composes this mass participates
of the ultimate authority, the government will be safe; because the
corruption of the whole mass will exceed any private resources of
wealth." But if the people are the ultimate guardians of their
liberties, they must also be rendered the safe guardians of it. Hence
the necessity of providing for them an education adapted to the years,
the capacity, and the conditions of every one, and directed toward their
freedom and happiness. On this occasion Jefferson reproduced the view
already expressed in the Bill for the More General Diffusion of
Knowledge, as well as the tenor of the first section of the Bill for
Religious Freedom, but with new considerations which could scarcely be
incorporated in a statute.

Then comes a conclusion unexpected and revealing, a sort of pessimism
little in accordance with the supposed democratic faith of the writer;
there is no inherent superior wisdom in the people, but it happens that
under stress they so rise as to be superior to themselves, and it is for
those who direct the course of the State to make the best of this
fugitive opportunity:

  The spirit of the times may alter, will alter. Our rulers will become
  corrupt, our people careless. A single zealot may commence
  persecutions, and better men be his victims. It can never be too
  often repeated, that the time for fixing every essential right on a
  legal basis is while our rulers are honest, and ourselves united.
  From the conclusion of this war we shall go down hill. It will not
  then be necessary to resort every moment to the people for support.
  They will be forgotten therefore and their rights disregarded. They
  will forget themselves, but in the sole faculty of making money, and
  will never think of uniting to effect a due respect for their rights.
  The shackles, therefore, which shall not be knocked off at the
  conclusion of this war, will remain on us long, will be made heavier
  and heavier, till our rights shall revive or expire in a convulsion.

Is this a dreamer, a philosopher, a mere theorician, or a very alert and
keen politician with a high ideal and an exact realization of the
people's limitations? This pessimistic view of human nature and human
society did not make Jefferson entirely cynical, since he kept his faith
in his ideal and never questioned the eminent superiority of the
republican form of government. But he knew men too well to have faith in
their collective intelligence and disinterestedness, the naïve faith of
so many French philosophers. If in this passage Jefferson reminds one of
any French writers, it is not Rousseau, nor Helvétius, nor even
Montesquieu, but of Montaigne, the Mayor of Bordeaux, who after the
pestilence retired to his "Library" and composed his famous "Essais."
One may well understand why Jefferson took such care to recommend his
friends not to let the "Notes" out of their hands, and not to permit it
to be published in any circumstances. The French like to say "_toutes
les vérités ne sont pas bonnes à dire_"--these were truths that should
not be permitted to leak out and to circulate broadcast among the
people: at most they were good only to be disclosed to this élite who
had at heart the gradual betterment of the "plain people."

Jefferson's opposition to slavery rests on the same calculating motives.
The existence of slavery is as degrading for the master as for the
slave; it is destructive of the morals of the people, and of industry.

  And can the liberties of a nation be thought secure when we have
  removed their only firm basis, a conviction in the minds of the
  people that these liberties are the gift of God? That they are not to
  be violated but with his wrath?... It is impossible to be temperate
  and to pursue this subject through the various considerations of
  policy, of morals, of history natural and civil.

But it does not ensue that Negroes should ever be placed on a footing of
equality with the whites. To pronounce that they are decidedly inferior
would require long observation, and we must hesitate

  to degrade a whole race of men from the work in the scale of beings
  which their Creator may _perhaps_ have given them.... I advance it
  therefore, as a suspicion only, that the blacks, whether originally a
  distinct race, or made distinct by time and circumstance, are
  inferior to the whites in the endowment both of body and mind. It is
  not against experience to suppose that different species of the same
  genus, or varieties of the same species, may possess different
  qualifications. Will not a lover of natural history then, one who
  views the gradations in all the races of animals with the eye of
  philosophy, excuse an effort to keep those in the department of man
  as distinct as nature has formed them.

However the case may be, the blacks cannot be incorporated into the
State, and the only solution after they are emancipated and educated is
to "colonize them to such places as the circumstances of the time shall
render most proper, sending them out with arms, implements of household
and of the handicraft arts, seeds, pairs of the useful animals, etc.,
to declare them a free and independent people, and extend to them our
alliance and protection, till they shall have acquired strength." But
the freed slave "is to be removed beyond the reach of mixture", and the
purity of the white stock must be preserved.

Throughout the book Jefferson untiringly harps on the fact that American
civilization is different from any other that has developed in Europe,
and that principles of "economy" which apply to European nations should
not be transferred "without calculating the difference of circumstance
which should often produce a difference of results." The main difference
lies in the fact that while in Europe "the lands are already cultivated,
or locked up against the cultivator, we have an immensity of land
courting the industry of the husbandman." America is essentially
agricultural, and agricultural it must remain:

  Those who labour in the earth are the chosen people of God, if ever
  he had a chosen people, whose breasts he has made his peculiar
  deposit for substantial and genuine virtue. It is the focus in which
  he keeps alive that sacred fire, which otherwise might escape from
  the face of the earth. Corruption of morals in the mass of
  cultivators is a phaenomenon of which no age nor nation has furnished
  an example.... While we have land to labour then, let us never wish
  to see our citizens occupied at a work-bench, or twirling a distaff.
  Carpenters, masons, smiths, are wanting in husbandry: but, for the
  general operations of manufacture, let our work-shops remain in
  Europe. It is better to carry provisions and materials to work men
  there, than bring them to the provisions and materials, and with them
  their manners and principles.

This vision of an American entirely given to agricultural pursuits may
look Utopian in the extreme, and would be Utopian if Jefferson had
really believed that it was susceptible of becoming an actual fact. But,
in practice, this ideal was on the contrary subject to many adjustments
and modifications.

Jefferson's relativism is even more clearly marked in the last chapter,
which forms the real conclusion of the book. It outlines the future
policy of the United States with regard to foreign nations; it
formulates a peaceful ideal which has remained on the whole the ideal of
America. Once more it illustrates that curious balancing of two contrary
principles so characteristic of the philosopher of Americanism as well
as of the country itself.

  Young as we are, and with such a country before us to fill with
  people and with happiness, we should point in that direction the
  whole generative force of nature, wasting none of it in efforts of
  mutual destruction. It should be our endeavour to cultivate the peace
  and friendship of every nation, even of that which has injured us
  most, when we shall have carried our point against her. Our interest
  will be to open the doors of commerce, and to knock off all its
  shackles, giving perfect freedom to all persons for the want of
  whatever they may choose to bring into our ports, and asking the same
  in theirs. Never was so much false arithmetic employed on any
  subject, as that which has been employed to persuade nations that it
  is their interest to go to war. Were the money which it has cost to
  gain, at the close of a long war, a little town, or a little
  territory, the right to cut wood here, to catch fish there, expended
  in improving what we already possess, in making roads, opening
  rivers, building ports, improving the arts and finding employment for
  their idle poor, it would render them much stronger, much wealthier
  and happier.

"This," adds Jefferson, "I hope will be our wisdom." But it is only a
hope and circumstances which cannot be changed by pious hopes exist and
have to be confronted. In order to avoid every cause of conflict it
would be necessary to abandon the ocean altogether, and "to leave to
others to bring what we shall want, and to carry what we shall spare."
This unfortunately is impossible, since a large portion of the American
people are attached to commerce and insist on following the sea. What
then is the answer?--Preparedness.--"Wars then must sometimes be our
lot; and all the wise can do, will be to avoid that half of them which
would be produced by our own follies, and our own acts of injustice; and
to make for the other half the best preparations one can."

One would not have to search long in the speeches of Woodrow Wilson to
find the same idea expressed in almost identical terms. Even a
Republican president such as Mr. Coolidge did not speak differently,
when he simultaneously proposed conferences of disarmament and
recommended that appropriation for the navy be enormously increased.
This combination of will to peace, these reiterations of the pacific
policies of the United States have been since the early days combined
with the fixed determination to maintain a naval force adequate to cope
with any attacking force. For such is the policy advocated by Jefferson.
One should not be deceived by his very modest statement, "the sea is the
field on which we should meet an European enemy. On that element it is
necessary that we should possess some power." What he proposes is simply
the building in one year of a fleet of thirty ships, eighteen of which
might be ships of the line, and twelve frigates, with eighteen hundred
guns. And he significantly adds, "I state this only as one year's
possible exertion, without deciding whether more or less than a year
should be thus applied." But, so as not to leave any potential aggressor
in doubt as to the resources of America, he mentions that this naval
force should by no means be "so great as we are able to make it."

After stating categorically his principles, Jefferson did not object to
minor modifications when it came to practice. As early as the winter of
1781 he had found and determined the main tenets of his political
philosophy. It was essentially American and practical. The idea never
entered his mind that in order to establish an American government it
was necessary to make a _tabula rasa_ of what existed before. As a
matter of fact, Americans had certain vested rights through several
charters enumerated by Jefferson in answer to Query XIII; they had
revolted in defense of these rights, but the principles of their
government, "perhaps more peculiar than those of any other in the
universe", were simply "a composition of the freest principles of the
English constitution, with others derived from natural right and natural
reason." Essentially "founded in common law as well as common right", it
was not necessarily the best possible form of government or the only one
imaginable, "for every species of government has its specific
principle." But despite its imperfections, it was better adapted to
American conditions than any other that could be devised. At that time,
at least, Jefferson did not seem to suspect that it could be taken as a
model by any other nations, or that its main principles would prove so
"contagious." The situation of America was unique. Unlimited
agricultural lands extended to the west, and one could estimate that it
would take at least a century to reach a density of population
comparable to that of the British Isles. For a long time America would
remain mainly agricultural, with a population scattered in farms instead
of being concentrated in large cities, and would keep many of the
virtues inherent in country life. In addition, the country would be
practically free from any attack by land, as she had no powerful
neighbors. She was geographically isolated from the rest of the world,
and even if she were attacked by sea, it would be by a fleet operating
far from its base and therefore at a disadvantage. No permanent army had
to be maintained and a comparatively small fleet would suffice for
protection. Free from the ordinary "sores" of civilization, not yet
wealthy but prosperous, for, says Jefferson "I never saw a native
American begging in the streets or highways", a country peaceful and
with hatred towards none, not even to "that nation which has injured us
most",--such is the ideal picture of America drawn by Jefferson for
himself and his French correspondent during the winter of 1781-1782.

Whatever faults existed would be corrected in time. If slavery could be
abolished and the last vestiges of an hereditary aristocracy eradicated,
little would be left to be desired. Yet it would not be a complete
Arcadia, for Jefferson did not believe that a state of perfection once
reached could be maintained without effort. Several dangers would always
threaten America. The influx of foreigners might alter the character of
her institutions. In spite of her peaceful ideals, dangers from the
outside might threaten her prosperity. But on the whole, the country,
even in its "infant state", was in no wise inferior to any European
nation. In all the sciences it gave promise of extraordinary
achievements. In architecture, to be sure, it seemed that "a genius has
shed its malediction over this land", but artists and artisans could be
induced to come, and even if America never reached the artistic
proficiency of some European nations, it was and would remain more
simple, more frugal, more virtuous than nations whose population
congregate in large cities.

Such, briefly told, is the conception of Americanism reached by
Jefferson when he wrote the "Notes on Virginia." He had not had any
direct contact with Europe, but he had read enormously and he had come
to the conclusion that, reasonably secure against foreign aggressions,
keeping her commerce at a minimum, America could develop along her own
lines and, reviving on a new land the old Anglo-Saxon principles
thwarted by kingly usurpations and church fabrications, bring about an
Anglo-Saxon millennium which no other country might ever dream of
reaching. It now remains to see to what extent and under what influences
Jefferson came to modify certain of his conclusions, following his
prolonged contact with Europe.




CHAPTER IV

A STATESMAN'S APPRENTICESHIP


The year 1782 was for Jefferson a year of trial and suffering. A child
was born to Mrs. Jefferson on May 8; she never recovered fully and soon
it appeared that she was irrevocably doomed. This tragic, touching story
had better be told in the simple words of his daughter Martha, then nine
years of age:

  As a nurse no female had ever more tenderness nor anxiety. He nursed
  my poor mother in turn with aunt Carr and her own sister--sitting up
  with her and administering her medicines and drink to the last. For
  four months that she lingered he was never out of calling; when not
  at her bed-side, he was writing in a small room which opened
  immediately at the head of her bed. A moment before the closing
  scene, he was led from the room in a state of insensibility by his
  sister, Mrs. Carr, who with great difficulty, got him into the
  library, where he fainted, and remained so long insensible that they
  feared he never would revive. The scene that followed I did not
  witness, but the violence of his emotion, when, almost by stealth, I
  entered his room by night, to this day I dare not describe to myself.
  He kept his room three weeks, and I was never a moment from his side.
  He walked almost incessantly night and day, only lying down
  occasionally, when nature was completely exhausted, on a pallet that
  had been brought in during his long fainting fit. My aunts remained
  constantly with him for some weeks--I do not remember how many. When
  at last he left his room, he rode out, and from that time he was
  incessantly on horseback, rambling about the mountain, in the least
  frequented roads, and just as often through the woods. In those
  melancholy rambles I was his constant companion--a solitary witness
  to many a burst of grief, the remembrance of which has consecrated
  particular scenes of that lost home beyond the power to obliterate.

In Jefferson's prayer book is found this simple entry:

"Martha Wayles Jefferson died September 6, 1782, at 11 o'clock 45
minutes A.M."

She was buried in the little enclosure in which rested already three of
her children; on a simple slab of white marble her husband had the
following inscription engraved:

  To the memory of
  Martha Jefferson,
  Daughter of John Wayles:
  Born October 19th, 1748 O.S.
  Intermarried with
  Thomas Jefferson
  January 1st 1772;
  Torn from him by death
  September 6th 1782
  This monument of his love is inscribed

  [Greek: Ei de thanontôn per katalêthont' ein Haidao,
  Autar egô kakeithi philou memnêsom' hetairou.][87]

  If in the house of Hades men forget their dead
  Yet will I even there remember my dear companion.

Whether, as Tucker thought, Jefferson selected a Greek quotation so as
not to make any display of his feelings to the casual passer-by, or
whether Greek had so really become his own habit of thought that he
could not think of any better way to express his grief, is a matter of
conjecture. He was not the man to speak of himself and his sorrows, even
to his closest friends. But it was probably at this time that he wrote
these lines found after his death in his pocketbook: "There is a time in
human suffering when exceeding sorrows are but like snow falling on an
iceberg", and in Latin, "_Heu quanto minus est cum reliquis versari quam
tui meminisse._"

At thirty-nine he was left a widower with a house full of children.
Martha, born in 1772, Mary born in 1778, Lucy Elizabeth, the baby just
born, who was to die two years later, and in addition the children of
his friend and brother-in-law Carr, whom he had adopted at the death of
their father. As soon as he had recovered from the first shock,
Jefferson went with the children to the house of Colonel Archibald Cary,
at Ampthill, in Chesterfield County, where he had them inoculated for
the smallpox. "While engaged as their chief nurse on the occasion, he
received notice of his appointment by Congress as Plenipotentiary to
Europe, to be associated with Dr. Franklin and Mr. Adams in negotiating
peace (November 13,1782)."[88]

He was just emerging from the stupor of mind which had rendered him "as
dead to the world as she whose loss occasioned it."[89] It appeared to
him that "public interest and the state of his mind concurred in
recommending the change of scene proposed; and he accepted the
appointment."[90]

The next three months were spent in preparing for the journey. He made
arrangements for his children and wrote a very touching letter to
Washington, evincing once more that reluctance to express affectionate
feeling so often found in Americans, a result of early education and
training as much as of the national temperament: "Were I to indulge
myself in those warm effusions which this subject forever prompts, they
would wear an appearance of adulation very foreign to my nature; for
such is the prostitution of language, that sincerity has no longer
distinct terms in which to express her own truths."[91]

The ship that was to carry him to France was caught in the ice at the
entrance of the Chesapeake, with no prospect of sailing before the
beginning of March. When news came early in February that the
negotiations were making satisfactory progress, he felt some doubts
about the desirability of a voyage which entailed so much expense, and
placed the matter in the hands of Congress. It was not until April 1,
however, that he was informed that the object of his appointment was "so
far advanced as to render [it] unnecessary for him to pursue his
voyage." He left for Virginia a few days afterwards. For the third time
his plans for visiting Europe had been thwarted, but he does not seem to
have resented it so deeply as previously.

The wounds inflicted to his _amour-propre_ by the Virginia Assembly were
healing. He had renewed his contact with public affairs, and when, on
June 6, he was chosen as delegate to Congress, with Samuel Hardy, John
F. Mercer, Arthur Lee, and James Monroe, he accepted without hesitation.
The two years which were to elapse between June, 1782, and July 5, 1784,
the date of his final departure from France on the _Ceres_, are not the
most eventful or the most picturesque of Jefferson's career. In many
respects, however, they are the fullest and the most important for a
true understanding of his mind and character. In the absence of Franklin
and Adams he stood out in Congress, head and shoulders above his
colleagues; he was placed on most of the important committees, he
completed his acquaintance with the internal and foreign policies of the
United States, he reported on measures of vital importance and
crystallized his opinion on fundamental problems.

Before being chosen as a delegate to Congress, Jefferson had already
decided "to lend a hand to the laboring oar" and to participate in the
affairs of his State, if not as a legislator at least as an adviser and
counsellor. From the conversation he had held in Richmond with "as many
members" of the Assembly "as he could",[92] he had concluded that
Virginia was ready to call a convention to revise the Constitution of
1776. On June 17 he wrote again to Madison, inclosing his ideas on the
"amendments necessary." No convention was called at that time, but
Jefferson's memorandum was printed in pamphlet form later in Paris, and
he added it to his "Notes on Virginia." First of all he reassured that
the Constitution of 1776 had no legal permanent value, being simply the
result of the deliberation of a General Assembly, in no way different
from the succeeding Assemblies. A power superior to that of the ordinary
legislature could alone have authority to decide on a constitution. This
could only be done by recommending "the good people of the State" to
choose delegates "with powers to form a constitution of government for
them, and to declare those fundamentals to which all our laws present
and future shall be subordinate." Many of the provisions of the proposed
constitution were not original and, as indicated by Jefferson himself in
his letter to Madison, had been tried in other States. The document,
however, may serve to illustrate the progress accomplished by Jefferson
in the science of government since he had written his first State paper,
and to show how far he still remained from his reputed views on
democracy.

Although still a free State, Virginia was no longer completely
independent, since she had entered a society of States, and it was
acknowledged that: "The confederation is made a part of this
constitution, subject to such future alterations as shall be agreed to
by the legislature of this State, and by all the other confederating
States."

Almost universal suffrage was granted, the vote being given to "All free
male citizens of full age, and sane mind, who for one year before shall
have been resident in the country, or shall through the whole of that
time have possessed therein real property to the value of ----, or shall
for the same time have been enrolled in the militia."

This was an immediate consequence of the contractual concept of society
and it is not without some interest to remark that this principle stood
in direct contradiction to the physiocratic doctrine; for it was the
contention of the Physiocrats that, society resting essentially on real
property, those who own the land can alone participate in the government
of the country. If, on the contrary, society is considered as an
association of men who agree to live together in order to secure fuller
enjoyment of their fundamental rights, all the signatories to the
compact must have the same rights as well as the same obligations in the
government of the association thus formed.[93]

Yet it remained understood that the voters were not to be intrusted with
all the details of government, and Jefferson thought it desirable to
establish certain safeguards against the possible lack of knowledge of
the electors. They chose delegates and senators, but the governor was to
be appointed by joint ballot of both houses of the Assembly, and the
same procedure was to be followed in choosing a Council of State to
advise the governor, the judges of the High Court of Chancery, the
General Court and Court of Admiralty, while the judges of inferior
courts were to be appointed by the governor on recommendation of the
Council of State. The powers of the governor were to be strictly limited
and it was made clear that although the old English title was preserved,
the chief executive of the State had "none of the powers exercised under
our former government by the Crown": "We give him those powers only
which are necessary to execute the laws (and administer the government),
and which are not in their nature either legislative or judiciary." The
governor had a sort of suspensive veto. The military was to be
subordinate to the civil power, and the printing press to be subject to
no other restraint but liability to legal prosecution for false facts
printed and published. The plan provided also for the gradual abolition
of slavery after the year 1800.

The most remarkable feature of this scheme was the strict imitation of
popular participation in the government. The only power recognized as
belonging to the people was that of selecting delegates to both Houses,
and of appointing delegates to a constitutional convention whenever "any
of the three branches of the government, concurring in opinion each by
the voice of two-thirds of their existing number, decided that such a
convention is necessary for amending the constitution." We are very far
from government by referendum and even by periodic elections, since none
of the State officials were directly appointed by the people. Jefferson
had not at that time departed from his fundamental idea that government
must be placed in the hands of well-qualified experts, carefully
selected and appointed. The "Constitution of Virginia" was a "true form
of Republican government", but by no means demagogical or even truly
democratic. Curiously enough, and through mere coincidence, the
essential features of the present constitution of France closely
resemble the general outline of the plan proposed by Jefferson. This
alone should suffice to demonstrate how far he was at that time from
accepting and propounding some of the main tenets of the so-called
Jeffersonian democracy. But Virginia was not yet ready for a change; the
constitutional convention was not called, and nothing had been done when
Jefferson left the State late in November, arriving at Annapolis on the
twenty-fourth.

Much to his disgust, he found that, after a fortnight, the delegates
from only six States had appeared and that it was impossible to transact
any serious business. The Treaty of Commerce had been received and was
referred to a committee of which Jefferson was chairman, but a bare
quorum was not assembled until December 13, and on the twenty-third,
according to the "Autobiography", it was necessary to send to several
governors a letter "stating the receipt of the definitive treaty; that
seven States only were in attendance, while nine were necessary to its
ratification."

In the meantime Washington had come to Annapolis to resign his
commission, in circumstances which can scarcely have been as impressive
as is generally related, since the whole program carefully laid out by
Jefferson took place before a bare majority of Congress. The rest of the
month was spent in discussing whether the treaty could be ratified by
less than nine states. It soon appeared that "there now remained but
scanty sixty-seven days for the ratification, for its passage across the
Atlantic and its exchange. There was no hope of our soon having nine
States present; in fact that this was the ultimate point of time to
which we could venture to wait; that if the ratification was not in
Paris by the time stipulated, the treaty would become void...."--On
January 13, delegates from Connecticut attended, and the next day a
delegate from Carolina having arrived, "the treaty was ratified without
a dissenting vote."

This was for Jefferson a most profitable experience. As chairman of the
committee, he had to familiarize himself with questions of foreign
policies and foreign commerce. He had also to put aside whatever
remnants of sectionalism and provincialism he unconsciously retained and
he realized that "Those United States being by their constitution
consolidated into one federal republic, they be considered in all such
treaties & in every case arising under them as one nation under the
principles of the Federal Constitution."[94]

The same principle is reasserted more strongly in the "Draft for
proclamation announcing ratification of definitive treaties", in which
all the good citizens of the United States are enjoined to reverence
"those stipulations entered into on their behalf under the authority of
that federal (moral, political and legal bond) whereby they are called,
by which their existence as an independent people is bound up together,
and is known and acknowledged by the nations of the world."[95]

On January 16, Jefferson wrote to Governor Harrison enumerating the
important objects before Congress:

  1. Authorizing our Foreign minister to enter into treaties of
  alliance and commerce with the several nations who have deserved it;
  2. Arranging the domestic administration; 3. Establishing arsenals &
  ports on our frontiers; 4. Disposing of Western Territory; 5.
  Treaties of peace and purchase with the Indians; 6. Money.

A full program, requiring for the adoption of any measure the
concurrence of nine States, while barely nine were present, seven of
which were represented only by two members each; "any of these fourteen
gentlemen differing from the rest would stay the proceedings", and it
seemed very doubtful whether anything could be achieved during the
session.

This brought home to Jefferson the fact that the concentration of the
executive functions in Congress was an obstacle to carrying out
effectively the business of the Confederation, and he thought it his
duty to point out this defect in his "draft of the report on a committee
of the States", January 30, 1784. It was a lengthy report, not very
accurately summed up in the "Autobiography", authorizing a permanent
Committee of the States to act as executive during the recess of
Congress, and enumerating very minutely the powers that such a committee
might exercise and those from which it would be excluded. The plan as
adopted was somewhat different and it was resolved: "That the Committee
should possess all the powers which may be exercised by the seven States
in Congress assembled", except concerning foreign relations.

Jefferson recalled in the "Autobiography" that during the following
recess the committee quarrelled, split into two parties, "abandoned
their posts, and left the government without any visible head, until the
next meeting of Congress." He significantly added: "We have since seen
the same thing take place in the Directory of France; and I believe it
will forever take place in any executive consisting of a plurality. Our
plan,--best, I believe,--combines wisdom and practicality; by providing
a plurality of Counsellors, but a single Arbiter for ultimate decision."
This conclusion was already reached in 1784, not following a logical
reasoning, or because of an innate need of unity, but as a result of
experience. Very early in his life Jefferson became convinced that the
country could not be properly administered unless the executive powers
were concentrated in one responsible person, with powers strictly
defined, but left free to act and to act rapidly within that field. This
explains, among other things, not only Jefferson's approval of the
powers granted to the Executive under the Constitution, but also his
conduct during his two terms as President.

He soon had an opportunity to study the financial problems of the
Confederation, when a "grand Committee of Congress" was appointed to
take up the Federal expenses for the current year, inclusive of articles
of interest on the public debts foreign and domestic.[96] He presented
on March 22 a "Report on the Arrears of Interest", in which were
carefully tabulated not only the interest on sums due on account of the
national debts but an estimate of the expenses for the year 1784,--in
other words a budget. An outgrowth of the work assigned to the Committee
was the _establishment of a money unit, and of a coinage for the United
States_. The report of Jefferson retained some of the essential
provisions of the proposal drawn up by the "Financier of the U.S."
(Robert Morris, assisted by Governor Morris), and Jefferson himself did
not claim so much originality for it as has been given him by some of
his biographers. The report of the financier proposed that the new
coins "should be in decimal proportions to one another", and this was
retained. On the other hand, Morris had proposed as a unit "the 1440th
part of a dollar", after taking into consideration the old currencies,
"all of which this unit measures without leaving a fraction." Jefferson
pointed out that, although theoretically perfect, the unit was much too
complicated and too small, and he maintained that the unit should be the
Spanish dollar "a known coin, and the most familiar of all to the minds
of the people." ... "It is already adopted from South to North," he
added, "has identified our currency, and therefore happily offers itself
as a Unit already introduced."

In spite of the financier's opposition, the plan as amended by Jefferson
was finally adopted and still constitutes the essential foundation of
the American monetary system. To the student of psychology this incident
affords another illustration of Jefferson's practical-mindedness. Having
to choose between two solutions, one mathematically perfect, and another
one simply regulating and organizing what already existed, he did not
hesitate a minute and practical considerations prevailed at once in his
mind.

In the meantime he was working on one of his most important State
papers. Randall called attention to it and P. L. Ford maintained that
"next to the Declaration of Independence (if indeed standing second to
that) this document ranks in historical importance of all those drawn by
Jefferson; and, but for its being superseded by the 'Ordinance of 1787',
would rank among all American state papers immediately after the
National Constitution."[97] Yet it does not seem that its value is
generally recognized and it is but seldom listed as one of the
outstanding achievements of Jefferson. For reasons that will shortly
appear, Jefferson himself neglected to mention it in his
"Autobiography." It is a capital document by which to understand the
growth of the Jeffersonian doctrine.

First of all, it resolved that "so much of the territory ceded or to be
ceded by individual States to the United States as is already purchased
or shall be purchased of the Indian inhabitants & offered for sale by
Congress, shall be divided into distinct states." Which simply meant
that the westward growth of the country, instead of being left to the
initiative of the individual States, was placed under the ægis of the
Confederation and thus became a matter of national importance and
significance. It provided for a practically unlimited expansion of the
United States by the establishment of States analogous to the already
existing Confederacy. It also insisted strongly that all such territory
be connected as closely as possible with the already existing Union.
Settlers in any of the territories thus organized, had authority to
establish a temporary government, adopting with due modification the
constitution and laws of any of the original States. A permanent
government was to be established in any State as soon as it should have
acquired a population of twenty thousand free inhabitants, provided, and
here we probably have the most important provisions:

  1. That they shall forever remain a part of this confederacy of the
  United States of America. 2. That in their persons, property and
  territory they shall be subject to the Government of the United
  States in Congress assembled & to the articles of confederation....
  4. That their respective Governments shall be in republican forms and
  shall admit no person to be a citizen who holds any hereditary title.
  5. That after the year 1800 of the Christian aera, there shall be
  neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in any of the said states.

Finally, "whenever any of the said States shall have, of free
inhabitants, as many as shall then be in any one of the least numerous,
of the thirteen original States, such State will be admitted by it's
delegates into the Congress of the United States on an equal footing
with the said United States."

This report, submitted March 1, recommitted to the committee March 17,
was considered again by Congress on April 19, 21, 23, and adopted after
amendment by every State except one. But the amendment took the teeth
out of the report, since the clause referring to slavery was struck out,
as well as that concerning the admission of persons holding hereditary
titles. Other provisions concerning the names to be given to the new
States were also eliminated. The scholar reappeared in these
suggestions. If Jefferson's original motion had been accepted, the
present State of Michigan would wear the name of _Chersonesus_ and on
the map of the United States would appear such designations as
_Metropotamia_, _Polypotamia_, and _Pilisipia_.[98]

Finally Jefferson intended to complete the organization and expansion of
the United States with "An ordinance establishing a Land Office" for the
United States "to give sure title to the settlers and determine the
division and subdivision into lots" which was defeated, an entirely new
ordinance being adopted April 26, 1785.[99]

The most striking feature of all these bills was the eagerness of
Jefferson to consolidate the Union and to strengthen Federal bonds. With
a common monetary unit, common interest in a large territory just
acquired by cession from Virginia, one more thing remained to be
settled: the organization of permanent relations with foreign nations,
that is to say, the conclusion of commercial treaties.

It had appeared very soon to Jefferson that if such treaties were to be
concluded it was desirable to adopt a working policy outlined in his
"Resolves on European Treaties."[100] To have foreign plenipotentiaries
come to the United States, discuss with the badly organized body called
the Continental Congress, whose members would have to report to their
legislatures and after interminable delays accept or reject the
proposal, was an impossible procedure. This distrust of Congress was
amply justified at the time, and one may wonder whether satisfactory
treaties could ever have been concluded under the supervision of
Congress; Jefferson therefore proposed that ministers be sent to Europe
to negotiate with the old and established nations, who could not be
expected to cross the Atlantic.

On May 7, Congress agreed on _Instructions to the Ministers
Plenipotentiary appointed to negotiate treaties of Commerce with the
European Nations_. Once more it was proclaimed:

"That these United Sates be considered in all such treaties, and in
every case arising under them, as one nation, upon the principle of the
Federal constitution."

It was also deemed "advantageous that treaties be concluded with Russia,
the Court of Vienna, Prussia, Denmark, Saxony, Hamburg, Great Britain,
Spain, Portugal, Genoa, Tuscany, Rome, Naples, Venice, Sardinia and the
Ottoman Porte. That treaties of amity and commerce be entered into with
Morocco, and the Regencies of Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli. To have
supplementary treaties with France, the United Netherlands and Sweden in
order to incorporate the new policies of the United States."

The plan of treaties contained some remarkable provisions; they were
clear departures, not from the theory of international law and _droit
des gens_, as Jefferson had found it in the authorities consulted, but
from the actual policy of the European nations.

Thus it was proposed that in case of war between the two contracting
parties,

  The merchants of either country, then residing in the other shall be
  allowed to remain nine months to collect their debts and settle their
  affairs, and may depart freely, carrying off all their effects,
  without molestation or hinderance, and all fishermen, all cultivators
  of the earth, and all artisans or manufacturers, unarmed and
  inhabiting unfortified towns, villages or places, who labor for the
  common subsistence and benefit of mankind, and peaceably follow
  their respective employments, shall be allowed to continue the same.

That "neither of the contracting powers shall grant or issue any
commission to any private armed vessels, empowering them to take or
destroy such trading ships, or interrupt such commerce."

In case of war with another nation, "no merchandize heretofore called
contraband, such as arms, ammunition and military stores of all
kinds,... shall, on any account, be deemed contraband, so as to induce
confiscation, and a loss of property to individuals." The right to
detain vessels carrying such goods a reasonable length of time was
granted, as well as the right not to seize, but "to purchase" military
stores with a reasonable compensation to the proprietors; in all cases
the owners of the ships delayed were to receive a compensation. But all
vessels not carrying contraband were to be entirely free, adding that a
blockade in order to be recognized had to be effectual, but even in that
case "no vessel of the party who is not engaged in the said war, shall
be stopped without a material and well-grounded cause."

Besides these general provisions, it was recommended that "each party
shall have a right to carry their own produce, manufactures, and
merchandise in their own bottoms to the ports of the others, and thence
the produce and merchandise of the other, paying, in both cases, such
duties only as are paid by the most favored nations."

A paragraph was intended specially for the commerce with the West
Indies, "desiring that a direct and similar intercourse be admitted
between the United States and possessions of the nations holding
territorial possessions in America."

Finally, as Jefferson as well as his contemporaries were already fearful
of seeing any influx of foreigners settle in their country and dominate
the infant government, it was stipulated that no right be accorded to
aliens to hold real property within these States, this being "utterly
inadmissible by their several laws and policy."

From the European point of view many things were inadmissible in the
plan of treaties. To request the nations of the Old World not only to
abandon privateering, but to relinquish their definitions of contraband
and their commercial monopolies with their own colonies, was something
which must have appeared as the wild dream of a people unexperienced in
the handling of foreign relations. As a matter of fact, the treaties
were never signed. But if the principles formulated by Jefferson were
not accepted by the European powers, they remained nevertheless an
essential part of the foreign policy of the United States.

On the very day the "Instructions" were adopted, Jefferson was appointed
Minister Plenipotentiary to "negotiate treaties of commerce with foreign
nations in conjunction with Mr. John Adams and Dr. Franklin." No man in
Congress was better qualified for such a mission. His work for two years
on several important committees had acquainted him with the main
problems of the Union. He had demonstrated his ability to present clear
reports on the most intricate questions. He had completed his
apprenticeship of men and things; but it may be wondered whether the
delegates who recommended his appointment were not impelled by ulterior
motives. The stand taken by Jefferson on slavery had made him decidedly
unpopular with the Southern delegates. He had opposed the original
statutes of the Order of Cincinnati, in which he saw the beginnings of a
new aristocracy. He had made enemies as well as friends and could write
to Washington that an experience of twenty years had taught him "that
few friendships stand this test, & that public assemblies, where
everyone is free to act & to speak, are the most powerful looseners of
private friendship." The petty discussions in Congress, the long
speeches he had to listen to, the quibbling, lack of initiative and
lack of national spirit of the delegates had thoroughly disgusted him.
Before receiving his appointment he had already repented of his return
to public life and had signified his intention of going back to his
beloved Monticello.

  I have determined--he wrote to Washington--to take no active part in
  this or anything else, which may lead to altercation, or disturb that
  quiet & tranquillity of mind to which I consign the remaining portion
  of my life. I have been thrown back by events on a stage where I had
  never more thought to appear. It is but for a time, however, & as a
  day laborer, free to withdraw, or be withdrawn at will.[101]

He seized with eagerness the opportunity of visiting older civilizations
and enjoying a change of scenes. Having hastily cancelled his order for
printing a few copies of the "Notes on Virginia", he at once made
preparations for his departure.

The new plenipotentiary decided to take with him his older daughter
Martha, then in Philadelphia at Mrs. Hopkinson's, and to leave the two
younger ones with their maternal aunt, Mrs. Eppes, in Virginia. William
Short, his "_élève_" and friend, accompanied him as private secretary
and Colonel David Humphreys as secretary of the legation.[102] From
Philadelphia he went to Boston, visiting Connecticut, Rhode Island, and
the principal towns on his way, in order to acquire "what knowledge he
could of their commerce and other circumstances." He sailed from Boston
on the _Ceres_, Captain Sainte-Barbe, bound to Cowes.

Jefferson was then forty-one years old. He knew life and men and had no
illusions; he had experienced happiness and sorrow; he had had moments
of exaltation, of hot patriotic fever; he had occupied the front of the
stage in several circumstances never to be forgotten; he had aroused
enmities and made devoted and faithful friends, among them Monroe,
Madison, and Short whom he was taking along with him. But neither his
disappointments nor his sorrows had made him a misanthrope. Not an
orator, he liked to talk, and he could not live without society. The
tall spare man in black was no longer able to feel his heart moved by
the early emotions of his youth. Next to Washington, who remained in
America, and to Doctor Franklin, a debonair patriarch, he was the most
famous national figure of America. None was better qualified by his
former life and studies to represent America and to speak for his
country. Whatever sectionalism he may have had in him had disappeared in
these last two years of Congress, when he had striven so strenuously to
make the Union an actual fact and to consolidate the loose Federal
fabric, for only there could men "See the affairs of the Confederacy
from a high ground; they learn the importance of the Union & befriend
federal measures when they return. Those who never come here, see our
affairs insulated, pursue a system of jealousy and self interest, and
distract the Union as much as they can."

Of Europe he knew little, except what he had been able to absorb from
books. It was a country of great artistic productivity, of enviable
social life. Towards England he was not particularly attracted; towards
France he felt much more favorably inclined. He had met many Frenchmen;
some of them already had become his close friends, two particularly, the
Chevalier de Chastellux and especially the youthful, impulsive, and
charming Lafayette, who in a parting note had asked him to consider his
house as his and to take the little motherless girl to Madame de
Lafayette. He knew he would not be without friends, without society,
that he would have an unique chance to meet the best minds of Europe.
This practical American, so little given to the "_joie de vivre_" and
without _abandon_, wanted primarily to increase his knowledge, to gather
facts, to make comparisons. He had retained the taste for society, the
good breeding, the polite manners, the artistic tendencies of the
Virginian, but in him the American was already fully grown. He felt also
that he had a certain mission and intended to fulfill it: it was to
convey to the European statesmen whose wiles he distrusted the
impression that the United States existed as a country, that they did
not form a loose and temporary confederation of States, but a nation to
be reckoned with and respected. His country was no longer his native
Virginia alone: he was thinking nationally and not sectionally. For the
French Jefferson was already a great American figure; he was going to
embody the best there was in the newly constituted Union.




BOOK THREE

_An American View of Europe_




CHAPTER I

SOCIETY AND TRAVEL


The _Ceres_ reached Portsmouth nineteen days after leaving Boston, a
remarkably swift passage, without incident, except for three days spent
in fishing on the Banks of Newfoundland, while the ship was becalmed.
Jefferson and his companions were delayed a week in Portsmouth by
Martha's slight illness, and then went directly to Paris, where he
arrived on August 6, 1784. Jefferson was to remain in France till the
fall of 1789--five years crowded with pleasures, social duties,
political duties, and hard work. His activities were so varied and his
interests so diversified that it is no longer possible to follow any
chronological order; we must establish arbitrary divisions, though
Jefferson passed at all times from one subject to another and was
incessantly busy with undertakings and plans truly encyclopedic.

First of all, he had to find quarters. He had put up at the Hôtel
d'Orléans, Rue des Petits Augustins, then he had rented "Hôtel
Tête-Bout, cul-de-sac Tête-Bout", and a year later moved to a house
belonging to M. le Comte de L'Avongeac "at the corner of the Grande
Route des Champs Elysées and Rue Neuve de Berry", where he continued to
live as long as he remained in Paris. His secretary Short and Colonel
Humphreys, secretary to the legation, lived with him. It was "a very
elegant house, even for Paris, with an extensive garden, court and
outbuildings, in the handsomest style."

Of Jefferson's first impressions after landing in France we
unfortunately know nothing. Not until a full year had elapsed did he
express his personal views in writing. Although he deplored the
wretched condition of the larger mass of the people, he had already come
to the conclusion, probably correct, that life in Paris was more
pleasant than anywhere else on earth: "The roughnesses of the human mind
are so thoroughly rubbed off with them, that it seems as if one might
glide through a whole life without a jostle."[103] It was some time,
however, before he felt entirely at home in Parisian society. He was
somewhat handicapped and humiliated at first because of lack of means at
the disposal of the Minister of the United States for maintaining his
rank. In his report on the reduction of the civil list (March 5, 1784),
Jefferson, animated with a fine republican zeal, had fixed the
compensation of American representatives abroad at ten thousand dollars.
Now that he was in Paris he found the allowance very inadequate. A proud
Virginian, accustomed to entertain generously, he considered hospitality
an imperious duty as well as a pleasure, and his letters to Congress are
filled with complaints on the niggardliness of his resources. However,
he procured a good French cook in the person of the worthy Petit, who
became quite attached to him, and wrote for him recipes for "_poulet en
casserole_" and "_café à la française_." He informed himself concerning
the best French wines, some of which he already knew, and made a
thorough and scientific study of the different vintages, recording the
result of his observations in unpublished notes. Nor was he so selfish
as to keep all his knowledge to himself. Adams and Washington used his
good offices to keep their cellars well stocked in champagne and
sauternes. For them and for Madison he subscribed to "L'Encyclopédie
Méthodique", he bought new French books, engravings, plaster casts, and
medals, and his willingness to oblige his friends and to go shopping for
them was so well known that Mrs. Adams asked him to buy for her daughter
"two pairs of corsets", much to his distress, since she had omitted to
send him the measure. For Mrs. Bingham he filled boxes with "caps and
bonnets"; for Madison he bought a pocket telescope, a walking stick, a
chemical box, for poor little Polly who had remained with her aunt at
Eppington "sashes" and Parisian dolls.

Through Franklin, Jefferson was introduced to Madame d'Houdetot, who had
unlimited admiration for a man who not only was an American and a
philosopher, but who also knew the names of American plants and trees
much more thoroughly than her dear Doctor. He obtained for her seeds,
bulbs, and trees to be planted in the park of Sannois.[104] Through
Franklin also he met Madame Helvétius and her two abbés, who always
wrote jointly to Jefferson.[105] At her house, he saw Cabanis, then a
very young man, Destutt de Tracy and abbé Morellet. He attended concerts
at Madame d'Houdetot's brother's house, but above all he was attracted
by Lafayette's family and friends. It was large enough for a man of more
leisure and more worldly tendencies. There was the Marquis himself and
his charming wife, who befriended Martha and wrote Jefferson several
notes filled with that delightful eighteenth-century "_sensibilité_" and
amiability of which we have lost the secret. There was also Madame de
Tessé, Lafayette's cousin, who was, however, considerably older than the
Marquis and whom he called "aunt." Jefferson saw her in Paris and
visited her often at Chaville, where Short stayed for weeks at a time,
perfecting himself in the French language and the ways of French
society. She loved trees, good paintings, fine buildings, statues, and
music, and did much to educate Jefferson's taste in these matters. Not
mentioned by his biographers, Madame de Corny played a not
inconsiderable part in Jefferson's sentimental life. Young, pretty,
witty, and married to a husband much older than herself, she enjoyed
Jefferson's company, took with him many walks in the Bois de Boulogne
and perhaps, secretly, found him too scrupulously polite and too
respectful.[106] There were also several other women, Madame de Tott, a
distinguished painter, the vivacious and charming Lucy Paradise,
Comtesse Barziza, a real "_enfant terrible_", irresponsible, outspoken,
who in her letters to Jefferson listed all the scandals of the
days.[107] And one must not forget among Jefferson's feminine
acquaintances the old Comtesse de la Rochefoucauld, dignified,
sarcastic, a terrible bore at times, whom on many occasions he vainly
tried to avoid.

But when all is told, it does not appear that the circle of Jefferson's
friends was ever very large. During his first year in Paris he did his
best to keep in the background. To Franklin he owed deference, because
of his age and the position of the Doctor as the only accredited
representative to the Court of Versailles. Adams, the other
plenipotentiary, was older than Jefferson, who on every occasion
insisted that his colleagues should have precedence over him. A good
listener, he was much more reserved than Franklin and always remained
somewhat self-conscious when he spoke or wrote French. If the Doctor
spoke French as badly as he wrote it, his conversation must have been an
extraordinary jargon; but Jefferson was too sensitive and had too much
_amour-propre_ to venture upon long discussions and conversations with
people he did not know intimately. Most of his French letters were
written by Short, who became rapidly a master of the language, and we
may presume that Jefferson never really felt at home in a purely French
circle.

This was true at least of his first year in Paris. He had many fits of
despondency and wondered at times whether he was not too old to accustom
himself to strange people and to strange manners. He often experienced
the usual longing of the traveler for his native land: "I am now of an
age which does not easily accommodate itself to new modes of living and
new manners," he wrote to Baron Geismer, the former prisoner of
Charlottesville; "and I am savage enough to prefer the woods, the wilds
and independence of Monticello, to all the brilliant pleasures of this
gay capital. I shall therefore, rejoin myself to my native country with
new attachments and exaggerated esteem for its advantages."[108] It was
probably on these occasions that he took refuge in the most silent of
all places, a Carthusian monastery, a very strange abode for one who has
been accused of being a fierce anti-clerical:

  He also had rooms in the Carthusian Monastery on Mount Calvary; the
  boarders, of whom I think there were forty, carried their own
  servants, and took their breakfasts in their own rooms. They
  assembled to dinner only. They had the privilege of walking in the
  gardens, but as it was a hermitage, it was against the rules of the
  house for any voices to be heard outside of their own rooms, hence
  the most profound silence. The author of "Anarcharsis" was a boarder
  at the time, and many others who had reasons for a temporary
  retirement from the world. Whenever he had a press of business, he
  was in the habit of taking his papers and going to the hermitage,
  where he spent sometimes a week or more till he had finished his
  work. The hermits visited him occasionally in Paris, and the Superior
  made him a present of an ivory broom that was turned by one of the
  brothers.[109]

From time to time this same mood recurred:

  I am burning the candle of life without present pleasure or future
  object--he wrote to Mrs. Trist in 1786.--A dozen or twenty years ago
  this scene would have amused me; but I am past the age for changing
  habits. I take all the fault on myself, as it is impossible to be
  among a people who wish more to make one happy--a people of the very
  best character it is possible for one to have. We have no idea in
  America of the real French character.[110]

Not foreign to this despondency was the bad news that came from America.
His youngest daughter Lucy died in the fall of 1784 and he was not
satisfied until he had his remaining daughter near him in Paris, and
Mary, familiarly called Polly, had joined her sister in the best convent
of the French capital.

Between social duties and pleasures, dinners at the house of Lafayette,
meetings of the Committees of Commerce, interviews with Vergennes,
preparation of long letters to be sent home to keep his Government
informed of the situation in Europe, correction of the proofs of the
"Notes on Virginia", interviews with former French volunteers clamoring
for their back pay, visits to shops and factories, Jefferson was a very
busy man indeed. But exacting as his occupations were, he found time to
escape from Paris on three different occasions to see something of
France and Europe. In 1786 he journeyed to England, traveled in France
and Italy in the spring of the following year, and visited Holland and
the Rhine shortly before leaving for home. The diaries he kept during
these trips are both revealing and disappointing. They demonstrate how
little of European culture had penetrated his American mind, how
carefully he preserved himself from the contamination of European
manners and ways of thinking. In some respects it must be confessed that
Jefferson remained very narrow and provincial, and almost a Philistine
in his outlook.

The most damning document is the outline he made for Rutledge and
Shippen on June 3, 1788, though in some respects it shows good judgment,
as when Jefferson recommends "not to judge of the manners of the people
from the people you will naturally see the most of: tavern keepers,
_valets de place_, and postillions."--"These are the hackneyed rascals
of every country. Of course they must never be considered when we
calculate the national character." He manifested the same good sense in
recommending always to ask for the _vin du pays_ when traveling. But the
worst comes in his enumeration of the "Objects of Attention for an
American." It has to be read to be believed and should be transcribed
here almost in full:

  1. Agriculture. Everything belonging to this art, and whatever has a
  near relation to it.... 2. Mechanical arts, so far as they respect
  things necessary in America, and inconvenient to be transported
  thither ready-made, such as forges, stone quarries, boat bridges,
  etc. 3. Lighter mechanical arts, and manufactures. Some of these will
  be worth a superficial view; but circumstances rendering it
  impossible that America should become a manufacturing country during
  the time of any man now living, it would be a waste of attention to
  examine these minutely. 4. Gardens peculiarly worth the attention of
  an American, because it is the country of all others where the
  noblest gardens may be made without expense.... 5. Architecture worth
  a great attention. As we double our numbers every twenty years, we
  must double our houses.... It is, then, among the most important
  arts; it is desirable to introduce taste into an art which shows so
  much. 6. Painting, Statuary. Too expensive for the state of wealth
  among us. It would be useless, therefore, and preposterous, for us to
  make ourselves connoisseurs in those arts. They are worth seeing, but
  not studying. 7. Politics of each country, well worth studying so far
  as respects internal affairs. Examine their influence on the
  happiness of the people. Take every possible occasion for entering
  into the houses of the laborers, and especially at the moment of
  their repast; see what they eat, how they are clothed, whether they
  are obliged to work too hard.... 8. Courts. To be seen as you would
  see the tower of London or menagerie of Versailles with their lions,
  tigers, hyenas, and other beasts of prey, standing in the same
  relation to their fellows.... Their manners, could you ape them,
  would not make you beloved in your own country, nor would they
  improve it could you introduce them there to the exclusion of that
  honest simplicity now prevailing in America, and worthy of being
  cherished.

The man who wrote these lines was certainly not denationalized; the
emancipated Virginian had unconsciously retained a puritanical distrust
of purely æsthetic enjoyments. He seems to have taken a sort of wicked
pleasure in denying himself the disinterested joys of the artist and
philosopher and his travels in Europe were no "sentimental journey." It
cannot even be maintained that the views expressed in the letter to
Shippen were a paradox and that he felt free to enjoy the pleasures from
which he strove to protect his fellow countrymen. Most revealing in this
respect is the following passage from a letter written to Lafayette,
when he was traveling along the Riviera:

  In the great cities I go to see, what travellers think alone worthy
  of being seen; but I make a job of it, and generally gulp it all down
  in a day. On the other hand, I am never satisfied with rambling
  through the fields and farms, examining the culture and cultivators,
  with a degree of curiosity which makes some take me to be a fool, and
  others to be much wiser than I am.[111]

He seems to have been dominated by the same utilitarian preoccupations
during his English journey. There he noted carefully all the
peculiarities of English gardens, visiting all the show places with
Whateley's book on gardening in his pocket: "My inquiries," he himself
said, "were directed chiefly to such practical things as might enable me
to estimate the expense of making and maintaining a garden in that
style." This is why the only thing worth noticing at Kew was an
Archimedes screw for raising water, of which he made a sketch. His
conclusions were summed up in a letter to John Page after he came back
to Paris. England had totally disappointed him. The "pleasure gardens",
to be sure, went far beyond his ideas, but the city of London, though
handsomer than Paris, was not so handsome as Philadelphia: "Their
architecture is in the most wretched style I ever saw, not meaning to
except America, where it is bad, not even Virginia, where it is worse
than in any other part of America which I have seen." On the other
hand, the mechanical arts were carried to a wonderful perfection, but
he took no joy in visiting manufactures and shops, since the view
reminded him that the frivolity of his fellow countrymen made them
import many articles from London and thus pay tribute to a foreign
nation.[112]

When he left Paris for the South of France he was in no more amiable
mood. It was his first real contact with the French countryside and he
was shocked beyond words at the sight of the first villages he passed
through from Sens to Vermanton. He could not understand why the French
peasants insisted on living close together in villages instead of
building their houses on the grounds they cultivated. He racked his
brains for an explanation and could find no better one than to suppose
that they were "collected by that dogma of their religion which makes
them believe, that to keep the Creator in good humor with His own works,
they must mumble a mass every day." The people were illy clothed; the
sight of women and children carrying heavy burdens and laboring with the
hoe made the Virginian slave-owner conclude that "in a civilized
country, men never expose their wives and children to labor above their
force and sex, as long as their own labor can protect them from it." But
he nowhere expressed any emotional distress nor heartfelt sympathy for
these poor wretches and concluded that if there were no beggars it was
probably an effect of the police.[113]

On the other hand, he noted every detail of the fabrication of Burgundy
wine, enumerated the different vintages, the cost of casks, bottles,
methods of transportation and marketing, the price of "_vin ordinaire_",
of oil, butter, cattle, the cultivation of olive trees and fig trees and
capers. Monuments are described with a mathematical eye, many small
points noted, columns described, ornaments studied, but the only
personal impression elicited by Arles is that "The principal monument
here, is an amphitheatre, the external portico of which is tolerably
complete."

What is true of France is even more true of Italy. At Milan the
cathedral is not even mentioned, but "the salon of the Casa Belgiosa is
superior to anything I have ever seen." And he adds immediately, "The
mixture called Scaiola, of which they make their walls and floors, is so
like the finest marble as to be scarcely distinguishable from it." Pages
are given to the fabrication of Parmesan cheese. Once, however, in
walking along the shore from Louano to Alberga, he could not resist the
enchantment of the landscape. There he noted the remarkable coloration
of the Mediterranean and was puzzled by it, but he also added, let it be
marked to his credit:

  If any person wished to retire from his acquaintances, to live
  absolutely unknown, and yet in the midst of physical enjoyments, it
  should be in some of the little villages of this coast, where air,
  water and earth concur to offer what each has most precious. Here are
  nightingales, beccaficas, ortolans, pheasants, partridges, quails, a
  superb climate, and the power of changing it from summer to winter at
  any moment, by ascending the mountains. The earth furnishes wine,
  oil, figs, oranges, and every production of the garden, in every
  season. The sea yields lobsters, crabs, oysters, thunny, sardines,
  anchovies etc. Ortolans sell at this time at thirty sous, equal to
  one shilling sterling, the dozen.

A queer mixture of suppressed artistic emotions and avowed culinary
preoccupations. Shades of Rousseau and Wordsworth, to mention the
nightingale and the ortolans in one breath! But one thing at least we
must be thankful for is his lack of pretence and conventional
admiration. It is, after all, refreshing to find a traveler who does not
copy from his guidebook and does not fall into raptures and worked-up
ecstasies. He came back through "Luc, Brignolles, Avignon, Vaucluse",
simply noting that "there are fine trout in the stream of Vaucluse and
the valley abounds particularly with nightingales." He saw Nîmes,
Montpellier, Frontignan, where he discussed the manufacture and price of
wine; he passed through Carcassonne and was much interested in the canal
and "the carp caught there", but did not mention the walls; he stayed
several days at Bordeaux, measured the remains of a Roman amphitheater
and made a thorough study of the wines; "Chateau Margau, La Tour de
Ségur, Hautbrion, Chateau de la Fite, Pontac, Sauternes, Barsac." He
visited Nantes, Rennes, Angers, Tours, and ascertained the truth of the
allegations of the famous "growth of shells unconnected with animal
bodies" mentioned by Voltaire and discussed in the "Notes on Virginia."
He saw Chanteloup and heard a nightingale there, but was far more
interested in "an ingenious contrivance to hide the projecting steps of
a stair-case."

The same utilitarian preoccupation reappears most conspicuously in his
"Memorandums on a Tour from Paris to Amsterdam, Strasburg, and back to
Paris" (March, 1788). At Amsterdam he studied the Dutch wheelbarrow, the
canal to raise ships over the Pampus, joists of houses, the aviary of
Mr. Ameshoff near Harlem; he made a sketch of the Hope's House "of a
capricious appearance yet a pleasant one"--an architectural atrocity if
ever there was one. At Düsseldorf "the gallery of paintings is sublime",
but equally interesting is the hog of this country (Westphalia) "of
which the celebrated ham is made which sells at eight and a half pence
sterling the pound." If he saw the cathedral at Cologne he forbore to
mention it, but at Coblenz he had his first taste of the Moselle wine.
It would be cruel to reproduce his description of the "clever ruin at
Hanau, with the hermitage in which is a good figure of a hermit in
plaster, colored to the life, with a table and a book before him, in the
attitude of contemplation."

And yet, when the worst is told, one may wonder whether there would not
be some unfairness in judging Jefferson merely from these memoranda.
There he noted information for which he foresaw some further use,
interesting knowledge which could be utilized at Monticello or for the
benefit of his fellow countrymen. How to plant and prune the vines and
the olive trees; how to make cheese and oil; how to introduce the "St.
Foin", new vegetables, new crops such as rice, new industries such as
the silkworm and mulberry tree; how to build a house; all this required
exactness and precision and could scarcely be trusted to memory.
Pleasant impressions of travel, on the contrary, could always be evoked
through the imagination and would lose very little of their charm and
value with time. Furthermore to put down these impressions in black and
white would have required a certain process of analysis entirely foreign
to Puritan consciousness, and a Puritan Jefferson had remained in his
speech and manners far more than he himself believed. There was in these
purely æsthetic pleasures something really too personal to be indulged
in, at least in writing. Once, however, he did away with all the
restraint imposed upon him by education and the "habits of his country";
it is in the well-known letter written from Nîmes to Madame de Tessé.
Parts of it at least, in all fairness to Jefferson, have to be quoted
here as a contrast to the dryness and objectiveness of the notes on
travel....

  Here I am, Madam, gazing whole hours at the Maison Quarrée, like a
  lover at his mistress.... This is the second time I have been in love
  since I left Paris. The first was with a Diana at the Château de
  Laye-Epinaye in Beaujolais, a delicious morsel of sculpture, by M. A.
  Slodtz. This, you will say, was in rule, to fall in love with a
  female beauty; but with a house, it is out of all precedent. No,
  Madam, it is not without a precedent in my own history. While in
  Paris, I was violently smitten with the Hôtel de Salm, and used to go
  to the Tuileries almost daily to look at it. The loueuse des
  chaises--inattentive to my passion--never had the complaisance to
  place a chair there, so that sitting on the parapet, and twisting my
  neck around to see the object of my admiration, I generally left with
  a torti-colli.

  From Lyons to Nismes I have been nourished with the remains of Roman
  grandeur. They have always brought you to my mind, because I know
  your affection for whatever is Roman and noble. At Vienna I thought
  of you. But I am glad you were not here; for you would have seen me
  more angry than, I hope, you will ever see me. The Praetorian palace,
  as it is called--comparable, for its fine proportions, to the Maison
  Quarrée--defaced by the barbarians who have converted it to its
  present purpose, its beautiful fluted Corinthian columns cut out, in
  parts, to make space for Gothic windows, and hewed down, in the
  residue, to the plane of the buildings, was enough, you must admit,
  to disturb my composure. At Orange too, I thought of you. I was sure
  you had seen with pleasure the sublime triumphal arch of Marius at
  the entrance of the city. I went then to the Arenae. Would you
  believe, Madam, that in this eighteenth century, in France, under the
  reign of Louis XVI, they are at this moment pulling down the circular
  wall of this superb remain, to pave a road? And that too, from a hill
  which is itself en entire mass of stone, just as fit, and more
  accessible.[114]

This is indeed a charming letter; but why did he not write more often in
this vein? Why did he send to Martha moralizing and edifying letters
when he was traveling in Southern France and Italy? His latent
puritanism, as already shown, may partly account for this reticence, but
this came from a deeper feeling. He had already protested in his "Notes
on Virginia" against the claim made by Europe to intellectual supremacy.
He realized, however, how powerful was the attraction of the great
centers of European culture on young America, and was afraid that the
introduction of foreign arts, foreign literature, foreign customs, and
"mode" might corrupt the very springs of American life. This blind
admiration of everything European constituted one of the greatest
dangers if America wished to develop on her own soil a civilization of
her own. Friends in Virginia had to be convinced that an American youth,
brought up on a strictly American diet, would in nowise be inferior to
most Europeans. If one insisted upon sending a young man to Europe, the
chances were that he would learn nothing essential, that on the contrary
he would lose many of his native qualities and at any rate his native
innocence and purity of mind. This appears most conspicuously in a
letter written to J. B. Bannister, Junior, who had manifested the
intention of sending his son to Europe. There Jefferson proceeded to
denounce the features of European civilization as vehemently as any
Puritan preacher and with the same frankness of expression. To enumerate
the disadvantages of sending a youth to Europe "would require a volume",
so he had to select a few. England is shortly disposed of: "If he goes
to England, he learns drinking, horse racing, and boxing," for those are
the peculiarities of English education. If he goes to the continent he
will acquire a fondness for luxury and dissipation, he will contract a
partiality for aristocracy and monarchy; he will soon be led to consider
"fidelity to the marriage bed as an ungentlemanly practice." He will
become denationalized and recollecting "the voluptuary dress and arts of
the European women, will pity and despise the chaste affections and
simplicity of those of his own country." He will return to America "a
foreigner", speaking and writing his own tongue "like a foreigner", and
therefore unqualified to obtain those distinctions, which eloquence of
the pen and tongue ensures in a free country. There can be only one
conclusion after such a fierce denunciation of Europe:

  It appears to me, then, that an American, coming to Europe for
  education, loses in his knowledge, in his morals, in his health, in
  his habits, and in his happiness. I had entertained only doubts on
  this head before I came to Europe: what I see and hear, since I came
  here proves more than I had expected. Cast your eye over America: who
  are the men of most learning, of most eloquence, most beloved by
  their countrymen and most trusted and promoted by them? They are
  those who have been educated among them, and whose manners, morals,
  and habits, are perfectly homogeneous with those of the country.[115]

Very bold indeed would have been the American father who, with such a
frightful picture before his eyes, would have sent his son to Europe.

Thus we are led to a very unexpected conclusion. There is little doubt
that Jefferson's democratic theories were confirmed and clarified by his
prolonged stay in Europe. But this was not due to the lessons he
received from the French philosophers. He had gone to France under the
misapprehension that he would be considered there as a "savage from the
mountains of America"; he had been dazzled at first by the splendor of
the old world, but he had soon overcome his admiration and arrived at
the conclusion that the game was not worth the candle. Life in Paris was
very pleasant, but some one had to foot the bill, and the general fate
of humanity was most deplorable in Europe. Such are the general
impressions he sent to his friend Bellini one year after arriving in
Paris:

  It is a true picture of that country to which they say we shall pass
  hereafter; and where we are to see God and his angels in splendor,
  and crowds of the damned trampled under their feet. The great mass of
  the people suffer under physical and moral oppression; but the
  condition of the great if more closely observed cannot compare with
  the degree of happiness which is enjoyed in America. Among them there
  is no family life, no conjugal love, no domestic happiness; intrigues
  of love occupy the young and those of ambition, the elder part of the
  great.

Much, very much inferior, this, to the tranquil, permanent felicity with
which domestic society in America blesses most of its inhabitants;
leaving them to follow steadily those pursuits which health and reason
approve, and rendering truly delicious the intervals of those pursuits!

If one looks to another field, the situation is very similar. "In
science, the mass of the people are two centuries behind ours; their
literature half a dozen years before us." But that is no serious
inconvenience; books which are really good acquire a reputation in that
lapse of time and then pass over to America, while poor books,
controversial and uncertain knowledge are naturally weeded out, so that
America is not bothered with that "swarm of nonsensical publications
which issue daily from a thousand presses, and perishes almost in
issuing."

On some points, however, Europeans have a decided superiority over the
Americans: they have more amiable manners, they are more polite, more
temperate, "they do not terminate the most sociable meals by
transforming themselves into brutes. I have never seen a man drunk in
France, even among the lowest of the people."

Finally in the arts there is no possible comparison:

  Were I to proceed to tell you how much I enjoy their architecture,
  sculpture, painting, music, I should want words. It is in these arts
  they shine. The last of them particularly, is an enjoyment the
  deprivation of which with us, cannot be calculated. I am almost ready
  to say, it is the only thing which from my heart I envy them, and
  which, in spite of all the authority of the Decalogue, I do
  covet.[116]

Nor are we to believe that in Jefferson's opinion this was a small
achievement. Had he been more poetically inclined he might have repeated
the apostrophe of the old poet: "France mother of all the arts." But
when all is told, the fact remained that Europe had more to learn from
America than she could possibly give to the new nation, and thereupon
Jefferson started to "boost" his own country. Protesting against a
pseudo-discovery of an English wheelwright, he declared that the idea
had been stolen from Doctor Franklin who had observed it in
Pennsylvania, Delaware and Jersey, and the Jersey farmers might have
borrowed it from Homer, "for ours are the only farmers who can read
Homer."[117] Against the architectural feats of the Europeans it is not
unfair to claim the superiority of American scenery, particularly of the
Virginia marvels, such as the Natural Bridge, for "that kind of pleasure
surpasses much in my estimation, whatever I find on this side of the
Atlantic."[118]

At the end of his journey in France and Italy he conceded that there are
indeed in these countries "things worth our imitation." But he
immediately added, "the accounts from our country give me to believe
that we are not in a condition to hope of the imitation of anything
good."[119] In the meantime it is better for the Americans to stay at
home, for "travelling makes men wiser, but less happy"; and he wrote to
Peter Carr, whose education he had undertaken to direct: "There is no
place where your pursuit of knowledge will be so little obstructed by
foreign objects, as your own country, nor any, wherein the virtues of
the heart will be less exposed to be weakened."[120]




CHAPTER II

GALLO-AMERICAN COMMERCE AND THE DEBT QUESTION


After Franklin's departure from Paris, Jefferson was left officially in
charge of the diplomatic relations of the United States with the French
Court. Adams was in London and Carmichael in Madrid, and with them he
exchanged extensive communications. But the Paris legation was really
the headquarters of American diplomacy, and the problems that came up
taxed the ingenuity and all the intellectual resources Jefferson could
command.

Summing up his activities in Paris, he declared with too much modesty in
his "Autobiography":

  My duties, at Paris, were confined to a few objects; the receipts of
  our whale oils, salted fish, and salt meat, on favorable terms; the
  admission of our rice on equal terms with that of Piedmont, Egypt and
  the Levant; a mitigation of the monopolies of our tobacco by the
  Farmers-general, and a free admission of our productions into their
  islands, were the principal commercial objects which required
  attention; and on these occasions, I was powerfully aided by all the
  influence and the energies of the Marquis de LaFayette, who proved
  himself equally zealous for the friendship and welfare of both
  nations.

As a matter of fact, Jefferson's duties extended to many other subjects,
of which the most important and at any rate the most perplexing may have
been the settlement of the debt question. This problem, as we shall
presently see, haunted Jefferson's mind and was never separated by him
from the purely commercial questions. In many respects the situation
then existing between the United States and France was very similar to
the present situation and certainly not easier to solve. An estimate of
Jefferson's career that would leave out this particular side of his
activities when in France, would necessarily be incomplete, if not
misleading. A large part of the minister's time was devoted, not to
philosophical conversations with Helvétius' friends but to obstinate,
patient, and harassing endeavor to obtain for his country commercial
rights and even privileges that would enable her to pay off her debt to
Europe. In spite of his affected scorn for figures and statistics, the
"philosopher" demonstrated an unusual business ability.

The tobacco trade in which the Southern States and particularly Virginia
were vitally interested was at that time entirely in the hands of the
Farmers-general, whose monopoly was not administered to the best
interests of either the American growers or the French consumers. Being
closely allied with some of the prominent economists and entirely in
sympathy with their views, Lafayette was naturally against the farming
of taxes on tobacco. But as he realized that there was very little hope
of doing away entirely with the system, he contented himself at first
with employing his best efforts to facilitate the direct importation of
tobacco into France. As early as May, 1785, he managed to obtain a copy
of a document indicating that some London dealers were offering to the
Farmers-general large quantities of Virginia tobacco. He communicated
the document at once to Jefferson, and suggested that it was important
for both countries to eliminate the London middlemen. Direct commercial
relations should be established between France and America, not only as
a matter of patriotism, but also as a matter of interest.[121]

This proposed change in the traditional policy of the Farmers-general,
who were accustomed to deal with British intermediaries, met with a
strong opposition from the Farmers-general. For reasons which they did
not state openly, they refused either to deal with independent American
growers, or to buy from a new and strictly American company planned by
Jefferson.[122]

Unable to overcome the resistance of the Farmers-general, Jefferson
decided that the next step would be to fight the monopoly and to
persuade the Court to do away with it. It was a logical more than a
truly diplomatic procedure, since Jefferson took upon himself to meddle
in the internal affairs of the government to which he was accredited.
But Jefferson, without being the originator of the famous "shirt-sleeve"
diplomacy, was not the man to let diplomatic proprieties stand in the
way of the best interests of his country. Furthermore, he was quite
sincere in his belief that he was acting to the greatest advantage of
both France and America. He therefore wrote to Vergennes a long letter,
in which he stated the advantages which would accrue to the royal
treasury from the abolition of the tobacco monopoly.[123]

There is no indication that Vergennes resented in any way Jefferson's
suggestion; but there is no evidence either that he paid any attention
to it. Things remained in the same condition to the end of the year. Up
to that date, Lafayette had fought as a free lance the commercial battle
of the United States, using his personal influence and family
connections to undermine the prestige of the Farmers-general. At the
beginning of 1786, Calonne, yielding to his solicitations, formed the
Comité du Commerce composed of Farmers-general, inspectors of commerce,
and members of the council, in order to study the future of the
commercial relations between France and the United States. Lafayette was
appointed to the committee on February 9, 1786. He had very little
training in economics and had never displayed any particular aptitude
for financial problems. But back of him was Jefferson, and on the
committee Lafayette was nothing but the spokesman of the American
Plenipotentiary. The account of his speeches before the committee, given
by Brissot, and reprinted in a note to the "Memoirs of General
Lafayette", is simply the résumé of a letter sent by Jefferson to
Vergennes six months earlier. Jefferson prompted him, furnished him with
figures and statistics, and in a letter written at the eleventh hour
urged him to expose the fundamental dishonesty of the Farmers-general.
Since, according to their own figures, said Jefferson, they lose
annually over four million livres by the farming of tobacco "the king,
in favor to them, should discontinue the bail; and they cannot ask its
continuance without acknowledging they have given in a false state of
quantities and sums."[124]

Standing alone in the committee against a strong combination of skilled
financiers, Lafayette was fighting for a lost cause without any profit
to himself or any visible hope of success.[125]

Both Lafayette and Jefferson were outmaneuvered by the financiers. They
professed that they were willing to denounce their contracts with the
London merchants, and thus seemed to accomplish a grand patriotic
gesture, but they granted to the American financier, Robert Morris, the
exclusive privilege of buying tobacco for them and thus defeated the
main purpose of Jefferson. The minister had to confess that he was
beaten, although he had spared no pains to strike at the root of the
monopoly. "The persons interested in it are too powerful to be opposed,
even by the interest of the whole country."[126]

But it was not in his character ever to give up; he soon renewed the
attack at another point. First he succeeded in postponing for six months
the effect of the new lease to Morris, and thus permitted American
importers who had accumulated stocks in Lorient to sell them directly
to the Farmers-general. Some time later he partially nullified the
concession to Morris by obtaining an order from the council "obliging
the Farmers-general to purchase from such other merchants as shall offer
fifteen thousand hogshead of tobacco", and to grant to the sellers in
other respects the same terms as they had granted Robert Morris.

Thus, indirectly but very effectively, Jefferson finally achieved his
purpose: to undermine an odious monopoly which caused a great loss to
the planters of his country; to enable the American consumers to buy
directly from France manufactured products, or at least those
"commodities which it is more advantageous to us to buy here than in
England, or elsewhere"; finally "to reinforce the motives for a
friendship from this country towards ours.--This friendship we ought to
cultivate closely, considering the present dispositions of England
towards us."[127]

In addition, he flattered himself that he had taught the French some
sound economic principles:

  I have been for some time occupied in endeavouring to destroy the
  root of the evils which the tobacco trade encounters in this country,
  by making the ministers sensible that merchants will not bring a
  commodity to a market, where but one person is allowed to buy it; and
  that so long as that single purchaser is obliged to go to foreign
  markets for it, he must pay for it in coin and not in commodities.
  These truths have made their way to the mind of the ministry
  insomuch, as to have delayed the execution of the new lease of the
  farms, six months. It is renewed, however, for three years, but so as
  not to render impossible a reformation of the great evil. They are
  sensible to the evil, but it is so interwoven with their fiscal
  system, that they find it hazardous to disentangle. The temporary
  distress, too, of the revenue, they are not prepared to meet. My
  hopes, therefore, are weak, though not quite desperate.[128]

One might well wonder to what extent these "truths" were as new to the
French as Jefferson seemed to believe, and to what extent he was
operative in strengthening the opposition to the Farmers-general,
already very strong in France. However that may be, the American
minister learned from the French example as much as he taught the
members of the committee. The tobacco monopoly was to him another object
lesson on the danger of farming taxes, and he did not forget it.

Even greater obstacles were encountered by Jefferson and Lafayette in
their effort to develop commercial transactions with New England. The
negotiations extended over three years and would be worth relating in
detail.[129] Jefferson, bent on breaking customs barriers and obtaining
free entrance for the products of New England fisheries, brought forward
every possible argument to fight the doctrine of commercialism and
summed up his case in a letter sent to Lafayette, but evidently intended
for the committee. There for the first time he pointed out the necessary
connection existing between the tariff question and the repayment of the
French debt. The problem of "transfers" is not a new one, and
Jefferson's reasoning sounds strangely familiar to all those who have
paid any attention to our present problems of debt settlement,
reparations, and tariff. The following passage seems particularly worth
quoting:

  On running over the catalogue of American imports, France will
  naturally mark out those articles which she could supply us to
  advantage; and she may safely calculate, that, after a little time
  shall have enabled us to get rid of our present incumbrances, and
  some remains of attachment to the particular forms of manufacture to
  which we have been habituated, we shall take those articles which she
  can furnish, on as good terms as other nations, to whatever extent
  she will enable us to pay for them. It is her interest therefore, as
  well as ours, to multiply the means of payment. These must be found
  in the catalogue of our exports, and among these will be seen neither
  gold nor silver. We have no mines of either of those metals. Produce
  therefore is all we can offer.[130]

The conclusion was that it was imperative to obtain such abatement of
duties and even such exemptions as the importance of the article might
justify, in the hope that his country would be enabled to build up a
commercial credit of about 275,000 louis, which would provide for the
service and amortization of the American debt to France.

Thanks to the unrelenting efforts of Lafayette and also to the
sympathetic attitude of the committee, a series of _arrêts du conseil_
listed in a letter to Monroe was finally obtained.[131] There was little
hope at first that they would be countersigned, but in October of the
same year Jefferson, with evident satisfaction, was able to inform Jay
of the new regulations granting free ports to America, abolishing export
taxes on brandies, and for a year the tax on whale oil and spermaceti,
on potash, furs, leather, timber, trees, and shrubbery, brought either
in American or French bottoms. Every effort had been made not only to
place the United States on the footing of the most favored nation, but
to encourage her infant industries and manufactures. The new regulations
approved by Calonne did much to free America from her commercial
subservience to Great Britain and also reinforce, according to
Jefferson's wishes, the motives for a "friendship from France towards
America."

This was by no means the end of all difficulties; the abatement on whale
oil was only temporary and Jefferson was never able to obtain entire
satisfaction in respect to the tobacco trade, but there is no doubt that
the situation had greatly improved.

Even during the last months of his stay in France he never overlooked an
opportunity to further the commercial interests of the United States.
His fear to see his fellow countrymen "over-trade themselves and embark
into the ocean of speculation" had not abated. He still believed that
"we have no occasion for more commerce than to take off our superfluous
produce", and tobacco was clearly in that class.[132] But at that time
there arose an opportunity both to develop commercial relations and to
be of distinct service to France. The years that immediately precede the
French Revolution were marked by a very distressing food shortage in
France and particularly in the capital. This was one of the most
disquieting problems confronting the Committee of Commerce and the city
syndics. Jefferson, because of his connections with Lafayette, Du Pont
de Nemours, and Mr. Ethis de Corny, was particularly well informed on
the situation and he turned his best efforts to induce the government to
remedy it through the importation of American products. He thought that
besides the salt fish from New England, salt meat and corn beef would
constitute a desirable addition to the French diet and he undertook a
campaign to convert the French to the idea. One of his last letters to
Necker, on September 26, 1789, was to recommend the importation of
salted provisions from the United States, appraising the quality of
American salt meat, for "the experience of a great part of America,
which is fed almost entirely on it, proves it to be as wholesome as
fresh meat."[133]

In spite of all the obstacles to the development of the Gallo-American
commerce because of the deep-rooted French horror of innovations and
changes, the efforts of Jefferson and his friends were not wholly
unavailing. According to Mr. Woolery, in 1789 importations from the
United States amounted to 140,959 barrels of flour, 3,664,576 bushels of
wheat and 12,340,000 pounds of rice. Vessels coming from the United
States to French ports in this year included thirteen French,
forty-three English and one hundred and sixty-three American; the
tonnage of American vessels was 19,173 in 1788 and 24,173 in 1789.
Exports to France in 1788 were valued at $1,384,246; to French
possessions in America $3,284,656; and from them, $155,136 and
$1,913,212 respectively. In this trade the American tonnage engaged was
approximately ten times that of the French. The philosopher had proved
himself a first-class commercial agent. He had built up trade relations
which would have consolidated the friendship between the two countries
if the Revolution had not intervened. But no real friendship can exist
between creditor and debtor; the debt problem was no less important than
the commercial problem, and Jefferson displayed on this occasion an
ingenuity and a diplomatic skill no less worthy of commendation.

When he took charge of the legation at Paris the finances of the United
States were in a deplorable condition. Loans made by the
Farmers-general, by Beaumarchais, by the King of France, and loans
contracted in Holland and in Spain, constituted the most important
outstanding liabilities of the American Government. In 1783 the
situation as reported to Congress was as follows:

  To the Farmers-general of France, livres    1,000,000
  To Beaumarchais                             3,000,000
  To King of France, to the end of 1782      28,000,000
  To same for 1783                            6,000,000

To this total was to be added a loan from Holland for $671,200, and
$150,000 borrowed from Spain by Jay. Interest was coming in at the rate
of four per cent. on the French loan, making it a total of approximately
$7,885,000. The domestic situation was far worse; the States had plunged
into issues of paper money: $241,552,780 had been issued in bills of
credit by Congress, and $209,524,776 by the States.

If it is remembered that private investors had bought American paper
rather recklessly, that important sums were due to England, and that
the United States could not even meet the interest on the debts without
further borrowing, it is small wonder that European creditors began to
wonder whether they would ever be repaid. The first task confronting the
new Minister Plenipotentiary was to convince them that the United States
as then organized had a sufficient stability to allay all fears.
Jefferson undertook at once to clarify the situation. In a letter to the
Dutch bankers, N. and J. Van Staphorst, he asserted that no man in
America had ever entertained any doubt that "our foreign debt is to be
paid fully." He significantly added: "Were I the holder of any of them,
I should not have the least fear of their full payment." But he had to
call the attention of the bankers to the fact that some international
notes were issued for paper money debts, and those of course would be
subject to a certain depreciation, to be settled by Congress according
to carefully worked out tables. The safer thing, therefore, for European
investors was to beware of and to avoid any speculation on American
bills and "foreigners should be sure that they are well advised, before
they meddle with them, or they may suffer."[134] He repeated the same
advice on October 25: "It is a science which bids defiance to the powers
of reason."

With the particulars of the different loans obtained by Jefferson while
he was in France, and with the transactions that took place in Holland,
we cannot deal here. It would be a study well worth undertaking
separately, and one for which there is abundant material not yet
utilized in the Jefferson papers, particularly in his correspondence
with Dumas, the agent at the Hague. We shall restrict ourselves,
however, to the political aspect of the debt settlement during
Jefferson's mission.

The French were at first very polite about it; without insisting in any
way on the question of payment, Vergennes simply asked Jefferson whether
"the condition of American finances was improving." The French minister
did not even mention the possibilities of the United States paying the
arrears of the interest; but Jefferson suffered and irked, thinking that
he was probably expected to mention it first, while he could not do so
without instructions and there were "no visible means to pay anything
for the present."[135]

Curiously enough, the matter came to a head with England during the trip
made by Jefferson in the spring of 1786. He held several conferences
with the British merchants and tried to obtain with them a sort of
compromise by which American merchants would repay in full the capital
of debts contracted before and after the war, but withdrawing payment of
the interest for the period of the war. It was then that Jefferson put
forth the principle he was to maintain persistently with the
French,--namely that the matter of commerce and the question of the
debts could not be separated, "were it only as a means of enabling our
country to pay its debts."[136]

The chief fault of Jefferson's solution, however, was that there was
very little America could sell to England, while the Americans
themselves were eagerly buying goods manufactured in England. There was
great danger of seeing that economic vassalage perpetuated, for "instead
of a proper equilibrium, everything at present lies all in the British
scale."[137] Importations being permitted, fashion and folly requiring
English products, the country was sinking deeper and deeper into
poverty, and all the news on the matter received by Jefferson "filled
him with despair."

However, something had to be done at once in the case of the French
debt, as Jefferson knew that the French Minister of Finance was "at his
wit's end to raise supplies for the ensuing year."[138] It does not
appear that the French Court had made any representation on the debt to
the American Plenipotentiary, but Jefferson fully realized that he was
placed in a position of inferiority as long as the vexing question
remained unsettled and payments on the interest were overdue. This was
the more deplorable, as France was the only European nation with which
the United States could hope to develop really satisfactory relations.
It was at this juncture that a very interesting proposition was made
through Dumas by the Dutch bankers. The French debt's most objectionable
feature was that it placed the American Government under direct
obligation to the French; in other words, as we would say now, it was a
political debt, but means might be found to change it into a purely
commercial debt. If a company of bankers were formed to pay off France
at once, the American Government would be able to treat with them on a
business basis, the greatest advantage being that in case of delayed
payments, no political pressure could be exerted or political advantage
claimed.

The only objection to such a combination was that it could not be made
without the consent of both the French and American governments, and
negotiations to that effect would necessarily take a long time. To
provide for the most pressing needs, Jefferson proposed to raise
directly in Holland the four and twenty millions due to France as
accrued interest. This would make a beginning and create a precedent. In
the meantime Adams was urged to go to Holland to acquaint himself with
the situation, so as to be able to present a definite solution to
Congress on his return to America.[139] The French court remained very
considerate and did not make any formal representations; but very harsh
criticism of the failure of America to meet her obligations were heard
during the Assemblée des Notables. The funds were so low that the
American Government could not even pay its debts to the French officers
who, because of their influence with the Court, should have received
special consideration. Yet Congress did not seem to realize how pressing
the matter was, and Jefferson could only repeat with real despair and
disgust: "Would to heaven they would authorize you to take measures for
transferring the debt of this country to Holland before you leave
Europe."[140]

On their side, the French Court did their best to reassure the French
creditors, and when the written report of the Assemblées des Notables
appeared it had been considerably toned down, simply stating that:

  ... the interest of the claims of His Majesty on the United States of
  America, cannot be drawn out for the present, except as a document.
  The recovery of these claims, as well as principal as perhaps even
  interest, although they appear to rest on the most solid security,
  may, nevertheless, be long delayed, and should not consequently, be
  taken into account in estimating the annual revenue.

But even that mention seemed to Jefferson a reflection on the national
honor of his country. He was harassed by French claimants; Beaumarchais
had just placed in his hands a memorial to Congress; French officers
were writing to him and calling on him, threatening to sell their claims
to a single creditor, or to ask the court to intervene in their favor.
But all the unfortunate American minister could answer was that Congress
"would do in that business, what justice would require, and their means
enable them."[141]

At the end of the same year he learned that Congress had rejected the
proposition of the Dutch bankers, and he could not help expressing deep
disappointment. One hope was left however: the sale of western lands
then going on which would provide Congress with important liquid
assets.

  I turn to this precious resource--he wrote to a friend--as that which
  will, in every event, liberate us from our domestic debt, and perhaps
  too, from our foreign one; and this much sooner than I had expected.
  I do not think anything could have been done with them in Europe.
  Individual speculators and sharpers had duped so many with their
  unlocated land-warrants, that every offer would be suspected.[142]

In the meantime something had to be done to reassure the creditors of
the United States, and Jefferson pressed Dumas to publish a series of
articles in the _Gazette of Leyden_ to demonstrate the financial
stability of his country. The situation had to be presented as follows:
two sales of five million and two million acres respectively had been
made, another for four million was in process and Jefferson considered
that these sales had absorbed seven million dollars of the domestic
Federal debt. The States had absorbed by taxation and otherwise about
ten million dollars, so "that the debt stands now at about ten millions
of dollars, and will probably be all absorbed in the course of next
year. There will remain then our foreign debt, between ten and twelve
millions, including interest. The sale of land will then go on for
payment of this."[143] But in spite of this official optimism the
Commissioners of the Treasury had informed Willincks and Van Staphorsts
that they should "not be able to remit one shilling till the New
Government gets into action" and that consequently they were not to pay
anything towards the interest of the Dutch loan except out of the
proceeds of the last loan. To which the Dutch bankers had answered that
"there was not much prospect to raise as much on that new loan as would
cover the next June interest and that the credit of the United States
was in danger of being wiped off."[144] As Adams was about to leave for
America, Jefferson, at the request of the Dutch bankers, met him at
Amsterdam and for several days the two American envoys did their best to
convince close-fisted financiers, who had speculated in American bonds
and refused to do anything until paid for the interest on the domestic
bonds they held. They finally yielded, but to avoid further
embarrassment Jefferson and Adams decided to provide at one stroke for
the years 1789 and 1790 by signing new bonds for a million florins,
subject to approval of Congress.[145]

The real danger, as both Adams and Jefferson saw it, came from unwise
speculation in American domestic bonds, since the bankers had tried to
use these bonds as a sort of lever; consequently the transfer of
domestic bonds to Europe was to be discouraged by every possible means.
"If the transfer of these debts to Europe, meet with any encouragement
from us, we can no more borrow money here, let our necessities be what
they will."[146]

How desperate the situation was at that date appears in two letters
written to General Washington May 2, 1788, and to James Madison, May 3,
1788.[147] Jefferson's visit at Amsterdam had convinced him that the
credit of the United States was at its lowest ebb and in great danger of
being reduced to nil. The nation with the highest credit was Great
Britain, because the English never asked for a loan without providing by
new taxes for the repayment of it. He indicated that no doubt was
entertained by any one in Holland about the ultimate repayment of the
capital, but that repeated failures to pay the interest on the old loans
had stopped any further borrowing. As to the French debt, the Court had
carefully avoided any public mention of it, "the government here, saying
nothing about it, the public have supposed they wished to leave us at
our ease as to the payment. It is now seen that they call for it, and
they will publish annually the effect of that call." The most pressing
need was an order from the Treasury to pay the arrears for the last
three years to the French officers. With much difficulty Jefferson had
prevented them from holding a meeting to agree on concerted action on
the matter, and when he came back he prevented them from taking
"desperate measures" till July. But a solution could not be deferred
much longer. The necessary sum was comparatively small: twenty thousand
florins a year would have sufficed "to suppress these clamors", and
through diplomacy he finally succeeded in staying the address they
intended to send to Congress and to the king, asking him to intervene on
their behalf.[148]

Fortunately the loan launched in Holland to meet the payment of the June
interest had succeeded and had been finally ratified by Congress.[149]
It was a beginning that brought some respite to Jefferson, but he
insisted again that the next step to take was the funding of the foreign
debt, for the French Government expected "a very satisfactory provision
for the payment of their debt, from the first session of the new
Congress."[150] He was enclosing two tables "showing what fund will
suffice to discharge the principal and interest, as it shall become due
aided by occasional loans, which the same fund will repay." This very
detailed and technical proposal now preserved in the Jefferson papers of
the Library of Congress would repay careful study.

During the spring of the same year, however, Jefferson made a startling
discovery which added to his distress. The international bankers of
Amsterdam were not as politically disinterested as he had thought at
first. He even suspected that, by careful manipulations, they intended
to keep control of the credit of the United States.

  I have observed--wrote Jefferson--that as soon as a sum of interest
  is becoming due, they are able to borrow just that, and no more; or,
  at least, only so much more as may pay our salaries and keep us
  quiet.... I think it possible, they may choose to support our credit
  to a certain point, and let it go no further, but at their will; to
  keep it poised, as that it may be at their mercy. By this, they may
  be sure to keep us in their own hands.[151]

This had to be remedied at once; energetic representations were sent to
the bankers and an order of the Treasury was obtained deciding that
"money for the captives and foreign affairs was to be furnished before
any other payment of interest."[152]

In spite of these tremendous handicaps, due to the apathy of Congress,
to the "stagnation" of American affairs, Jefferson succeeded, through
sheer persistency and hard work, in gaining at least a few points. The
history of his negotiations concerning the debt and the commerce of the
United States may not be so dramatic and picturesque as some other
episodes of his long career; but it cannot be neglected without doing
injustice to his sense of duty, to his industry and above all to his
political vision and understanding of international psychology. The
application to the present situation is so obvious that it needs not to
be elaborated upon. More fortunate than many recent negotiators,
Jefferson had been able to obtain a settlement of the debt question
satisfactory to both parties, and succeeded in eliminating the political
factor from the situation; the debt to France was no longer an obstacle
to the maintenance of friendly relations between the two countries. He
was not the man to boast of his achievements but the legitimate pride he
felt at having done his work to the best of his ability appears in the
letter he wrote to John Jay shortly before his departure from France:

  I am well informed that our credit is now the first at that exchange
  (Amsterdam), (England not borrowing at present). Our five per cent.
  bonds have risen to ninety-seven and ninety-nine. They have been
  heretofore at ninety-three. There are, at this time, several
  companies and individuals here, in England and Holland, negotiating
  to sell large parcels of our _liquidated debt_. A bargain was
  concluded by one of these the other day, for six hundred thousand
  dollars. In the present state of our credit, every dollar of this
  debt will probably be transferred to Europe within a short time.[153]




CHAPTER III

UNION AND ISOLATION


Even an incomplete survey of Jefferson's activities in Paris would
convince any one that at all times the preoccupation uppermost in his
mind was to defend and further the interests of the United States. He
shared practically without any reservation the commonly accepted theory
of his time that self-interest is the most powerful motive of human
actions, and that enlightened self-interest is the true foundation of
morality. Never a sentimentalist, he felt it his duty to put all the
questions he had to discuss on a purely practical basis, neglecting
every other consideration. He had been welcomed enthusiastically and
would have been lionized if he had permitted it. But in the midst of the
adulation showered upon him by Madame d'Houdetot, Madame de Tessé and
the friends of liberty, he endeavored to keep a cool head; and at the
end of his first year in France, he summed up as follows his views of
the situation:

  The body of the people of this country love us cordially. But
  ministers and merchants love nobody. The merchants here, are
  endeavoring to exclude us from their islands, the ministers will be
  governed in it by their political motives, and will do it or not do
  it, as these shall appear to dictate, without love or hatred to
  anybody. It were to be wished that they were able to combine better,
  the various circumstances which prove, beyond a doubt, that all the
  advantages of their colonies result in the end, to the mother
  country.[154]

Representing a country hardly organized, without any diplomatic
traditions, and inexperienced in dealing with foreign affairs, Jefferson
had no easy task. One of his first duties was to convince the diplomats
he was dealing with that America was a country to be trusted, in which
existed a certain permanency and some sort of responsible organization
with which it was possible to deal. This preoccupation influenced to
such an extent his views on the American Constitution that they can be
considered to a large extent a result of his experiences in Europe.

As chairman of the committee on the ratification of the peace treaties,
as plenipotentiary entrusted with the negotiations of the treaties of
commerce, Jefferson had more than once felt how insufficient were the
Articles of Confederation. He had repeatedly proclaimed that to all
intents and purposes the United States were to be regarded as one
nation; but as long as treaties with foreign powers had to be ratified
not only by Congress but by the different States, as long as delegates
had to refer constantly to the particular States they represented, the
Federal organization remained a very clumsy, inefficient piece of
machinery, and business could not be transacted. He never thought for an
instant that it was possible or desirable for the former colonies to
remain completely independent; they had at least to form a society of
nations in order to insure their very existence and their development.
His first months in Europe could only confirm him in these views, and he
wrote to Madison at the end of 1786: "To make us one nation as to
foreign concerns, and keep us distinct in domestic ones, gives the
outlines of the proper division of powers between the general and
particular governments. But to enable the federal head to exercise the
powers given it to best advantage, it should be organized as the
particular ones are, into legislative, executive and judiciary."

At that date, however, he had not admitted the desirability of
appointing a single executive and came back to all his proposals of
vesting the executive powers in a committee of the States, leaving to
Congress the legislative authority.

To Adams, who saw in Congress "not a legislative but a diplomatic
assembly", he protested that it was an opinion not entirely correct and
not likely to do good. As a matter of fact, in forming a confederation,
the individual States yielded some parts of their sovereignty to
Congress, and these parts were both legislative and executive. The
confederation was part of the law of the land, and "superior in
authority to the ordinary laws, because it cannot be altered by the
legislature of any one State." It is not without piquancy to remark here
that the man who was to become the champion of State rights and
decentralization was advocating a strong Federal bond, while the future
Federalist was in favor of a very loose association of States, truly a
sort of League of Nations. In Jefferson's view, on the contrary, the
United States as such were endowed with a sort of super-power, while the
independent States retained only those rights which they were able to
exercise fully.[155] On the other hand, Congress should have absolutely
no authority over acts which do not concern the confederacy. In case of
conflict an appeal could be made "from a state judicature to a Federal
court", in other words to a Supreme Court, and there again Jefferson
takes the position which his enemies were fifteen years later to defend
against him, namely that there ought to be some power above Congress to
restrain it.

  It will be said that this court may encroach over the jurisdiction of
  the State courts. It may. But there will be a power, to wit,
  Congress, to watch and restrain them. But place the same authority in
  Congress itself, and there will be no power above them, to perform
  the same office. They will restrain within due bounds a jurisdiction
  exercised by others, much more rigourously than if exercised by
  themselves.[156]

In a letter to Edward Carrington he summed up his views even more
clearly. Reforms are necessary, although with all its defects the
present government of the United States is so far superior to any
monarchy that its defects must be viewed with indulgence. If any change
is to be made, the general principle ought to be

  to make the States one as to everything connected with foreign
  nations, and several as to everything purely domestic. Then to
  separate the executive from the legislative in order to avoid the
  terrible delays which are bound to happen with a large assembly and
  to have the most important propositions hanging over, from week to
  week and month to month, till the occasions have passed them, and the
  things never done.[157]

Even if originally Jefferson had been of another opinion, the situation
in Europe would have rapidly brought him to the same conclusion. For the
credit of the United States could only be maintained on the condition
that the newly formed confederation gave guarantees of permanency and
stability. In his letters to foreign correspondents, such as Dumas,
financial agent of the United States in Holland, he consequently
affected more confidence in the wisdom of the convention than he perhaps
felt at heart:

  No trouble of any sort is to be anticipated. Happily for us that when
  we find our constitutions defective and insufficient, to secure the
  happiness of our people, we can assemble with all the coolness of
  philosophers, and set it to rights, while every other nation on earth
  must have recourse to arms to amend or restore their
  constitutions.[158]

The main principle to observe is a separation of powers into
"legislative, executive and judiciary" as complete as possible, and the
rest will follow of itself.

Yet as the convention approached, he favored less than ever the
possibility of trusting any individual with the executive power for an
indefinite length of time. "There are things in it which stagger all my
dispositions to subscribe to what such an Assembly has proposed," he
wrote to Adams. His chief objection to the Constitution was the
appointment of a President who would be a sort of Polish king. If they
wanted a President they could have it, provided they should make him
ineligible at the end of four years. He even came to wonder whether too
much ado was not made by the convention, for all the good that was in
the new Constitution "could have been couched in three or four new
articles added to the old articles of confederation." Far from being a
radical and one of these reformers who first think of destroying the old
order of things in order to build anew, Jefferson proposed to keep as
much as possible "the good old and venerable fabric which should have
been preserved, even as a religious relic."[159]

At that time Jefferson had not yet received the text of the Constitution
and had only vaguely heard of the discussion in the convention. When the
newspapers brought him more details, he acquainted Carmichael with his
views on the situation. This time his objection to the proposed scheme
was more specific. It bore not only on the presidency but on the absence
of a Bill of Rights; the thirteen States could not be melted into one
government without guarantees to the people, and particularly without
the recognition of the freedom of the press. The subordination of the
laws of the States to Federal legislation was equally objectionable and
he predicted that many States, among them Virginia, would reject several
articles, making it necessary to assemble another convention to reach a
better agreement.[160]

But it was reserved for Madison finally to become his confident on this
question, and Jefferson's letter to him is both a capital document for
the history of Jeffersonian democracy and a discussion of the first
rank on the science of government. The good things Jefferson saw in the
Constitution were many: the division of powers; the election of a
greater House by the people directly; the negative given to the
executive by a third of either Houses, and many others of less moment.
But the absence of a Bill of Rights could not be condoned, for it was a
sacred palladium of liberty, nor the abandonment of rotation in office,
particularly in the case of the President. He did not despair of the
Commonwealth, but he foresaw the necessity of calling another convention
to agree on an explicit Bill of Rights and to change the objectionable
features of the convention. In a postscript, he made one of those
curious proposals which would be disconcerting if it were not remembered
that his faith in democracy and representative government was tempered
with a great deal of common sense. The people are right most of the
time, the people are right in most cases, but the people are not right
in all cases: they are apt to be swayed by temporary interests and
considerations and they are apt also to pass contradictory laws from day
to day. In order to remedy this instability of legislation, Jefferson
did not hesitate to recommend that there should always be "a twelvemonth
between the engrossing a bill and passing it", adding that if
circumstances required a speedier passage, it should take "two thirds of
both Houses instead of a bare majority."[161]

Having thus defined his position with regard to the Constitution, he
thought it necessary to qualify it. Despite its imperfections, it
contained many excellent points; and if it were felt that insistence on
a Bill of Rights, or on the principle of rotation for the presidency
should cause dissensions between the States, Jefferson declared himself
ready "to swallow the two bitter pills" in order to avoid a schism in
the Union. For that would be "the incurable evil" because near friends,
falling out, never re-united cordially; "whereas, all of us going
together, we shall be sure to cure the evils of our new Constitution
before they do great harm."[162]

The unlimited confidence he had in the ultimate wisdom of the people
convinced him that if they went wrong for a time they would soon admit
their mistakes, for there was in America a "good sense and a free
spirit" which was the safest guarantee that things will right themselves
in time. First ratify and amend afterwards, such was therefore the best
procedure to follow, and he prayed heartily that a sufficient number of
States would ratify, even Virgina and obstinate little Rhode Island! For
after all there was no immediate danger, and the character of Washington
was such that nobody could suspect him of coveting a life tenure for
himself.[163]

Following anxiously and almost day by day the progress of the
ratification, he declared himself perfectly satisfied with the
successful result obtained in August, 1788, and was confident that the
two main defects would be remedied, the first one, the lack of a Bill of
Rights, very soon, the other as soon as General Washington should retire
from office. Jefferson had come gradually to this stand, to a large
extent under the influence of the _Federalist_, which had "rectified him
on several points" and which he considered the "best commentary on the
principles of government ever written."[164]

The most complete expression of Jefferson's views at that time is found
in a letter to Francis Hopkinson, written at the beginning of 1789. He
had been informed that both his friends and his enemies were trying to
put a definite label on him and protested on that occasion that he was
not a Federalist, because, he said, "I never submitted the whole system
of my opinions to the creed of any party whatever, in religion, in
politics, or in anything else, where I was capable of thinking for
myself. If I could not go to heaven but with a party, I would not be
there at all." But he added at once, "I am even farther from the
anti-federalists." Neither a Federalist, nor an anti-Federalist, nor "a
trimmer between parties", he absolutely refused at that date to take
sides, for he would have been sure to draw criticism from the other side
and to see his name in the papers. This was to be avoided at any cost,
for "the pain of a little censure, even when it is unfounded, is more
acute than the pleasure of much praise." As a matter of fact, Jefferson
was already preparing to become the leader of a new party whose program
would combine elements borrowed from the Federalists as well as from
their opponents, but which would rest essentially upon principles
apparently overlooked by both sides. These principles had already been
enunciated in the document written by Jefferson concerning the Articles
of Confederation; they are really the key to his political philosophy.

In forming a society of States, as well as in forming a society of men,
there are rights "which it is useless to surrender to the government,
and which governments have yet always been found to invade." These
rights which cannot be abridged or alienated are "the rights of thinking
and publishing our thoughts by speaking or writing; the right of free
commerce; the right of personal freedom." In a similar way, there are
some instruments of government which are so trustworthy that they ought
to be placed beyond the power of any legislature to alter; the most
important of these is probably trial by jury. Scarcely less essential to
the permanency of a free government is the absence of a standing army,
for such a body of men whether placed at the disposal of the executive
or of the legislative power, may always become an instrument of
oppression. Hence the necessity of a separate instrument, a Bill of
Rights, to secure and protect these fundamental principles of free
government. On the whole, Jefferson declared himself well pleased with
the Constitution "unquestionably the wisest ever yet presented to men";
its obvious defects would be remedied in the near future, and in the
meantime it had effected its main object, the consolidation of the
thirteen States into a Union.[165]

Whether Jefferson would have reached that lofty and disinterested
attitude if he had remained in America is quite another question. He was
placed in a situation entirely different from that of his countrymen who
could not help being influenced by party politics and sectionalism. But
it is a fact worth remembering that before the Constitution was adopted,
the only men who constantly had to think of the United States as one
nation were the American ministers abroad. The very fact that Jefferson
was in Paris not only put him above all parties, but brought home to him
the fact that the United States could not hope to face successfully
external dangers or even survive unless they gave up some of their
liberty for more security, while reserving some of their unalienable
rights. In his views on the Constitution, Jefferson remained perfectly
consistent and followed very closely the principles he had formulated in
1776.

On the other hand, he had found in Europe an opportunity to test his
principles by facts and direct observation. He was opposed to monarchy
on general grounds, but he had seen in France monarchy and absolutism at
their worst. A well-meaning king, not by any means a tyrant, unable to
prevent the dissolution of the nation, a corrupt hereditary aristocracy,
in the main narrow and selfish, a State religion, monopolies, a standing
army, "_lettres de cachet_", no freedom of the press, everywhere
ignorance and misery; such was the picture of France that presented
itself to his eyes; and conditions were such that they could not be
remedied effectively except through a bloody revolution, a last and
desperate resort, to be dreaded as much as monarchical oppression. In
many respects the same situation prevailed all over Europe,
demonstrating beyond the possibility of a doubt that absolutism does not
pay, that it fails to procure the maximum of happiness to the largest
number of inhabitants, that it is wasteful, inefficient and leads
nations to follies, ruin, and war. America was free from all these
evils, but every precaution had to be used lest they should take root
there.

This task naturally required constant vigilance, for everywhere men in
power have a tendency to continue in power, and to extend the limits of
their attributions; some safeguards against these encroachments could be
provided, the greatest safeguard being the pressure of public opinion.
Public opinion could be misled temporarily; but after a time, in a
country where the citizens were reasonably educated, and knowledge more
diffused than in any other country, the chances were that in most cases
the citizens would see where their true interest lay and correct such
evils. This could be achieved only if the citizens were in a position to
collect information on the true state of affairs, to discuss freely with
their neighbors, and communicate their opinion so as to make that
pressure felt. A free press, therefore, was one of the most essential
features of a republican government, for one might conceive a modern
nation existing without a legislature, but it was impossible even to
think of a free government existing without the control of the men who
had subscribed to the social compact. Public opinion and a free press
were not a fourth estate, they were the true source of all three powers,
and superior to all.

Thus, after more than fifteen years of personal reflection aided by
direct observation, Jefferson came to formulate very clearly in his own
mind a certain number of principles founded on reason and verified by
facts. Whether he was at that time under the influence of any particular
philosopher cannot be proved satisfactorily. It may even be said that it
is very improbable, for he was not a man "to submit the whole system of
his opinions to the creed of any party of men whatever." Elements of
different origins can be recognized in his political philosophy: the
theory of natural rights was perhaps Lockian in its principle, but it
had been developed by many philosophers, incorporated in the Virginia
Bill of Rights and thus naturalized as American even before the
Declaration of Independence. The theory of the social compact, too, may
have come from Locke; certainly it did not come from Rousseau; but
Jefferson introduced into it a fundamental modification when he
distinguished between real natural rights and the civil rights
guaranteed by society but limited in order to provide for more safety.
At any rate, Jefferson's conception of the social compact was far more
rigorous, precise, and specific than any that had been proposed before.
A man who had been trained as a lawyer knew exactly what a contract was,
and how necessary it is, in such an instrument, to write clauses
safeguarding both parties. The Bill of Rights was to serve that very
purpose: it was nothing but a document enumerating, defining, and
recognizing once for all a certain number of rights that every
individual specifically reserved in joining a new society. The
constitution on the contrary was purely an instrument of government,
susceptible of all sorts of amendments from time to time, and certainly
from generation to generation. Public opinion was set up as a court of
last resort in all cases; for public opinion, not necessarily right in
all cases, is always right ultimately in a nation where people have
received a minimum of education and are kept informed by a free press.

Such were the essential lines of Jefferson's political philosophy on the
eve of his departure from France. It does not appear that there was in
it anything particularly English or particularly French, although the
remote source of some ideas may be traced to English and French
political thinkers. His principles, as a matter of fact, belonged to the
common fund of political thought drawn upon by all the liberal thinkers
of the eighteenth century, and Jefferson, calling no man his master,
simply reflected the general trend of his time. But whatever may have
been the primary origin of some of his ideas, he was fully convinced
that they corresponded to conditions existing in America and nowhere
else on earth, that in America alone were they susceptible of immediate
application and extensive development.

These views on the uniqueness of America's position among the nations of
the world contributed to the crystallization of certain principles which
Jefferson enunciated when he was sent to Paris and endeavored to apply
when Secretary of State and President. They were to exert a tremendous
influence upon the destiny of the nation and to a certain extent are
still to-day the directing principles of America's foreign policy.

If Jefferson had ever believed that it was possible for the United
States to coöperate effectively and satisfactorily with Europe in any
common undertaking, after his failure to organize a confederacy of the
European States against the Barbary pirates, he soon came to the
conclusion that such a hope was chimerical. The question of the
navigation of the Mediterranean was not the least complicated of the
puzzles that confronted the American minister in Paris. After long
hesitations the European powers had finally adopted a _modus vivendi_
with the Barbary pirates--a solution far from satisfactory, since it
meant the paying of a regular tribute to the Dey of Algiers, the Regency
of Tunis, and the Sultan of Morocco. Was the young republic of the
United States to follow in their steps and accept such a humiliating
compromise? If they refused, their commerce with the Near East was
placed on a very precarious foundation. On the other hand, they could
hardly maintain a sufficient fleet in the Mediterranean to insure the
safety of their merchantmen. To pay tribute, or to give efficient
protection to the merchant marine entailing expenditure of sums easily
as large as the tribute, or else to give up the Mediterranean trade,
were the only solutions to be considered.[166]

[Illustration: LAFAYETTE

_After a lithograph from the portrait by Grevedon_]

The first solution was absolutely repugnant to Jefferson. "When this
idea comes across my mind, my faculties are absolutely suspended between
indignation and impatience."[167]

He therefore approached Vergennes to sound him on his intention and to
determine whether it would not be possible to establish a permanent
blockade of Algiers. Although Admiral d'Estaing was in favor of the plan
and thought it perfectly feasible, the prudent diplomat did not give
Jefferson much encouragement. But in spite of the instructions sent by
his government and the pressure exerted by Adams, who thought it cheaper
to buy peace, Jefferson's preference for war remained entire. With his
characteristic obstinacy, he tried another approach and thought it
possible to organize a confederation of all the nations interested in
the Mediterranean trade, in order to maintain an international blockade
before the ports of the pirates and thus paralyze their operations. He
explained his plan in detail to Adams and even drew up the articles of
confederation.[168]

At this juncture he took Lafayette into his confidence as he had already
done so many times, and discussed the situation with him. The Marquis
saw at once another opportunity to be of service to America. He had
hardly left Jefferson's house before the idea came to his mind that he
could offer his services as chief of the operations against the Barbary
pirates, and he wrote at once to Jefferson to that effect.[169] That the
project did not come to completion was due to many causes and to a large
extent to Adams' opposition, as may be inferred from a letter written
by Lafayette to his "Dear General" during the fall of 1786,[170] but
most of all to lack of coöperation between the European powers; and
during the rest of his mission Jefferson had to restrict himself to
making arrangements in order to obtain the release of the American
captives.

On the other hand, if it was evident that Europe was unwilling to
coöperate with America in the Mediterranean, it was not so certain that
France, England, and Spain had given up their ambitious designs on the
New World, and Jefferson considered it his duty to forestall any attempt
of theirs to develop or reëstablish colonies on the American continent.

As far as France was concerned, she had given up all claims to her
former colonies by the Treaty of Alliance signed on February 6, 1778,
but there always remained the possibility that she might attempt to
settle on the western coast of the American continent and thus take
possession of the back door of the country. The preparations made for
"La Peyrouse's voyage to the South Seas" aroused strong suspicions in
Jefferson's mind. He could not be persuaded that the French were in a
position to spend so much money "merely for the improvement of the
geography of that part of the globe." They certainly had some ulterior
aims, at least that of establishing fur-trading stations on the western
coast, as a first step towards regular colonization; and "if they should
desire a colony on the western side of America, I should not be quite
satisfied that they would refuse one which should offer itself on the
eastern side," wrote Jefferson to Jay. So, to ascertain the true nature
of the expedition, he commissioned Paul Jones to go to Brest "to satisfy
himself of the nature of the expedition; conducting himself so as to
excite no suspicion."[171] This was not a very important incident in
itself, but it is not impossible that it attracted Jefferson's attention
to the western coast fifteen years before he sent out the Lewis and
Clarke Expedition; and his unwillingness to permit France to obtain a
footing even in a very remote part of the continent is quite
significant.

His fears of the colonizing designs of France were soon allayed, but
there remained England to consider, and England still constituted the
greatest potential danger for the United States. While in America,
Jefferson never manifested any strong animosity against the British as a
people, and even expressed the hope that a reconciliation would follow
the victory of American arms. Soon after coming to Europe, however, he
had to admit that the commercial policy of Great Britain was so
obnoxious that the American hatred "against Great Britain having lately
received from that nation new cause and new aliment, had taken a new
spring."[172] Thus, added Jefferson, "in spite of treaties, England is
still our enemy. Her hatred is deep rooted and cordial, and nothing is
wanting with her but the power to wipe us, and the land which we live on
out of existence." The only hope of avoiding a new war was to make Great
Britain realize that her true interest lay in some compromise, and that
America had more energy than she suspected. But all told it was "a
conflict of dirty passions."[173] Unfortunately the British were
absolutely unrelenting in their hostility:

  ... they keep a standing army of newswriters formally engaged in war
  against America. They dwell very much on American bankruptcies--and
  thus worked to such good effect that by destroying America's credit
  they checked her disposition to luxury; and forcing our merchants to
  buy no more than they have ready money to pay for, they force them to
  go to those markets where that money will buy most.[174]

Jefferson's tour in England only confirmed him in his views, for

  that nation hate us, their ministers hate us, and their King more
  than all other men. They have the impudence to avow this, though they
  acknowledge our trade important to them.... They say they will pocket
  our carrying trade as well as their own. Our overtures of commercial
  arrangements have been treated with a derision, which shows their
  firm persuasion, that we shall never unite to suppress their
  commerce, or even to impede it. I think their hostility towards us is
  much more deeply rooted at present than during the war.[175]

To Dumas, the financial agent at the Hague, he reiterated his views that
"the English are still our enemies." He even predicted war, a war which
would renew the scenes of Rome and Carthage: "Peace and friendship with
all mankind is our wisest policy; and I wish we may be permitted to
pursue it. But the temper and folly of our enemies may not leave this in
our choice."[176]

Finally the Spanish colonies in America constituted another source of
danger. Jefferson was confident that Spain would never be in a position
to conduct a war of aggression against the United States; but being a
weak country and embroiled in European affairs, her colonies might be
used at any time as mere pawns in the unscrupulous game of European
politics. In these circumstances the attitude the United States should
observe in their relations with the Spanish colonies was to be seriously
considered. A curious illustration of the fears and schemes which passed
at that time through Jefferson's mind is found in an episode of his
Southern journey during the preceding year. The gist of his conversation
with a Brazilian he met at Montpellier was that an important group of
colonists were ready to follow the example of the United States and
proclaim their independence of the mother country. But as Portugal was
certain to join forces with Spain in repressing such a revolution, the
Brazilian patriots had decided not to undertake anything before securing
the assistance of some other country. The thinking part of the
population had naturally thought of the United States. "They would want
cannons, ammunition, ships, sailors, soldiers and officers, for which
they are disposed to look to the United States, it being always
understood that every service and furniture will be well paid." The
answer of Jefferson to that alluring proposition, contains more than one
interesting point:

  I took care to impress on him, through the whole of our conversation,
  that I had neither instructions nor authority to say a word to
  anybody on this subject, and that I could only give him my own ideas,
  as a single individual; which were, that we were not in a condition
  at present to meddle nationally in any war; that we wished
  particularly to cultivate the friendship of Portugal, with whom we
  have an advantageous commerce. That yet a successful revolution in
  Brazil could not be uninteresting to us. That prospects of lucre
  might possibly draw numbers of individuals to their aid, and purer
  motives our officers, among whom are many excellent. That our
  citizens being free to leave their own country individually, without
  the consent of their governments, are equally free to go to any
  other.[177]

Amusingly enough, Jefferson evidently believed that he had displayed a
remarkable caution during the whole conversation. It is doubtful that
such would have been the opinion of the Portuguese Government had his
letter to Jay been intercepted, and one may wonder what he would have
said if he had really intended to encourage a revolution in the
Portuguese colonies. With a Mexican who made a similar inquiry he was
somewhat more reserved. He had observed that the gentleman was "intimate
at the Spanish Ambassador's" and suspected that he might be a spy. He
was therefore "still more cautious with him than with the Brazilian";
mentioning simply that "a successful revolution was still at a distance
with them": that he feared "they must begin by enlightening and
emancipating the minds of their people." He finally recalled that the
British papers had mentioned during the late war an insurrection in Peru
"which had cost two hundred thousand lives, on both sides!"--a figure
not to be taken too literally.

During the course of a year, however, Jefferson's views underwent a
remarkable change. In May, 1788, he mentioned to Carmichael his
suspicions that a Spanish squadron had been sent to South America in
order to quell an incipient revolt started at the instigation of the
British. This placed the situation in an entirely different light. The
United States would have very little to gain if a weak neighbor were
displaced by a powerful and treacherous nation. He consequently
requested his colleagues to reassure the Spanish Court that the United
States would not favor in any way a revolt of the Spanish colonies in
the New World, for "those who look into futurity farther than the
present moment or age, and who combine well what is, with what is to be,
must see that our interests, well understood, and our wishes are, that
Spain shall (not forever, but) very long retain her possessions in that
quarter; and that her views and ours must, in a good degree, and for a
long time concur."[178]

This is the more important as it already defines the position taken by
Jefferson twelve years later during the negotiations concerning the
Louisiana Purchase. It is also a reiteration of that desire of isolation
which constituted the cardinal principle of American foreign policies
and which had been enunciated in the Treaty of Alliance concluded with
France in 1778. Jefferson had not originated the principle, since this
article of the Treaty of Alliance was due to Adams, but his direct and
prolonged contact with European affairs had strengthened in him the
instinctive conviction that it was the only wise course for America to
follow. If he had felt free to indulge in his own theory, he would have
gone even further than any of his contemporaries for, as he wrote in
1785, "I should wish the United States to practice neither commerce, nor
navigation, but to stand, with respect to Europe, precisely on the
footing of China." Unfortunately, this was only a theory and the
servants of the country were not at liberty to follow it, since
"Americans have a decided taste for navigation and commerce." Being on a
mission to protect and further the commerce of his fellow countrymen,
Jefferson consequently thought it his duty to forget for the time being
his personal preferences. In a similar way, although he strongly
believed in free trade and would have seen no objection to "throwing
open all the doors of commerce, and knocking its shackles", he realized
that such an ideal condition could not be reached unless the European
powers granted similar treatment to American goods. He therefore came to
the conclusion that, "as this cannot be done for others, unless they
will do it for us, and there is no great probability that Europe will do
this, we shall be obliged to adopt a system which may shackle them in
our ports, as they do in theirs."[179]

We have here another striking instance of the close partitioning
established by Jefferson between theory and practice, between his wishes
as a political philosopher, and his conception of his duties as a public
servant. Far from being a single-track mind, his was decidedly a
double-track intellect, with two lines of thought running parallel
without any apparent contradiction, for theory never seemed to have
interfered with his practice. When a month later he wrote to W. W.
Seward about the future of commercial relations between Ireland and
America, he excellently defined his position by saying that "the system
into which the United States wishes to go, was that of freeing commerce
from every shackle. A contrary conduct in Great Britain will occasion
them to adopt a contrary system, at least as to that island."[180]

There is probably nothing in this to astonish the man in the street,
either in Washington or in London, for it seems to be a curious quality
of the Anglo-Saxon mind to be able to pursue a very practical and
hard-headed policy, while keeping its belief in disinterested and
idealistic principles. Yet it may not be out of place to mention that
this is the very reason why both England and America have so often been
accused of hypocrisy by European public opinion. Without attempting to
justify all the foreign policies of the United States on that score, it
may be said that in this particular case there was no hypocrisy.
Jefferson made no attempt whatever to conceal the difference that
existed between his theory and his practice; he even called attention to
it. He did not attempt to color unpleasant reality with idealistic
camouflage, and gave the European nations a chance to choose between two
entirely different courses. He would rather have chosen to follow the
more liberal system, but he gave due notice that if it came to playing
the game of real politics, America could be just as practical and firm
in insisting upon her rights as any nation of the Old World.

The millennium had not yet arrived; and America, in spite of her
peaceful attitude, might be caught at any time in European "commotions."
While maintaining a policy of strict aloofness, it would have been
foolish and ostrich-like for her to ignore that danger, and it became
the strict duty of those in power to keep close watch on political
developments in the Old World. Such is the conclusion reached by
Jefferson as a result of his observations, and in a letter to E.
Carrington he outlined a policy of watchful waiting to which Woodrow
Wilson himself would have subscribed:

  I often doubt whether I should trouble Congress or my friends with
  these details of European politics. I know they do not excite that
  interest in America, of which it is impossible for one to divest
  himself here. I know, too, that it is a maxim with us, and I think it
  is a wise one, not to entangle ourselves with the affairs of Europe.
  Still I think, we should know them. The Turks have practiced the same
  maxim of not meddling in the complicated wrangles of this continent.
  But they have unwisely chosen to be ignorant of them also, and it is
  this total ignorance of Europe, its combinations and its movements,
  which exposes them to that annihilation possibly about to take place.
  While there are powers in Europe which fear our views, or have views
  on us, we should keep an eye on them, their connections and
  opposition, that in a moment of need, we may avail ourselves of their
  weakness with respect to others as well as ourselves, and calculate
  their designs and movements, on all the circumstances under which
  they exist. Though I am persuaded, therefore, that these details are
  read by many with great indifference, yet I think it my duty to enter
  into them, and to run the risk of giving too much, rather than too
  little information.[181]

Watchful waiting, no political entanglements, unofficial
observers--everything is here and this page could have been written ten
years ago or yesterday. It is sometimes said that America, being a young
and inexperienced nation, has had no time to develop traditions, but it
may be wondered whether any other nation could be found which, after
defining so clearly the essentials of a policy, has adhered to them so
persistently for a century and a half. There is no doubt, at any rate,
that once again Jefferson, although he did not originate the theory,
formulated it with his usual felicity of expression, and thus
contributed toward giving America what Descartes would have called her
"maxims of action."




CHAPTER IV

JEFFERSON AND THE FRENCH REVOLUTION


Jefferson has often been represented, both by his enemies and friends,
as the American exponent of the theories of the French Revolution. The
possible influence exerted upon the development of his political
philosophy by French thought has been the subject of lengthy discussions
and probably will never be determined with any degree of exactness. It
is very difficult to see how a man of his character could have remained
in Paris for more than five years without participating in some manner
in the great battle of theories which preceded the French Revolution. He
associated with Lafayette and his group of "republicans", exchanged some
correspondence with Condorcet, frequently saw Abbé Morellet, was
introduced by Benjamin Franklin to Madame Helvétius and her coterie; he
worked with Du Pont de Nemours on commercial questions, subscribed to
papers and gazettes and to the "Encyclopédie Méthodique", a continuation
and systematization of Diderot's "Encyclopédie."

But when all is said, the most careful scrutiny of the letters he wrote
during that period fails to reveal any enthusiasm or even any
endorsement of the many and somewhat contradictory political doctrines
which were preached in France at the time. I do not even see that his
prolonged sojourn in France modified to any extent the conclusions he
had already reached independently in the "Notes on Virginia." When he
arrived in Paris he was over forty and had been in public life for
almost fifteen years; he had written not only the Declaration of
Independence but many reports on vital questions; he had participated
actively and for several years in the deliberations of the Virginia
Assembly and of the Congress of the United States and he had been chief
executive of his native State. Such a man was not a student coming to
Paris to sit at the feet of French masters; he was considered by the
French themselves, not only as a master but as the apostle of the
religion of liberty.[182] They looked up to him for advice and help, for
he had over them the great superiority of having been more than a simple
theorizer; he had contributed to a great movement of liberation; he was
the promoter of the Bill for Religious Freedom; he had proposed a
complete plan of public education and he had proclaimed in a national
document the inviolable rights of man. They had much to learn from
Jefferson and he was not reluctant to teach them, but he never felt that
his French friends could repay him in kind. On the other hand, it cannot
be denied that he was very happy to find enunciated in a very clear and
logical way some of his favorite ideas; it is equally certain that
France was to him a living demonstration and a sort of horrible example
of all the evils caused by aristocratic, monarchical, and ecclesiastical
oppressions. His sojourn in France had at least the effect of making him
more intensely, more proudly American than he was before sailing, and
more convinced than ever of the unsurpassed superiority of the
civilization which had already developed on the northern continent of
the New World.

This sentiment appears even during the first year of his stay in Paris
in a letter to Mrs. Trist:

  It is difficult to conceive how so good a people, with so good a
  king, so well-disposed rulers in general, so genial a climate, so
  fertile a soil, should be rendered so ineffectual for producing human
  happiness by one single curse--that of a bad form of government. But
  it is a fact in spite of the mildness of their governors, the people
  are ground to powder by the vices of the form of government. Of
  twenty millions of people supposed to be in France, I am of opinion
  there are nineteen millions more wretched, more accursed, in every
  circumstance of human existence, than the most conspicuously wretched
  individual of the whole United States.... Nourish peace with their
  persons, but war against their manners. Every step we take towards
  the adoption of their manners is a step to perfect misery.[183]

This was no passing mood: a few weeks earlier he had written much more
vehemently to his friend and "_élève_", James Monroe, engaging him to
come to France in order to see for himself the extraordinary superiority
of America over Europe and particularly France.

  It will make you adore your own country, it's soil, it's climate,
  it's equality, liberty, laws, people & manners. My God! how little do
  my country men know what precious blessings they are in possession
  of, and which no other people on earth enjoy. I confess I had no idea
  of it myself. While we shall see multiplied instances of Europeans
  going to live in America, I will venture to say no man now living
  will ever see an instance of an American removing to settle in
  Europe & continuing there.[184]

But unhappy as they are, the French are lovable, for he loved them with
all his heart and thought that, "with a better religion, a better form
of government and their present Governors, their condition and country
would be most enviable." At any rate they were to be preferred to the
"rich, proud, hectoring, swearing, squibbling, carnivorous animals who
lived on the other side of the Channel."[185]

At the beginning of his stay, Jefferson paid little attention to the
internal affairs of the country; the only incident worth comment during
his first year in Paris was the imprisonment of the chief editor of the
_Journal de Paris_ who was sent to the Bastille, perhaps to end his days
there:

  Thus--wrote he--you see the value of energy in Government for
  such a measure, which would have been wrapt in the flames of war
  and desolation in America, ends without creating the slightest
  disturbance. Every attempt to criticize even mildly the government
  is followed immediately by stern measures, suppressing the London
  papers, suppressing the _Leyden Gazette_, imprisoning Beaumarchais,
  and imprisoning the editor of the _Journal_, the author of the
  _Mercure_, etc.[186]

It is not until February, 1786, that he gave hints, quite incidentally,
that the situation might become critical and that serious disturbances
might be feared for the future.

But he did not see anywhere any immediate danger of a political
commotion and during that year he continued to repeat in his letters
that "Europe was very quiet for the present." As a matter of fact, he
had come to the conclusion that the case of the Old World was hopeless;
they were past redemption and, "if the Almighty had begotten a thousand
sons, instead of one, they would not have sufficed for this task. If all
the sovereigns of Europe undertook to emancipate the minds of their
subjects, a thousand years would not place them on that high ground on
which our common people are now setting out." France has become a
horrible example to place constantly before the eyes of America, to
remind her that the most important factor for the happiness of the
people is the diffusion of common knowledge that will enable them to
preserve themselves from kings, nobles, and priests, for it is
impossible to imagine a people of more pleasant dispositions, more made
for happiness, surrounded by so many blessings of nature, and yet
"loaded with misery by kings, nobles, and priests, and by them
alone."[187]

Never before had Jefferson been so vehement in his denunciations of
kingly and priestly usurpations, never had he been so positive of the
necessity of preserving American civilization from any foreign
influences. But again this is not with him an _a priori_ view, it is the
result of his observations more than of his theories.

He was confirmed in his hatred of the French régime by his conversations
with Latude, who "comes sometimes to take family soup with me, &
entertains me with anecdotes of his five & thirty years imprisonment,
all of which for having written four lines on Madame de Pompadour."[188]

In a letter to Washington already quoted, but capital for the history of
his mind, he remarked that before coming to Europe he had not even begun
to suspect the evils of monarchical government; what he saw there
brought home to him the conviction that "as long as a single fibre of it
would remain in America, the scourge that is rendering existence a
scourge to 24 out of 25 parts of the inhabitants of this country might
break out."[189]

As late as 1787 he was still persuaded that under pretence of governing,
the ruling classes have divided the nations into two classes, wolves and
sheep: "But what can the sheep do against the wolves except to submit,
to suffer without any hope of ever changing the established order."[190]

His first mention of the possibility of introducing some modification in
the existing order does not occur before he heard of the convocation of
the Assembly of the Notables "which had not been done for one hundred
and sixty years"; but this interests him only mildly at the beginning,
as nothing certain could be known about the program of the
Assembly.[191] A few days later he admitted to Colonel Edward Carrington
that "this event which will hardly excite any attention in America is
deemed here the most important one which has taken place in their civil
life during the present century." But his only real interest in it was
that Lafayette had finally been put on the list and was the youngest of
the Notables but one.[192] He felt that it was his duty to attend the
first meeting of the Notables, and still more to pay his call to the new
minister Montmorin--the only thing that detained him in Paris, and when
he wrote to John Adams and Jay to describe the inaugural session opened
by the king, he restricted himself to a dry recital of facts. With a
prince of the blood at the head of each committee, he did not expect
great results from the convocation and was skeptical about the
efficiency of the members.[193] Just as he was leaving Paris for his
long extensive trip to the South of France, he thought, however, of
sending a last word of advice to Lafayette whose republican ideas he
evidently feared. It was a counsel of prudence. Whatever may have been
his sympathies for the republicans, in his opinion France was not ready
for a complete change in her system of government.

Least of all was she ready for a democratic experiment. Consequently
Jefferson, the American patriot, the enemy of England, the alleged hater
of aristocracies, advised his friend "to proceed step by step, towards a
good constitution, keeping the good model of your neighboring country
before your eyes. Though that model is not perfect, yet, as it would
unite more suffrages than any new one which could be proposed, it is
better to make that the object.

"You see how we Republicans are apt to preach", he said in conclusion;
but his letter was more than a sermon; it contained also the advice of a
shrewd and very practical politician who recommended that every possible
effort be made to give the king what he wanted in the way of personal
expenses. "If every advance is to be purchased by filling the royal
coffers with gold, it will be gold well employed. The King who means so
well, should be encouraged to repeat those Assemblies."[194]

That was all he could say, and even so he had probably said too much,
for it was a risky thing for a diplomat to write about or to discuss at
all. Jefferson was certainly guilty of trespassing on a province that
constituted an essential part of the internal politics of the kingdom.
And yet the charge of plotting against the existing government cannot be
laid at his door. As long as he remained in France, and I believe, even
after he came back to America, he carefully refrained from giving any
encouragement to those of his French friends who held radical views. He
was caught in the torrent and, as we shall see later, did not always
observe the reticence of an old-fashioned diplomat; but whatever
influence he exerted was exerted in order to maintain rather than to
overthrow the existing order of things.

During his trip he observed the condition of the peasants and, much to
his surprise, found among them a smaller degree of poverty than he had
expected; but if he made observations and entered many minute facts in
his diary, he did not come to any conclusion nor did he seem to have
been interested by the state of mind of the people. He had judged them
once for all, he knew that they were priest-ridden and lord-ridden and
did not see how any real reform might originate from them. Once,
however, but only once, did he indicate that he had paid serious
attention to the work before the Assembly. Writing to Lafayette's aunt,
Madame de Tessé, in the evident expectation that she would communicate
his ideas to the proper persons, he drew up an almost complete plan of
administrative reforms: To have frequent meetings of the Assembly of
Notables; the Assembly to be divided into two houses--the Noblesse and
the Commons; the Commons to be taken from those chosen by the people for
provincial administrations; the number of deputies for the Nobility to
be reduced. These two Houses so elected "would make the King great and
the people happy." And the next sentence expresses very cleverly, too
cleverly perhaps, that this innocuous reform would in fact be a sort of
revolution, the name of which would be avoided. "They would thus put
themselves in the track of the best guide they can follow (the king);
they would soon overtake it, become its guide in turn, and lead to the
wholesome modifications wanting in that model, and necessary to
constitute a rational government." What he had in mind at the time was a
sort of government following very closely the lines of the British, not
as an ideal but as a temporary measure; for before the eyes of his
friends he held another prospect. But for the present that was the
maximum they could wisely expect; "should they attempt more than the
established habits of the people are ripe for, they may lose all, and
retard indefinitely the ultimate object of their aim."[195]

Commerce more than politics absorbed all his attention when he came back
from his trip. He found time, however, to send to Madison his first
estimate of the king and queen, a most unflattering portrait of poor
Louis XVI.

  The King loves business, economy, order, and justice, and wishes
  sincerely the good of his people; but he is irascible and rude, very
  limited in his understanding, and religious, bordering on bigotry. He
  has no mistress, loves his queen, and is too much governed by her.
  She is capricious like her brother, and governed by him: devoted to
  pleasure and expense; and not remarkable for any other vices or
  virtues. Unhappily the King shows a propensity for the pleasures of
  the table. That for drink has increased lately, or, at least, it has
  become more known.[196]

It was not until August that he summed up in a letter to Monroe the
great improvements in the constitution of the French effected by the
Assemblées des Notables. He was surprised at the great explosion of
joy, which he thought unwarranted; for after all, even the unexampled
boldness of the enemies of the régime was nothing but the "follies of
nations in their dotage."[197] Yet writing to John Jay the next day he
took a more serious view of things and declared "It is evident, I think,
that a spirit of this country is advancing towards a revolution in their
constitution. There are not wanting persons at the helm, friends to the
progress of this spirit. The Provincial Assemblies will be the most
probable instrument of effecting it."[198]

But it is primarily from the American point of view that he continues to
be interested, and he becomes more and more convinced that, "with all
its defects, and with all those of our particular governments, the
inconveniences resulting from them, are so light in comparison with
those existing in every other government on earth that our citizens may
certainly be considered as in the happiest political situation which
exists."[199] With more intimate friends he was far more violent and
outspoken, as in the letter he wrote the same day to Colonel Humphreys.
It is seldom he indulges in these outbursts of passionate invective, so
seldom that it may be wondered whether his expression is not stronger
than his thought:

  From these events, our young Republic may learn useful lessons, never
  to call on foreign powers to settle their differences, to guard
  against hereditary magistrates, to prevent their citizens from
  becoming so established in wealth and power, as to be thought worthy
  of alliance ... in short to besiege the throne of heaven with eternal
  prayers, to extirpate from creation this class of human lions,
  tigers, and mammoths called Kings; from whom, let him perish who does
  not say, "good Lord deliver us!"[200]

He had caught something of the general fever, and he drew a vivid
picture of Paris with crowds surrounding the "Parliament House",
stopping carriages in the queen's livery, indulging in _bons mots_,
caricatures, "collecting in mobs, and yet the King, long in the habit of
drowning his cares in wine, plunges deeper and deeper. The Queen cries,
but sins on", and the only practical result one can see is that "all
tongues in Paris and in France have been let loose."[201] The same note
is given six weeks later in a letter to John Jay. "The King goes for
nothing. He hunts one half of the day, is drunk the other, and signs
whatever he is bid."[202] Even the reforms, the most important from the
point of view of the French, seem to him insignificant, and when the
edict on the Protestants appears, it is cruelly analyzed by the American
minister:

  It is an acknowledgement that Protestants can beget children, and
  that they can die, and be offensive unless buried. It does not give
  them permission to think, to speak, or to worship.... What are we to
  think of the condition of the human mind in a country, where such a
  wretched thing as this throws the State into convulsions, and how
  must we bless our own situation in a country, the most illiterate
  peasant of which is a Solon, compared with the authors of this
  law.[203]

When he wrote his "Autobiography", Jefferson used very extensively not
only the notes he had taken when in Paris but the press copies of his
correspondence, and on the whole gave an accurate picture of the events
that immediately preceded the French Revolution--those he had witnessed
before his departure from Paris, in October, 1789. But, true as the
picture may be, it is not progressive, and here we aim not to trace
again the main episodes of the French Revolution, but the development of
Jefferson's mind, his reaction towards the events. Most of all we must
seek to find out from contemporary evidence whether the old accusation
launched by Gouverneur Morris, seized upon eagerly by Jefferson's
enemies, and since repeated again and again, is in any way justified.

We have already seen that, with a corrupted court, a weak king, a
selfish and ignorant queen, the only remedy he recommended at first was
for the French not to reconquer their liberties by force and by a
revolution, but gradually to buy them from the king. Yet he foresaw that
the nobility would make a sort of alliance with the people, that is to
say the _tiers état_, in order to get money from them, and he held the
rather cynical view that "Courtiers had rather give up power than
pleasures; they will barter, therefore, the usurped prerogatives of the
King, for the money of the people. This is the agent by which modern
nations will recover their rights."[204] This is written, not to Jay in
a confidential letter, but to a French liberal of his acquaintance, and
that practical piece of advice cannot be called philosophical.
Altogether the results reached by the Assemblée des Notables were small
and the king terribly slow to see the light. So for a long time
Jefferson refused not only to encourage but even to admit that he was
witnessing the beginnings of a true revolution. Writing to Rutledge in
July, 1788, he declared "That the struggle in this country is, as yet,
of doubtful issue. It is, in fact, between the monarchy and the
parliaments. The nation is no otherwise concerned, but as both parties
may be induced to let go some of its abuses, to court the public favor.
The danger, is that the people deceived by a false cry of liberty, may
be led to take sides with one party, and thus give the other a pretext
for crushing them still more."[205] Writing to Cutting a few days later
he was more optimistic. Most of the late innovations had been much for
the better; a convocation of the States-General could not be avoided;
"it will produce a national assembly meeting at certain epochs,
possessing at first a negative on the laws, but which will grow into the
right of original legislation. Much could be hoped from the
States-General and it was also to be hoped that all this will be
effected without convulsion."[206]

Such was his confident expectation. He foresaw "that within two or three
years this country will be in the enjoyment of a tolerably free
constitution, and that without its having cost them a drop of
blood."[207]

To Carmichael he described his own attitude as that of a bystander, not
otherwise interested, but entertaining a sincere love for the nation in
general and a wish to see their happiness promoted, "keeping myself
clear of the particular views and passions of individuals."[208] Had he
felt differently he would not have taken into his confidence a man for
whom he felt no particular friendship; but, at that date at least, he
could make that statement without departing from the exact truth. As far
as contemporary evidence is concerned, it does not seem that he ever
urged his friends forward, but on the contrary he always advised them to
play a waiting game, and to keep from having recourse to violence. About
the middle of that year, 1788, he toned down his severe estimate of the
king, to whom he attributed "no foible which will enlist him against the
good of his people."[209] Calonne had been removed and Necker called in
as Director General of finance; things were looking decidedly better, a
convocation of the States-General had been decided upon; the issue
depended largely on three possible solutions: whether the three orders
would meet separately; whether the clergy and the nobility would form a
house and the Commons a second one; or finally whether the three orders
would meet in one house which would give the majority to the Commons.
The choice was really thought incumbent upon the king, who thus had the
power to place the people on his side if he was wise enough to prefer
to have on his side twenty-three millions and a half instead of the
other half million.[210]

At the end of 1788, with the convocation of the States-General announced
for the beginning of the following year, he was still very optimistic,
but he had not departed from his cautious and reserved recommendations.
The States could not succeed if they asked too much, for the Commons
would frighten and shock the court and even alarm the public mind. If
any durable progress was to be accomplished, it would have to be by
degrees and successive improvements. Such probably would be the course
followed, unless an influence unaccountable, impossible to measure, and
yet powerful entirely changed the situation: "The fact that women visit
alone persons in office, solicit in defiance of laws and regulations, is
an extraordinary obstacle to the betterment of things, unbelieveable as
it may be to the inhabitant of a country where the sex does not
endeavour to extend itself beyond the domestic line."[211]

He did not even believe that any real reform could be accomplished
beyond fixing periodical meetings of the States-General and giving them
the right to participate in the legislation and to decide on taxes. They
did not seem to be unanimously in favor of the _habeas corpus_; as for
the freedom of the press,--"I hardly think the nation itself ripe to
accept it."[212] This was his prophecy at the beginning of 1789, and
during the first month of the year he had no occasion to express new
views, since everybody was in the provinces "electioneering, choosing or
being chosen." With his experience of Assemblies, however, he could not
help wondering how any result could be accomplished with a body which
was to include some twelve hundred persons and moreover to consist of
Frenchmen, among whom are always more speakers than listeners.[213] In a
letter to Thomas Paine we find the first intimation that Jefferson
began to be influenced by the political thinkers of France or rather to
discover in them a certain quality of thought and presentation that make
their work of some use for the American people. They were at any rate
much preferable to the Englishman, who "slumbering under a kind of half
reformation in politics and religion, is not excited by anything he sees
or feels, to question the remains of prejudice. The writers of this
country, now taking the field freely and unrestrained, or rather
involved by prejudice, will rouse us all from the errors in which we
have been hitherto rocked."[214] Taken in itself and without the context
this sentence would tend to indicate in Jefferson an almost unreserved
approval of the doctrines of the radical reformers and of the very
spirit of the French Revolution, but as is so often the case with him,
the real meaning is hidden in the last part. It was not so much in their
theoretical views he was interested as in the fact that "their logical
presentation, might be used in America to overcome the last resistance
to the establishment of a true republican régime free from any vestige
of monarchical order." But that he hoped that such radical reforms could
succeed in France is not indicated. His complete thought is far better
expressed in the letter written the next day to Humphreys:

  The writings published on this occasion are, some of them, very
  valuable; because, unfettered by the prejudices under which
  Englishmen labor, they give a full scope to reason, and strike out
  truths, as yet unperceived and unacknowledged on the other side of
  the channel.... In fine, I believe this nation will, in the course of
  the present year, have as full a portion of liberality dealt out to
  them, as the nation can bear at present, considering how uninformed
  the mass of their people is.[215]

On the other hand, to believe that they would be able to establish a
truly representative and free government was certainly inconceivable to
him at this date. To the last moment he hoped that some sort of an
agreement would be possible between the nobility and the Commons, for he
had decided very early that no confidence should be placed in the
clergy. He was looking forward to a close coöperation between the
younger part of the nobility and the Commons, who, working together with
the king, would seek the support of the people and accomplish important
reforms. No fundamental change however could be expected, since the
French refused to show any interest in the most vital question of trial
by jury.

But as soon as the States-General were opened he realized that he had
been too optimistic. Since the "_Noblesse_" would not yield and wanted
their delegates to do their dirty work for them, the only manly stand to
take for a man like Lafayette, who although of liberal opinion had
solicited and obtained a mandate from the nobility, was to go over
wholly to the _tiers état_. The opening of the States-General was as
imposing as an opera but it was poor business,[216] and even at that
time Jefferson placed his confidence in the king who grew astonishingly
in his estimation during this year: "Happy that he is an honest,
unambitious man who desires neither money nor power for himself; and
that his most operative minister (Necker), though he has appeared to
trim a little, is still, in the main, a friend to public liberty."[217]

As the deadlock continued, the three orders sitting separately without
being able to settle the "great parliamentary question whether they
would vote by orders or by persons", Jefferson favored more and more the
only solution which, in his opinion, could prevent complete failure,--a
triumph of despotism or a sort of civil war:

  This third hypothesis which I shall develop, because I like it, and
  wish it, and hope it, is that as soon as it shall be manifest that
  the committees of conciliation, now appointed by the three chambers,
  shall be able to agree in nothing, the Tiers will invite the other
  two orders to come and take their seats in the common chamber. A
  majority of the Clergy will come, and the minority of the Noblesse.
  The chamber thus composed, will declare that the States General are
  now constituted, will notify it to the King, and propose to do
  business.[218]

At this juncture, Jefferson, in his anxiety to effect a satisfactory
compromise, broke all diplomatic precedence; he could not and did not
wish to write a French Declaration of Independence; but he could at
least propose some form of government which would recognize the
fundamental rights of the French citizen while preserving the appearance
of the old monarchy. He therefore drew up a "Charter of Rights for the
King and Nation" and sent it, not only to Lafayette, but also to Rabaud
de Saint Etienne, a prominent defender of the newly reinstated
Protestants. In view of the developments that took place later,
Jefferson's proposal does not seem revolutionary. At that time, however
(June 3, 1789), it went much farther than the Court was willing to go.
No appeal to abstract principle and no mention of rights was made. The
main provisions consisted of an annual meeting of the States-General,
which alone had the right to levy taxes and to appropriate money; the
abolishment of all privileges, a sort of _habeas corpus_, the
subordination of the military to the civil authority and liberty of the
press. In order to induce the king to accept these new charters, all
debts already contracted by him became the debts of the nation, and he
was to receive a sum of eighty million livres to be raised by a loan.
Thus Jefferson was attempting to put into effect the advice he had
several times given his French friends: to buy their liberty from the
king rather than bring about a revolution. I leave it to others to judge
of the morality of the expedient. Certainly it was not in accord with
the old battle cry of Patrick Henry. But once more Jefferson was
consistent in so much as he had always maintained that what was good for
America was not necessarily good for France. Moreover, he knew there was
no need to stir up the spirit of the Assembly by inflammatory
declarations. More than any incitement to take radical steps they needed
a dose of cool common sense.

Unfortunately the man at the helm (Necker) "had neither skill nor
courage; ambition was his first passion, virtue his second, his
judgement was not of the first order not even of the second", and the
ship continued to drift in the storm. On June 18, 1789, Jefferson wrote
a long letter to Madison, to indicate the situation of the different
parties after the Commons had proclaimed themselves the National
Assembly on the fifteenth. His characterization even to-day seems
remarkably clear and disinterested. He sided decidedly with the Commons
who had in their chamber almost all the talents of the nation;

  They are firm, bold, yet moderate. There is, indeed, among them, a
  number of very hot-headed members; but those of most influence are
  cool, temperate and sagacious.... The Noblesse on the contrary, are
  absolutely out of their senses. They are so furious, they can seldom
  debate at all.... The Clergy are waiting to profit by every incident,
  to secure themselves, and have no other object in view.

Jefferson, however, paid tribute to the _curés_ who, throughout the
kingdom, formed the mass of the clergy: "they are the only part
favorably known to the people, because solely charged with the duties of
baptism, burials, confession, visitation of the sick, instruction of the
children, and aiding the poor, they are themselves of the people, and
united with them."[219] The letter to Jay of June 24 is a day-by-day
recital of the succession of events, the suspension of the meetings of
the National Assembly, the _serment_ of Jeu de Paume on the twentieth,
the _séance royale_ of June 23 and the refusal of the _tiers état_ to
deliberate separately.

Jefferson could not help admiring the tenacity of the Assemblée
Nationale, but at the same time estimated that they were going too far
and had formed projects that were decidedly too ambitious. "Instead of
being dismayed with what has passed, they seem to rise in their demands,
and some of them to consider the erasing of every vestige of a
difference of order as indispensable to the establishment and
preservation of a good constitution. I apprehend there is more courage
than calculation in this project."[220]

A letter of Lafayette to Jefferson dated Versailles, July 4, contains an
interesting postscriptum: "Will you send me the bill of Rights with your
notes." A subsequent letter is even more pressing: "To-morrow I propose
my bill of rights about the middle of the sitting; be pleased to
consider it again and make your observations." As Lafayette introduced
his "Déclaration Européenne des droits de l'homme et du citoyen" on July
11, 1789, the latter may be dated July 10. I had the good fortune to
find in the Jefferson papers not one text but two of the Declaration.

One of the versions probably antedated by several months the meeting of
the National Assembly. Jefferson had it in his hands as early as the
beginning of 1799 and he even sent a copy of it to Madison on January
12.[221] The second text, far more important, was annotated by Jefferson
in pencil. Although the handwriting is faint, it is perfectly legible.
The emendations and corrections he suggested are quite characteristic,
and are studied more in detail in the text I have published
elsewhere.[222]

Some of the modifications suggested by Jefferson do not require any
comment; they are mere verbal changes such as the substitution of "_tels
sont_" for "_tels que_". But as Lafayette had enumerated among the
essential rights of man "_le soin de son honneur_" and "_la propriété_",
Jefferson put both terms in brackets, thus indicating that they should
be taken out. The elimination of the first term is probably due to the
fact that Montesquieu had indicated that "_honneur_" is the main
principle on which rests monarchical government and is easily
understandable. The elimination of the "_droit de propriété_" can only
be explained if we refer to the document in which Jefferson had
"explained to himself" his theory of natural rights, and established a
distinction between the natural rights and the civil rights. Lafayette
accepted the first correction but not the second; he was too much under
the influence of his physiocratic friends even to understand the much
more advanced theory of Jefferson. The project he submitted to the
Assembly, as well as the three "Déclarations des droits de l'homme",
consequently followed on this point the Virginia Bill of Rights rather
than the Declaration of Independence.

In a similar way, Lafayette had listed the powers constituting the
government in the following order: "_exécutif, législatif et
judiciaire_", and refused to follow the order suggested by Jefferson's
"_législatif, exécutif, judiciaire_". This was more than a mere question
of arrangement; there was evidently in the minds of both Jefferson and
his French friend a question of hierarchy and almost subordination; if
it is a mere nuance, the nuance was very significant. The last paragraph
deserves even more careful consideration. In the January version it
read: "_Et comme le progrès des lumières, et l'introduction des abus
nécessitent de temps en temps une revision de la constitution_...." The
second edition annotated by Jefferson expressed the same idea in much
more definite terms: "_Et comme le progrès des lumières, l'introduction
des abus et le droit des générations qui se succèdent nécessitent la
révision de tout établissement humain, il doit être indiqué des moyens
constitutionnels qui assurent dans certain cas une convocation
extraordinaire de représentants dont le seul objet soit d'examiner et
modifier, s'il le faut, la forme du Gouvernement_." This mention of the
"_droit des générations qui se succèdent_" seems a typically
Jeffersonian idea. The same theory will be found fully developed in a
letter to Samuel Kercheval written in 1816 and dealing with the revision
of the Constitution of Virginia. It was expressed originally in a letter
to James Madison, written from Paris on September 9, 1789. Curiously
enough, Jefferson declared then that this theory had never been proposed
before: "The question whether one generation of men has a right to bind
another, seems never to have been started on this or on our side of the
water. Yet it is a question of such consequence as not only to merit
decision, but places also the fundamental principles of every
government."[223] It is true that this special point was not retained in
the "Déclaration des droits de l'homme" as finally adopted by the
Assemblée Nationale in its sessions of August, 1789, although it was
proposed by Montmorency and reappeared as the last article of the
"Déclaration" of the Convention Nationale of May 29, 1793. But one may
wonder how Jefferson could overlook the fact that the same principle was
embodied in Lafayette's "Declaration." It is very unlikely that he would
have claimed credit for the idea if it had been originated by his
friend. A more acceptable explanation would be to admit that having
suggested to Lafayette a theory which was not retained by the committee,
he felt perfectly free to state that "the question had never been
started."

The American plenipotentiary was not an eye-witness of the famous scenes
of the fourteenth of July, or as he calls it "the tumult of Paris", but
he learned about it fully from M. de Corny, and wrote to Jay a long and
interesting account (July 19) of the capture of La Bastille, the return
of the king to Paris and the presentation of the national cockade.[224]

In the meantime he was placed in a very embarrassing situation by his
French admirers. The prestige of the author of the Declaration of
Independence was such that the committee in charge of a plan of
constitution thought they could do no better than to call into
consultation the Minister of the United States. Champion de Cicé,
Archbishop of Bordeaux and chairman of the committee, sent him an urgent
appeal to attend one of the first meetings, so that they might profit by
the light of his reason and experience.[225] Jefferson, after mentioning
the invitation, relates the incident in his "Autobiography" as follows:
"I excused myself on the obvious considerations that my mission was to
the King, as chief magistrate of the nation, that my duties were limited
to the concerns of my own country, and forbade me to intermeddle with
the internal transactions of that, in which I had been received under a
specific charter." This may be the sense he wished to convey to Champion
de Cicé but the actual letter is far less categorical. Contrary to his
custom he wrote it himself, although it is in French, alleging that the
dispatches for America took all his time and adding that the committee
would lay themselves open to criticism if they invited to their
deliberations a foreigner accredited to the head of the nation, when the
very question under discussion was a modification and abridgement of his
powers. But he assured the archbishop of his most sincere and most
passionate wishes for the complete success of the undertaking, which was
certainly stretching diplomatic proprieties to the limit.

The deliberations of the committee went on without Jefferson's official
assistance; but shortly after the project of the constitution was
presented, the deputies came to a deadlock on the veto power to be
given to the king. After some stormy meetings, Lafayette conceived the
idea that the house of the Minister of the United States was the only
place near Versailles where some tranquillity could be obtained. He
consequently invited eight of his friends to take dinner at the house of
Jefferson, and having no time to consult him on the matter, scribbled a
note in great hurry to ask Jefferson to make the necessary preparations
for the unexpected guests: "Those gentlemen wish to consult with you and
me; they will dine to-morrow at your house, as mine is always
full."[226]

Jefferson has given a somewhat embellished account of the memorable
dinner in his "Autobiography." The mention of it in a letter to John Jay
a few weeks later is less florid and probably more accurate.[227] The
members of the committee discussed together their points of difference
for six hours, and in the course of the discussion agreed on mutual
sacrifices. Writing from memory, at the age of seventy-seven, Jefferson
added: "I was a silent witness to a coolness and candor of argument,
unusual in the conflicts of political opinion; to a logical reasoning,
and chaste eloquence, disfigured by no gaudy tinsel of rhetoric or
declamation, and truly worthy of being placed in parallel with the
finest dialogues of antiquity, as handed to us by Xenophon, by Plato and
Cicero."[228]

Whether Jefferson remained a silent witness during these six hours is
not so improbable as it would seem. It may well be doubted whether his
knowledge of French was sufficient to enable him to participate in an
animated discussion with eight Frenchmen. Under the circumstances
silence was as much a necessity as a virtue. But when the American
minister woke up the next morning he realized that it was impossible to
keep the thing secret and that the French Government had every right to
blame him for lending his house for a discussion of French internal
politics. Unpleasant as it was, the only thing to do was to make a clean
breast of it. He went at once to Montmorin to tell him "with truth and
candor how it happened that my house had been made the scene of
conferences of such a character."--"He told me," Jefferson continued,
"that he already knew everything which had passed," which is the stock
answer of the professional diplomat, whether he wishes to appear
well-informed or wants to draw some further information from his
interlocutor. Jefferson opened his heart, and if Montmorin did not know
everything before giving audience to the American minister, there was
little he did not know after hearing his account of the dinner.

With this curious incident, Jefferson ends his account of the French
Revolution. During the year, he had complained on several occasions that
his French friends seemed unable to realize the importance of insisting
on trial by jury in criminal cases. He finally persuaded one of the
"abbés" to study the question thoroughly and on that occasion indicated
exactly how he stood in matters of government. All told, his views had
not changed much, and at that time he would not have accepted without
reservations and qualifications the famous principle of "government by
the people." There was still in his mind, if not in all his formulas, a
tacit admission that all the people could not unreservedly participate
in all branches of government. Nothing could be clearer than the
distinctions he established and nothing could be less demagogical.

"We think, in America, that it is necessary to introduce the people into
every department of government, as far as they are capable of exercising
it; and that this is the only way to insure a long-continued and honest
administration of its power." Then he proceeded to define, point by
point, the extent to which the people could safely be allowed to
participate in the executive, legislative, and judiciary branches of the
government.

  1. They are not qualified to exercise themselves the executive
  department, but they are qualified to name the person who shall
  exercise it. With us, therefore, they choose this officer every four
  years. 2. They are not qualified to legislate. With us therefore,
  they only choose the legislators. 3. They are not qualified to
  _judge_ questions of _law_, but they are very capable of judging
  questions of _fact_. In the form of juries, therefore, they determine
  all matters of fact, leaving to the permanent judges to decide the
  law resulting from those facts.[229]

Thus spoke the champion of democracy at the beginning of the French
Revolution, after spending five years in Paris and supposedly permeating
his mind with the wild theories of the French philosophers. And what he
said of the people on this occasion did not apply to the French people
alone, for he made it clear that it was the political theory applied "in
America." It was essentially the theory of government by experts which
he already had in mind when he proposed the reorganization of the
College of William and Mary. In 1778, as well as in 1789, Jefferson did
not hesitate to proclaim that if the source of all power was in the
people, the people could not exercise their power in all circumstances,
that they had to delegate their authority to men really qualified,
retaining only the right to select them. This may not be the common
acceptation of the term "Jeffersonian democracy", but I have a strong
suspicion that on the whole Jefferson never changed much in this
respect. He certainly never stood for mob rule, nor for direct
government by the masses, and he knew too much about the delicate and
complicated wheels of government to believe that the running of such a
tremendous machine could be intrusted to untrained hands.

As for the French, he trusted them even less, and never believed, as
long as he remained in France, that they were prepared for
self-government. He refused to consider that a real revolution had
started before his eyes or was even in sight. "Upon the whole," he wrote
to Madison shortly before his departure from Paris, "I do not see yet
probable that any actual commotion will take place; and if it does take
place, I have strong confidence that the patriotic party will hold
together, and their party in the nation be what I have ascribed it." Up
to the last moment he held the belief that the king, "the substantial
people of the whole country, the army, and the influential part of the
clergy, formed a firm phalanx which must prevail."[230] The analysis of
the situation sent to Jay just as he was about to leave Paris does not
indicate even the possibility of establishing a republic, since the only
parties he distinguished were:

  ... the aristocrats, comprehending the higher members of the clergy,
  military, nobility, and the parliaments of the whole kingdom; the
  moderate royalists who wish for a constitution nearly similar to that
  of England; the republicans who are willing to let their first
  magistracy be hereditary, but to make it very subordinate to the
  legislature, and to have that legislature consist of a single
  chamber.[231]

Jefferson was not the man to indulge in effusions even when he was
deeply moved and throughout his mission in France he deliberately
refrained from any expression of personal feelings. But the love and
friendship of the French for the United States was so general and so
genuine, it formed such a contrast with the cold and tenacious enmity of
Great Britain, that the American minister was won and conquered by it
and had to come to the conclusion that "nothing should be spared to
attach this country to us. It is the only one on which we can rely for
support, under every event. Its inhabitants love us more, I think, than
they do any other nation on earth. This is very much the effect of the
good dispositions with which the French officers returned."[232]
Everybody is familiar with the closing lines of Jefferson's account of
his mission to France: "So, ask the traveller inhabitant of any nation,
in what country would you rather live?--Certainly, in my own, where are
all my friends, my relations, and the earliest and sweetest affections
and recollections of my life. Which would be your second choice?
France."

These lines were written at the twilight of his life, when his memory
took him back to the wonderful days he had lived in Paris, while the old
régime was shedding the last rays of its evanescent glory. Less known,
but far more revealing of his true feelings at the time, is a passage in
one of his letters to James Madison. It is one of the very few times,
and as a matter of fact, the first time when he declared that the
nations of the world had to abandon their old code of selfishness and
that a new principle of international life had to be recognized. For
there is only one standard of morality, one code of conduct between
nations as between individuals.

  It is impossible--he wrote--to desire better dispositions towards us
  than prevail in this Assembly. Our proceedings have been viewed as a
  model for them on every occasion; and though in the heat of debate,
  men are generally disposed to contradict every authority urged by
  their opponents, ours has been treated like that of the Bible, open
  to explanation, but not to question. I am sorry that in the moment of
  such a disposition, anything should come from us to check it. The
  placing them on a mere footing with the English, will have this
  effect. When of two nations, the one has engaged herself in a ruinous
  war for us, has spent her blood and money to save us, has opened her
  bosom to us in peace, and received us almost on the footing of her
  own citizens, while the other has moved heaven, earth, and hell to
  exterminate us in war, has insulted us in all her councils in peace,
  shut her doors to us in every part where her interests would admit
  it, libelled us in foreign nations, endeavoured to poison them
  against the reception of our most precious commodities; to place
  these two nations on a footing, is to give a great deal more to one
  than to the other, if the maxim be true, that to make unequal
  quantities equal, you must add more to one than the other. To say, in
  excuse, that gratitude is never to enter into the motives of national
  conduct, is to revive a principle which has been buried for centuries
  with its kindred principles of the lawfulness of assassination,
  poison, perjury, etc. All of these were legitimate principles in the
  dark ages which intervened between ancient and modern civilization,
  but exploded and held in just horror in the eighteenth century. I
  know but one code of morality for men, whether acting singly or
  collectively.... Let us hope that our government will take some other
  occasions to show, that they proscribe no virtue from the canons of
  their conduct with other nations.[233]




BOOK FOUR

_Monocrats and Republicans_




CHAPTER I

THE QUARREL WITH HAMILTON


For more than two years Jefferson had repeatedly expressed the wish to
be allowed to return to his native country, at least for a short visit.
When he finally received official notification that his request had been
granted, he departed from Paris rather abruptly and even without taking
leave of his best friends. "Adieus are painful," he wrote to Madame de
Corny, "therefore I left Paris without bidding one to you."[234] This is
a naïve and quite significant confession of the difficulty he
experienced in maintaining his puritanical restraint and impassibility
at that time. He went with his two daughters from Le Havre to Cowes, and
waited there till October 14 for favorable winds. After a rapid crossing
on the _Montgomery_ they sighted the "Capes" on November 13, and barely
escaped being shipwrecked in the bay. Although damaged by fire and
stripped of part of her rigging, the ship was able to reach Norfolk, and
Jefferson promptly set out for Richmond and Monticello, stopping however
on the way at Eppington with the Eppes. It was there that he received
two letters from President Washington, one dated October 13, the other
November 30, asking him to accept the post of Secretary of State in the
newly formed cabinet. The President's letters were most flattering and
indicated that he had been "determined, as well by motives of private
regard, as a conviction of public propriety" to nominate him for the
office.

Jefferson at first experienced the natural repugnance of a man who had
put his heart into an important undertaking and was asked suddenly to
abandon it. He was better acquainted with the situation in Paris than
any man he could think of: it had taken him several years of constant
work and patient efforts to bring the French officials over to his
views. His best friends were in the new government and would help him to
obtain for the United States better commercial terms and a more
satisfactory debt settlement. Let us add that for a philosophical
observer France offered the most fascinating spectacle, and Jefferson
did not feel that life in Philadelphia could bring him the same social
and intellectual pleasures as Paris. Quite significantly he wrote to
Washington: "as far as my fears, my hopes, or my inclination enter into
this question, I confess that they would not lead me to prefer a
change." On the other hand, he did not make a categorical refusal, in
case he should be "drafted", and the President formally nominated him.

Nothing else was done in the matter until Madison visited him at
Monticello and acquainted him with the situation. But even Madison could
not win his consent,[235] and the President had to assure Jefferson that
the duties of his office would probably not be quite so complicated and
hard to execute as he might have been led at the first moment to
imagine.[236] It was not a command, but while the President left him
free to decide he expressed a strong hope and wish that Jefferson would
accept. So, on February 14 he sent his letter of acceptance.

In the meantime he had married Martha to Thomas Mann Randolph, Junior,
"a young gentleman of genius, science, and honorable mind", who
afterwards filled "a dignified station in the General Government, and
the most dignified in his own State."[237] Although Jefferson had wished
for such a marriage, he had left Martha free to make her own choice, as
he explained in a letter to Madame de Corny: "Tho' his talents,
disposition, connections, fortune, were such as would have made him my
first choice, yet according to the usage of my country, I scrupulously
suppressed my wishes, that my daughter might indulge in her own
sentiments freely."[238] The marriage took place on April 2, 1790, and
on the next day Jefferson set out for New York to take his place in the
Cabinet. He reached Philadelphia on the twelfth. There he stopped to pay
his respects to the man "he has succeeded but not replaced", old Doctor
Franklin then on the sick bed from which he never arose. "My recent
return from a country in which he had left so many friends, and the
perilous convulsions to which they had been exposed, revived all his
anxieties to know what part they had taken, what had been their course,
and what their fate. He went over all in succession with a rapidity and
animation almost too much for his strength." It was on this occasion
that Franklin put in his hands a paper containing an account of his
negotiations with Lord Howe to prevent a war between the colonies and
their mother country, papers which, unfortunately, Jefferson entrusted
later to William Temple Franklin, who "delayed the publication for more
than twenty years."[239] Jefferson arrived in New York on the
twenty-first, took his lodgings at the City Tavern, and finally rented a
small house in Maiden Lane.

Congress was in session and business had accumulated on the desk of the
new secretary: he plunged at once into work. All his colleagues had
already taken charge of their respective departments: Colonel Alexander
Hamilton was in charge of the Treasury, General Henry Knox of the War
Department, Edmund Randolph, Attorney-general. Those were the only
departments thus far created and among them the four secretaries divided
all the different attributions of the executive power. With them he was
to sit in Cabinet meetings presided over by Washington until his
retirement from office, in December, 1793.

The distinction usually established between domestic and foreign
politics is obviously an arbitrary one and does not correspond to
reality. This was particularly true of an age when the attributes of
the Secretary of State were far less specialized than in our day.
Even if he had been inclined to neglect the questions of internal
administration--to give himself entirely to foreign affairs--Jefferson
would have been constantly reminded of the existence of many other
problems of equal importance to the future of the nation by his
colleagues and the President himself. In addition, it was Washington's
ordinary practice not only to discuss all important measures in a
Cabinet council, but often to request each member of his official family
to give his opinion in writing on these questions. Such documents as
have been preserved constitute a most precious source of information for
the history of the period; they are usefully supplemented by the notes
that Jefferson took at the time and transcribed "twenty five years or
more" afterwards for the use of posterity. The three volumes "bound in
marbled paper" in which Jefferson copied these notes, taken on loose
scraps of paper, are the famous "Anas" which he collected to justify
himself against the accusations that biographers of Washington--such as
Marshall--had already launched against him. Although there is no reason
to believe that Jefferson deliberately altered the old records, it is
certain that they were edited, that many scraps of papers were
discarded, although not destroyed, and that a "critical" edition of the
"Anas" would not be without interest. They are preceded by an
introduction in which, more than twenty-five years later, Jefferson gave
an estimate of his former opponents, Hamilton and John Adams. This final
judgment can in no way be used in discussing events that took place
between 1790 and 1793, and it contains no indication worth retaining
about Jefferson's attitude at that time towards his colleagues and the
Vice President. The man who wrote this introduction in February, 1818,
was really another Jefferson. He may tell us that he arrived in the
midst of a bitter contest, "But a stranger to the ground, a stranger to
the actors on it, so long absent as to have lost all familiarity with
the subject, and as yet unaware of its object, I took no concern in
it."[240] It must be admitted at the outset that such is not the
impression one can gather from the correspondence.

That the financial structure of the Continental Congress had collapsed
and that immediate remedies were necessary Jefferson knew as well and
probably better than any other member of the Cabinet. He had not the
expert knowledge of Hamilton, but more than once he had had to deal with
financial questions, and when in Paris had displayed considerable skill
in dealing with the members of the Committee of Commerce. He had
prepared schedules for the payment of the French and Dutch loans and
discussed finances with Dutch bankers in Amsterdam. Furthermore, his
governorship of Virginia during the war had acquainted him with the
question of State debts. If he could be tricked and made to hold the
candle, as he said, there was no man who could resist the superior
genius and Machiavellism of the arch financier of the United States. As
a matter of fact, if he was hoodwinked, he was not at the beginning, at
least, a blind or an unwilling victim.

Following the financial reorganization defined by the Constitution and
the appointment of a Secretary of the Treasury, according to the Act of
1789, Hamilton prepared for the period under consideration four
documents: Report on Public Credit, January 9, 1790; Report on a
National Bank, December 5, 1790; Report on the Establishment of a Mint,
May 1, 1791; Report on Manufactures, December 5, 1791.

The first subject for consideration was the national debt. The foreign
debt was unquestionably a matter of national honor and had to be paid in
full, according to the terms of contract: with the arrears of interest
it amounted to $11,710,000. The domestic debt was estimated at
$27,383,000 for the principal, $13,030,000 for accrued interest and
$2,000,000 for unliquidated debt. After some opposition it was finally
decided that holders of certificates would receive their face value with
interest. But there remained the question of States debts which was
hopelessly confused and destined to lead to a bitter controversy. The
reorganization plan proposed that repayment could be made in a more
orderly way through some sort of a central organization rather than
through the States, and outlined the famous "Assumption" by which the
Federal Government would "assume", with a discount to be determined, the
debts incurred by the several States during the course of the war. It
naturally meant that additional revenue had to be raised by Federal
measures and consequently distributed between all the States, whose
debts varied in nature and amount from State to State, some of which
having already proceeded to a semi-reorganization, while others, having
not suffered from the war, were financially in good condition. The
opposition came naturally from the Southern States, whose population was
smaller in comparison with the Northern States.

The opponents of the measure objected very strenuously at first, arguing
that it would give an unfair advantage to those that had contracted
debts too freely during the war, and would penalize those who had
already set their financial house in order; and also that it would be a
usurpation of powers not conferred by the Constitution to the Federal
Government.

First defeated in Congress, the "Assumption" was finally adopted under
circumstances now to be related. Jefferson's unofficial representative
in Congress, Madison, had already strenuously opposed the measure
proposed by the Secretary of the Treasury. When Jefferson arrived in
New York to take possession of his office, the battle had been going on
for some time, and four days later he wrote to T. M. Randolph that
"Congress is principally occupied with the treasury report. The
assumption of the State debts has been voted affirmatively in the first
instance, but it is not certain that it will hold its ground through all
the changes of the bill when it shall be brought in."[241] There is
little doubt that Madison had already acquainted him with his views of
the situation, but it is also probable that Jefferson paid small heed to
them for the time being. He suffered for several weeks from severe
headaches, he had to write many letters of farewell to his French
friends, and the accumulation of reports and papers he found on his desk
required all his attention.

In June, however, he expressed to George Mason his doubts that the
"Assumption" would be finally adopted. But, far from siding with the
out-and-out opponents of the measure, he thought it would be wiser to
compromise, so he added, "my duties preventing me from mingling in these
questions, I do not pretend to be very competent to their decision. In
general, I think it necessary to give as well as take in a government
like ours."[242]

As a matter of fact, it was already patent that an almost irreconcilable
difference of opinion on the matter existed between Hamilton and the
Virginians, and, a week later, Jefferson himself invited the Secretary
of the Treasury to take dinner at his house with a few friends in order
to hold an informal conference; for he thought it impossible that
"reasonable men, consulting together coolly, could fail, by some mutual
sacrifices of opinion to form a compromise which was to save the Union."
Jefferson has related the scene in the "Anas", but a somewhat different
account is given in his letter to James Monroe, written June 20, 1790,
from New York, in which he outlined the compromise. He mentioned that
two considerations had impelled him to discuss it; first the fact that
if some funding bill were not agreed to, the credit of the United States
at Amsterdam would collapse and vanish and each State be left alone to
take care of itself. Although he was not enthusiastic about the means to
be employed and foresaw that the United States would have difficulties
in raising the necessary money by Federal taxation instead of letting
the States raise it themselves, he accepted the solution with open eyes:
"In the present instance, I see the necessity of yielding to cries of
the creditors in certain parts of the Union; for the sake of the Union,
and to save us from the greatest of all calamities, the total extinction
of our credit in Europe." More than any member of the Cabinet he was
aware of the imminence of this danger. On the other hand, and in order
to give some satisfaction to the Southern States, it would be agreed
that Congress would be transferred to Philadelphia for a period of
twelve to fifteen years, and thereafter, without further declaration, to
Georgetown. This was clearly a "deal", and Jefferson knew it so well
that he denied that it was one. "The Pennsylvania and Virginia delegates
have conducted themselves honorably, on the question of residence.
Without descending to talk about bargains, they have seen that their
true interests lay in not listening to the insidious propositions made,
to divide and defect them, and we have seen them at times voting against
their respective wishes rather than separate." Whether the word bargain
had been used or not is immaterial. Gentlemen sitting around a table
after the cloth has been removed and the punch bowl brought in can come
to an understanding "_à demi mot_."[243] Nothing official had been done
yet, but writing to Dumas, the financial agent at Amsterdam, Jefferson,
in order to maintain the credit of the country, put his best foot
forward and solemnly declared "that there is not one single individual
in the United States, whether in or out of office, who supposes they can
ever do anything which might impair their foreign contracts." With
respect to domestic paper, Dumas could rest assured that "justice would
be done" and, although the question was terribly complicated, it was
"possible that modifications may be proposed which may bring the
measure, yet into an acceptable form."[244]

With Gilmer, he was more frank and indicated clearly that among the
possible ways in which the conflict in Congress might yet terminate, the
best probably would be "a _bargain_ between the eastern members who have
it so much at heart, and the Middle members who are indifferent about
it, to adopt these debts without modification, on condition of removing
the seat of government to Philadelphia or Baltimore." The third
solution, which Jefferson preferred, would have proposed to divide the
total sum between all the States in proportion to their census, and to
establish the national capital first and temporarily at Philadelphia,
then, and permanently at Georgetown.[245] This was not an ideal
solution; it was a compromise which would at least present the advantage
of giving new life to the agriculture and commerce of the South. The
main objection, however, still remained, for the Federal Government
would have to raise the imposts and overburden that source of revenue,
but it seemed that "some sacrifice was necessary for the sake of
peace."[246] Once again, but not for the last time, Jefferson saw
himself in a dilemma. He was too far-sighted not to understand that the
individual States would have to abandon some of their rights and a
portion of their sovereignty in order to acquire more financial
stability, and that more power would be concentrated in the hands of the
Federal Government. On the other hand, he was no less firmly convinced
that a secession would unavoidably result from a rejection of the
"Assumption", and he was ready to sacrifice his most cherished
preferences on the altar of the Union.

On August 14, Jefferson could announce to Randolph that Congress had
separated

  the day before yesterday, having reacquired the harmony which always
  distinguished their proceedings before the two disagreeable questions
  of assumption and residence were introduced.... It is not foreseen
  that anything so generative of dissention can arise again, and
  therefore the friends of the government hope that this difficulty
  once surmounted in the States, everything will work well. I am
  principally afraid that commerce will be over loaded by the
  assumption, believing that it would be better that property should be
  duly taxed.

He discussed for the first time the exact ways and means in a letter to
Gouverneur Morris on November 26, 1790, and indicated that additional
funds would be provided by a tax on spirituous liquors, foreign and
homemade, that the whole interest would be raised by taxes on
consumption.... "Add to this what may be done by throwing in the aid of
western lands and other articles as a sinking fund, and our prospect is
really a bright one."[247]

It is perfectly true that the letter to Morris was to a great extent for
publicity purposes, yet we do not find in it the slightest mark of
disapproval of the tax itself, nor do we find it in a letter written to
De Moustier[248] in which, on the contrary, Jefferson mentioned the
advantages of duties on consumption, which fall principally on the rich;
for it is "a general desire to make them contribute the whole money we
want, if possible." It was not until February that doubts began to
percolate into his mind, and he inquired from Colonel Mason "what was
said in our country (Virginia), of the fiscal arrangements now going
on." But he did not yet take the question really to heart:

  Whether these measures be right or wrong abstractedly, more attention
  should be paid to the general opinion. However, all will pass,--the
  excise will pass--the bank will pass. The only corrective of what is
  corrupt in our present form of government will be the augmentation of
  the numbers in the lower House, so as to get more agricultural
  representation, which may put that interest above that of the
  stock-jobbers.[249]

This is the first indication of a rift between Jefferson and Hamilton.

Yet Jefferson was willing to yield more ground in order to avoid an open
break. The Bank Bill of Hamilton had passed the Senate without
difficulty; in the House it had been opposed on constitutional grounds
by Madison but had finally obtained a majority. When the bill was sent
to the President, Washington, unwilling to do anything unconstitutional,
asked both the Attorney-general Randolph and Jefferson to give their
opinion on the matter in writing. The report written on this occasion by
the Secretary of State is a psychological document both interesting and
revealing.

Jefferson started out by enumerating the different measures included in
the Bank Bill, pointing out _en passant_ that they were intended to
break down the most ancient and fundamental laws of several States, such
as those against mortmain, the laws of alienage, the rules of descent,
the acts of distribution, the laws of escheat and forfeiture, the laws
of monopoly. He then demonstrated to his own satisfaction that power to
establish such an institution was neither specifically declared nor
implied in any article of the Constitution. The only general statement
that could be construed as authorizing it was a mention "to make all
laws _necessary_ and proper for carrying into execution the enumerated
powers." Finally he undertook to prove that the bank might be
convenient but was in nowise necessary. The conclusion was obvious after
these very closely knitted pieces of legal reasoning: "Nothing but a
necessity inevitable by any other means can justify such a prostitution
of laws, which constitute the pillars of our whole system of
jurisprudence." The President's veto could clearly be used in that case,
since that was the buckler provided by the Constitution to protect it
against the invasions of the legislature.

[Illustration: ALEXANDER HAMILTON

_From the painting by John Trumbull in the possession of the Essex
Institute, Salem, Mass._]

Jefferson could and perhaps should have stopped there. But he was far
from certain that Hamilton's views would not prevail, and in that case
he would have committed himself irrevocably. This he did not wish to do.
He consequently provided at the end a way of escape for himself as well
as for the President:

  It must be added, however, that unless the President's mind on a view
  of everything which is urged for and against this bill, is tolerably
  clear that it is unauthorized by the Constitution; if the pro and the
  con hang so even as to balance his judgment, a just respect for the
  wisdom of the legislature would naturally decide the balance in favor
  of their opinion. It is chiefly for cases where they are clearly
  misled by error, ambition, or interest, that the Constitution has
  placed a check in the negative of the President.

This was very adroit, almost too adroit. It was the answer of a master
politician. Whether it was absolutely straightforward is a very
different question. Jefferson, who so often accused others of being
"trimmers", was undoubtedly open to such an accusation himself.

With the opinion of Randolph and Jefferson before him, the President
asked Hamilton, as sponsor of the bill, to present his rejoinder in
writing. On the twenty-third he submitted his famous "Opinion as to the
Constitutionality of the Bank of the United States" in which he
developed the doctrine of "implied powers."

  Now it appears--said Hamilton--to the Secretary of the Treasury
  that this general principle is inherent in the very definition of
  government and essential to every step of the progress to be made
  by that of the United States, namely: That every power vested in a
  government is in its nature sovereign, and includes, by force of the
  term, a right to employ all the means requisite and fairly applicable
  to the attainment of the ends of such power, and which are not
  precluded by restrictions and exceptions specified in the
  Constitutions, or not immoral, or not contrary to the essential
  ends of political society.

As a matter of fact, the question at the bottom of the controversy was
the question of State rights; but, curiously enough, it is indicated
only incidentally in Jefferson's opinion. He was not ready to join
issues on that question, much more clearly brought forward by Madison in
his speeches before the House, when he said:

  I consider the foundation of the Constitution as laid on this ground:
  That all powers not delegated to the United States, by the
  Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the United States, are reserved
  to the States or to the people (XIIth amendment). To take a single
  step beyond the boundaries thus specifically drawn around the power
  of Congress, is to take possession of a boundless field of power, no
  longer susceptible of definition.[250]

This was exactly the question, for to accept Hamilton's theory was to
open the way to countless encroachments of the Federal Government on
State rights. Washington's administration had come to its most momentous
decision for the future of the government of the United States. This was
really the parting of the ways. Jefferson knew it and saw it; it was
obvious that, with a centralized financial organization, a central
political organization would develop. All sorts of practical
considerations may be brought in and nice legal points drawn, but the
fact remains that when the representatives of the different States not
only permitted but were eager to see the Federal Government assume the
responsibility of State debts, they sold their birthright for the not
unconsiderable sum of $21,500,000. Perhaps it was the only possible
solution at the time. Perhaps Jefferson showed wisdom and political
sense in not getting up and fighting to the last ditch. He registered as
strong a protest as he could without burning his bridges. He knew from
the temper of the House that there was no hope of making them accept any
other solution. He knew that against the strongly organized Federalists
he could not muster any well-disciplined troops. He feared the immediate
dissolution of the Union and temporized; but all the rest of his life
was to be spent in trying to recover the ground lost on that day.

Jefferson was soon to realize how poorly equipped and seconded he was
when he had to take up the battle practically single-handed.

In the spring of 1791 Madison had loaned him a copy of Thomas Paine's
pamphlet, "The Rights of Man", written in answer to Burke's denunciation
of the French Revolution. When the owner of the pamphlet requested that
it be returned, for it was the only copy at his disposal and he intended
to have it reprinted in Philadelphia, Jefferson courteously returned it,
and added a short note in which he expressed his satisfaction that such
a valuable work would appear in America: "I am extremely pleased to find
it will be reprinted here, and that something is at length to be
publicly said against the political heresies which have sprung up among
us. I have no doubt our citizens will rally a second time round the
standard of 'Common Sense.'" There is no indication whatever that
Jefferson intended the note for publication, but the printer thought it
would help the success of the pamphlet if Jefferson's letter were
printed as a preface. All the peaceful intentions of the Secretary of
State had come to naught. The word heresies could apply only to the
Federalists, and among the Federalists to John Adams, whose "Discourse
on Davila" had been appearing in Fenno's paper. Jefferson could declare
that nothing was further from his intentions than to appear as a
contradictor of Mr. Adams in public; very few men would believe it and
Jefferson himself realized it so well that he wrote at once to
Washington to explain his position:

  Mr. Adams will unquestionably take to himself the charge of political
  heresy, as conscious of his own views of drawing the present
  government to the form of the English constitution, and, I fear, will
  consider me as meaning to injure him in the public eye. I learnt that
  some Anglomen have, censured it in another point of view, as a
  sanction of Paine's principles tend to give offence to the British
  government. Their real fear, however, is that this popular and
  republican pamphlet, taking wonderfully, is likely at a single
  stroke, to wipe out all the unconstitutional doctrines which their
  bell wether Davila has been preaching for a twelvemonth. I certainly
  never made a secret of my being anti-monarchical, and
  anti-aristocratical; but I am sincerely mortified to be thus brought
  forward on the public stage, where to remain, to advance or to
  retire, will be equally against my love of silence and quiet and my
  abhorrence of dispute.[251]

His abhorrence of dispute was so real that, at this juncture, he decided
to leave Philadelphia for a trip north, staying two days in New York,
visiting the battlefield of Saratoga, Lake George, Lake Champlain, and
coming back through the Connecticut valley. Madison accompanied him on
the trip, and Mr. Bowers has advanced the hypothesis that it was during
the long conversations the two friends had during a whole month alone
together that the plans were formulated for establishing a separate
party to defend the republican ideals. This may have been the result of
the journey, but I doubt very much that such was the purpose of
Jefferson when he set out from Philadelphia. A more simple explanation
is that, having written his letter to Washington and made, as he
thought, his position clear, he hoped that the President would not fail
to communicate its contents to Adams if any unpleasant situation should
develop; and he simply withdrew from the battlefield in order not to
enter into a public controversy. But he counted without Adams' temper.
The Vice President considered Jefferson's short sentence as a challenge
and proceeded promptly to have it answered. A series of articles signed
"Publicola" began to appear in the _Centinel_, denouncing not only
Paine, but Jefferson himself. "Brutus" took up the cudgels in favor of
Jefferson and the newspaper battle was on. The public, always eager to
identify anonymous writers, did not fail to attribute to Adams the
articles signed "Publicola", while to Jefferson were attributed the
answers written by Agricola, Brutus, and Philodemus. When Jefferson came
back from his trip the controversy was raging, and soon he began to
enjoy the conflict.

On July 10 he sent to Colonel Monroe a bundle of papers showing "what a
dust Paine's pamphlet has kicked up here", and he reiterated his
approval of the book:

  A writer under the name of Publicola, in attacking Paine's
  principles, is very desirous of involving me in the same censure with
  the author. I certainly merit the same, for I profess the same
  principles; but it is equally certain I never meant to have entered
  as a volunteer into the cause. My occupations do not permit it. Some
  persons here are insinuating that I am Brutus, that I am Agricola,
  that I am Philodemus, etc., etc. I am none of them, being decided not
  to write a word on the subject, unless any printed imputation should
  call for a printed disavowal, to which I should put my name.

On the other hand he refused to take seriously the denial that Adams
"has no more concern in the publication of the writings of Publicola,
than the author of the 'Rights of Man' himself." But he saw with
satisfaction that Hamilton had taxed Adams with imprudence in stirring
up the question and agreed that "his business was done." What was far
more serious was the fury of gambling that had arisen at the opening of
the bank: "the land office, the federal town, certain schemes of
manufactures, are likely to be converted into aliment for that
rage."[252]

In a last effort to placate Adams, however, and chiefly in order to
avoid having his name dragged into a public controversy, he wrote to the
Vice President "from the conviction that truth, between candid minds can
never do harm." He assured him that he had not written "a line for the
newspapers." He declared "with truth in the presence of the Almighty
that nothing was further from his intention or his expectations than to
have either his own or Adams' name brought before the public on this
occasion." This was perfectly true, but at the same time he was
proposing to appoint Paine Postmaster, and on July 29 he wrote to
congratulate him, for, thanks to his little book, the general opinion
seemed to rally against a sect high in name but small in number. "They
are checked at least by your pamphlet, and the people confirmed in their
good old faith."[253] The fact that Adams accepted Jefferson's
explanation more gracefully than was to be expected did not prevent the
fight from going on. It had already been taken out of the hands of the
leaders and the controversy was raging in the papers. At this juncture
Jefferson realized that the republicans were very poorly armed in the
capital and that they had no paper in which their views could be
expressed so as to counteract the pernicious propaganda of Fenno's
paper. Thus the result brought about was the foundation of the _National
Gazette_, Philip Freneau's paper, in which Jefferson had a great part.
The story has never been told completely and deserves more than passing
attention, since Jefferson was soon to be attacked by his enemies for
the interest he took in the _Gazette_. Several documents heretofore
neglected allow us to reconstruct exactly the part played by Jefferson
in the undertaking, and particularly to settle a few questions of
chronology which are not without importance.

It does not appear that Jefferson had any ulterior motives when, on
February 28, 1791, he offered to Freneau, then living miserably in New
York, the clerkship for foreign languages in the Department of State.
"The salary indeed is very low," he wrote, "being but two hundred and
fifty dollars a year; but also it gives so little to do, as not to
interfere with any other calling the person may choose.... I was told a
few days ago that it might perhaps be convenient to you to accept it. If
so, it is at your service." Freneau answered promptly, on March 5, that,
having been for some time engaged in endeavouring to establish a Weekly
Gazette in Monmouth County and having at present a prospect of
succeeding in a tolerable subscription, he found himself under the
necessity of declining the acceptance of this "generous unsolicited
proposal." On May 15, 1791, Jefferson, writing to T. M. Randolph,
expressed his discontent at the attitude of the two leading papers of
Philadelphia and added:

  We have been trying to get another weekly or half weekly paper set up
  excluding advertisements so that it might go through the States and
  furnish a right vehicle of intelligence. We hoped at one time to have
  persuaded Freneau to set up here, but failed--in the meantime Bache's
  paper, the principles of which were always republican improve it's
  matter.

Not until August 4 did Freneau write to Jefferson that, after discussing
the matter with Madison and Colonel Lee, he had succeeded in making
arrangements with a printer in Philadelphia and would submit proposals
for the publication of a newspaper. Freneau moved to Philadelphia, was
appointed clerk for foreign languages on August 16, and took oath of
office the next day. There is consequently no doubt that Freneau was
induced to leave New York by the double prospect of working in
Jefferson's office and at the same time establishing a republican
newspaper. On November 20, Jefferson sent some sample copies to Randolph
and wrote again on January 22 to ask his son-in-law to find subscribers
to the _Gazette_. He sent to Freneau a list of subscribers from
Charlottesville (March 23, 1792) and wrote to his friends that it was
the best paper ever published in America. On November 16, 1792, he
announced to Randolph that Freneau's paper was getting into
Massachusetts under the patronage of "Hancock, Sam. Adams, Mr. Ames, the
colossus of the monocrats and paper men will either be left out or hard
run. The people of that State are republican; but hitherto they have
heard nothing but the hymns and lauds chaunted by Fenno."

When Freneau was vehemently accused by Hamilton of attacking members of
the government while in the pay of the government, Jefferson took up his
defense and wrote to the speaker of the House to point out that Freneau
received a nominal salary and had even "to pay himself special
translators for languages with which he was unacquainted."[254] Finally,
on October 11, Freneau sent in his resignation to date from October 1,
1793. Such are the bare facts and as Freneau's paper was to play an
important part in the quarrel with Hamilton, it is important to state
them exactly.

The battle did not begin in earnest until the first months of 1792. But
Jefferson's distaste for the financial structure erected by Hamilton
increased during the summer and fall of that year. To Carmichael he
grudgingly admitted that the domestic debt "funded at six per cent., is
twelve and a half per cent. above par." "But," he added, "a spirit of
gambling, in our public paper has seized too many of our citizens, and
we fear it will check our commerce, arts, manufactures, and agriculture
unless stopped."[255] To Gouverneur Morris he declared that the fever
of gambling on government funds has seized everybody, "has laid up our
ships at the wharves, as too slow instruments of profit, and has even
disarmed the hand of the tailor of his needle and thimble. They say the
evil will cure itself. I wish it may; but I have rarely seen a gamester
cured, even by the disasters of his vocation."[256]

One may wonder at this point what course of conduct was open to
Jefferson. He might have placed his views of the situation before
Washington and tried to open his eyes to the danger of the Republic. He
might have broken completely with Hamilton and declared to the President
that he had to decide between the Secretary of the Treasury and the
Secretary of State, but as a matter of fact his hands were tied since he
had accepted the "Assumption" and had not dared categorically to decide
against the Bank Bill. Apparently he had reached an impasse. But it was
not in Jefferson's temperament to try to overcome insuperable obstacles
or stay very long in a blind alley. Since experience had shown that the
general government "tended to monarchy" and this tendency strengthened
itself from day to day, the only remedy was for the States to erect
"such barriers at the constitutional line as cannot be surmounted either
by themselves or by the General Government."[257] An opportunity
presented itself to experiment with the idea in a proposed convocation
of a convention in Virginia to amend the Constitution. Jefferson,
consulted on this occasion, sent to Archibald Stuart his ideas on the
modifications desirable; to lengthen the term of the representatives and
diminish their number; to strengthen the Executive by making it more
independent of the legislature.

  Responsibility is a tremendous engine in a free government. Let him
  feel the whole weight of it then, by taking away the shelter of his
  executive council. Experience both ways has already established the
  superiority of this measure. Render the judiciary respectable by
  every possible means, to wit, firm tenure in office, competent
  salaries, and reduction of their numbers.

This was quite characteristic of Jefferson and of his extraordinary
tenacity. It was also very good strategy. Since the strengthening of the
Federal Government could not be avoided, the only way to avoid a rapid
absorption of local government by the Federal machine was to strengthen
in a parallel way the State governments. It was an unexpected
application of Montesquieu's theory of checks and balances.[258]

Soon afterwards, however, in February, 1792, Jefferson found a favorable
opportunity to reveal his ideas to Washington. The occasion that offered
itself was the post-office, just reorganized as an independent and
self-supporting branch of the government, thus removing it from the
tutelage of the Treasury Department. Jefferson at once claimed it for
the Department of State, not out of any appetite for power, "his real
wish" being to avail the public of every occasion, during the residue of
the President's period, to place things on a safe footing. By this he
meant that the usurpations of the Treasury Department should be brought
to a stop. In a long conversation the next morning after breakfast
Jefferson opened his heart, indicating that he would resign before long,
to which Washington answered that he could not resign when there were
certain signs of dissatisfaction among the public, and that none could
foresee what too great a change in the administration might bring about.
This was the opening awaited by Jefferson. No wonder the public was
dissatisfied, but whose fault was it! There was only one source of
discontent, the Department of the Treasury. Then he launched forth on a
passionate indictment of the system developed by Hamilton, contrived for
deluging the States with paper money instead of gold and silver, "for
withdrawing our citizens from the pursuits of commerce, manufactures,
buildings, and other branches of useful industry, to occupy themselves
and their capitals in a species of gambling, destructive of morality,
and which had introduced its poison in the government itself." He
indicated that members of Congress had been gambling in stocks and
consequently could no longer be depended upon to vote in a disinterested
way, for they had "feathered their nests with paper." Finally Jefferson
let the cat out of the bag and told the President that the public were
awaiting with anxiety his decision with respect to a certain
proposition, to find out whether they lived under a limited or an
unlimited government. The report on manufactures which had not
heretofore drawn particular attention meant to establish the doctrine
that the power given by the Constitution to collect taxes to provide for
the "_general welfare_ of the United States, permitted Congress to take
everything under their management which _they_ should deem _public
welfare_, and which is susceptible of the application of money." He
added that his decision was therefore expected with far greater anxiety
than that felt over the proposed establishment of the Bank of the United
States.[259]

On May 23, Jefferson had found it impossible to have again a
heart-to-heart talk with the President, and we may well imagine that
Washington rather avoided giving him another opportunity to express
himself again so freely with reference to the policy of the Treasury
Department. The object of the letter he wrote on that day was twofold;
first of all it was to persuade Washington that in spite of his so often
manifested intention to retire at the end of his first term, it was his
imperious duty to the nation to remain in office. There existed, in
Jefferson's opinion, a real emergency and he pointed out at length the
dissatisfaction of the South, the separatist tendencies appearing in
that quarter, upon seeing what they considered an unfair share of the
Federal taxes placed on their shoulders, not only in order to pay the
national debt, but also to encourage the Northern industries with
bounties. Rumors were circulating everywhere that new measures were on
foot to increase the mass of the debts; industry was encouraged at the
expense of agriculture; the legislature itself had been corrupted. The
only hope of salvation lay in the coming election and in an increase in
the number of representatives following the census. But everything would
be in question if the President did not run. "The confidence of the
whole Union is centered in you. Your being at the helm will be more than
an answer to every argument which can be used to alarm and lead the
people in any quarter, into violence and secession. North and South will
hang together if they have you to hang on."

This incidentally does not sound like a man who was trying to organize a
strong political party for his own benefit, and I cannot believe that
Jefferson was as deep a politician as Mr. Bowers has made him. He was
quite sincere in his desire to retire from office "after the first
periodical renovation of the government." He was tired and sick at
heart, and his one inclination was "bent irresistibly on the tranquil
enjoyment of his family, his farm and his books."[260] On the other
hand, he was firmly convinced that the coming elections might change
favorably the majority in Congress. They had no chance to be held
fairly, however, unless the people had an opportunity to select as
President a man who would be above all suspicion, a really national
figure enjoying the confidence of every man in every section of the
country, such as was Washington alone. Had Washington followed his
inclination at that time; had he withdrawn at the end of his first term
and left the field free to other candidates, there is no way of
surmising what the issue of the campaign of 1792 would have been. Truly
Jefferson was right: the fate of the republic was at stake.

Shortly after, Hamilton, who had not yet attacked Jefferson personally,
led an offensive against Freneau who was accused by the _Gazette of the
United States_ of using his salary for publications, "the design of
which is to villify those to whom the voice of the people has committed
the administration of our public affairs." But Freneau, in Hamilton's
opinion, was only the puppet whose strings were pulled by an arch
plotter, and soon the _Gazette_ started direct attacks against
Jefferson, asserting that while a member of the Cabinet he had
undertaken to undermine the government. Freneau, in an affidavit, denied
that Jefferson had any connection with his paper or had dictated or
written a single line in it, and at the same time hinted that, on the
contrary, the authorship of many articles published in Fenno's _Gazette_
could clearly be attributed to Hamilton. This denial had precisely the
value of any such statement issued during political campaigns. It was
literally true that Jefferson had never written a line in Freneau's
paper, but he had an opportunity to see Freneau every day, since "clerk
for foreign languages" had to report to him. He was requesting all his
friends to subscribe to Freneau's papers, he was following anxiously the
progress of the _Gazette_ in all parts of the Union, and one word from
him would have stopped all attacks against Hamilton. In fact, Freneau's
paper was just as much Jefferson's paper as if the Secretary of State
had written all the articles in it and had owned all the stock.

Hamilton's attacks, however, had a very important and unexpected result.
Whether Jefferson had serious political ambitions or not, he was not the
man to come out in the open and proclaim himself the leader of a new
party. Of a retiring disposition, fearful of public criticism although
thirsty for public praise, he was not ready at that time to assume the
part and the duties of a political chief. But the savage attacks of the
Federalists attracted public attention to him, he was represented so
often by them as the champion of republicanism, that discontented
republicans began to rally round him and Jefferson was thus invested
with the leadership of the new party as much by his enemies as by his
friends.

During the summer of 1792, when he was at Monticello, he received from
Washington a letter in which the President expressed his distress at the
dissensions that had taken place within the government, and once more
attempted to bring about a reconciliation between the two secretaries
(August 23). Jefferson answered in a long letter. This time his temper
had been thoroughly aroused. He had seen articles signed "An American"
in Fenno's _Gazette_, accusing him on three counts: "with having written
letters to his friends in Europe to oppose the present constitution;
with a desire of repudiating the public debt; with setting up a paper to
decry and slander the government." Jefferson had no difficulty in
proving the first two accusations absolutely untrue. On the third charge
he admitted and even boasted of having given a poet a miserable
appointment at a salary of $250 a year, while Hamilton had filled the
administration with his creatures. He protested in the name of Heaven
that "I never did, by myself, or any other, directly or indirectly,
write, dictate, or procure any one sentence of sentiment to be inserted
in _his_, or any other gazette, to which my name was not affixed or that
of my office." He confessed, however, that he had always taken it for
granted, from his knowledge of Freneau's character, "that he would give
free place to pieces written against the aristocratical and monarchical
principles these papers had inculcated." He again protested against
Hamilton's insinuation that Freneau had received his salary before
removing to Philadelphia, and on this point he is supported by the
evidence published above. In a very dignified way he assured Washington
that he would refrain from engaging in any controversy while in office
and that he wished to concentrate all his efforts on the last of his
official tasks. He added, however, that he reserved the right to answer
later, for, he said: "I will not suffer my retirement to be clouded by
the slanders of a man whose history, from the moment at which history
can stoop to notice him, is a tissue of machinations against the liberty
of the country which has not only received and given him bread, but
heaped honors on his head."

Jefferson has sometimes been reproached for having attacked in the
"Anas" a dead enemy, but this was no posthumous attack. In one sentence
he had expressed not only condemnation of Hamilton's policies but all
the scorn of a Virginian, of the old stock, for the immigrant of
doubtful birth, who was almost an alien. He knew full well the weight
that such a consideration might have on the mind of Washington; it was a
subtle but potent appeal to the solidarity of the old Americans against
the newcomer. Truly, Jefferson was no mean adversary, and the rapier may
be more deadly than the battle-ax. Having thus parried and thrust, he
expressed the pious wish that the coming elections would probably
vindicate his point of view and that it would not be necessary to make a
further appeal to public opinion. He was tired and wished to retire from
office at the earliest opportunity, and certainly no clique would
receive any support from him during the short space he had to remain in
Philadelphia. Monticello was calling him and his most earnest hope was
that he would be permitted to forget all political strife in a bucolic
retirement.[261]

On his way back to Philadelphia he stopped at Mount Vernon (October 1,
1792) and found Washington still undecided whether he would be a
candidate for a second term. The General was not certain that the
emergency was such that he must sacrifice his personal preferences. He
had consulted Lear about opinion in the North; Jefferson could tell him
something about the South. When he was assured that he alone could save
the Republic, it was his turn to argue that Jefferson ought to remain
in office as long as he himself would be President. Washington said that
until very recently he had been unaware that such personal differences
existed between the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the
Treasury. The old General gently reminded Jefferson that the best way to
counteract the action of Hamilton was to remain in office, in order "to
keep things in their proper channel, and prevent them from going too
far." Finally the President refused to accept wholly the pessimistic
forecasts of Jefferson and declared: "That as to the idea of
transforming this Government into a monarchy, he did not believe there
were ten men in the United States whose opinions were worth attention,
who entertained such a thought." He refused to take seriously
Jefferson's accusation that Hamilton would have said that "this
Constitution was a shilly-shally thing, of mere milk and water, which
could not last, and was only good as a step to something better." That
as far as corruption in the legislature was concerned, the term was
probably too severe; it was simply a manifestation of "interested
spirit"; it was what could not be avoided in any government, unless we
were to exclude from all office particular descriptions of men, such as
the holders of the funds. "For the rest he only knew that before the
funding operations he had seen our affairs desperate and our credit
lost, and that this was in a sudden and extraordinary degree raised to
the highest pitch." With the common sense and poise that were his
outstanding qualities, Washington refused to inquire into the ultimate
motives of Hamilton. The Secretary of the Treasury had rescued the
finances of the country from bankruptcy; he was a good, efficient, and
personally honest administrator, and it was Washington's hope that he
would be able to keep with him two useful collaborators whom he could
not easily replace.

Shall I confess that, in my humble opinion, and in spite of the contrary
judgment of several American historians, Washington was probably right.
The quarrel between Hamilton and Jefferson is undoubtedly of
considerable importance in the history of political parties in the
United States. I am not so certain that it exerted so tremendous an
influence on the destinies of the nation. Whatever may have been the
ambitious schemes of Hamilton, the theoretical preferences of John
Adams, it is difficult to see how any one could have succeeded at that
time in establishing overnight an hereditary monarchy in the United
States. Such a _"coup d'état"_ is always a possibility in the old
countries of Europe, all of them more or less centralized and controlled
from a national capital; but in 1793 there was no national capital in
America, loyalty to the Federal Government was scarcely nascent,
citizens had not been accustomed to look to Congress for bounties,
assistance, and subsidies. The vastness of the country would have
offered insuperable obstacles, even to the genius of a Bonaparte. No
real danger existed because, as Montesquieu would have said, a monarchy
was not in the nature of things, and both Hamilton and Jefferson would
have realized it, if they had not been caught in the maelstrom of
political and personal passions.

When Jefferson left Mount Vernon, Washington was still undecided whether
he would accept a second term, but Jefferson had determined that he
would not stay in office any longer than he could help; and on November
8, he wrote to Humphreys to send all further communications not to him
personally, but to the Secretary of State, by title and not by name.
News of election was coming slowly, winter had already begun in the
northern States. But the news that did arrive was reassuring and
Jefferson was able to write on November 16, "the event has been
generally in favor of republican, and against the aristocratical
candidates." By the beginning of December, the reëlection of Washington
being conceded, it appeared that the election of the Vice President "had
been seized as a proper one for expressing the public sense on the
doctrine of the monocrats." It was already apparent that Adams would be
reëlected in spite of a strong vote against him, but Jefferson
discounted the significance of the election and attributed it to "the
strength of his personal worth and his services, rather than to the
merits of his political creed."[262] It seemed that the anti-Federalists
had gained control of the lower House and this was a most significant
victory.

Then as more news of the election came, telling of the victory of the
republicans or, as they were called by derision, the Jacobins, other
news arrived from France. The army of the Duke of Brunswick had been
forced to retreat and had failed in crushing the republican army of
France. "This news," wrote Jefferson, "has given wry faces to our
monocrats here, but sincere joy to the great body of the citizens. It
arrived only in the afternoon of yesterday, and the bells were rung and
some illuminations took place in the evening."[263] Four days later the
conviction that a disaster had overcome Brunswick had made great
progress, although no other news had been received, and Jefferson had
anxiously awaited the arrival of ships from France. But the tide had
turned and he wrote to Mercer: "The monocrats here still affect to
disbelieve all this, while the republicans are rejoicing and taking to
themselves the name of Jacobins which two months ago was fixed on them
by way of stigma."[264] The first victory of the republicans coincided
with the first victory of the Revolution against the coalition of kings.
The French Revolution itself had become a domestic issue and was to
inject more passion into the strife between the monocrats and the
republicans.




CHAPTER II

JACOBIN OR AMERICAN?


One of the first duties of Jefferson in taking charge of foreign affairs
was to explain to his French friends, who on the other side of the
Atlantic had been accustomed to look up to him as a guide and
counsellor, the reasons which had determined his choice to remain in
America. To Madame de Corny, the Duchesse Danville, the Duc de La
Rochefoucauld, Madame d'Houdetot, he wrote gracefully worded notes, in
the best style of the society of the time. In France, among other
things, he had learned how to turn a charming compliment. More official
but still very graceful is the letter he sent to Montmorin to take
formal leave of the French Court and at the same time introduce himself
in his new capacity. But besides the compliments, there appears in the
letter a reaffirmation that the best foundation for international
friendship lay in satisfactory commercial relations. "May this union of
interests forever be the patriotic creed of both countries."[265] The
new Secretary of State had not forgotten that the most important
questions relative to Gallo-American commerce had not yet been settled,
and that it would be no negligible part of his duties to carry out the
principles he had always defended when in Paris.

To Lafayette, closer to his heart than any other Frenchman, he explained
more fully his view of the situation and stated once more the principles
which would direct him in his policy towards France:

  Wherever I am, or ever shall be, I shall be sincere in my friendship
  to you and to your nation. I think with others, that nations are to
  be governed with regard to their own interests, but I am convinced
  that it is their interests, in the long run, to be grateful, faithful
  to their engagements, even in the worst of circumstances, and
  honorable and generous always. If I had not known that the head of
  our government was in these sentiments, and that his national and
  private ethics were the same, I would never have been where I
  am.[266]

This was more than a banal compliment. To the homely wisdom of Doctor
Franklin that honesty is the best policy, Jefferson had added a new
element. He had combined in one formula two principles which often seem
contradictory and which at any rate are difficult to reconcile. Not a
mere idealist, nor simply a practical politician, he was, during the
rest of his political life, to make persistent efforts to propagate that
gospel of practical idealism which remains to this day one of the
fundamental tenets of Americanism. In that respect, party lines count
little, and Lincoln was quite as much a disciple and a continuator of
Jefferson as Woodrow Wilson.

On the other hand, it cannot be denied that in many circumstances it
would take more than superhuman virtue and intelligence rightly to
operate that ideal combination and maintain an equal balance between
national selfishness and philosophical idealism. When it came to
practice, Jefferson showed himself just as canny as any European
diplomat and never neglected an opportunity to further the interests of
his country. This appeared in the very first letters he sent to Europe
after taking charge of the foreign policies of the United States.

Communications were slow at the time. Jefferson was kept regularly
informed of developments in France by Short, his former secretary, left
in charge in Paris, who sent him weekly letters; but they averaged
eleven weeks and a half in transit, while of his answers "the quickest
were of nine weeks and the longest of near eighteen weeks coming."
Information through the British papers took about five or six weeks to
reach America but was not to be relied upon, and Jefferson gave definite
instructions to Short for "news from Europe is very interesting at this
moment, when it is so doubtful whether a war will take place between our
two neighbors."[267]

This was indeed at the time his main preoccupation. War between Spain
and England seemed not only possible but probable, and Jefferson saw in
it an opportunity to press the claims of the United States to the
navigation of the Mississippi. The question was not "the claims of Spain
to our territory north of the thirty first degree and east of the
Mississippi (they never merited the respect of an answer), but the
navigation of the Mississippi and that was not simply to recognize the
American rights on the river." Navigation "cannot be practiced without a
port, where the sea and river vessels may meet and exchange loads, where
those employed about them may be safe and unmolested." The right to use
a thing comprehends a right to the means necessary to its use, and
without which it would be useless. Jefferson added that he could not
answer that "the forbearance of our western citizens would last
indefinitely, and that a moment of impatience, hazard or other
considerations might precipitate action on their part." On the other
hand, the United States were in no position to antagonize openly even
weak Spain, and in case nothing should develop Carmichael was instructed
to bide his time:

  You will be pleased to observe, that we press these matters warmly
  and firmly, under this idea, that the war between Spain and Great
  Britain will be begun before you receive this; and such a moment must
  not be lost. But should an accommodation take place, we retain,
  indeed, the same object and the same resolutions unalterably; but
  your discretion will suggest, that patience and persuasion must
  temper your conferences, till either of these may prevail, or some
  other circumstances turn up, which may enable us to use other means
  for the attainment of an object which we are determined, in the end,
  to obtain at every risk.[268]

Naturally this is no worse than the ordinary run of instructions sent at
that time to diplomatic agents by other foreign secretaries, and
Jefferson's policy was no more underhanded than the policies of any
other nation of the Old World. It cannot be said, however, that it
rested upon higher and nobler moral principles. Perhaps America had no
diplomatic tradition at that time, but she was not deficient in tactics,
and neither Jefferson nor his agents were exactly innocent tools in the
hands of wily European diplomats.

But this is not all. Jefferson unfolded his whole plan in a letter to
Short written a week later. In case of a war between England and Spain,
France would be called into the war as an ally on the side of Spain. She
would have a right to insist that Spain should do everything in her
power to lessen the number of her potential enemies and to eliminate
every cause of friction with the United States. "She cannot doubt that
we shall be of that number, if she does not yield our right to common
use of the Mississippi, and the means of using and securing it." The
point made by the United States was that "they should have a port near
the mouth of the river, so well separated from the territories of Spain
and her jurisdiction, as not to engender daily disputes and broils
between us." Such a claim was not an arbitrary one, but resulted from
the configuration of the land. "Nature has decided what shall be the
geography of that in the end, whatever it might be in the beginning, by
cutting off from the adjacent countries of Florida and Louisiana, and
enclosing between two of its channels, a long and narrow slip of land,
called the Island of New Orleans." Jefferson conceded that the idea of
ceding that territory might be disagreeable to Spain at first, because
it constituted their principal settlement in those parts, with a
population of ten thousand white inhabitants, but "reason, and events,
however, may, by little and little, familiarize them to it." The idea,
however, might seem excessive to Montmorin, particularly as it was
thought that France had not entirely given up the project of recovering
the country along the Mississippi. But fortunately the National Assembly
seemed opposed to conquest and the subject might be broached merely in
general terms at the beginning. Furthermore, Lafayette could be used
once more as an intermediary without officially compromising the United
States.[269]

Finally Gouverneur Morris was told to warn England that should they
entertain any design against any Spanish colony, the United States would
contemplate a change of neighbors with extreme uneasiness. While the
United States would remain neutral if "they execute the treaty fairly
and attempt no conquests adjoining us," Jefferson added, "it will be
proper that these ideas be conveyed in delicate and friendly terms; but
that they be conveyed, if the war takes place; for it is in this case
alone, and not till it be begun, that we should wish our dispositions to
be known."[270] That question being disposed of satisfactorily, at least
in theory, for after all, the war did not break out, Jefferson abandoned
temporarily his plans to obtain New Orleans. How he resumed them and
pushed them to a successful conclusion ten years later is too well known
to need recalling here.

It is not until February 4, 1791, that Jefferson expressed in writing
his hope to see a republican form of government established in France.
This was in direct contradiction with all the advice and counsel he had
given to his French friends when he was in Paris, with his repeated
affirmations that the French were not ready for self-government, and
with the conclusions contained in his letter written to Jay in the
summer of 1789. None of the developments that had taken place in France
was of such a character as to change Jefferson's attitude on the
matter. But in the meantime, he had come to the conclusion that the fate
of the republican government in the United States depended largely on
the failure or success of the French Revolution. If it proved impossible
for the French to establish a stable form of self-government, if they
could not withstand the attacks of their foreign enemies, the conclusion
would inevitably be drawn in America that there was an inherent defect
and weakness in all republican governments. Thus the French Revolution
had already become an international issue, for the cause of liberty
could not remain secure for any length of time in America if it were
crushed in Europe. On that particular point Jefferson himself was very
explicit:

  I look with great anxiety for the firm establishment of the new
  government in France, being perfectly convinced that if it takes
  place there, it will spread sooner or later all over Europe. On the
  contrary, a check there would retard the revival of liberty in other
  countries. I consider the establishment and success of their
  government as necessary to stay up our own, and to prevent it from
  falling back to that kind of half-way house, the English
  constitution. It cannot be denied that we have among us a sect who
  believe that to contain whatever is perfect in human institutions;
  that the members of this sect have, many of them, names and offices
  which stand high in the estimation of our countrymen. I still rely
  that the great mass of our community is untainted with these
  heresies, as is its head. On this I build my hope that we have not
  labored in vain, and that our experiment will still prove that men
  can be governed by reason.[271]

On receiving the news that the National Assembly of France had gone into
mourning over the death of Franklin, Jefferson sent to its President one
of those letters worded in the "felicitous style" which he had perfected
in France. His feelings were sincere, he had great respect and affection
for the Doctor, but he knew what was expected of him, and with great
skill, without promising anything, or using any expression that might be
taken as a definite promise and turned against him later, he made a
vague but satisfactory appeal to a sort of international friendship,
praising the Assembly for having set the first example and brought "into
our fraternity the good and the great wherever they have lived or died."
He ended with a reaffirmation of the good dispositions of his government
towards France: "That these separations may disappear between us in all
times and circumstances, and that the union of sentiment which mingles
our sorrows on this occasion, may continue long to cement the friendship
and interests of our two nations, is our constant prayer."[272]

This openly declared sympathy for France and his hopes for a new form of
government did not in the least obscure his views on the commercial
difficulties between the two countries. The bone of contention was still
the question of commerce with the West Indies. The National Assembly, on
ratifying the consular conventions, had showed little disposition to
admit the right of the United States to send consular agents to the West
Indies. In his opinion the word _"États du roi"_ did not mean merely
France, but all colonial possessions of France as indicated in the
translation "French dominions." He was not ready officially to press the
matter so as to cause difficulties between the two nations and was
willing to have the two agents already appointed, "Skipwith at
Martinique and Bourne at St. Dominique", ask for a regular
exequatur.[273]

He elaborated on his policy with reference to the West Indies in another
letter to Short, written three months later. In it will be found
expressed more discreetly, but no less firmly, the philosophy outlined
already with reference to Spain and the Mississippi. He maintained first
of all that the United States had no design whatever on the West
Indies, for "If there be one principle more deeply rooted than any other
in the mind of every American, it is that we should have nothing to do
with conquest." This principle once established, he proceeded to examine
the situation from a practical point of view. The regulations imposed by
the French on their colonies are such that they cannot trade directly
with their neighbors; for the supplies necessary to relieve their mutual
wants have to be carried first to France in order to be exported either
to the colonies or to the American continent. This is contrary to the
natural order of things: "An exchange of surplusses and wants between
neighbor nations, is both a right and a duty under the moral law, and
measures against right should be mollified in their exercise, if it be
wished to lengthen them to the greatest term possible." It seemed to
Jefferson that such a right ought to be recognized by any unprejudiced
mind; but, unfortunately, "Europeans in general have been too long in
the habit of confounding force with right with respect to America."
Circumstances are such that these rights cannot be pressed very strongly
and "can be advanced only with delicacy", but what the United States
cannot do themselves, Lafayette perhaps can present informally to his
friends. He alone can make them understand that, while they are
establishing a new régime for their colonial possessions of the West
Indies, "in policy, if not in justice, they should be disposed to avoid
oppression, which, falling on us, as well as on their colonies, might
tempt us to act together."[274]

Was this a veiled threat? Not exactly. It was an extension of
Montesquieu's theory of laws to international relations, an application
of the theories of the French economists on free trade. But even
supposing that the theory itself had some remote French origin, to a
large extent it was new and typically American. Only former colonies
which had won their complete independence could maintain that, in
matters of trade, the colonies were completely independent of the
metropolis, and that commercial and geographical considerations should
outweigh political regulations. The United States were strongly inclined
to use every favorable opportunity to make this principle obtain in
their relations with their neighbors, and what was a far more dangerous
thing, they considered this policy both "a right and a duty under the
moral law." It was not political imperialism to be sure, but in our days
it certainly would be called commercial imperialism under a moral
disguise. At that time, it was really a theory far in advance of both
the theory and practice of any European nation, and it is very doubtful
whether Jefferson would have found justification for it in any of the
authorities on the law of nations he had consulted with reference to the
navigation of the Mississippi.[275]

There is no doubt that Jefferson fully realized all the implications of
his doctrine, for he submitted it to the President before sending it to
Short in cipher; but he insisted that, if the contents of his letter
were permitted to leak out at a favorable opportunity, "the National
Assembly might see the impolicy of insisting on particular conditions,
which, operating as grievances on us, as well as on their colonists,
might produce a concert of action."[276]

The news of the flight of the king was for him another evidence of the
"fruits of that form of government, which heaps importance on idiots,
and which the Tories of the present day are trying to preach into our
favor." Then he added significantly: "I still hope the French revolution
will issue happily. I feel that the permanence of our own leans in some
degree on that; and that a failure there would be a powerful argument to
prove there would be a failure here."[277]

Meanwhile his actions were far more cautious than his theories would
lead one to believe. When the Santo Domingo Assembly placed their
situation before the Government of the United States, asking for
ammunition, arms, and provisions to be charged against the money owed
France by the United States, Jefferson answered that although the United
States had with them "some common points of union in matters of
commerce" he could not do anything without the approbation of Ternant.
When the colonists asked him what would be the attitude of the United
States in case they became independent, Jefferson did not conceal the
fact that they would lay themselves open to any attack by a strong
nation and that their interest, as well as the interests of the United
States, was to see them retain their connection with their mother
country; and he finally decided to give them such small supplies from
time to time "as will keep them from real distress, and to wait with
patience for what would be a surplus, till M. Ternant can receive
instructions from France.... It would be unwise in the highest degree,
that the colonists should be disgusted with either France or us."[278]

He was soon to be deprived, however, of direct news from France, for
Short was transferred from Paris to the Hague and Gouverneur Morris
appointed Minister Plenipotentiary to France.[279] He had to explain his
policy to the new minister, which he did on March 10, 1792, this time
insisting that nothing in the conduct or the views of the United States
should cause any apprehension to the French Government and that he
should allay all fears on that score.[280] But with Lafayette he still
insisted that if he did not mention the point again, it was largely
because he considered that it had been won:

  We have been less zealous in aiding them, lest your government should
  feel any jealousy on our account. But, in truth, we as sincerely
  wish their restoration and connection with you, as you do yourselves.
  We are satisfied that neither your justice nor their distresses will
  ever again permit their being forced to seek at dear and distant
  markets those first necessaries of life which they may have at
  cheaper markets, placed by nature at their door, and formed by her
  for their support.[281]

It was not until the latter part of 1792 that reiterated letters from
Morris, describing the situation and asking for instructions, forced
Jefferson to make a very important declaration on relations that could
be transacted with revolutionary governments. There again he displayed
the resourcefulness of a good lawyer combined with the idealism of a
political philosopher. Having no hint of the form of government that the
French were to adopt, he thought it necessary to lay down certain
principles to direct the conduct of the American plenipotentiary in
Paris. They were substantially as follows: The permanent principle of
the United States was to recognize any government "which is formed by
the will of the nation substantially declared." If the government to be
formed by the French presented such a character, there was no reason to
doubt that the United States would grant recognition, and Morris could
proceed without further ado to transact with them "every kind of
business." On the other hand, the government established might present
an entirely different complexion and in that case the recognition might
be more doubtful; but even then it was to be considered as a _de facto_,
if not a _de jure_ government, and it was the duty of the American
minister to discuss some matters with them in order to obtain
concessions "reforming the unfriendly restrictions on our commerce and
navigation."[282] The question as to Morris' safety was left entirely to
him to determine and could not very well be the object of precise
instructions.

Two weeks later, Jefferson himself had an opportunity to make a
practical application of his policy. Although they had received no
formal authority from the National Assembly, the United States were
willing to contribute aids from time to time to Santo Domingo, and were
placing at their disposal for December the sum of forty thousand
dollars. But Jefferson insisted that such moneys as were thus obtained
were to be spent in America where supplies could be had cheapest, "and
where the same sum would consequently effect the greatest measure of
relief to the colony." Incidentally, it was spent also for the greatest
benefit of the American merchants, and strengthened the commercial
connection between the islands and the American continent, a point not
to be mentioned to the French envoy, but well worth keeping in
mind.[283]

At the beginning of 1793, Jefferson was not only inclined to treat
favorably the new French Government but resented strongly any criticism
of it. When he discovered that in several letters his friend and
disciple Short had censured the proceedings of the French Jacobins,
Jefferson, fearing that he had been corrupted by aristocratic
friendships, undertook to set him right on the matter. He took the
following view of the situation:

  The contest had been between the Feuillant patriots favoring a free
  constitution with an hereditary executive and the Jacobins who
  thought that expunging that office was an absolute necessity. The
  Feuillants had their day and their experiment had failed miserably.
  The nation was with them in opinion and had finally won. Certainly in
  the struggle many guilty persons fell without the forms of trial and
  innocents with them. But altogether they are to be considered as
  soldiers who have fallen during a battle; their memory will be
  embalmed by truth and time.

Meanwhile the only thing to consider was that the liberty of the whole
world depended on the issue of the contest:

  Was ever such a prize won with so little innocent blood? My own
  affections have been deeply wounded by some of the martyrs to this
  cause, but rather than it should have failed I would have seen half
  the earth desolated; were there but an Adam and an Eve left in every
  country, and left free, it would be better than as it is now.

Short was then severely rebuked for having expressed in conversations
sentiments offensive to the French patriots. He was reminded that there
were in the United States "some characters of opposite principles
hostile to France, and fondly looking to England as the staff of their
hopes. Their prospects have certainly not brightened.... The successes
of republicanism in France have given the _coup de grace_ to their
prospects, and I hope to their projects." This was to be kept in mind by
Short, and, as Jefferson intended to retire at an early date, he called
his attention to the fact that not knowing who his successor would be
and into whose hands his further communications would fall, he had
better be prudent and not let his "too great sensibility to the
misfortunes of some dear friends obscure his republicanism."[284]

In a communication to Gouverneur Morris, Jefferson was more reserved but
no less insistent upon the principle that the French Government was a
government _de jure_ as well as _de facto_:

  We surely cannot deny to any nation that right whereon our own
  government is founded, that every one may govern itself according to
  whatever form it pleases, and change these forms at its own will; and
  that it may transact its business with foreign nations through
  whatever organ it thinks proper, whether King, Convention, Assembly,
  Committee, President, or anything else it may choose. The will of the
  nation is the only essential thing to be regarded. Such being the
  case, the United States not only should continue to pay the
  installment on the debt but use their utmost endeavors to make
  punctual payments. Urged by the strongest attachment to that country,
  and thinking it is even providential that moneys lent to us in
  distress could be repaid under like circumstances, we had no
  hesitation to comply with the application, and arrangements are
  accordingly taken, for furnishing this sum at epochs accommodated to
  the demands and our means of paying it.

This was the doctrine of national gratitude reaffirmed and illustrated,
but naturally relations could not be placed on an entirely sentimental
basis. Morris was instructed at the same time "to use and improve every
possible opportunity which may occur in the changeable scenes which are
passing, and to seize them as they occur, for placing our commerce with
that nation and its dependencies, on the freest and most encouraging
footing possible."[285]

A week later news of the execution of the king arrived at Philadelphia.
For the fate of Louis XVI, Jefferson felt and expressed little personal
regret. He never held the monarch in high esteem: furthermore, the
example set by France might teach a good lesson to other autocrats and
"soften the monarchical governments, by rendering monarchs amenable to
punishment like other criminals, and doing away with that rage of
insolence and oppression, the inviolability of the King's person."[286]
Here again it is evident that domestic considerations were uppermost in
Jefferson's mind. Never could one correct too vigorously those who
wished to establish a monarchy in the United States. Whether he was
justified or not, Jefferson sincerely believed that the American
republic was in danger, and his attitude at that time reflects his fear
of the monocrats more than any real sympathy for the French Terrorists.

Thus spoke Jefferson, the party man, and he made no mystery of his
sentiments either in his conversations or in his private letters. The
Secretary of State, however, could not easily afford to adopt publicly
the same attitude. Early in February Colonel W. S. Smith had brought the
intelligence that the French Minister Ternant, whose royalist opinions
shocked the French sympathizers in Philadelphia, would be recalled and
Citizen Genet would be sent in his place by the Republic. It was already
known that Genet would bring very advantageous propositions to the
United States, for he would come

  with full powers to give us all the privileges we can desire in their
  countries, and particularly in the West Indies; that they even
  contemplate to set them free the next summer; that they proposed to
  emancipate South America, and will send forty-five ships of the line
  there next spring, and Miranda at the head of the expedition; that
  they desire our debt to be paid them in provisions, and have
  authorized him to negotiate this.[287]

On the other hand it was to be feared that Genet would remind the
American Government of the existence of the Treaty of 1778, by which the
United States agreed to give distinct advantages to French privateers
and to guarantee the integrity of the French West Indies. It was not
until April that it was known war had been declared between France and
England. Were the United States going to be dragged into the European
convulsions and would they have to side openly with their former ally?
Acting on the information received from Colonel Smith, Jefferson quickly
wrote to Carmichael and Short, asking them to refrain from mentioning
the Louisiana question to Spain, and chiefly to be very careful not to
"bind us to guarantee any of the Spanish colonies against their own
independence, nor indeed against any other nation." Jefferson believed
that there was a possibility of seeing France encourage the Spanish
colonies to revolt and would not have objected "to the receiving those
on the east side into our confederation." This was an eventuality not to
be lightly dismissed, and once more Jefferson's uppermost preoccupation
was not to please the French Revolutionists but to further the interests
of his country.[288] But before deciding upon any course of action it
was advisable to temporize and to find out from what quarter the wind
was about to blow. The only thing to do for the present was to wait and
to avoid any unpleasant complications with the powers at war; and first
of all to see to it that the United States should enjoy the rights and
privileges of a complete neutrality. Jefferson began sending
instructions to that effect to Samuel Shaw, consul at Canton,
China.[289] Two days later he wrote even more explicitly to Dumas: "We
wish not to meddle with the internal affairs of any country, nor with
the general affairs of Europe. Peace with all nations, and the right
which that gives us with all nations are our objects. It will be
necessary for all our public agents to exert themselves with vigilance
for securing to our vessels all the rights of neutrality, and from
preventing the vessels of other nations from usurping our flags."[290]

As the cabinet met only one month later (April 18) at the request of
Washington to discuss the proclamation of neutrality, it is not without
importance to call attention to the date and the text of that letter.
Winning Jefferson over to the position finally adopted by the American
Government could not present insuperable difficulties since he had
already outlined the same policy even before consulting with the
President, and on his own initiative had sent instructions to the
agents.

When the Cabinet met to consider the emergency, and the several
secretaries were invited by Washington to submit their opinions in
writing, the course to be followed was officially agreed upon and
Washington issued the famous Proclamation of Neutrality on April
22,--the very same day the new minister from France landed at
Charleston. Jefferson did not lose any time notifying the American
agents abroad of the policy of the United States, repeating
substantially the instructions already sent to Dumas one month
before.[291] At the same time Ternant was officially notified that
credits opened in favor of the West Indies had to be stopped;[292] as
the emergency had passed and a regular government had been established
in France, money could be appropriated from the regular installments
paid on the debt.

[Illustration: THOMAS JEFFERSON

_From the portrait by Rembrandt Peale_]

According to a letter written to Monroe,[293] Jefferson saw with a
secret pleasure, the monocrat papers publish the most furious philippics
against England, and the old spirit of 1776 rekindled from Charleston to
Boston. He expressed the pious wish that "we may be able to repress the
spirit of the people within the limits of fair neutrality." But he
revolted against what he considered a subservient attitude to England on
the part of Hamilton. It is one of the few occasions in which he
departed in a letter (I do not count the "Anas") from his judicial
attitude: "In the meantime," he said, "Hamilton is panick struck, if we
refuse our breech to every kick which Great Britain may choose to give
it. In order to preserve even a sneaking neutrality a fight is necessary
in every council for our votes are generally two and a half against one
and a half."

Jefferson's private opinion might have favored the French Revolution, as
it undoubtedly did. I do not see, however, that in any important
circumstance he departed from the strict line of neutrality which he had
traced for the country.

He sent instructions to Thomas Pinckney[294] to the effect that, in
order to avoid any violation of neutrality, passports could be issued to
vessels only in American ports; that "in other lands American citizens
were free to purchase and use any foreign built vessels, as those were
entitled to the same protection as home built vessels." That all vessels
belonging to citizens of the United States loaded with grain to the port
of one of the belligerents could not be stopped by the other
belligerent if going to an unblockaded port.

Then Genet, still at Charleston and before being regularly accredited,
took upon himself to outfit privateers and to commission them. "The
British ship _Grange_, while lying at anchor in the bay of Delaware,
within the territory and jurisdiction of the United States, was taken
possession of by the _Embuscade_, a frigate of the French Republic,
brought to port where she was detained as a prize and the crew kept
prisoners."[295] Ternant was asked to detain the vessel, waiting for a
decision to be taken concerning the representations of the British
minister, Hammond. But it will be seen in Jefferson's letter to
Hammond[296] that he did not hesitate to grant that the capture of the
_Grange_ was not "warranted by the usage of nations, nor by the existing
treaties between the United States and France", nor, Jefferson added,
"by any law of the land." On the other hand he maintained that agents of
the French Government were free to purchase "arms and military
accoutrements" with an intent to export them to France, and that
citizens of the United States could sell such articles, being duly
warned, however, that they were subject to confiscation should they fall
into the hands of a belligerent.

Indeed, it took all the calamitous blunders of Genet to turn Jefferson
against him. From Charleston, where he had landed, to Philadelphia, his
march had been a triumph. The citizens of Philadelphia, hearing that the
President might refuse to receive him, had even decided to give him an
ovation and to meet him at Gray's Ferry. He delivered his credentials on
May 18, and at once communicated the object of his mission in a style
which now appears grandiloquent, but simply reflected that enthusiasm
for America which was running so high in France at the time. "In short,"
wrote Jefferson to Madison, "he offers everything, and asks
nothing."[297] This was too good to be true, and too wonderful to last
long.

Less than three weeks later (June 5) Jefferson had to send to Genet
strong representations on his attitude and pointed out several breaches
of neutrality, particularly in the arming of French privateers in
American ports, stating rather stiffly that it was "the _right_ of every
nation to prohibit acts of sovereignty from being exercised by any other
nation within its limits and the duty of a neutral nation to prohibit
such as would injure one of the warring powers."

But in a letter to Hammond he stated that the measures could not be
retrospective. In the first days of the war, French citizens, duly
commissioned by the authorities of their country, had captured British
vessels. It was impossible for the United States to rescue those vessels
from the captors. All that could be done was to prevent the repetition
of such an incident and to order the departure of all French privateers
from the ports of the United States. It was fine legal reasoning, not
without some of that hairsplitting for which Jefferson reproached
Randolph. Whether Randolph had a hand or not in the reaching of that
decision is another question. Jefferson indorsed it in transmitting it
both to Hammond and Genet.

Another proposition of Genet did not meet with more favorable approval.
The Republic was hard pressed for money, and the new plenipotentiary had
been requested to make every possible effort "to obtain payment in one
lump sum of all the annuities coming to France, taking the debt in
produce if necessary, or changing it into bonds to be sold to the
public." To this Jefferson was unequivocally opposed, although he
referred the President to Hamilton. He recommended payment in advance of
the installments due for the year, but strongly objected to changing the
form of the debt.[298] He wrote, furthermore, to Gouverneur Morris to
acquaint him with the situation and to request him "to prevent any such
proposition in the future from being brought forward."[299]

As a matter of fact, although Jefferson expressed pious and fervent
wishes for the success of the French, I cannot see that he officially
did much to further their cause. He was not even pleased by the
agitation and propaganda in their behalf carried on in America by
enthusiastic patriots. This appears very clearly in a letter to his
son-in-law, Thomas Mann Randolph, which, better than any official
document, indicates his state of mind at the end of June, 1793:

  The French have been guilty of great errors in their conduct towards
  other nations, not only in insulting uselessly all crowned heads, but
  endeavoring to force liberty on their neighbors in their own form.
  They seem to be correcting themselves on the latter point; the war
  between them and England embarrasses our government daily and
  immensely. The predilection of our citizens for France renders it
  very difficult to suppress their attempts to cruise against the
  English on the ocean, and to do justice to the latter in cases where
  they are entitled to it.[300]

Monroe had sent him a long dissertation on the proclamation of
neutrality which he judged both "unpolitick and unconstitutional"; for,
if the President "possesses the right to say we shall be neutral, he
might say we should not be."[301]

To this Jefferson answered that his friends' apprehensions were somewhat
exaggerated, for the United States being at peace with England, the
so-called proclamation of neutrality--which, by the way, did not contain
the word neutrality--did nothing but maintain a _status quo_. This was a
fine legal distinction, not very convincing, but very characteristic of
Jefferson's state of mind at that time and of his reluctance to favor
the French side. Had he ever wished to do it, the attitude of the French
envoy would have soon forced him to adopt a different policy.

The case of Citizen Genet is too well known to require elaborate
treatment. Less than six weeks after his arrival in Philadelphia,
Jefferson had given him up as hopeless and dangerous:

  Never in my opinion, was so calamitous an appointment made, as that
  of the present minister of France here. Hot headed, all imagination,
  no judgment, passionate, disrespectful & even indecent towards the
  President in his written as well as verbal communications, talking of
  appeals from him to Congress, from them to the people, urging the
  most unreasonable & groundless propositions, & in the most
  dictatorial style.[302]

The case of the _Little Sarah_, a British prize, taken to Philadelphia
and refitted as a privateer by Genet's orders, brought the matter to a
head. Genet was warned that the vessel could not sail; he refused to
give definite assurances that it would not be ordered to sea. Washington
was away at the time, and Knox and Hamilton proposed mounting a battery
of cannon to prevent the sailing of the vessel, a measure strongly
opposed by Jefferson, determined to avoid at all cost measures
tantamount to a declaration of war. The _Little Sarah_ and the
_Democrat_ escaped, and Washington in vehement words manifested his
disapproval of the weakness shown on this occasion. The least the
American Government could do was to ask that Genet be recalled, and it
was so decided at a meeting of the Cabinet on August 3. In a long letter
intended for the French Government, but sent to Gouverneur Morris and
communicated to Genet himself, Jefferson drew up a terrible indictment
of the French minister. Hamilton and Knox were decidedly in favor of
stronger measures and of deciding then and there upon the "_renvoi_" of
Genet. Jefferson, following his constant policy, was against a measure
that could be construed as the recognition that a state of war existed
between the two countries. This has been sometimes interpreted as
evincing partiality to France on his part, but entries in the "Anas"
under August 20 and August 23 demonstrate beyond any doubt that he was
also guided by his uppermost desire to promote the interests of his
country.

There was at least some reason to believe that Genet's conduct would not
receive the support of his Government, and on the other hand he had
brought over with him certain proposals worth considering for a treaty
referring to the commerce with the West Indies. Although the Cabinet had
never considered the question formally, Jefferson estimated the matter
of such importance that he had taken it upon himself to discuss it with
Genet in several conversations. To leave the friendly overtures of the
French Republic without any answer would not only be insulting but
highly unpolitic, since the Executive might be accused "of neglecting
the interests of the United States." Under these circumstances some
means had to be found of sparing the feelings of the French Government,
so as not to lose entirely the chances of concluding a treaty so
advantageous to the United States. As Secretary of State, Jefferson had
to find a satisfactory formula. This was to ask the French Government to
recall Genet, but at the same time to appoint his successor and to renew
to this successor the powers granted originally to Genet. Such was the
tenor of his letter to Morris, a very clever solution to a very
difficult situation. As for Genet himself, he was to be tolerated until
the arrival of his successor.

Unfortunately the "citizen" did not know how to keep quiet or when to
quit. Not a dishonest man in ordinary life, not even an unintelligent
man, he was the greatest bungler ever sent by a friendly nation to
another. When he arrived in May, 1793, he had public opinion largely in
his favor. Members of Congress and of the government, except possibly
Hamilton, were not hostile to France; the French envoy could have
obtained distinct advantages for his country if he had proceeded slowly
and with ordinary caution. Two months later he had succeeded in turning
against himself and against the country he represented the whole of
public opinion, in sowing germs of distrust never to be eradicated, in
fixing and crystallizing all sorts of prejudices and unfavorable
generalizations about France.

Jefferson had made all possible efforts to keep the disaffection of the
American Government toward the French minister as much under cover as
possible. But Citizen Genet threw down the gauntlet by publishing part
of his official correspondence, thus forcing an appeal to the people and
running the risk of arousing the "disgusts" Jefferson had so much wished
to avoid.[303] A week later, he had to admit to Madison that Genet's
conduct "has given room to the enemies of France to come forward in a
style of acrimony against that nation which they never dared to have
done. The disapprobation of the agent mingles with the reprehension of
his nation and gives a toleration to that which it never had
before."[304]

By a strange irony of fate, one of the last acts of Jefferson as
Secretary of State was a final protest against Genet's attitude. Six
months before he had been notified that he could not be received by the
Executive and that all communications from him had to be made in
writing. Deciding to appeal to Congress over the head of the President,
Genet had copies of his instructions printed, demanding that they should
be laid before both houses. A more stupid and childish step could hardly
be imagined. Jefferson, requested by the President to draw up an answer
to Genet, wrote at first a scathing denunciation of the French minister
which was probably thought too strong, for it is marked "not inserted"
on the manuscript:[305]

  The terms in which you permit yourself in this and some other of your
  letters to speak of the President of the U. S., and the influence and
  impressions you venture to ascribe to him, are calculated to excite
  sentiments which need no explanation. On what grounds of truth they
  are hazarded, how to reconcile them to decorum, to the respect due to
  the person and character of our chief magistrate, and to the nation
  over which he presides and that too from the representative of a
  friendly people, are questions left to your mature reflection.

The letter which was finally sent, more moderate in its terms, was
nevertheless a formal reminder of diplomatic proprieties:

  Your functions as the missionary of a foreign mission here, are
  confined to the transactions of the affairs of your nation with the
  Executive of the United States; that the communications, which are to
  pass between the Executive and Legislative branches, cannot be a
  subject for your interference, and that the President must be left to
  judge for himself what matters his duty or the public good may
  require him to propose to the deliberations of Congress. I have
  therefore the honor of returning you the copies sent for
  distribution.[306]

That very same day Jefferson resigned his office into the hands of
Washington, assuring him that in his retirement he was taking with him
"a lively sense of the President's goodness, and would continue
gratefully to remember it."[307]




CHAPTER III

MONTICELLO--AGRICULTURE AND POLITICS


When Jefferson left Philadelphia for what he sincerely believed would be
definite retirement from the field of politics, he felt weary, tired,
and already old. He had transacted all the business of his office with a
minimum of clerical assistance, attending himself to all the details not
only of foreign but also of domestic affairs, sometimes translating
documents which he did not trust Freneau with, preparing reports for the
President, digging in his manuals of international law, Wolfe,
Puffendorff, Vatel, and Grotius. The actual labor was enormous, the
variety of subjects amazing; many times during the course of a day he
had to shift from one subject to another. Under fire all the time,
harassed by the Federalist papers, consulted by the leaders of the party
which was beginning to form, he had not broken down under the strain,
but was in urgent need of complete rest and agricultural quietude. He
had packed books and furniture in advance and sent everything to
Monticello; his letter to Genet written, he set out for Virginia without
even waiting for the justification that would result from the order to
publish his correspondence with the French minister.

At that time a vague idea that he could turn a new leaf and start a new
life may fugitively have crossed his mind. He had respectfully but
profoundly admired Madame de Corny when he was in Paris. News from her
had come through Mrs. Church; Mr. de Corny had died; Madame de Corny
left a widow in very limited circumstances had retired to Rouen.[308]
It seems that he entertained the hope that she might decide to move to
America and in that case he would have liked to see her at Monticello:
"Madame de Cosway is in a convent ... that she would have rather sought
the mountain-top. How happy should I be that it were _mine_, that you,
she, and Madame de Corny would seek." But he had seen too many of these
brilliant French women in Philadelphia to believe that a Parisian could
ever become accustomed to the simplicity of Monticello and to its lack
of entertainments, and he made the suggestion very timidly: "I know of
no country where the remains of a fortune could place her so much at her
ease as this, and where public esteem is so much attached to worth,
regardless of wealth; our manners & the state of society here are so
different from those to which her habits have been formed, that she
would lose more perhaps in that scale." After all, he had not changed so
much since he had declared his flame to Belinda, almost in the same
terms, twenty years earlier. This was the typical Jeffersonian way of
presenting his own wishes, of letting the others decide after he had
stated the pros and cons; clearly he was not made to win personal
triumphs, either in love or in politics.

Of politics he was utterly sick. He pictured himself spending the rest
of his days in bucolic occupations. "The length of my tether is now
fixed for life from Monticello to Richmond," he wrote to Gates. "My
private business can never call me elsewhere, and certainly politics
will not, which I have ever hated both in theory and practice."[309]

Writing to Mrs. Church, he had gone into more details.

  I am to be liberated from the hated occupations of politics retire
  into the bosom of my family, my farm, & my books. I have my house to
  build, my family to form, and to watch for the happiness of those who
  labor for mine. I have one daughter married to a man of science,
  sense, virtue and competence; in whom indeed I have nothing more to
  wish. They live with me. If the other shall be as fortunate in the
  process of time, I shall imagine myself as blessed as the most
  blessed of the patriarchs.[310]

At Monticello he found Martha and her husband, Thomas Mann Randolph, and
induced the young couple to stay with him. Maria was now a tall girl,
vivacious and witty, who would soon find a suitor. Devoting himself
entirely to his family and domestic cares, Jefferson plunged into the
reorganization of his estate left to an overseer for more than ten
years, and granted so little attention to politics that he did not even
subscribe to any newspaper, being quite content with those published at
Richmond. "I think it is Montaigne who has said that ignorance is the
softest pillow on which a man can rest his head," he wrote to Edmund
Randolph. "I am sure it is true as to everything political, and shall
endeavor to estrange myself to everything of that character."[311] Since
that time there have been in American politics many instances of
politicians who left for a hunting party, or retired to their farms in
order to avoid responsibility. This was not the attitude of Jefferson;
his was no temporary retirement while waiting for the storm to blow
itself over. Had he chosen to remain in Philadelphia, as he had been
asked to do by Washington, he would have at least checked Hamilton's
personal influence and counterbalanced in Washington's mind the advice
and counsels of his enemy. His party had been reorganized and the
republicans had just obtained a majority in the new Congress, but his
principles were far from being secure. He indicated it himself in the
same letter to Randolph when he wrote:

  I indulge myself on one political topic only, that is, in declaring
  to my countrymen the shameless corruption of a portion of the
  Representatives to the first and second Congresses, and their
  implicit devotion to the Treasury. I think I do good in this, because
  it may produce exertions to reform the evil on the success of which
  the form of the government is to depend.

Shortly after coming back to Monticello, he discovered, somewhat to his
dismay, that the rank and file of the good people of the country did not
pay much attention to the political battle which was still raging in
Philadelphia. He went to "court" at Charlottesville at the beginning of
February and was amazed to find that his neighbors had not heard of
Madison's speeches in Congress or even of the recall of Genet.

  I could not have supposed--he wrote to Madison--when at Philadelphia
  that so little of what was passing there could be known even at
  Kentucky as is the case here. Judging from this of the rest of the
  Union, it is evident to me that the people are not in a condition
  either to approve or disapprove of their government, nor consequently
  to influence it.[312]

This would tend to give confirmation to the supposition I timidly
ventured in the last chapter. Neither the inflammatory speeches made in
Congress, nor the foundation of democratic clubs, nor the newspaper
battle between different editors had been able to rouse the people of
the country. In America, as in every other country, the rural
population, at that time the majority of the population, remained
passive and took little interest in discussions that did not immediately
affect their interests. Then, too, as in our days, the press was able to
modify and to influence to some extent public opinion, but did not
express it. Editors were years in advance of the slow-moving masses in
their prognostications. It takes a national emergency, a violent crisis
or a well-organized political machine to coalesce the great majority of
a people and force them to see beyond the limited horizon of their
village, their county or their State. This is so even now, and it was
certainly so a century and a half ago, when the parochial and provincial
spirit was still stronger than the national spirit.

Since this was realized by Jefferson, it is difficult to understand how
he did not come to the conclusion that his clear duty was to go back to
Philadelphia and do his utmost to educate an apathetic people. But he
was not the man to enjoy strife and struggle; he was too sensitive of
personal criticism and attacks, too timid also to care to exchange blows
with an opponent. He was the type of man who likes to play chess by
correspondence, to suggest solutions, but not the one "to knead the
dough", as the French say, and to take an active part in the daily game
of politics.

From his retirement he found time to answer letters from Madison and
Monroe. Before leaving Philadelphia, he had transmitted to the House of
Representatives a Report on the Privileges and Restrictions of the
Commerce of the United States.[313] It was incumbent upon Madison to
draw from it specific recommendations. Jefferson pointed out in a
dispassionate way the obstacles put by Great Britain to the growth of
American commerce, her lack of reciprocal treatment, her prohibitions
and restrictions. He ended by indicating that France had, of her own
accord, proposed negotiations for improving the commercial relations
between the two countries by a new treaty on fair and equal principles;
that her internal disturbances alone had prevented her from doing it,
though the government had repeatedly manifested reassuring dispositions.
On the contrary, "in spite of friendly advances and arrangements
proposed to Great Britain, they being already on as good a footing in
law, and a better in fact, than the most favored nation, they have not,
as yet, discovered any disposition to have it meddled with." As a
remedy, pending the conclusion of treaties, Jefferson laid down five
principles to protect American commerce and retaliate in so far as would
not hurt the interests of the American people, although at the beginning
trade might suffer from it. A storm broke out in Congress, and once
more Jefferson became the target of the Federalists.

He was not uninformed of these developments, for Madison and Monroe sent
him several letters at short intervals at the beginning of March; nor
did he leave his lieutenants without directions. He still hoped that a
war could be avoided; but he could not conceive that it would be
possible in any event to let Great Britain seize the French West Indies:
"I have no doubt that we ought to interpose at a proper time, and
declare both to France and England that these islands are to rest with
France, and that we will make a common cause with the latter for that
object." Having thus outlined these policies, he relapsed into his
ataraxy, affirming that he had not seen a Philadelphia paper until he
had received those inclosed by Madison. The patience of Monroe must have
been taxed to the breaking point when, after sending to his chief a long
letter full of detailed information, he received in answer an equally
long letter replete with agricultural disquisitions--"on such things as
you are too little of a farmer to take much interest in."[314]

The supposed leader of the Republicans was not more encouraging in his
letters to Madison when he wrote a month later: "I feel myself so
thoroughly weaned from the interest I took in the proceedings there,
while there, that I have never a wish to see one [a newspaper], and
believe that I shall never take another paper of any sort. I find my
mind totally absorbed by my rural occupation."[315] Yet the old fame
flared up occasionally, as when he learned that Hamilton was being
considered to succeed Pinckney who would be recalled from England: "a
more degrading measure could not have been proposed," he wrote to
Monroe. In regard to Hamilton, he foresaw an investigation on the
Treasury and had wanted to withdraw before it took place.[316]

But he fell back into the same detached attitude of mind, when he wrote
to Washington the next day: "I return to farming with an ardor which I
scarcely knew in my youth, and which has got the better entirely of my
love of study. Instead of writing ten or twelve letters a day, which I
have been in the habit of doing as a thing of course, I put off
answering my letters now, farmer-like, till a rainy day."

As a matter of fact, I doubt very much whether he had reached any such
equanimity. For if he was unwilling to reënter public life, he was not
averse to giving his opinion and advice in critical circumstances. While
Madison's resolutions were still before Congress, news arrived in
Philadelphia of the seizure of American ships in the Caribbean, under
the Order in Council of November 6. Indignation was running high and
democratic societies held patriotic meetings throughout the country. War
seemed imminent, and although Jefferson preferred to contemplate the
tranquil growth "of his lucern and potatoes", he still felt indignant
when thinking "of these scoundrels" (the British). Yet he believed that
war should be avoided and wrote to that effect to Tench Coxe:

  We are alarmed here with the apprehension of war; and sincerely
  anxious that it may be avoided; but not at the expense either of our
  faith or honour.... As to myself I love peace, and I am anxious that
  we should give the world still another useful lesson, by showing to
  them other modes of punishing injuries than by war, which is as much
  a punishment to the punisher as to the sufferers.[317]

To Washington he wrote two weeks later a most amusing letter, starting
with a dissertation on crop rotation and "a certain essence of dung, one
pint of which would manure an acre according to Lord Kaims", but not
forgetting, in a negligent way, to slip in at the end a piece of
political advice: "to try to extricate ourselves from the event of a
war; at the same time to try to rouse public opinion in Great Britain
and the only way to do it being to distress their commerce." But he
added once more, "I cherish tranquillity too much to suffer political
things to enter my mind at all."[318] This was nothing but the
non-intercourse policy then debated by the government and of which
Jefferson had evidently heard. When his letter reached the President, a
solution had already been adopted and Jay had sailed for England on the
mission which was to end with his signing the famous or infamous treaty.
The summer went on without any new letter from Jefferson. A letter of
the Secretary of State, asking him whether he would not consider lending
a hand to the President in the present emergency, found him in bed
"under a paroxysm of rheumatism which had kept him for ten days in
constant torment." Then he emphatically added,

  No circumstance will evermore tempt me to engage in any thing
  public.... It is a great pleasure to me to retain the esteem and
  approbation of the President, and this forms the only ground of any
  reluctance at being unable to comply with every wish of his. Pray
  convey these sentiments, and a thousand more to him, which my
  situation does not permit me to go into.[319]

This was the very time when the Whisky Boys of Eastern Pennsylvania
revolted against the excise laws of Hamilton which fell on them harder
than on any other part of the rural population, for they could not
market their grain for lack of transportation facilities and their only
means of living was distilling it into whisky. Individual acts of
resistance to the agents of the excise culminated in August, 1794, in an
armed convention denouncing the law and defying the government on
Braddock field, under the leadership of the chief expert of the
Jeffersonians, Albert Gallatin. Not only was the militia called but the
President and Hamilton went to visit the camp at Carlisle. The
insurrection ended without bloodshed, but the side of the
insurrectionists was taken up in the large cities by the Democratic
societies in which the Irish element was largely represented--hot-headed
people, recently come from an oppressed land, who felt an ingrained
spirit of revolt against soldiers and men in uniform,--until dressed in
a uniform themselves. The immediate effect of the Hamiltonian policy was
to amalgamate rural population and urban groups of mechanics and small
operatives in a hostile attitude towards the aristocratic government.
Hamilton thought the time had come to crush the vanguard of the
Jeffersonian troops, and Washington, who had an inveterate hatred of
anything smacking of disorder and mob rule, lent a favorable ear. He
wrote a stinging denunciation of the Democratic societies in his yearly
message to Congress.

This time Jefferson was aroused, although personally he had never had
anything to do with Tammany in New York nor any of the Democratic
societies in Philadelphia. He fairly exploded in a letter to James
Madison: the denunciation of the Democratic societies was "one of the
extraordinary acts of boldness of which we have seen so many from the
faction of monocrats." How could one condemn the Democratic societies
and let alone the Society of the Cincinnati, "a self-created one,
carving out for itself hereditary distinctions, lowering over our
Constitution eternally." It was an inexcusable aggression. With regard
to the transactions against the excise law, he refused to take seriously
the "meeting of Braddock field", and ridiculed the mobilizing of an army
against men who were not thinking seriously of separating, "simply
consulting about it."--"But to consult on a question does not amount to
a determination of that question in the affirmative, still less to the
acting _on such determination_," he advised. A fine legal distinction
which Jefferson forgot at the time of the Burr conspiracy! But "the
first and only cause of the whole trouble was the infernal excise law."
The first error was "to admit it by the Constitution"; the second, to
act on that admission; the third and last will be to "make it the
instrument of dismembering the Union." In conclusion he advised Madison
to stay at his post, "to take the front of the battle" for Jefferson's
own security, and once again he reaffirmed that he would not give up his
retirement for the empire of the universe.[320]

On April 23, 1795, he wrote to James Madison to refuse categorically any
resumption of office high or low. That was already his firm resolution
when he had left Philadelphia and it was even stronger then, since his
health had broken down during the last eight months: "My age requires
that I should place my affairs in a clear state. The question is forever
closed with me." To propose his name would only mean a division of votes
in the party and that was to be avoided before everything.[321] To Giles
he repeated that his days "were busy with now and then a pious
ejaculation for the French and Dutch, returning with due despatch to my
clover, potatoes, wheat, etc."[322] In the meantime Jay had returned
with the treaty surrendering practically all the claims of the United
States, placing the country in a position of constant inferiority with
reference to England, opening the Mississippi to the British trade and
forbidding American vessels to carry molasses, sugar, and cotton to any
ports except their own. It was laid in special session before the Senate
on June 8, ratified on June 24, and sent to the President without the
contents being known to any one. It would have remained secret if
Thomson Mason of Virginia had not taken a copy of it to Bache, who
published it the next day in the _Aurora_. It was a most humiliating and
scarcely defensible transaction: Jay had been outgeneraled at every step
by Grenville and, in a way, betrayed by Hamilton. But although it was
distinctly a Federalist victory, it offered good campaign material for
the Republicans.[323]

On August 30, Jefferson sent to Thomas Mann a sort of apologia, telling
him how, "while all hands were below deck, every one at his own business
and the captain in his cabin attending to the log book a rogue of a
pilot had run the ship into an enemy's port." Not that he wanted to
express any opinion of his own but, "metaphor apart, there is much
dissatisfaction with Mr. Jay and his treaty.... For my part, I consider
myself now but as a passenger leaving the world and its government to
those who are likely to live longer in it."[324]

With H. Tazewell he was more outspoken: a glance at the treaty had been
enough to convince him that the United States would be much better
without any treaty than with a treaty of that sort. "Acquiescence under
insult is not the way to escape war," and he could only hope that the
Executive's sense of public honor and spirit would be awakened. To
Madison he gave the benefit of his advice. There was no leader in the
camp of the Republicans to take advantage of the situation; rioting in
the streets could not influence favorably the judgment of Washington,
who had not yet signed, and there was always Hamilton, who had retired
to be sure, but was "a host in himself"; the Federalists were in a
defile, but "too much security will give time to his talents and
indefatigableness to extricate them." He ended with an appeal to
Madison: "We have had only middling performances to oppose to him. In
truth, when he comes forward, there is nobody but yourself who can meet
him.... For God's sake take your pen, and give a fundamental reply to
Curtius and Camillus."[325]

With real perspicacity Jefferson had put his finger on the fundamental
weakness of the Republicans. They were only the yeomanry; they counted
a number of very honest and distinguished men; some of them were even
brilliant in debates and could flatter themselves that they were
victorious, as long as the Federalist chieftain did not appear in person
on the battlefield. When he did, however, they had no outstanding man
with the same capacity for work, the same ability to marshal facts, to
present cogent arguments and to use biting sarcasm. Jefferson alone,
with his great felicity of expression and his mastery of style, could
have opposed successfully the Federalist leader, but, as he wrote to
Rutledge: "after five and twenty years' continual employment (in the
service of our country), I trust it will be thought I have fulfilled my
tour, like a punctual soldier and may claim my discharge."[326]

That he would have been a redoubtable opponent, had he chosen to be so,
appears in a letter he sent at the time to William B. Giles. The treaty
once ratified by the Senate and signed by the President, it was thought
that the House, on which fell the duty of making the necessary
appropriations for the enforcement of the different articles, might
possibly pass in their turn on the merits of the document. Randolph had
been requested by the President to give his opinion on the subject and
did it in one of those written consultations which Jefferson had so
often been asked to prepare himself, when in the official family of
Washington. To Giles, who was to attack the treaty in the House with
Gallatin and Madison, Jefferson sent an elaborate and cruel dissection
of Randolph's opinion:

  The fact is that he has generally given his principles to one party,
  and his practice to the other, the oyster to one, the shell to the
  other.... On the precedent now to be set will depend the future
  construction of our Constitution, and whether the powers of
  legislation shall be transferred from the President, Senate, and
  House of Representatives to the President and Senate, and Piamingo
  or any other Indian, Algerine, or other chief.[327]

Clearly he was getting back into his stride and when thoroughly aroused,
as he had been once or twice in his career, he could also hit back or
rather pierce with rapid thrust of the rapier. And yet he was not really
thinking of reëntering the arena, for at the same time he was offering
to George Wythe to superintend an edition of the laws of Virginia, of
which he had made as complete a collection as he could, "either the
manuscripts crumbling into dust or printed."[328] Yet he had an eye upon
the budding geniuses of the Democratic party. Soon he realized the value
of Albert Gallatin, who had undertaken a thorough analysis and
demolition of Hamilton's administration:

  Hamilton's object from the beginning was to throw them into forms
  which would be utterly undecypherable.... If Mr. Gallatin would
  undertake to reduce this chaos to order, present us with a clear view
  of our finances, and put them in a form as simple as they will admit,
  he will merit an immortal honor. The accounts of the United States
  ought to be, and may be made as simple as those of a common farmer,
  and capable of being understood by common farmers.[329]

With such sentences, simple and easily remembered, such felicity of
expression and of thought, one can make a lasting impression on the
people, without addressing directly the Indians of Tammany Hall or
participating in whisky riots. One can also throw suspicion of
intentional dishonesty on one's adversaries, coin mottoes which,
repeated in a political campaign, fix themselves easily in the
unsophisticated minds of the common people. But it does not ensue
necessarily that Jefferson was an arch plotter, pulling the strings and
laying plots to explode years later. He was quite sincere in his dislike
of Hamilton's budgets, for the simple reason that he did not understand
them himself. The master financier and expert was beyond Jefferson's
comprehension; in many respects he was even far ahead of his own time,
while Jefferson, in matters of finance at least, remained all his life
an eighteenth-century man. But the young Swiss-American who had made his
mark in the whisky insurrection must have felt himself elated at
Jefferson's approval. By such appropriate compliments and
encouragements, great tacticians create and foster party and personal
loyalty, and Jefferson was a past master in this difficult art.

As he had encouraged Gallatin, he encouraged Giles, kept in touch with
him and through him sent a word of congratulation to a new Republican
recruit, Doctor Leib: "I know not when I have received greater
satisfaction than on reading the speech of Doctor Leib in the
Pennsylvania Assembly. He calls himself a new member. I congratulate
honest republicanism on such an acquisition, and promise myself much
from a career which begins on such elevated ground."[330] He reminded
him that Democratic societies were proscribed in England and that it
would be interesting to know the terms of the bill proposed by Pitt
against them. Gallatin again called for his commendation for a speech
printed in Bache's _Aurora_, the sole organ of the Republicans since
Freneau had discontinued his _Gazette_: "It is worthy of being printed
at the end of the _Federalist_, as the only rational commentary on the
part of the law to which it relates."[331] Then Jefferson raved over the
indignities heaped upon the country by the treaty, over the point made
by the Federalists that the House had nothing to say in the matter, and
in his fury he even went so far as to treat Washington more severely
than he had ever done before. "Curse on his virtues," he exclaimed;
"they have undone his country." This political advice was naturally
buried under rural news: "Mercury at twenty degrees in the morning.
Corn fallen at Richmond to twenty shillings." But this bucolic note
stopped short and the political thermometer was consulted again and
indicated that "Nicholas was sure of his election, R. Joue and Jo.
Monroe, in competition for the other vote of the county."

Three weeks later Jefferson dug in his files to send Madison more
ammunition, showing clearly that, at least in one case, Washington
himself had recognized formerly the authority of the legislature, that
is to say both branches of the House, when it came to ratifying the
treaty with the new Emperor of Morocco.[332] Then he wrote to his former
neighbor, Philip Mazzei, a letter which was to cause him more
difficulties than any of the previous acts of his career. He thought
that he could and should give news of the country to this curious
character, who had come to Virginia as a vine-grower to engage in
agricultural experiments but who was also the former agent of the Duke
of Tuscany and of Stanislas of Poland, a Grimm "_au petit pied_", a
literary correspondent and a philosopher. In all fairness to Jefferson a
preliminary remark is here necessary. He was apt in conversation to take
his cue from his interlocutors rather than to force on them any topic,
and he was apt also to speak in the same tone and same diapason. In his
letters he instinctively yielded to the same tendency, changing his tone
and style according to his correspondent. Writing to an Italian he
adopted a flowery, metaphoric, and emphatic manner not often found in
his letters, and in his desire to flatter the Tuscan ear of his friend,
he overshot the mark and overemphasized what he would have stated much
more moderately to an American:

  Against us are the Executive, the Judiciary, two out of three
  branches of the Legislature, all the officers of the government, all
  who want to be officers, all timed men who prefer the calm of
  despotism to the boisterous sea of liberty.... It would give you a
  fever were I to name to you the apostates who have gone over to
  these heresies, men who were Samsons in the field and Solomons in
  the council, but who have had their heads shorn by the harlot
  England....

But these men had not realized the great strength of the party then
coming into being: "We have only to awake and snap the Lilliputian cords
with which they have been entangling us during the first sleep which
succeeded our labors." Then came the customary mention of his health,
even more mournful than usual: "I begin to feel the effects of age. My
health has suddenly broken down, with symptoms which give me to believe
that I shall not have much to encounter of the _tedium vitae_."[333]
Little did he believe when he indulged in this rhetorical outburst that
Mazzei would give the letter to an Italian paper, that it would be
translated from the Italian into French, from French into English and
finally appear in America.

For Jefferson was eager to remain on good personal terms with
Washington, even if he strongly disapproved of his policies, and this
appeared when a few months later he denied having communicated to
Bache's _Aurora_ the questionnaire on the _Little Sarah_, and he seized
the occasion to assure Washington once again of his affectionate
sentiments. But he was already thinking of protecting himself, for in
the same letter he asked the President to send him copies of the
opinions presented by Hamilton and Randolph as "they had his opinion and
he never had been able to obtain copy of theirs." And significantly he
added, "Though I do not know that it will ever be of the least
importance to me, yet one loves to possess arms, though they hope never
to have occasion for them."[334]

The summer was apparently entirely occupied in agricultural and
scientific pursuits. La Rochefoucauld-Liancourt, the former president of
the National Assembly, at whose house Jefferson used to visit when in
Paris to meet the "_républicains_", was then traveling through the
United States and stopped at Monticello for a week. The Duke has left us
a most valuable description of Jefferson's establishment and the country
around it. He praised the house "which will deserve when completed to be
ranked with the most pleasant mansions in France and in Europe." He
admired the view from the hill: for "Mr. Jefferson's house commands one
of the most extensive prospects you can meet with." But his eye was that
of a refined and overcivilized Frenchman of the eighteenth century
accustomed to limited horizons, limited forests, to a certain balance
between the woods, the rivers and the lands inclosed with hedges, to a
nature stamped, modified, remolded by centuries of human labor. The
contrast between the "moderate French landscapes" and the unlimited
vistas in which plowed fields occupied a negligible space, impressed him
almost painfully.

[Illustration: MONTICELLO AS IT APPEARS TO-DAY

_Copyright Harris and Ewing, Washington, D. C._]

It was a magnificent view, but too vast; and rather than look at the
scene as it presented itself, he preferred to call on fancy "to picture
to us those plains and mountains such as population and culture will
render them in a greater or smaller number of years." He looked with
some suspicion at the numerous agricultural experiments of Jefferson,
who seemed "to have derived his knowledge from books." He was not alone
in this opinion. In any farming country, innovations are looked upon
askance and we are not surprised to learn that "his system is entirely
confined to himself; it is censured by some of his neighbours, who are
also employed in improving their culture with ability and skill, but he
adheres to it, and thinks it founded on just observation." Finally came
the picture of the master himself and life at Monticello, worth
preserving and reproducing.

  In private life, Mr. Jefferson displays a mild, easy and obliging
  temper, though he is somewhat cold and reserved. His conversation is
  the most agreeable kind, and he possesses a stock of information not
  inferior to that of any other man. In Europe he would hold a
  distinguished rank among men of letters, and as such he has already
  appeared there; at present he is employed with activity and
  perseverance in the management of his farms and buildings; and he
  orders, directs and pursues in the minutest detail every branch of
  business relative to them. I found him in the midst of the harvest,
  from which the scorching heat of the sun does not prevent his
  attendance. His negroes are clothed, and treated as well as white
  servants could be. As he cannot expect any assistance from the two
  small neighboring towns, every article is made on his farm; his
  negroes are cabinet-makers, carpenters, masons, bricklayers, smiths,
  etc. The children he employs in a nail factory, which yields already
  a considerable profit. The young and old negresses spin for the
  clothing of the rest. He animates them by rewards and distinctions;
  in fine, his superior mind directs the management of his domestic
  concerns with the same abilities, activity, and regularity which he
  evinced in the conduct of public affairs, and which he is calculated
  to display in every situation of life. In the superintendence of the
  household he is assisted by his two daughters, Mrs. Randolph and Miss
  Maria, who are handsome, modest, and amiable women. They have been
  educated in France.

It is pleasant to have the direct testimony of a foreigner and a
philosopher on the way Jefferson treated his slaves. But how can we
believe that a man who could supervise all the details of the
agricultural and industrial life around Monticello and endure the
harvest sun was absolutely broken down in health? If he had ever been,
Jefferson certainly was picking up. It seems probable that he did not
discuss politics with the noble traveler. Perhaps he heard another
recital of the excesses of the French Revolution,--a painful subject and
one that did not serve any purpose; far better was it to exchange views
on crop rotation, sheep raising, dung and manure, clover and potatoes
and to demonstrate the new plow he had invented with a mold board of
least resistance, which was to bring him some years later the "_grande
médaille_" of the Agricultural Society of Paris.[335]

The first mention of the coming presidential election occurs in a letter
to Monroe of July 10, 1796. The treaty had finally passed, but the party
of the monocrats was shaken to its very foundation, "Mr. Jay and his
advocates are treaty-foundered." The result was not doubtful. Even if a
monocrat were elected, he would be overborne by the republican sense of
his constituents. "If a republican, he will, of course, give fair play
to that sense and lead things into the channel of harmony between the
governors and the governed. In the meantime, patience!" He mentions that
in order to operate a division and to split the Virginia vote, _they_
had unsuccessfully endeavored to run Patrick Henry for vice president
and would probably fall back on Pinckney, "in which they regard his
southern position rather than his principles." But curiously enough the
presidential nominees or preferences are not even mentioned. Could
Monroe really believe that _Hamlet_ was going to be played without
Hamlet, and that the election of a vice president was the only thing
that mattered? This omission was far more significant than any expressed
preference. If Jefferson mentioned no candidates, it was simply because
he already knew at that date that his faithful lieutenants in Congress
were thinking of him as the only logical candidate, the only one who had
not participated actively in the last three years' fierce debates in
Congress, the only one who had not officially and openly taken a
definite position, and consequently would be entirely free to make
whatever concessions were necessary to reëstablish harmony in the
divided camps of the voters. The result of the election was certainly in
doubt; but at a time when foreign affairs were the dominant question,
when in spite of the Jay treaty England was multiplying almost
unbearable insults, when the nation was deeply humiliated, and even the
Federalists resented the terms of the treaty, there were only two men of
the first rank in America who had maintained the prestige of the United
States before foreign nations and had shown themselves to be able
negotiators: the man who with Franklin had put his signature to the
Treaty of Peace, and the man who had concluded treaties of commerce with
the nations of Europe; Adams and Jefferson.

A strange campaign it was, in which the champion of the Republicans
seemed to remain completely silent. The middle of December came, and
Jefferson had not yet manifested any desire to run, nor had he made any
declaration concerning his program. He had to come out however when, on
the night of the sixteenth, he received a letter from Madison informing
him that there was no longer any doubt about the logical choice of the
Republicans and that Madison would decline to be candidate. Jefferson
took up his pen at once to define his position to his friend. He hoped
that Adams would be elected; and in that case he would be satisfied with
the second place although he would prefer the third, that is, his
rejection, since he would be free to remain at home. It was desirable,
however, in case of a tie, that Madison be instructed to request on his
behalf that Mr. Adams should be preferred. Some of the reasons he gave
were highly honorable, the best being that Mr. Adams was his senior and
had always "ranked" him in public life, either in France or in America.
Other reasons he did not indicate: one was evidently that the situation
had never worn so gloomy an aspect since the year 1783 and that
Jefferson did not believe he could steer clear of the present
difficulties.[336]

Ten days later he wrote more at length to Rutledge. No news had come
from Philadelphia, but he protested that he had no political ambition:
"Before my God, I shall from the bottom of my heart, rejoice at
escaping." Scrutinizing himself, he found that the unmerited abuse he
had been subjected to still rankled; he was convinced that "no man will
ever bring out of that office the reputation which carries him into it."
The honeymoon would be as short in that case as in any other, and its
moments of ecstasy would be ransomed by years of torment and hatred.
Frankly he had no heart for the job. Nor was this a declaration of
philosophical principles, but another instance of his political
foresight, and a simple admission of facts, for not only had Franklin
been bitterly attacked after his death, but Washington himself was not
immune from public abuse, and such would be the fate of Adams.

Jefferson was quite sincere when he declared: "I have no ambition to
govern men; no passion which would lead me to delight to ride in a
storm." In advance, he repeated the _suave mari magno_ of the old poet
and hoped that he would not be elected, his only wish was that the
newspapers would permit him "to plant his corn, beans, peas, etc. in
hills or drills as he pleased, while our eastern friend will be
struggling with the storm which is gathering over us, perhaps be
shipwrecked in it! This is certainly not a moment to covet the helm."
If this was not a sincere and true statement, then language certainly
has been given to man to conceal his thought. If Jefferson was thirsty
for power at that time he was more Machiavellian than Machiavelli
himself. But in spite of the inferences of ill-intentioned historians, I
do not see that there is the slightest ground to doubt Jefferson's
sincerity ... except that he accepted finally the vice presidency, as he
clearly hinted he would if it were offered to him.[337] He ended with a
picturesque and energetic phrase and said in French what he could not
say in English. He had not forgotten the words he had heard in the
streets of Paris and perhaps in some salons after dinner, but certainly
not in the mouth of Madame de Tessé or Madame de Corny: "_Au diable les
bougres!_"

The next day he started writing to John Adams: he had not received any
direct news of the election, but from his own calculations he had every
reason to believe that barring a "trick worthy of your arch-friend of
New York, Hamilton", Adams would be elected. In that eventuality he
wished to send his best wishes, and had only one hope to express, that
Adams would be able to avoid the war. A friendly, sincere letter which
Adams never saw. As Jefferson was going to send it, came Madison's
letter of the seventeenth, announcing the complete results of the
election.

It caused a certain amount of surprise to Jefferson; the vote had come
much nearer an equality than he had expected, and, as he wrote a week
later to Volney, "the difference between sixty-eight and seventy-one
votes is little sensible." The presidency would have been decidedly
distasteful to him; the vice presidency was something different and he
could not in his own mind decide whether he "had rather have it or not
have it." Then he went into a curious piece of philosophizing which
marks him as very different from eighteenth-century philosophers and
eighteenth-century optimists. More of a realist in politics than he is
given credit for, he showed himself once more a disciple of Hobbes in
his vision of society:

  I do not recollect in all the animal kingdom a single species but man
  which is eternally and systematically engaged in the destruction of
  its own species. What is called civilization seems to have no other
  effect than to teach him to pursue the principle of _bellum omnium in
  omnia_ on a larger scale, and in place of the little contests of
  tribe against tribe, to engage all quarters of the earth in the same
  work of destruction. When we add to this that as to the other species
  of animals, the lions and tigers are mere lambs compared with men
  alone, that nature has been able to find a sufficient barrier against
  the too great multiplication of other animals and of man himself, an
  equilibrating power against the fecundity of generation. My situation
  points my views chiefly to his wars in the physical world: yours
  perhaps exhibit him as equally warring in the moral one. We both, I
  believe, join in wishing to see him softened.[338]

For the first time Jefferson was going to occupy a position of prestige
in the American Government and to become President of the Senate, second
only to the President, the "heir apparent", as Adams had termed himself
during the preceding administration. Far from rejoicing over the honor,
he expressed his reluctance to attend elaborate ceremonies for the
inauguration, and he did his best to wriggle out of them. He asked
whether it would not be possible for him to be notified of his election
by mail instead of being waited upon by a special delegation from the
Senate; then he looked up the Constitution and decided that he could
just as well take oath of office in Charlottesville as in Philadelphia,
and that it was hardly worth the trouble, since Congress was to adjourn
at once, to undertake the long journey over muddy roads for such an
ordeal. Finally he set out for Philadelphia. He had reëntered public
life for twelve more years and little suspected that it would be so long
before he could come back to dear Monticello and resume his agricultural
experiments.




CHAPTER IV

"THE DICTATES OF REASON AND PURE AMERICANISM"


When Jefferson arrived in Philadelphia to attend the inauguration of the
new President, he had not seen Adams for four years and only
insignificant communications had passed between them, since Madison had
thought it proper to suppress the letter written by Jefferson at the end
of December, not knowing "whether the rather difficult temper of Mr.
Adams would not construe certain passages as a personal criticism."[339]
With Adams, however, the first impulse was often the best. At the time
he felt in a very conciliating mood; he even indulged in the hope that
it would be possible to announce a sort of political armistice and to
bring about a union of the different parties.

The two old friends had a cordial interview. Both of them, years later,
wrote accounts of this historical meeting; though differing in a few
details they agreed as to Adams' intention of burying the hatchet and
beginning anew. He offered to send Jefferson to Paris as special envoy,
insisting that he alone had the confidence of the French and would be
able to bring about an arrangement. Jefferson being both unwilling and
unavailable, Madison's name was mentioned, but nothing was decided as
both knew that Madison had refused such an offer when tendered by
Washington.

In his inaugural address Adams discreetly sounded a note of
reconciliation. He praised the Constitution, declared that it was
"better adapted to the genius, character, situation and relations of
this nation and country than any which had ever been proposed or
suggested"; he added, much to the disgust of the Federalists, that he
did not think of "promoting any alteration in it but such as the people
themselves in the course of their experience should see and feel to be
necessary or expedient"; finally, he seemed to desert the Federalist
camp when he averred that, since he had seen the Constitution for the
first time, "it was not then, nor had been since, any objection to it in
his mind that the Executive and Senate were not more permanent."

Not without good reason had Hamilton failed to show any enthusiasm over
the candidacy of Adams, and the Hamiltonians had some ground for
declaring that the speech "was temporizing" and "was a lure for the
favor of his opponents at the expense of his sincerity." Two days later
Jefferson and Adams attended a dinner offered by Washington to the new
administration. When they left the house they started walking home
together and the name of Madison being mentioned, Adams declared that
objections to the nomination had been raised. The President and the Vice
President had come to Fifth Street, where their roads separated; they
took leave of each other and the subject was never mentioned again. It
was really the parting of the ways after a timid effort toward
reconciliation. Adams in the meantime had called together his Cabinet
and the Cabinet, as he himself admitted afterwards, had proposed to
resign _en bloc_ if he insisted on Madison's nomination.

For the "incongruous portrait gallery" that constituted the Cabinet
inherited by Adams from Washington, we may refer to the vivid picture of
Mr. Bowers: "Ali Baba among his Forty Thieves is no more deserving of
sympathy than John Adams shut up within the seclusion of his Cabinet
room with his official family of secret enemies" may seem to some a
rather severe characterization. The least that can be said, however, is
that it was a Cabinet hand-picked by Hamilton and that neither
Pickering, Wolcott nor McHenry were the best minds Adams could have
chosen in his party. But there again the term party is inaccurate; if
Adams had, in some respect, Federalist tendencies, he was not a party
man or a party leader. The irritable, impulsive, patriotic, peevish old
New Englander was too individualistic to belong to any party; he was not
the man either to rally the hesitating, to uphold the vacillating, or to
encourage and educate the blind. Curiously enough, he has found very few
defenders. Severely treated by the friends of Jefferson, he has not been
spared by the admirers of Hamilton. He stands alone, one of the most
complicated and contradictory figures in American history--a pure
patriot, whose patriotic work is almost forgotten, a catholic spirit who
loved to play with ideas and paradoxes, a contrary mind, but in my
opinion more widely read than any of his American contemporaries, not
excepting Jefferson. A man who spent his life by the side of the severe
and haughty "New England Juno", but who had more ideas in his brain than
any sultan of the Arabian Nights had favorites in his harem.

He had taken the helm at the climax of external difficulties.
Complicated and delicate as were the problems of domestic
administration, they were overshadowed by the difficulties with France.
The misunderstandings, the incidents repeated on both sides, had
accumulated with such an effect that, at the beginning of 1797, war with
France seemed to be almost unavoidable. Though Jefferson had very little
to do with it, it is not out of place to recall the main facts.

Genet had unfortunately his American parallel in Gouverneur Morris. As
witty and devoid of ordinary morals and honesty as Talleyrand himself,
elegant, refined, and corrupt, Gouverneur Morris had been, since his
arrival in Paris, the toast of French aristocrats. His activities in
favor of the king and his partisans were not unknown to the French, and
when Genet was sent to America he had been requested to present
discreetly the situation to the American Government. Genet had made no
official representation, but he discussed Morris' attitude in a private
conversation with Jefferson, and Washington, apprised of the facts, had
seen the necessity of acting.

Monroe, on the contrary, had attempted to resume the Jeffersonian
tradition. A disciple of the former minister, a true Liberal, and
friendly to the French Revolution, he had been enthusiastically received
at once, in spite of the many difficult problems he had to present to
the government. But the Jay treaty had proved a bitter pill to swallow,
and the Directory had made strong representations to the American
minister: America was accused of having violated the treaties of
Alliance and Commerce, and when Monroe was recalled, the Directory not
only refused to receive the successor that had been appointed but even
ordered him to leave the French territory at once.

Without entering into the merits of the question, we may say that
Jefferson was still decidedly for peace, although somewhat doubtful of
Adams' intentions. Shortly after the inauguration he analyzed his
position as follows:

  I sincerely deplore the situation of our affairs with France. War
  with them, and consequent alliance with Great Britain, will
  completely compass the object of the Executive Council, from the
  commencement of the war between France and England; taken up by some
  of them from that moment, by others more latterly. I still, however,
  hope it will be avoided. I do not believe Mr. Adams wishes war with
  France; nor do I believe he will truckle to England as servilely as
  has been done. If he assumes this front at once, and shows that he
  means to attend to self-respect and national dignity with both the
  nations, perhaps the depredations of both on our commerce may be
  amicably arrested. I think we should begin first with those who first
  began with us, and, by an example on them, acquire a right to
  re-demand the respect from which the other party has departed.

An ideal policy, but hardly enforceable with a man of Adams' temperament
and with the Cabinet he had inherited. Immediately after taking oath of
office, Jefferson had repaired to Monticello and was getting acquainted
with his duties as presiding officer of the Senate; in January he asked
his old master George Wythe to send him all possible information on
parliamentary procedure "whether in books or scraps of paper",[340] and
he was working on his "Parliamentary Manual." Early in April news of the
refusal of the Directory to receive Pinckney arrived in Philadelphia,
Adams proclaimed at once a day of fasting and prayer and called an
extraordinary session of Congress for May 15. It was to be feared that a
declaration of war would be the order of the day, for "the President did
not need the assistance of Congress to continue in peace."[341]

As soon as he reached Philadelphia, Jefferson studied the situation and
summed it up in a letter to Elbridge Gerry even before the opening of
Congress. He had already come to the conclusion that a rapprochement
between Adams and himself would prove impossible. There was really no
way to convince Adams that Jefferson had not coveted the first place and
did not nourish some rancor at his alleged failure to obtain it.
Furthermore, it was quite certain that the Hamiltonians would do
everything in their power to poison the mind of the President. This was
most unpleasant but of little import to politics. Jefferson considered
himself part of the legislative and not of the executive, and he had not
even the right to be heard in consultation. It was his duty as well as
his inclination to sit back, without trying to meddle in any way with
the conduct of government.

On the other hand, he had not given up the right of expressing an
opinion as a private citizen on matters of importance to the nation, and
after stating that he had no concern in the present situation, he
launched out on a long _exposé_ of the political situation as he saw it
on the eve of the special session. With reference to foreign relations
his wish and hope was that "we should take our stand on a ground
perfectly neutral and independent towards all nations." This was
particularly true with respect to the English and the French, but more
easily said than done, since the English, not satisfied with equal
treatment, wanted special privileges. Then Jefferson drew up a very
impressive picture of the hold on the United States maintained by Great
Britain through her commerce. Without domestic industries the United
States had to go to England; she was the workshop of America. Goods were
largely transported in English bottoms; British merchants, some of them
fictitiously naturalized, were in every American port and in all the
cities and towns of the interior, occupying strategic positions. The
British also were dominating American banks and American finance and,
through finance, could exert a powerful influence on American political
life. Finally, they were accused of attempting to break the Union by
advocating in their subsidized press a scission between the North and
the South. If difficulties came to such a point that the only way to
avoid a secession was to go to war with Europe, Jefferson, much as he
abhorred war, was willing to become embroiled with Europe. He still
hoped, however, that it would be possible to find some means to keep out
of European quarrels and in the meantime gradually to free America from
all foreign influence, "political, commercial, or in whatever form it
may be attempted."

One might say that this was no original point of view to develop. It was
to a certain extent the policy advocated by Washington in his Farewell
Address. Curiously enough, it was not absolutely remote from Hamilton's
theory, for these two men who, temperamentally, could never come
together, held about the same view of the situation. That England had
the larger share of American commerce and that English manufactures had
a sort of monopoly of the American market had been repeatedly pointed
out by Hamilton. And on this Jefferson agreed completely. If one
objected to that condition, the obvious remedy according to the
Hamiltonian doctrine was, not to take measures to exclude English goods
from the market, but to encourage American manufactures so as to enable
them to compete with imported products. In this Jefferson differed from
Hamilton, but while complaining of the situation, he did not propose any
remedy, except perhaps to protect American inventors and thus stimulate
them to establish new manufacturing plants. One must admit that at this
point he let his "philosophy" interfere with realities.

As a matter of fact, he was thoroughly opposed to the development of
manufacturing plants, to the creation of large industrial cities housing
thousands of salaried workers. As we have said, his vision of America
was a sort of Arcadia where every man would live on his own farm, off
the products of his own land. In some respects it may seem perfectly
absurd, and yet it was very natural and to a certain extent quite
logical. It was purely and simply the extension of the Monticello type
of organization to the whole country. La Rochefoucauld-Liancourt had
been struck by the fact that Monticello was practically a
self-supporting economic unit. Jefferson was raising his own horses and
just enough sheep to provide the wool spun by the women slaves to clothe
the workers and sometimes the masters. On the plantation lived smiths,
carpenters, cabinet makers, brick makers, and layers; some grain was
sold, some nails were manufactured and sold to the neighbors. Selling
comparatively little, buying practically nothing, Jefferson's estate
came as close to being a sort of Robinson Crusoe island as was possible
in a modern country. Thus the Virginia planter had come to develop a
philosophy of society not unlike the ideal society described by Rousseau
in the "Nouvelle Héloise" and more feudal than he himself realized,
since, after all, if serfdom had been abolished, it rested essentially
on slavery. He was unequivocally against great agglomerations, although
he had not visited any of the large industrial cities of England except
London; but at least he knew London and Paris, he had lived in
Philadelphia and New York, and he felt that it was not good for men to
herd too closely together. Work in factories was both unhealthy and
immoral, for in congested centers of population there developed a spirit
of discontent aggravated by the fact that industrial workers, who
generally did not own a particle of land, were footloose, unattached,
and free to move from one city to another at any time; they constituted
a restless and dangerous element. It mattered little that, for the
present, they gave their support to the Republicans and had joined the
Democratic clubs; Jefferson knew too well that they would be easily
influenced in their views by a good orator, by passions of the moment,
and could not be relied upon in an emergency.

It would be easy to point out the close resemblance of certain features
of this ideal of Jefferson with the theories of the Physiocrats. Such a
parallelism, however, can be easily exaggerated and to a great extent is
very misleading. Whether all riches came from the soil, or were the
product of labor in any form, or both, Jefferson did not know and did
not care. He was no more a disciple of Quesnay than of Adam Smith,
simply because he was not an economist but a sociologist. Hamilton, who
was an economist of the first rank, was primarily interested in the
development of production and in the circulation of wealth, and paid
little attention to the social modification that an industrialization of
the country would probably bring about. Jefferson, on the contrary, was
solely interested in protecting and preserving a certain pattern of
civilization which was essentially an agricultural pattern--the only
safe foundation for the political and private virtues of vital
importance in a democracy. Manufactures meant surplus production, which
meant, in turn, the necessity of exporting. If America became a great
industrial nation, she would have, sooner or later, to export her
surplus production and in turn to import many products from Europe. But
if the country maintained extensive trade connections with Europe she
would be necessarily caught in the maze of international politics. Her
commercial interests would clash with the interests of Europe, and this
would ultimately result in wars or at least in a constant threat of war.
It would also mean the building of a strong navy to protect American
commerce, perhaps the establishment of a permanent army; at any rate,
the immediate consequence would be an enormous increase in taxes, the
necessity of resorting to internal taxation, the burden of which would
fall on the backs of the farmers. Numerous tax collectors would have to
be appointed; Federal employees and officials ready to act at the beck
and call of the Government would swarm all over the country. State
rights and individual rights would be restricted and invaded, and
liberty would exist only in name. On the other hand, foreign commerce
was not to be entirely suppressed. Commerce was a natural and desirable
thing with one's neighbors. Geographically the West Indies had closer
connections with America than with Europe, and it was in that direction
that the United States could develop their trade. This was a natural law
and a natural right, and any obstacle put to the natural flow of trade
between the islands and the American continent was unjust and to be
fought persistently.

Such seems to have been at that time the political and social dream of
Jefferson. Like most dreams of the sort it was perfectly logical, even
if impossible to realize. But, as a matter of fact, it was far more
admissible than the ideal he was to propose four years later in his
inaugural address, following the lead of Washington: "peace, commerce
with all nations, entangling alliances with none." He was far more
clear-sighted when he came to the conclusion that America could not
combine political aloofness and commercial and economic relationship.
This formula was a desperate and none too successful attempt to coalesce
two contradictory principles and ideals, and for the last hundred and
thirty years America has been striving to achieve this impossible
program. Such a position has always seemed most absurd and
unintelligible to Europeans, with the result that America has often been
accused of hypocritical conduct in her foreign affairs, and more
indulgent historians have repeatedly confessed their puzzlement and
inability to understand her. The consequences of this incestuous union
of Jeffersonian political aloofness and Hamiltonian industrial and
commercial development are still apparent to-day. They were conspicuous
in the position taken by President Wilson during his first
administration; they reappear again and again in all American
declarations referring to the League of Nations, mandates, and
reparations. One of the first results was necessarily to embroil America
in all European wars and to raise again and again the question of
neutrality.

It is doubtful however whether, even in 1797, Jefferson would have
consented to carry to an extreme the realization of his bucolic dreams.
He knew full well that America had commercial aspirations that could not
be suppressed; all one could do was not to encourage them as Hamilton
wanted to do and, in the meantime, to reduce political connections to a
minimum.

At the end of the short session of Congress in which measures relative
to Europe had been debated, Jefferson wrote to Rutledge: "as to
everything except commerce, we ought to divorce ourselves from them
all." But this system would require "time, temper, wisdom, and
occasional sacrifice of interests; and how far all of these will be
ours, our children may see, but we shall not."[342] Such has been the
hope and the endeavor of America ever since that time; with what success
it is for others to judge.

Adams' speech had been a warlike one. That the Government of the United
States had been insulted by the French Directory was no "matter of
doubt." Pinckney, sent as successor to Monroe, had not been received by
the Government, and Monroe had been informed that the Directory "would
no longer recognize nor receive a minister plenipotentiary from the
United States, until after a reparation of the grievances demanded of
the American Government, and which the French Republic had a right to
expect." Pinckney himself had been notified that his presence in Paris
was illegal and that he could not stay in the country. No wonder that
Adams declared that: "Such attempts ought to be repelled with a decision
which shall convince France and the world that we are not a degraded
people, humiliated under a colonial spirit of fear and sense of
inferiority, fitted to be the miserable instruments of foreign
influence, and regardless of national honor, character and interest."

On May 23 the Senate sent an address to the President, indorsing his
views by a vote of seventeen to eleven. The fight was to take place in
the House and in the newspapers. "Foreign influence is the present and
just object of public hue and cry", wrote Jefferson to Thomas
Pinckney.[343] As always happens when the cry of wolf is raised, "the
most guilty and foremost and loudest in the cry", those who were
denouncing French influence, were to a large extent English
propagandists and not of the best type. But news from France was
infrequent and slight and, at the beginning of June, Jefferson waited
anxiously for the daily arrival of Paine and Monroe from whom he
expected a true account of the situation. Then came the news of
Bonaparte's latest victories and the announcement that the preliminaries
of peace were signed between France and Austria. This was the only thing
which could and did cool the fury of the British faction. "The victories
of the Rhine and Italy, peace with Austria, bankruptcy of England,
mutiny in her fleet, and the King's writing letters recommending
peace"--all that constituted a string of events nothing less than
miraculous.[344]

At this juncture Jefferson made a momentous political move. He wrote a
long letter to Colonel Aaron Burr to take him into his confidence. The
Vice President was beginning to gather up the loose threads: "Some
general view of our situation and prospects, since you left us, may not
be unacceptable. At any rate, it will give me an opportunity of
recalling myself to your memory, and of evidencing my esteem for you."
What could this mean in ordinary language if not that he counted on him
to counterbalance Hamilton's influence in New York and present the views
of the chief to the leaders of the party. First of all he called his
attention to the fact that the Republican party was losing ground in the
House as well as in the Senate, and that the majority was in the hands
of "five or six individuals of no fixed system at all, governed by the
panic or the prowess of the moment, who flap as the breeze blows against
the Republican or the aristocratic bodies."

For the present, the danger of going to war was less disquieting.
Bonaparte's victories had brought many to their senses and some were
complaining that Congress had been called together to do nothing. "The
truth is, there is nothing to do, the idea of war being scouted by the
events of Europe; but this only proves that war was the object for which
we were called." It had been a close call, and France might have
declared war against the United States if the Ancients had not
pronounced against it. "Thus we see two nations who love one another
affectionately, brought by the ill temper of their executive
administrations, to the very brink of a necessity to imbue their hands
in the blood of each other."

But leaving aside all sentimental considerations, Jefferson undertook
to demonstrate that such a war would have, as a result, the immediate
occupation of Louisiana by France, and with Louisiana again a
Gallo-American colony, the danger would indeed be great. Such were "some
of the truths that ought to penetrate into the Eastern States", and Burr
was no doubt intrusted with the mission to preach the true doctrine of
republicanism in his district.[345]

Four days later Jefferson announced with infinite joy to Elbridge Gerry
that he had been appointed to go as envoy extraordinary, jointly with
General Pinckney and Mr. Marshall, to the French Republic. Once more he
insisted upon the necessity of coming to some sort of an arrangement
with Europe. War against England or France could only result in civil
war in America and probably secession. The fate of the United States was
at stake.[346]

Congress was to adjourn on the twenty-eighth of June and Jefferson was
already looking forward to the rural quiet of Monticello, where he could
"exchange the roar and tumult of bulls and bears for the prattle of his
grandchildren and senile rest." His quiet however was disturbed by an
unexpected incident. Early in August he sent an urgent call to Madison
to come to Monticello with Monroe in order to consult with them on an
urgent matter. The letter written to Mazzei the preceding year had come
back, translated from the French, and was used as a political weapon
against Jefferson and the Republicans. Public repudiation of the letter
was impossible, since he had really written it, although the translation
had garbled the meaning of some important sentences. To remain silent
under fire and accept as true the accusations hurled against him was
equally difficult. His friends alone could help him out of the
difficulty. He finally decided to ignore the whole matter as he had
already been advised to do by his Philadelphia friends, but the letter
preyed on his mind and this was not an incident to be easily forgotten.
It was during the summer and fall of that year that certain principles
were definitely crystallized in his mind.

Deploring the fact that both factions had been incensed by political
considerations and political hatred rather than by a true judgment of
the situation and what he had called in a letter to Rutledge "the
dictates of reason and pure Americanism", he then reached for himself
certain conclusions which were to direct his political conduct during
the rest of his career. He was thoroughly sickened by the insults
passing in the press. Men of his own party he could not severely condemn
for this, nor could he take from their hands the weapons used to defeat
the enemy, but he was also loath to approve of their tactics. In
Democratic societies, established in large cities, he placed very little
confidence; they were fighting on his side, at least for the present,
and were vociferous enough; but to a large extent they were made up of
office hunters. They did not and could not constitute a trustworthy
bulwark for Republican institutions. Fortunately events had proved that
there existed in the country a large body of people sincerely attached
to republican principles; these had been slumbering and their leaders
had almost steered the ship into a foreign port, but they could be
enlightened and made to manifest their true sentiments; for all reforms
"must be brought about by the people using their elective rights with
prudence and self-possession, and not suffering themselves to be duped
by treacherous emissaries." "It is the sober sense of our citizens that
we are safely and steadily conducting from monarchy to republicanism,
and it is by the same agency alone that we can be kept from falling
back."[347] As to foreign questions, the fact that their intrusion into
American life had divided the nation against itself proved conclusively
that the only safe course to follow was to sever the last bonds that
connected America with Europe and "to place our foreign connections
under a new and different arrangement."[348] The time had come for
America to proclaim her independence in all foreign matters, for "we owe
gratitude to France, justice to England, subservience to none."

It was in coining these fine political maxims that Jefferson was at his
best. As had happened so often during his life, he refused to be carried
away by popular passions raging in Philadelphia, New York, and Boston.
From the "mountain top" of Monticello he was able to judge
dispassionately the sordid struggles of party politics. He was no party
boss, not even a party leader; if he had any ambition at that time, it
was to become a national leader and the exponent of what he himself had
called in his letter to Rutledge "pure Americanism."

Congress had been called for November 13, but the Vice President felt no
inclination to hurry back to Philadelphia and reënter the scene of
strife. He did not leave until December 4 and found, as he had expected,
that Congress was marking time, waiting for news from Paris. Madison he
kept informed minutely of all the changes that had taken place during
the summer, of the progress of republicanism in Vermont and New York,
and of all the small talk of politics, interesting only as showing how
eagerly Jefferson kept his finger on the pulse of the country. He had an
ulterior motive in sending to Madison papers and pamphlets recently
published in Philadelphia; it was that "the paragraphs in some of these
abominable papers may draw from you now and then a squib." Matters
seemed to be on the mend; the latest official intelligence from Paris
was that the envoys "would find every disposition on the part of the
Government to accommodate with us."[349] The session dragged on.
Jefferson's melancholy statement that the Senate was divided
"twenty-two and ten and will probably forever be", was not helped by
Adams' declaration that:

  No republic can ever be of any duration, without a Senate, and a
  Senate deeply and strongly rooted, strong enough to bear up against
  all popular storms and passions. The only fault in the Constitution
  of our Senate is, that their term of office is not durable enough.
  Hitherto they have done well, but probably they will be forced to
  give way in time.[350]

The only important proposition before Congress was "the bill of foreign
intercourse and the proposition to arm our foreign vessels"; but both
parties seemed to be afraid to press the matter. Everything was in
suspense "as the ensuing month will probably be the most eventful ever
yet seen in modern Europe." If Bonaparte's projected invasion of England
succeeded the tables would turn; in the meantime the official ball given
on Washington's birthday offered to Philadelphia society a pretext for
engaging in hot controversies. Business was bad and bankruptcies
multiplying. Congress was thinking of appropriating some money for
national defense so as to furnish convoys to vessels going to Europe and
to provide for the protection of smaller vessels of the coast trade.
Adams had decided to reorganize his Cabinet. Wolcott would remain in
office, but it seemed that McHenry was to go and Pickering was very
doubtful whether he would stay.[351]

Meanwhile dispatches from the American envoys had arrived; they were
being deciphered and the President hesitated upon the advisability of
communicating them in full to Congress. Then, on the nineteenth, came
Adams' message declaring that "it was incumbent on him to declare that
he perceived no ground of expectation that the objects of their mission
could be accomplished on terms compatible with the safety, honor, or the
essential interest of the Nation."

On the twenty-first Jefferson wrote to Madison that "a great change has
taken place in the appearance of our political atmosphere"; the "insane
message" had had great effect but there was still a possibility that, if
all members were present, the war measures would be defeated by one
voice in the House. What was to be done in that case? The only possible
solution was to make a bid for time and wait for the results of
Bonaparte's expedition against Great Britain. Jefferson's plan therefore
was to propose an adjournment of Congress "in order to go home and
consult their constituents on the great crisis of American affairs now
existing." "To gain time is everything with us." In this letter
Jefferson made one of his few material errors, so strange on the part of
a man in his position, and hardly to be explained unless we suppose that
the wish was father to the thought. "We relied," he said, "with great
security on that provision which requires two-thirds of the Legislature
to declare war. But this is completely eluded by a majority's taking
such measures as will be sure to produce war." Certainly there was no
such article in the Constitution, unless Jefferson in his excitement
interpreted the ratification of treaties by two-thirds of the Senate to
imply also that a declaration of war should have such a majority.[352] A
week later he was convinced that "the question of war and peace depends
now on a toss of cross and pile. If we could gain but one season we
should be saved."[353] It was to these Fabian tactics that the
Republicans were to bend all their efforts in order to avoid a formal
declaration of war.

In the meantime the dispatches of the envoys were made public and the
famous X.Y.Z. case came to light. Debate was hot in Congress on the
Sprigg resolution declaring that "under existing conditions it is not
expedient for the United States to resort to war against the French
republic."[354] Adams then decided to communicate the letters from
Paris.

No more terrible blow could have been inflicted upon the friends of
peace. Jefferson heard the news on April 3, but as it was still
undecided whether they could be made public, he refrained from
discussing them with Madison until the sixth. His first impressions were
"very disagreeable and very confused." Yet he tried, as was his wont, to
see both sides of the question. With the story of the abortive
negotiations was interwoven

  ... some base propositions on the part of Talleyrand, through one of
  his agents, to sell his interest and influence with the Directory
  towards soothing difficulties with them, in consideration of a large
  sum (fifty thousand pounds sterling); the arguments to which his
  agent resorted to induce compliance with this demand were unworthy of
  a great nation (could they be imputed to them), and calculated to
  excite disgust and indignation in the Republicans particularly, whom
  they so far mistake, as to presume an attachment to France and hatred
  to the Federal party and not to the love of their country, to be
  their first passion.

In the papers, as communicated, Adams had substituted for the names
given by the envoys--Hottinger, Bellamy, and Hauteval--the initials X.
Y. Z., hence the name given at once to the incident.

Whether the French bankers really represented Talleyrand is absolutely
immaterial; the result on American public opinion alone is to be
considered here. According to Jefferson, the public's first reaction was
one of astonishment;[355] furious indignation followed very quickly.
Sprigg's resolution was naturally discarded as not appropriate; war
seemed the order of the day. The last resort left to the remaining
Republicans was to avoid open hostilities with the French Republic and,
not being able to prevent a vote of credits for armaments, to insist
that they should be granted specially for internal defense and
preparation.[356] A more mature consideration of the letters convinced
Jefferson that the door to negotiation was not absolutely closed.[357]
But popular indignation was too strong; riotous scenes took place in the
streets of Philadelphia, addresses from all parts of the country came to
Adams, urging him to stand for national honor and the Federalist press
fanned the flames. The few faithful Republicans grew discouraged and one
by one drifted out of Philadelphia. "Giles, Clopton, Cabell, and
Nicholas have gone," wrote Jefferson on April 26, "and Clay goes
to-morrow. Parker has completely gone over to the war party. In this
state of things they will carry what they please. One of the war party,
in a fit of unguarded passion, declared sometime ago they would pass a
Citizen Bill, an Alien Bill, and a Sedition Bill."[358] Madison,
although urged to take up his pen "for heaven's sake and not desert the
public cause altogether", remained silent in Virginia. Jefferson felt
that the first and second measures were directed against his close
friend Volney,[359] who had been somewhat imprudent. That the republican
press would be muzzled for "the war hawks talk of septembrizing,
deportation and the examples for quelling sedition set by the French
executives. All the firmness of the human mind is now in a state of
requisition."[360]

It is remarkable, and not the smallest achievement of Jefferson, that he
kept a cool head in the midst of this turmoil. Insulted every day in the
press and in public meetings, lampooned and caricatured, he had to
remain silent because of his official position and could not protest to
the government. No stranger political situation could be imagined than
this,--a man recognized as the head of a party opposed to the
government, yet next to the President in rank, without power to defend
himself and to enter into polemics, ostracized, and, as he admitted
himself, "insulated in every society", forced to listen to the reading
of the most detestable things such as the Alien Bill, and still not
indulging in bitterness. A comparison of his letters with those written
by Adams and Hamilton at the same time would constitute the most
extraordinary tribute to his self-mastery. He persisted in seeing some
faint hope and refused to give up the ship.

First there was a possibility that when the merchants would see that
actual war meant War Tax, Land Tax, and Stamp Tax, these measures would
constitute sedatives to cool their ardor. The present session had
already cost two hundred thousand dollars and that was only a beginning.
Furthermore, there was also a possibility that, if an actual declaration
of war could be prevented during the summer, the coming election would
reënforce the republican party. Volney had decided to go back to France
with a few other aliens who had chartered a boat, without waiting for
the enactment of the Alien Bill. Many of them were much irritated, but
Volney at least was "thoroughly impressed with the importance of
preventing war, whether considered with reference to the interests of
the two countries, of the cause of Republicanism, or of man on a broad
scale."[361]

Isolated though he was in Philadelphia, from his room in the
Philosophical Society of which he was president, Jefferson persisted in
hoping against hope. One thing however was to be avoided at all cost. If
the situation became such that the Northern States, Connecticut and
Massachusetts particularly, clearly dominated the situation, it was far
better to submit temporarily and endure even detestable measures than to
break the Union. The beginning of the disaggregation could not be
stopped; a realignment of States conducing to new secessions would
finally be the result. Men must quarrel, and "seeing, therefore, that an
association of men who will not quarrel with one another is a thing
which never yet existed, from the greatest confederacy of nations down
to a town meeting or a vestry; seeing that we must have somebody to
quarrel with, I had rather keep our New England associates for that
purpose, than to see our bickerings transferred to others."[362]

This was a most important declaration and shows to what length Jefferson
was willing to go in order to avoid the only irremediable catastrophe.
Whatever may have been his weaknesses and shortcomings, his
inconsistencies and contradictions, the man who, in the hectic
atmosphere of Philadelphia, was able to put aside his own interests, the
interests of his party, his social and political ideals to think
nationally, was indeed a great American. We may even venture to say that
he was at the time the only great American in the country.

When Marshall came back from France--much to his surprise, as a war hero
and as an avenger of national honor--the Republicans began to take a
less pessimistic view of the situation. After all, the situation was not
so desperate as they had been led to believe; Gerry had remained in
Paris, and negotiations could be resumed. The show of honesty made by
the envoys in Paris was most gratifying to national honor and gave the
public a feeling of triumph over the corrupt practices of European
diplomacy. But with the return of Marshall a new campaign broke out
against Jefferson. Doctor Logan on his own initiative had gone to Europe
in the interest of peace, but had gone mysteriously and without telling
any one of his intentions. It was soon assumed that he had been sent on
an unauthorized and unofficial but highly objectionable mission by the
Jacobins "to solicit an army from France, instruct them as to their
landing, etc.", and Jefferson was again accused of being the arch
plotter. Nothing could be more ridiculous, for the poor doctor was
simply one of those idealistic pacifists who sometimes do more harm than
good, but whose intentions are not open to suspicion.

But popular passions once aroused cannot be silenced in a day and the
efforts of the friends of peace were weak and inefficient. On April 14 a
bill was passed on second reading by the Senate, declaring the treaties
with France void and nonexistent. Adams made it known that he would
refuse Gerry's request that other envoys be sent. If Congress remained
in session in a city where war hysteria had reached a paroxysm, extreme
measures were unavoidable. The only remedy was to adjourn as soon as
possible, for "to separate Congress now, will be withdrawing the fire
from under a boiling pot."[363] Congress did not separate, however,
without authorizing the President to increase the navy, to expend two
hundred fifty thousand dollars for fortifications, to purchase eight
hundred thousand dollars' worth of arms and ammunition, to raise an army
of ten thousand troops and to equip vessels to seize and bring to port
any armed vessels which had attacked American vessels or might be found
"hovering on the coast of the United States for the purpose of
committing depredations on the vessels belonging to the citizens
thereof." On July 6 were passed the famous Alien Bills, and on the
fourteenth, as a sort of defiance to the principles of the French
Revolution, Congress adopted the "Sedition Law", giving power to the
government "to prosecute persons or to prevent the circulating or saying
of any utterance against the Government of the United States, or either
House of the Congress of the United States, or the President of the
United States."




CHAPTER V

POLITICAL LEADER AND STRATEGIST


When Jefferson went home after the adjournment of Congress he remained
completely silent for two months. But the newspaper war went on in
Philadelphia with more virulence than ever: attacks against the arch
plotter and the defender of the French Jacobins were multiplied,
prosecutions were begun in Massachusetts under the Sedition Act and for
a time Jefferson himself seems to have feared for his own safety. To
Samuel Smith, who had sent him a clipping in which he was vehemently
accused, he answered that he had "contemplated every event which the
Maratists of the day can perpetrate, and I am prepared to meet every one
in such a way, as shall not be derogatory to the public liberty or my
own personal honor." He naturally denied that he had in any way plotted
with Bache, the editor of the _Aurora_, or Doctor Leib; then he went on
to define once more his position. He had acted on the same principles
from the year 1775 to that day, and he was convinced that these
principles were those of the great body of the American people. He was
for peace certainly, not only with France but also with England. He was
aware that both of them "have given and are daily giving, sufficient
cause of war; that in defiance of the laws of nations, they are every
day trampling on the rights of the neutral powers, whenever they can
thereby do the least injury, either to the other." But he still
maintained that the best policy was and would have been "to bear from
France for one more summer what we have been bearing from both of them
these four years." With England the United States had chosen peace; with
France they had chosen war; to what extent the Government was supported
by the majority of the people was a thing to be seen in the coming
elections. He ended with a note of Christian forgiveness for Fenno and
Porcupine, who "covered him with their implacable hatred." "The only
return I will ever make them, will be to do them all the good I can, in
spite of their teeth."[364]

This was almost too godly to be true; but if we remember that his
letters were intercepted and read by Adams' police, as he repeatedly
complained, and that letters sent to him were opened on their way to
Monticello, we may wonder whether he did not write these lines for the
eye of the censor, and with his tongue in his cheek. That he really
believed at the time in the existence of a monarchical conspiracy
appears from a letter to Stephens Thompson Mason.[365]

The Alien and Sedition bills were just a beginning. If the people did
not revolt against them, the next step would be to persuade Congress
that the President should continue in office for life, reserving to
another time the transfer of the succession to his heirs and the
establishment of the Senate for life.

This was a very accurate prophecy of the course that events were to
follow, not in America, but in France, and this shows at least that
Jefferson had an exact understanding of the gradual steps through which
a republican government might become an empire. But France had
Bonaparte, while neither Adams nor Washington ever had the inclination
or the power to bring about such a change in America. Yet when one
thinks of the military ambitions of Hamilton, of his real opposition and
scorn for republican government, it would perhaps be unfair to dismiss
these apprehensions as absolutely groundless. Whatever the case may have
been, Jefferson thought the time had come to erect a strong barrier
against the encroachments of the Federal Government. Towards the end of
the same month, the two Nicholas brothers, George and Wilson C.,
discussed with Jefferson at Monticello a plan to put to work the
Republicans, who, finding themselves useless in Congress, had retired
from the field. A plan was finally adopted to arouse the State
legislatures; during these meetings were drawn up the famous
"Resolutions" that George Nicholas was to present to the legislature of
Kentucky, and which Madison was to bring before the Virginia
Assembly.[366]

The exact authorship of the "Resolutions" remained a matter of doubt
until Jefferson more than twenty years later acknowledged his
participation in a letter to the son of George Nicholas.[367] It was
well for Jefferson's peace of mind that he remained behind the scenes on
this occasion and let Madison take the responsibility of the
recommendation, which he did not allow to pass without modifying the
original text to a considerable degree. The Kentucky resolutions have
been the subject of many discussions, and Madison himself used a great
deal of ink and time to explain the true import of the measures he had
sponsored before the Virginia Assembly. They will become much more
intelligible when studied in the light of the theory developed by
Jefferson in the document in which he stated his views on the social
compact, considered as a _pactum foederis_ and not a _pactum
subjectionis_.[368] It was simply the reaffirmation that in forming a
society neither men nor States abdicate entirely their sovereignty but
reserve a specified part of their natural rights set forth in a Bill of
Rights--an essential foundation on which to build a constitution. Such
is clearly the meaning of the first resolution;

  1. _Resolved._ That the several States composing the United States of
  America are not united on the principle of unlimited submission to
  their general Government; but that, by a compact under the style and
  title of a Constitution for the United States, and of amendments
  thereto, they constituted a general Government for special
  purposes--delegated to that Government certain definite powers,
  reserving, each State to itself, the residuary mass of right to their
  own self-government; and that whensoever the general Government
  assumes undelegated powers, its acts are unauthoritative, void, and
  of no force; that to this compact each State acceded as a State, and
  is an integral party, its co-States forming, as to itself, the other
  party: that the Government created by this compact was not made the
  exclusive or final judge of the extent of the powers delegated to
  itself; since that would have made its discretion, and not the
  Constitution, the measure of its powers; but, that, as in all other
  cases of compact among powers having no common judge, each party has
  an equal right to judge for itself, as well of infractions as of the
  mode and measure of redress.

Not only was Jefferson perfectly consistent in repeating almost word for
word in this Resolution the doctrine of natural rights and State rights
already enunciated in 1776, but the last lines foretold the theory he
was to defend against Marshall during his presidency. By denying that
the parties to the Federal compact had a common judge, he refused in
advance to consider the Supreme Court as the guardian, interpreter, and
defender of the Constitution. This principle once asserted, Jefferson
endeavored to prove that the Sedition Bill, the Alien Bill and other
measures adopted by Congress at the instigation of the Federalists
constituted an infringement of State rights, since they did not deal
with matters specifically reserved to Congress and since it was provided
that "the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution,
nor prohibited by it to the States are reserved to the States
respectively or to the people." This was at the same time an attempt to
prove the unconstitutionality of the recent legislation and an endeavor
to define more exactly the powers of the Federal Government. The Eighth
Resolution, the longest, proposed the establishment of a committee of
correspondence to communicate the resolutions to the different
legislatures and enunciated the doctrine of nullification, namely that
the State had the right to consider as nonexistent such laws as might be
passed in defiance of the Constitution. Naturally the Law of Sedition
and the Alien Bill came under that category.

Strong as the language of the Resolutions may have been, it was not
Jefferson's intention to promote a rebellion of certain States against
the Federal Government and to provoke a secession. They contained a
strong affirmation that the subscribers to the Resolutions were
sincerely anxious for the preservation of the Union. As a matter of
fact, in Jefferson's intention they were a piece of political strategy
and he had no desire to push the matter too far. A letter he wrote to
Madison on the subject is particularly significant on that score: "I
think we should distinctly affirm all the important principles they
contain, so as to hold to that ground in future, and leave the matter in
such a train as that we may not be committed absolutely to push the
matter to extremities, and yet may be free to push as far as events will
render prudent."[369]

In other words, it was what the French call a gesture, the act of a
lawyer reserving certain points in a trial before a tribunal and the
right to present conclusions. It was not the act of a revolutionist and
for the time being at least, although adopted in a modified form both by
Kentucky and Virginia, it remained a gesture and a simple protest
against Federalist usurpations.

The end of the fall came, and Jefferson relapsed once more into his
cautious silence. One letter only, written from Monticello to John
Taylor, is found in the files for that period.[370] This time Jefferson
was more optimistic; the ardor of the Federalists for war seemed to have
cooled down and the people began to realize that national pride was a
very expensive article, that wars had to be paid for: "the Doctor is now
on his way to cure it, in the guise of the tax gatherer."

At the end of the month, the Vice President set out for Philadelphia to
attend the opening of the third session of the Fifth Congress. Adams'
address was anxiously awaited. Much to the surprise and disgust of the
war party, if it could not be called conciliatory, it was far less
provocative than the address of the twenty-first of June preceding. He
protested against the decree of the Directory constituting "an
unequivocal act of war" and maintained that "to invigorate measures of
defence" was the true policy of the United States. But while he thus
reiterated some of his previous statements, the tone was far less
truculent. President Adams, while frowning threateningly, held behind
his back the olive branch and was ready to extend it. The conclusion was
one of these milk-and-water statements, that curious balancing of two
positions so often found in American State papers relating to foreign
affairs:

  But in demonstrating by our conduct that we do not fear war in the
  necessary protection of our rights and honor, we shall give no room
  to infer that we abandon the desire of peace.... An efficient
  preparation for war can alone insure peace. It is peace that we have
  uniformly and perseveringly cultivated, and harmony between us and
  France may be restored at her option.

Then came the really important part: "The United States Government could
not think of sending another minister ... unless given positive
assurances that he would be received. It must therefore be left with
France (if she is indeed desirous of accommodation) to take the
requisite steps."

Apparently an innocuous statement, but yet it was a new note; as it was
known that Adams had received some communications from Gerry and was to
make these communications known, it was supposed that a real change and
a change for the better was about to take place in the relations between
the two countries. Therefore Jefferson could mention in the speech "a
moderation unlike the President", and he also knew that Vans Murray,
the American minister at the Hague, had informed his Government "that
the French Government is sincere in their overtures for reconciliation
and have agreed, if these fail, to admit the mediation offered by the
British Government."[371]

In the meantime the fight in Congress was merrily going on, with that
peculiar circumstance that both leaders remained behind the scenes. To
the Kentucky Resolutions, followed by much milder representations from
other State legislatures, Hamilton opposed his instructions sent to
Dayton, and since published in his "Works." If they had fallen into
Jefferson's hands he would have found in them ample grounds for his
fears. The Federalist leader was of the opinion that his party was
losing ground, and the late attempt of Virginia and Kentucky to unite
the State legislatures in a direct resistance to certain laws of the
Union, could be considered in no other light than as an attempt to
change the Government. Under the circumstances, and considering that
"the enemies of the Government were resolved, if it shall be
practicable, to make its existence a question of force", Hamilton had
devised a certain plan to be executed by the Federalist troops in
Congress. The measures came under four heads: establishments which will
extend the influence and promote the popularity of the Government;
provision for augmenting the means and consolidating the strength of the
Government; arrangements for confirming and enlarging the legal powers
of the Government; laws for restraining and punishing incendiary and
seditious practices. The detail of the recommendations showed a
perfectly well-concerted plan to concentrate all powers in the hands of
the Federal Government.

One of the most remarkable proposals was perhaps the project of
subdividing the larger States into several small States containing no
less than a hundred thousand persons each, as these new units would be
"better adapted to the purposes of local regulations and to the
preservation of the Republican spirit." It is not without interest here
to note that the Federalist leader proposed the very measures which had
been adopted in France when the old provinces were divided into
_départements_. In the case of the Federalists, as in the case of the
Constituents, the purpose was the same: a concentration of all powers
into the hand of a central authority and the suppression of local
government. Other recommendations were an extension of the judiciary
with a Federal judge at the head of each district; the appointment of
conservators or justices of peace, who were to supervise the energetic
execution of the laws and to promote "salutary patronage"; a stronger
army; improvement of roads; powers given to the Government to call out
the militia to suppress unlawful combinations and insurrections; power
given to Congress to build canals through the territory of two or more
States, that "all seditious writings levelled against any officers
whatever of the U. S. shall be cognizable in the courts of the United
States."

If the administrative reorganization advocated by Hamilton had been
effected, it would have made the United States not far different from
the France of Napoleon and, such being the plans of the Federalists, it
cannot be said that Jefferson's fear was entirely exaggerated.

One of the first victories of the Federalists was to pass the famous
Logan Law (January 30) forbidding any citizen of the United States to
commence or carry on any verbal or written correspondence or intercourse
with any foreign government, or any officer thereof in relation to any
disputes or controversies with the United States. Doctor Logan's
intentions had been of the best. He had seen members of the French
Directory in Paris and had brought with him "non-equivocal proofs of the
pacific dispositions of the French Government towards the United States"
and particularly the Statement of Merlin that "_la liberté des
États-Unis nous a coûté trop de sang pour qu'elle ne nous soit pas
chère._"[372] None of these activities could be called treacherous, and
in normal times would not have been noticed. But behind Logan, Jefferson
was aimed at, and he was perfectly aware, as he wrote to Madison, that
"the real views in the importance they have given to Logan's enterprise
are mistaken by nobody."[373] Yet he thought he had to justify himself
to his friends, and sent a long letter on the subject to Gerry. Far more
important than his defense was a declaration of the principles he did
not fear to avow. "They are unquestionably," he said, "the principles of
the great body of our fellow-citizens." It was really the program of the
Democratic Party and the most luminous exposition of the Jeffersonian
doctrine ever made.

  I do then, with sincere zeal, wish an inviolable preservation of our
  present federal Constitution, according to the true sense in which it
  was adopted by the States ... and I am opposed to the monarchising
  its features by the forms of its administration, with a view to
  conciliate a first transition to a President and Senate for life, and
  from that to an hereditary tenure of these offices.... I am for
  preserving to the States the powers not yielded by them to the Union,
  and to the legislature of the Union its constitutional share in the
  division of powers; and I am not for transferring all the powers of
  the States to the General Government, and all those of that
  Government to the executive branch. I am for a government rigorously
  frugal and simple, applying all the possible savings of the public
  revenue to the discharge of the national debt; and not for a
  multiplication of officers and salaries merely to make partisans....
  I am for relying, for internal defence, on our militia solely, till
  actual invasion ... and not for a standing army in time of peace,
  which may overawe the public sentiment; nor for a navy, which by its
  own expenses and the eternal wars in which it will implicate us, will
  grind us with public burthens, and sink us under them. I am for free
  commerce with all nations; political connections with none; and
  little or no diplomatic establishment ... I am for freedom of
  religion, and against all manoeuvres to bring about a legal
  ascendency of one sect over another: for freedom of the press, and
  against all violations of the Constitution to silence by force and
  not by reason the complaints of criticism, just or unjust, of our
  citizens against the conduct of their agents. And I am for
  encouraging the progress of science in all its branches; and not for
  raising a hue and cry against the sacred name of philosophy....[374]

Jefferson ended with a paragraph in which he solemnly proclaimed the
integrity of his American nationalism, although he admitted that he was
a well wisher to the success of the French Revolution and still hoped
that it would succeed; but he added at once: "The first object of my
heart is my own country. In that is embarked my family, my fortune, my
own existence. I have not one farthing of interest, nor preference of
any one nation to another, but in proportion as they are more or less
friendly to us."

The man who drew up that program in the midst of an unprecedented
political strife and the riotous scenes of the streets of Philadelphia
was a political leader of the first rank. The letter to Gerry is more
than a letter from one individual to another; it transcends the
circumstances of the moment. It is the result of mature reflection; the
conclusions reached by Jefferson after almost thirty years of political
life. It is really the first program of his party and the first complete
definition of Government and of Americanism; for it was distinctly
American. I fail to perceive in it the influence of any foreign
political thinker except in so far as such principles as freedom of the
press, separation of the Church and the State may have been ideas common
to a great majority of political thinkers of the eighteenth century.
Even if Jefferson's request to Gerry to keep the communication
absolutely secret was obeyed, there is little doubt that we have here
the gist of the communication made orally by Jefferson to his friends
and to the leaders of the Republicans in Congress.

For the moment the letter contained a strong appeal to Gerry to place
every evidence at his disposal before the public, since the Government
refused to do it, and to publish in full the report on his mission. He
alone could save the situation by coming forward independently. But even
if Gerry acceded to this wish, some one else would have to present a
brief synopsis of the evidence and draw up a judicial arraignment of the
administration. At this juncture Jefferson thought of his old master
Pendleton, at whose feet he had sat in Williamsburg, and with whom he
had worked in the revision of the statutes of Virginia. He alone could
give the "_coup de grâce_" to the ruinous principles and doctrines; he
alone could recapitulate all the vexations and disgusting details of the
Stamp Act and the Direct Tax. A small handbill would be printed and they
could "disperse ten or twelve thousand copies under letter covers,
through all the United States, by the members of Congress when they
return home."[375] To make Pendleton's coöperation more certain,
Jefferson even drew up the plan of the indictment and inclosed all the
necessary documents.

February was for Jefferson a period of hectic activity. During all the
first part of the month he multiplied his entreaties to Pendleton to
gird up his loins and enter the fight. If he still refused to write for
the press he was not averse to communicating to the editors papers
written by his friends, and he begged these for expressions of opinion
to be sent to the press.

  The engine is the press. Every man must lay his purse and his pen
  under contribution. As to the former it is possible I may be obliged
  to assume something for you. As to the latter, let me pray and
  beseech you to set apart a certain portion of every post day to write
  what may be proper for the public. Send it to me while here, and
  when I go away I will let you know to whom you may send, so that your
  name shall be sacredly secret.[376]

The propaganda was beginning to bear its fruits. John Ogden was writing
from Litchfield that "many publications in the _Aurora_ have reached
Connecticut, within four weeks, which have opened the eyes of the
dispassionate" and he was asking for more pamphlets.[377] But a week
later Ogden was arrested and to Jefferson he sent a letter "From
Lichtfield Goal (sic) at the suit of Oliver Wolcott Esq", to affirm that
"prison has no horror to the oppressed, inspired and persecuted." To
Aaron Burr in New York Jefferson wrote very affectionately and very
familiarly to acquaint him with the state of public affairs.[378] To
Monroe he was sending pamphlets, asking him to distribute them where
they would do most good, adding as usual "Do not let my name be
connected in the business." He never tired of repeating that the proper
argument to strike the voters was the enormous increase in the budget of
the United States: a loan authorized for five millions at eight per
cent., another of two millions to follow and that was just a beginning.
All these measures were accepted by Congress in the teeth of Gerry's
communications with Talleyrand, showing the French Government willing to
continue the negotiations.

Then on February 18 came "the event of events." While all the war
measures were going on, while the Government of the United States was
blockading the French West Indies and French vessels were captured,
while there were in several instances cases of actual warfare, the
President had had in his hand for several weeks letters exchanged
between Pichon, the French chargé at the Hague, and Vans Murray,
declaring that the French Government was ready to receive "whatever
plenipotentiary the Government of the United States should send to
France to end our differences and that he would be received with the
respect due to the representative of a _free, independent, and powerful
nation_." Adams, almost on the eve of the adjournment of Congress, had
decided, as it seems, against the advice and without the knowledge of
his Cabinet, not only to communicate the Vans Murray-Pichon papers, but
to recommend that Murray be appointed as plenipotentiary to France. The
Federalists in the Senate were appalled and at first did not know what
to do.[379] But they were not lacking in strategy; not daring to come
out openly, they appointed on the President's recommendation, not only
Murray but Oliver Ellsworth and Patrick Henry, the last two "not to sail
from America before they should receive from the French Directory
assurances that they should be received with the respect due to the law
of nations, to their character, etc."

This, as Jefferson noticed at once, was a last effort to postpone the
patching-up of difficulties and also a last effort to provoke the
French, since they had already given such an assurance to Murray.[380]
"The whole artillery of the phalanx was played secretly on the P. and he
was obliged himself to take a step which should parry the overture while
it wears the face of acceding to it," he wrote to Madison.[381] But the
war party was defeated, the Federalists had received a fatal blow;
victory already was in sight when Congress adjourned at the beginning of
March.

Then Jefferson repaired to Monticello, while in the back counties
assessors clashed with farmers, troopers with small-town editors, while
Duane was flogged in the street after being dragged from his office by
militiamen. But he was not idle, although for some mysterious reason
several of the letters he published during the summer have never been
printed. He received many visitors, wrote to friends, proclaimed his
faith in ultimate victory for "the body of the American people is
substantially Republican, but their virtuous feelings have been played
on by some fact with more fiction. They have been the dupes of artful
manoeuvres and made for a moment to be willing instruments in forging
chains for themselves."[382] He encouraged Bache and Venable to publish
a gazette, for unfortunately "the people of Virginia were not
incorruptible and offices there as elsewhere were acceptable", so that
the situation was neither safe nor satisfactory. To William Greene he
wrote a truly splendid letter on "progress" in which he expressed his
belief "with Condorcet, that man's mind is perfectible to a degree of
which we cannot as yet form any conception", and predicted limitless
discoveries in the field of science. The present convulsions could only
be temporary, for it was impossible, he maintained, that "the enthusiasm
characterizing America should lift its parricidal hand against freedom
and science. This would be such a monstrous phenomenon as I cannot place
among possible things in this age and in this country."

At the same time he was not unmindful of keeping in complete harmony the
heterogeneous elements of the party just being formed. He strove to
placate Callender who, jealous of Bache, was writing epileptic letters
to complain of the whole universe, and asking at the same time that
Jefferson should send him some money, as he was short of funds.[383]
John Taylor, who was planning to declare void and unconstitutional laws
adopted by Congress, and to call together a convention to appoint a
dictator, had to be told to "forbear to push on to this ultimate
effort."[384] Much preferable was the work undertaken by Randolph in
presenting a legal refutation of the Federalist attitude towards the
foundation of law, and the similar document on which Wilson Nicholas was
working.[385]

All this time Jefferson was haunted by the fear that his letters would
fall into the hands of his enemies. To the few communications he wrote
during the later part of the summer, he did not even dare to put his
signature, "the omission of which has been rendered almost habitual with
me by the necessity of the post office; indeed the period is now
approaching during which I shall discontinue writing letters as much as
possible, knowing that every snare will be used to get hold of what may
be perverted."[386] He came to the point that on Monroe's advice he had
to refuse to see Madison in order to "avoid the appearance of a
collusion between them."[387]

At the beginning of December he was back in Philadelphia for the session
of Congress and soon after was able to send reassuring news to Monroe
who had become one of his "grand electors." Those who persist in
thinking him a dreamy idealist must read the letters he wrote between
January and May, 1800; not only did he keep his hand on the pulse of the
country, but he calculated the changes of the Republicans in every State
and figured out to a unit the possible number of votes they would
receive in the coming election. He knew the situation too well not to
admit that he was the natural choice of the Republicans even before any
census was held, and very early in January acknowledged it to Monroe:

  Perhaps it will be thought I ought in delicacy to be silent on the
  subject. But you, who know me, know that my private gratification
  would be most indulged by that issue, which should leave me most at
  home. If anything supersedes this propensity, it is merely the desire
  to see this government brought back to its republican principles.
  Consider this as written to Mr. Madison as much as yourself; and
  communicate it, if you think it will do any good, to those possessing
  our joint confidence, or any others where it may be useful and
  safe.[388]

He was undoubtedly sincere in disclaiming any ambition, but under the
circumstances he was bound to observe a certain reticence, being the
President of the Senate, next to Adams in the Government and yet Adams'
adversary in the next election. But in his letters he made no pretense
of false modesty and frankly mentioned time and again what he called
"our ticket." Yet he was not the man who could ever give all his energy
to a single task, and absorbing as were his political preoccupations he
showed during the summer of 1800 as much versatility as ever. He took up
again the transformation of William and Mary College, this time to make
a real university of the old institution. He wrote to Priestley to send
him a good plan of reorganization and a few weeks later to Du Pont de
Nemours who composed for him his "Plan of a National Education."[389]
With Colonel Benjamin Hawkins he discussed the desirability of studying
the language and customs of the Indians, while there was still
time.[390] He was thinking of compiling a volume on the "Morals of
Jesus" and discussed religion with Bishop Madison who intended to write
a book to prove that the Christian religion, "rightly understood and
carried into full effect, would establish a pure Democracy over the
world. Its main pillars are--Equality, Fraternity, Justice, Universal
Benevolence."[391]

At the same time he was keeping close watch on the news coming from
France and on political developments in Congress. Rumors circulated that
a new revolution had taken place in Paris and that Bonaparte was at the
head of it. This was a wonderful opportunity to test out by actual
experience the disadvantage of a directory or executive committee as
compared with a single executive in a republic.[392] From what he knew
of the French character, he did not believe that a monarchy could be
reëstablished in France, for "If Bonaparte declares for Royalty, either
in his own person, or that of Louis XVIII, he has but a few days to
live. In a nation of so much enthusiasm, there must be a million
Brutuses who will devote themselves to death to destroy him." But a few
days later he had come to the conclusion that it was probably what
Bonaparte had done, and what had been done in France could probably be
done in America when our Bonaparte, surrounded by his comrades in arms,
may step in to give us political salvation in his way. One thing was
certain, however: Bonaparte had clearly demonstrated that he had no
brains, no creative and constructive mind; and, with the pride of a man
who was engaged in a stupendous experiment, Jefferson pitilessly
criticized the Napoleonic reconstruction of France: "Whenever he has
meddled we have seen nothing but fragments of the old Roman government
stuck into materials with which they can form no cohesion; we see the
bigotry of an Italian to the ancient splendor of his country, but
nothing which bespeaks a luminous view of rational government."[393]

To his friend Samuel Adams, who had written him at the end of January,
he repeated the same judgment in less striking but perhaps even harsher
terms:

  I fear our friends on the other side of the water, laboring in the
  same cause, have yet a great deal of crime and misery to wade
  through. My confidence has been placed in the head not in the heart
  of Bonaparte. I hoped he would calculate truly the difference between
  the fame of a Washington and a Cromwell. Whatever the views may be,
  he has at least transferred the destinies of the republic from the
  civil to the military arm. Some will use this as a lesson against the
  practicability of republican government. I read in it a lesson
  against the danger of standing armies.[394]

No more patent demonstration could be desired of the fact that in his
judgments of the French Revolution, Jefferson was at all times
influenced by the possible effects that European examples might have on
the American crisis. The precedent established by Bonaparte was a very
dangerous one and might put similar ambitions into the head of an
unscrupulous schemer. Whether he really believed or not that there was
such an immediate danger for America, and that Hamilton had really such
intentions, is an entirely different question. Probably he did not
himself know. He only felt that a permanent army would constitute a
permanent temptation and consequently a permanent danger, for he had
only limited faith in the virtue of individual man, although he
continued to believe in the wisdom of the collectivity.

Domestic matters and other more immediate preoccupations were no less
worthy of attention. He followed very closely every measure proposed in
the House on the coming elections, on the voting procedure to be
adopted, and anxiously studied the political forecasts. The situation
was decidedly on the mend. This appears clearly in the attitude of the
Federalists towards him, not only in public but also in private. For
Madison he wrote a very elaborate review of the comparative strength of
the two parties in all the States of the Union; he saw that the key
States were Pennsylvania, Jersey and New York, the other States being
equally divided, and he concluded that "Upon the whole the issue was
still very doubtful." But officially one had to maintain a confident
attitude.[395]

When April came, he thought that it would be desirable for the
Republicans to come out with a public declaration, stating their
program and their ideals. "As soon as it can be depended on," he said,
"we must have a Declaration of the principles of the Constitution, in
the nature of a Declaration of Rights, in all points in which it has
been violated."[396]

If the plan had been put to execution we would have had the first
presidential "platform" as early as 1800, and Jefferson would thus have
hastened the formation of distinct political parties. But more
commonplace measures were not to be neglected. Discussing the situation
in North Carolina, still a very doubtful State, he advised that "the
medicine for that State must be very mild and secretly administered. But
nothing should be spared to give them true information." We would like
Jefferson better if he had shown more discrimination in the choice of
the men selected to disseminate this true information. For at that time,
at least, he was still employing Callender in Richmond--an amusing
scoundrel not much better than Cobbet, the Peter Porcupine of the
Federalists. But Callender was a useful tool, who was doing his utmost
to publish the second volume of the _Prospect_ and to catch up with
Federalist propaganda. One could condone much in a man then writing: "I
had entertained the romantic hope of being able to overtake the Federal
Government in its career of iniquity. But I am now satisfied that they
can _act_ much faster than I _can write_ after them."[397]

Fortunately he had the approval and indorsement of much more respectable
characters. Samuel Adams had already written him; then it was John
Dickinson, the Revolutionary hero, who wrote, when sending his thanks
for a copy of the late "Resolutions of the Legislature of Virginia": "It
is an inestimable contribution to the cause of Liberty.... How
incredible was it once, and how astonishing is it now, that every
measure and every pretense of the stupid and selfish Stuarts, should be
adopted by the posterity of those who fled from this madness and tyranny
to the distant wilds of America."[398]

Such letters, the congratulations of George Wythe, who urged him to
publish the "Manual of Parliamentary Practice", those of Pendleton, who
consented to revise the final text and to "freely cast his mite into the
treasury", were indeed balm on the wounds made by the fierce attacks of
the Federalist press.[399]

The end of the session was approaching and the most earnest desire of
the Federalists was to adjourn as soon as possible, for fear that the
envoys to France should announce the conclusion of a treaty. Their power
seemed on the wane, but Jefferson was still very doubtful of ultimate
victory. To Livingston he wrote that his knowledge of the art, industry,
and resources of the other party did not permit him to be prematurely
confident. The tide had turned, to be sure, and the Federalists were
losing ground constantly, but the main question whether "that would
insure a Republican victory was still undecided and it might take one or
two elections more."[400]

Congress adjourned on May 14. During the session congressional caucuses
had nominated for the Federalists John Adams, and General Charles
Cotesworth Pinckney of South Carolina; the choice of the Republicans
could only be Jefferson, and for candidate to the vice presidency they
selected Aaron Burr of New York.

In the course of the summer, Adams and his wife moved to the new Federal
City laid out by Major Lenfant, which boasted of one tavern, the
Capitol, the President's house, and a few boarding houses,--a capital in
the midst of the woods, in a veritable wilderness of trees, with
impassable paths,--a town unable to lodge Congress except at Georgetown,
which was connected with the new city by a clay road. Jefferson,
according to his custom, had hurried back to his "farm" and was
apparently absorbed by his domestic occupations, his children, and
grandchildren.

During the whole campaign he remained almost absolutely silent, not
daring to write, because his letters might have been intercepted and
used against him, receiving few visitors and reading without comment the
newspapers filled with the insults and abuse of the Federalists. He
broke his silence on few occasions, but these occasions are worth
studying in some detail. In a letter to Monroe, written from Eppington,
he discussed the best plans for assisting Callender, then jailed under
the Sedition Act, who "should be substantially defended whether
privately or publicly" and whose case should be laid before the
legislature.[401] These efforts did not avail since in August the
publicist wrote from his Richmond jail that he was in very bad health
"owing to the stink of the place."[402] There is not much that can be
said for Callender, and Jefferson might have better chosen his friends;
but when one reflects on the accusations commonly circulated against
Jefferson at the time, the interest taken by the Republican leader in
the pamphleteer seems less astonishing. If Callender had certainly
insulted Adams and Hamilton, had not the Reverend Cotton Mather Smith
accused Jefferson of "having robbed a widow and fatherless children of
an estate of which he was executor?" To Gideon Granger, who had called
his attention to the attacks of the clergyman, Jefferson easily
justified himself and seized the opportunity to discuss with his friend
a problem of general politics of far greater importance. It had very
little to do with the details of the election and for his remarkable
capacity to rise above contingencies Jefferson truly deserves the title
of "political philosopher." To incidents which he deemed without
permanent significance he paid little attention, but when dealing with
a phenomenon which seemed to him to indicate an important change in the
orientation of national policies, he always tried to penetrate beyond
the surface and reach the core of the question.

The thing that now disturbed him more than the possible victory of Adams
and Pinckney was the fact that political divisions seemed to correspond
to a geographical division. Not without reason had he written to Colonel
Benjamin Hawkins: "those who knew us only from 1775 to 1793 can form no
better idea of us than of the inhabitants of the moon."[403] The North
and the South had never been in complete harmony; economically they were
different and had different interests, but something new had developed
during the seven or eight years just passed. There was evidently a rift
in the Union; on several occasions talks of secession had been heard.
These rumors did not correspond to any real danger, but if the elections
proved that the Union was formed of two solid blocks of States, if the
North remained Federalist and the South were Republican, the very
existence of the nation would be put in question. Yet this seemed to be
a probable eventuality. In these circumstances, a victory of the South
would mean a defeat of the North, the country would be divided against
itself and the Union would be destroyed. This was particularly to be
feared if the powers of the Federal Government were enlarged. Leaving
aside all question of principle as to the moral merit of the questions
under dispute, Jefferson tried to show, on the one hand, that it was
impossible ever to organize a centralized form of government for the
simple reason that the United States were too big and covered a
territory much too large. If a centralized government were established
on paper, it would be necessary to have many agents of the Federal
Government with extensive powers distributed over all the States, and
because of their very remoteness they would be beyond the possibility
of continuous control. This could only mean corruption, plunder, and
waste. On the other hand, since on fundamental questions it was
impossible to bring into accord the North and the South, the true and
only remedy was to minimize the chances of conflict and to reduce to a
minimum the powers and attributes of the Federal Government. "The true
theory of our Constitution is surely the wisest and best, that the
States are independent as to everything within themselves, and united as
to everything respecting foreign nations." Once more, therefore, he came
back to the original theory of 1776 that, in forming a social compact,
liberty is exchanged for security and only those rights are given up
which the members of the new society have not full power to enforce.
Thus his theory of State rights was not only well founded in theory but
proved by practice and experience. Any other system would almost
necessarily conduce to a secession. The man who wrote these lines in the
summer of 1800, more than half a century before the Civil War, was
certainly not an ordinary politician; his was the clear farsightedness
of a great statesman and true political philosopher.

Furthermore, in the controversy which had been going on since 1793,
Jefferson had been submitted to fierce criticism on every possible
ground: as he wrote to McGregory, "the floodgates of calumny had been
opened upon him." It had been particularly distressing to him to see
that the religious issue had been injected into politics. There is no
doubt that his Bill for Religious Freedom proceeded, not from hostility
to religion, but from a deep and sincere conviction, reached after
careful study of the evidence available that "in law" there ought to be
no connection between the Church and the State and that if any had ever
been established, it was due to monkish fabrications and usurpations.
That he had turned against himself some of the Episcopalian clergy of
Virginia was quite natural, but before he went to France these attacks
were necessarily limited and did not extend beyond the borders of the
State or take the aspect of a national question.

When, on the contrary, he began to be criticized for his supposed foible
for the French Revolution, such attacks became far more pressing. The
excesses of the Revolution were attributed to the infidel doctrines of
the French philosophers; and, being "contaminated" by French political
philosophy, Jefferson was naturally accused of having brought back from
France its atheism. These views received confirmation when he befriended
Volney and Priestley, one a confirmed atheist, as Priestley himself had
demonstrated, the other a Unitarian--which in the eyes of the orthodox
clergy was possibly worse. The attacks from the pulpit became more
numerous, and a clergyman of New York, a close friend of Hamilton, even
published a pamphlet entitled "The voice of Warning to Christians on
ensuing election", in which Jefferson was accused of having answered to
a certain Doctor Smith, who expressed his surprise at the condition of a
church: "It is good enough for Him who was born in a manger."

Considering, on the other hand, that a large portion of the clergy were
enrolled under the Federalist banner, Jefferson had come to the
conclusion that the clergy had "a very favorite hope of obtaining an
establishment of a particular form of Christianity through the United
States; and as every sect believes its own form the true one, every one
perhaps hopes for his own, especially the Episcopalians and the
Congregationalists." Whether this was so absolutely untrue or
impossible, as some historians seem to believe, is a question far too
difficult to answer and one which probably cannot be solved. On the face
of things it does seem that there was in it a grain of truth, for no
human organization, whether ecclesiastical or civil, ever relinquishes
voluntarily the smallest particle of power or prestige.

One thing, however, is certain: if Jefferson had said the word, the
religious issue would have been injected into the campaign; and some of
his friends, believing that "Christianity was the strong ground of
Republicanism", were urging him to give his consent, for it was only
necessary for "Republicanism to ally itself to the Christian religion,
to overturn all the corrupted political and religious institutions in
the world."[404] But this was for Jefferson a forbidden subject. He had
"sworn upon the altar of God eternal hostility against every form of
tyranny over the mind of man"; he had formed "a view of the subject
which ought to displease neither the rational Christian nor the Deists
and would reconcile many to a character they have too hastily rejected";
but this was not the time or the place to discuss matters that ought to
be reserved for a calm and dispassionate discussion between friends, so
he refused to authorize the publication of any statement referring to
his religious views.[405]

In the meantime the political campaign was going on and the Federalists'
affairs were assuming a decidedly unhealthy complexion. How this
happened is a story of extraordinary intrigue and machination, already
told several times and still a delight to historians fond of studying
political deals. To a large extent the victory of the Republicans was
due to divisions in the Federalist camp and it came to pass that no
other man did more than Hamilton to assure Jefferson's success. From the
beginning, the former leader of the Federalists had set himself against
Adams, employing every effort to have Pinckney receive the first place
in the nomination. The first sign of a Federalist defeat appeared in New
York State, where Burr had his headquarters and had so cleverly
maneuvered things that the State went Republican at the April election.
This was a personal defeat for Hamilton and also a terrible blow to the
Federalists. Then Adams went into one of those fits of anger which make
him such a picturesque figure; he decided that he had been betrayed by
his Cabinet, summarily dismissed his Secretary of War, McHenry, and
offered Pickering an opportunity to resign, which the Secretary of State
did not choose to take. Thereupon the President informed him that he
"discharged him from further service in the Cabinet." He then called
into the Cabinet John Marshall of Virginia as Secretary of State and
Samuel Dexter of Massachusetts as Secretary of War. From that time on,
the political campaign reads as if the leaders of the Federalists had
really lost their heads. Hamilton bent all his efforts towards holding
another election in New York and, failing in that, towards preventing
Adams from obtaining a majority. The affair culminated in the
publication of a pamphlet, entitled "The true conduct and character of
John Adams, Esq. President of the United States", pointing out the
weakness of Adams' character. The pamphlet was intended for private
distribution, but it found its way into the hands of the Republicans;
Aaron Burr had parts of it printed in the _New London Bee_ and the whole
was soon to be given to the public. When the whole pamphlet came out, it
added more fuel to the raging controversy. This is only one incident,
but not the least significant, among the many so vividly related by Mr.
Bowers.

The electoral colleges met in each State on December 4. Returns came in
slowly to Washington but by the thirteenth it was known, in so far as
could be, that the Federalists were defeated; it also appeared that
there was a tie between the two Republican candidates. At this juncture
Jefferson, who had remained perfectly silent, took the matter in hand
and calmly assumed that he would be elected. To Robert R. Livingston,
brother of Edward Livingston who was a member of Congress from New York,
Jefferson wrote a letter congratulating him on his communications to the
American Philosophical Society and discussing quite seriously the
discovery "of some large bones supposed to be of the mammoth" in the
vicinity of New York. Then, as in an afterthought, he mentioned the
political situation. The matter of the election was as good as settled:
"We may, therefore, venture to hazard propositions on that hypothesis
without being justly subjected to raillery or ridicule." "To put the
vessel on a Republican tack", they would require the entire coöperation
of "men who could at once inspire the nation with perfect confidence in
their honesty and talents", and Jefferson asked Livingston whether he
would not assume the Secretaryship of the Navy. That in his own mind he
considered the election well over appears in the sentence in which he
speaks, not as a candidate but as the leader of his party, and as if no
other hypothesis could enter his mind: "Though I have been too honorably
placed in front of those who are to enter the breach so happily made,
yet the energies of every individual are necessary, and in the very
place where his energies can most serve the enterprise."[406]

The next day he wrote in the same vein to Aaron Burr to congratulate him
in no uncertain terms on his election as Vice President, expressing his
regrets that this distinction would prevent him from availing himself of
the services of Burr in the Cabinet. He based his conclusion on the
assurance he had received that South Carolina would withdraw one vote
from Burr, that Smith of Tennessee would give its second vote to
Gallatin. It was also surmised that the vote of Georgia would not be
entire. This would leave Burr well ahead of Adams but decidedly in the
second place. Jefferson indicated that several of the Federalists had
expressed the hope that "the two Republican tickets may be equal" and in
that case they expected to prevent a choice by the House and "let the
Government devolve on a President of the Senate." Then came a gently
insinuating sentence: "Decency required that I should be so entirely
passive during the late contest that I have never once asked whether
arrangements had been made to prevent so many from dropping votes
intentionally, as might frustrate half the Republican wish; nor did I
doubt till lately that such had been made." In the last paragraph,
Jefferson, refusing even to consider that Burr might aspire to the
presidency, indicated that he considered the matter as settled and
firmly put Burr where he belonged:

  While I must congratulate you, my dear Sir, on the issue of this
  contest, because it is more honorable, and doubtless more grateful to
  you than any station within the competence of the chief magistrate,
  yet for myself, and for the substantial service of the public,
  I feel most sensibly the loss we sustain of your aid in the new
  administration. It leaves a chasm in my arrangements, which cannot
  be adequately filled up.

If we put things together, the letter of Jefferson certainly meant first
that the time had come to make some "arrangements" to thwart the schemes
of the Federalists; second, that a tie was almost certain, and finally
that it was up to Burr to declare that he was not running for the
presidency.

This conclusion is all the more probable because three days later,
writing to John Breckenridge, Jefferson did not mention again Georgia
and Tennessee, but declared that "we are brought into a dilemma by the
probable equality of the two Republican candidates." Then he added: "The
Federalists in Congress mean to take advantage of this, and either to
prevent an election altogether, or reverse what has been understood to
have been the wishes of the people, as to the President and
Vice-President; wishes which the Constitution did not permit them
specially to designate."[407] Nothing could be clearer; it was to some
extent the situation of 1796, but reversed as to the candidates, and
Jefferson expected that Burr would do the right thing by him.

This, however, was not so obvious to Burr himself. The letter he sent in
reply to Jefferson must have been most disappointing in this respect.
The colonel side-stepped the issue, refused to come out frankly and did
not write a single line that could be constructed as an acceptance of
Jefferson's point of view. On December 31, Jefferson wrote to Tench Coxe
to express his opinion that an agreement between the two higher
candidates was their only hope "to prevent the dissolution of the
Government and a danger of anarchy, by an operation, bungling indeed and
imperfect, but better than letting the Legislature take the nomination
of the Executive entirely from the people."[408]

This could have been construed as a hint to Burr to give up his unavowed
hopes of becoming President. But Burr, who was in New York, could not
easily be communicated with and kept his sphinxlike silence. January
passed without Jefferson's finding any necessity of writing any
political letters. With Hugh Williamson he discussed the range of
temperature in Louisiana and whether the turkey was a native bird:[409]
with William Dunbar the temperature, Indian vocabularies and the origin
of the rainbow.

In February, however, he again wrote to Burr. He had been informed that
certain individuals were attempting "to sow tares between us that might
divide us and our friends." He assured Burr that he had never written
anything that could be regarded as injurious by his running mate; the
only time that he had discussed his conduct was in a letter to
Breckenridge written on December 18, in which he had expressed the
conviction that the wishes of the people were that he and not Burr be
President. That was a pure statement of fact at which no man could take
offense. This time, Burr apparently did not answer at all, and while the
House was preparing for the balloting, Jefferson discussed with Caspar
Wistar the bones found in the State of New York, "the vertebra, part of
the jaw, with two grinders, the tusks, which some have called the
horns, the sternum, the scapula, the tibia and fibula, the tarsus and
metatarsus, and even the phalanges and innominata."[410]

On the morning of the election and before going to the Capitol he wrote
to Tench Coxe: "Which of the two will be elected, and whether either, I
deem perfectly problematical: and my mind has long been equally made up
for either of the three events." This was on a Wednesday. After the
result of the election had been officially announced, the House retired
to proceed to the election of the President. Ballots were taken,
Jefferson receiving eight States, Burr six, nine being necessary to a
choice. The House stayed in continuous session till eight o'clock the
next morning, taking twenty-seven ballots without any change in the
results; members of the House dozing between ballots, snatching a bit of
sleep whenever they could, all of them admiring the fortitude of Joseph
N. Nicholson who, although sick in bed, had been brought to the House
and rested in a committee room, voting at each ballot. The House
adjourned until eleven o'clock on Friday and then took two successive
ballots without being able to break the deadlock. On Saturday three
ballots were taken without any change in the alignment, and they
adjourned until Monday. In the meantime passions were raging. The
Federalists had been told in no equivocal terms that, should they
attempt to have the Government devolve to some member of the present
administration, "the day such an act would pass, the Middle States would
arm" and that "no such usurpation would be tolerated even for a single
day."

On the other hand, Jefferson had been approached by the more sensible
heads of the Federalists, and apparently by Gouverneur Morris, who
stopped him as he was coming out from the Senate Chamber, and had
offered to influence one member of Vermont, provided he would declare:
"1. that he would not turn all the Federalists out of office; 2. that
he would not reduce the navy; and 3. would not wipe off the public
debt." To which Jefferson answered that he would not become President by
capitulation and would not make any declaration. Then he went to see
Adams, who seemed ready to approve of the choice of Jefferson as
President and who told him that he could have himself elected by
subscribing to conditions analogous to those indicated by Morris.
Finally he was visited in his room by Dwight Foster, senator from
Massachusetts, who also reiterated the same offer. These are,
undoubtedly, some of the maneuvers he mentioned on Sunday, the day of
rest, in a letter he wrote to Monroe: "Many attempts have been made to
obtain terms and promises from me, I have declared to them
unequivocally, that I would not receive the government on capitulation,
that I would not go into it with my hands tied."[411]

On Sunday and Monday parleyings went on, caucuses were held, and no
change was yet apparent. But on Tuesday morning an agreement was
reached. It was described by Jefferson himself as follows:

"Morris of Vermont withdrew, which made Lyon's vote that of his State.
The Maryland Federalists put in four blanks, which made the positive
ticket of their colleagues the vote of the State. South Carolina and
Delaware put in six blanks, so there were ten states for one candidate,
four for another, and two blanks." And the speaker of the House,
Theodore Sedgwick, one of Jefferson's bitterest enemies, was forced to
announce his election.

The letter he wrote to Monroe the same day is not a pæan of triumph. The
long-disputed victory, the irreducibility of a large portion of the
Federalists, made him fearful lest the fight would soon renew.
Furthermore, Adams had at once started making new appointments,
naturally without consulting his successor; Bayard was nominated
plenipotentiary to the French Republic, "Theophilus Parsons, Attorney
General of the United States in the room of C. Lee, who, with Keith
Taylor _cum multis aliis_ are appointed judges under the new system. H.
G. Otis is nominated a District Attorney."[412]

On his side, Jefferson wrote at once to Henry Dearborn to offer him the
Secretaryship of War in his Cabinet and courteously communicated with
Dexter, Secretary of the Treasury, and Stoddart, Secretary of the Navy,
to thank them for their offer to conduct the affairs of their
departments pending the arrival of their successors. To a certain Major
William Jackson whom he did not know and who had written him to express
the fear that he would discriminate against commerce, he answered that
he "might appeal to evidences of his attention to the commerce and
navigation of our country in different stations connected with them."

This was an evident allusion to his mission to France and to the
activity he had displayed in defending the commercial interests of the
United States. He resented particularly the fact that he had been
represented as a friend to agriculture and an enemy to commerce, "the
only means of disposing of its products."[413] The true position of
Jefferson on this matter has already been pointed out in a preceding
chapter; but the fact that the letter was written the very day he was
notified of his election is proof enough that he already intended to
conciliate both the agricultural and the commercial interests of the
country. To the smoothing over of old differences of opinion he bent all
his efforts during the three weeks that separated him from his
inauguration. Bayard having refused his appointment to France, he
approached at once Robert R. Livingston, intending to give the
nomination to the Senate at the first opportunity. At the same time he
repeated that the great body of the Federalist troops was discouraged
and truly repentant, or disposed to come back into the fold. Those who
were so inclined should be received with open arms for "If we can once
more get social intercourse restored to its pristine harmony, I shall
believe we have not lived in vain; and that it may, by rallying them to
true Republican principles, which few of them had thrown off, I
sanguinely hope."[414]

He resigned from the Chair of the Senate on the twenty-eighth, and made
the necessary preparations for the inauguration. The ceremonies were to
be very simple but dignified. John Marshall, Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, was asked by Jefferson himself to administer the oath,
and on March 4, 1801, the new President was inaugurated, while John
Adams, who had refused to welcome his successor, was starting on his way
to New England.




BOOK FIVE

_The Presidency_




CHAPTER I

"ALL REPUBLICANS, ALL FEDERALISTS"


The battle over, Jefferson's first and only desire seems to have been to
bring about a reunion of the former political opponents. He had hardly
been elected when he declared that he was not the choice of one party,
but that the analysis of the last ballot showed clearly that "the former
federalists have found themselves aggregated with us and that they are
in a state of mind to be aggregated with us."[415]

And this, much to the surprise and disappointment of the militants who
had fought the hard battle with him and for him, was the keynote of his
inaugural speech. Throwing overboard his former defense of the French
Revolution, he did not hesitate to attribute the political storm which
the ship had just weathered to the baneful influence of European
disturbances:

  During the throes and convulsions of the ancient world, during the
  agonizing spasms of infuriated man, seeking through blood and
  slaughter his long-lost liberty, it was not wonderful that the
  agitation of the billows would reach even this distant and peaceful
  shore; that this should divide opinions as to measures of safety. But
  every difference of opinion is not a difference of principle. We have
  called by different names brethren of the same principles.

Then came the final and definitive formula: "We are all republicans--we
are all federalists."

In more than one sense this was the most characteristic and the most
masterly of Jefferson's political utterances. The battle of Capitol Hill
was ended, the last streamers of smoke had floated away and America had
found herself: "a rising nation, spread over a wide and fruitful land,
traversing all the seas with the rich productions of her industry,
engaged in commerce with nations who feel power and forget right,
advancing rapidly to destinies beyond the reach of mortal eyes."

This was not written simply for effect and for the public eye. To
Monroe, Jefferson had declared that the policy of the new administration
would not be a policy of reprisals. The victory had been won partly
through the repentance of former Federalists who had seen their error,
and during the awful suspense of the week of the eleventh to the
seventeenth of February, had feared that the country would become a prey
to anarchy. These he welcomed back into the fold; the leaders, of
course, were irreconcilable, but the majority were to be forgiven, and
few removals from office were to be made on the ground of political
divergences of opinion. "Some, I know, must be made. They must be as few
as possible, done gradually, and bottomed on some malversation or
inherent disqualification."[416]

Of the thousands of Federal officers in the United States, the President
estimated that not twenty would have to be removed, while in two or
three instances, officers removed by Mr. Adams for refusing to sign
addresses were to be restored. Jefferson realized that by so acting and
"stopping thus short in the career of removal" he would give offense to
many of his friends, and he added with some melancholy: "That torrent
has been pressing me heavily, and will require all my force to bear up
against; but my maxim is "fiat justitia, ruat cælum."[417]

All this sounds perfectly sincere and true. Even the most superficial
consideration of Jefferson's life would convince any one that he was not
a man of vindictive character. By nature a pacifier and a harmonizer,
nothing would have been farther from his program than to revive the old
fires and to prolong party strifes. But if it takes only one to declare
war, it takes two to make peace, and the defeated party was in no
peaceful mood. Hamilton was removed from the scene, and the form of
government was apparently definitively settled by the election of
Jefferson, but the Federalists had not given up every hope; they were
still strongly intrenched and the battle went on during all of
Jefferson's administration. It was not so spectacular as the fight with
Hamilton, for the chief protagonist, John Marshall, lacked the dramatic
qualities of the former leader of the Federalists; but it was no less
momentous and no less important for the destinies of the United States.

When it came to actual removals, however, difficulties arose
immediately. Whether in all cases Jefferson was rightly advised or
inspired is open to question. The wisdom of appointing Samuel Bishop, a
man of "sound understanding, pure integrity and unstained character", as
collector of New Haven may be doubted, and there was something
undeniably worth considering in the protest of New Haven merchants, that
a man seventy-seven years old was unfit for such an office. The incident
in itself was paltry, but the letter written by the President in answer
to the protest put once again into light that curious mixture of
theoretical idealism and practical political sense so remarkable in
Jefferson. After all, the Federalists had begun with filling every
office with their partisans and it was necessary to reëstablish a just
balance, even if some individuals had to suffer. If the rights of the
minority could not be ignored, the majority had its rights also and
could not submit to the monopoly claimed by the Federalists: "Total
exclusions," concluded the President, "call for prompt corrections. I
shall correct the procedure; but that done, return with joy to that
state of things, when only questions concerning a candidate shall be, is
he honest? Is he capable? Is he faithful to the Constitution?"[418] In
other words, Jefferson was not ready to proclaim the principle so
frankly avowed later "to the victor belong the spoils." His principle
was and remained absolutely different. But he considered that he was
confronted by a situation which had to be remedied without any delay,
and in his behavior he reminds one in some way of the French publicist
who, although theoretically opposed to the death penalty, declared,
"_Que messieurs les assassins commencent_!" Certainly this is not the
pure and exalted morality of the political philosopher, but neither is
it the cynical attitude of the political "boss", and one may wonder how
many men who have occupied high offices would stand better than
Jefferson in this respect if documents were available and could be
subjected to the same scrutiny.

The fact remains, however, that during the battle from which he had come
out victorious, Jefferson had to employ and sometimes associate with men
whose character was not absolutely spotless. The presence of Aaron Burr
in the government was already a thorn in his side. It was also
particularly unfortunate that he had given aid and assistance to
Callender, whose scurrilous attacks against Adams went far beyond a
legitimate discussion of public utterances and actions of a man at the
head of the government. Callender had been sentenced under the Sedition
Act to a term in jail and liberated by Jefferson with all the other
victims of the act when he took office. It was even more unfortunate
that the pamphlet of Callender, "The Prospect Before Us", was reprinted
under a modified title as the "History of the Administration of John
Adams" more than a year after the new administration had taken hold of
things. It was also regrettable that the son of John Adams should have
been removed from office after the election. Soon after the death of
Jefferson's younger daughter, Mrs. Adams, who had befriended the little
girl when she arrived in London all alone in 1787, wrote to the bereaved
father to express her sympathy. Jefferson took the opportunity to
reassert his personal friendship for John Adams. He could not help
mentioning, however, that one act of Adams' administration he had to
consider as personally unkind, his last appointment to office of
Jefferson's most ardent political enemies.[419] This letter called for
an answer, and Mrs. Adams was not a woman to miss an opportunity to
express her husband's views and her own on the removal of Federal judges
and particularly of John Quincy. Thus Jefferson was led to write a final
letter in which he expressed more clearly than he had done anywhere else
his opinion on the judiciary and on the place it should occupy in the
general scheme of government. To understand this letter fully it is
necessary to go back to the beginnings of Jefferson's administration.

The original draft of Jefferson's message to Congress, December 8, 1801,
contained a paragraph which, after more mature reflection, the President
decided to omit "as capable of being chicaned, and furnishing something
to the opposition to make a handle of."[420] In it Jefferson held the
theory that the three powers existing in any government had been
distributed among three equal authorities, constituting each a check on
one or both the others. The President asserted that each of these three
branches of the government had a right "to decide on the validity of an
act according to its own judgment and uncontrouled by the opinions of
any other department." According to this theory, even if opposition
developed among different departments, no permanent ill could ensue,
since at the next election the people were at liberty to refuse to
reëlect those whose interpretation seemed erroneous.

Jefferson's disapproval of the Sedition Act had been known for a long
time; he had a right to assume that his election meant that the people
approved of his position and to make this declaration:

  On mature deliberation, in the presence of the nation, and under
  the tie of the solemn oath which binds me to them and to my duty,
  I do declare that I hold that act in palpable and unqualified
  contradiction to the constitution, considering it then as a nullity,
  I have relieved from oppression under it those of my fellow citizens
  who were within the reach of the functions confided to me.

In its final form the message was far less provocative. It simply
contained the statement that "the judiciary system ... and especially
that portion of it recently enacted, will, of course, present itself to
the contemplation of Congress." But the Federalists and particularly
Marshall were not placated by this apparent moderation; they knew that
the assault against the judiciary was about to begin. The debate between
Federalists and Republicans had already been transferred to another
ground.

No better account of it can be found than the chapters written on the
subject by Albert J. Beveridge in his "Life of Marshall." It must be
remembered, however, that Beveridge's account was necessarily colored by
his own political views, as were the views of most historians of the
subject.[421] One of the first episodes of the battle was the repeal of
the Judiciary Act passed in 1801 by the Federalists, in order to
reorganize the Supreme Court and to increase the number of Federal
judges. This was immediately followed by the impeachment of Judge
Pickering, the deposition of Judge Addison by the Senate of
Pennsylvania, and the famous decision given by Marshall on "Marbury
versus Madison." These incidents were of unequal importance and
significance. It was recognized by Pickering's friends and family that
the judge was half-demented and for several years had been unable to
fulfill his duties. But since the Act of 1801 had been repealed, no one
seemed to have authority at the time to remove the judge from office.
The Pickering case simply provided the Republicans with an opportunity
to test out their favorite contention, that impeachment was unrestricted
and could be enforced against any officer of the government deemed
undesirable by two thirds of the Senate.

Of far greater importance was the decision of Marshall in "Marbury
versus Madison." The senior member of the Supreme Court formulated on
this occasion a doctrine on the powers of the Court which, although
never written in the Constitution, was to obtain final recognition and
which to this day had remained one of the many unwritten laws of the
land. Another most curious situation this, so disconcerting to
historians and observers trained in the principles of Roman law, but
often recurring in American politics and administrative life. The case
itself was of no importance. Marbury was one of the "midnight judges"
whose commission, signed by Adams, had been withheld by Madison, on the
theory that the powers of the former President to make appointments had
really expired, not on the third of March, 1801, at midnight, but on the
day his successor was elected. It was maintained by the administration
that the commission not having been delivered Marbury had no right to
take office and to sit on the bench. Marbury had appealed to the Supreme
Court, but the sessions of the Court being suspended for fourteen months
by Congress, Marshall had at first no opportunity to declare himself
publicly on the matter.

When he finally passed on the case, the Chief Justice saw at once that
his hour had come, and gave his definition of the powers of the Court in
its relation to the executive and the legislative. Curiously enough, as
Beveridge remarked, the matter had never before come up and would have
remained undecided for a long time, if this particular juncture had not
made it a question of paramount importance for the destinies of the
country. Briefly summed up, the theory of Marshall, shorn of its legal
phraseology, was this: The happiness of the American people rested on
certain principles embodied in the Constitution. These principles could
not be altered by legislation; if, however, the legislative passed a law
evidently contrary to the Constitution, there must be for the individual
some recourse, some means of asserting his rights. In cases where
Congress adopts laws contrary to the Constitution, these laws must be
void. On this principle Jefferson and Marshall were in complete
agreement. But from that point on they differed widely. The next
question was to determine where does the power rest to declare a law
unconstitutional? With the Executive and even with the States, Jefferson
had first declared in his draft of 1801. With the Supreme Court,
answered Marshall; for this is essentially a judicial function. Under
this construction, the Constitution remains the supreme law of the land,
but it is within the powers attributed by the Constitution to the
judiciary, for the Supreme Court to decide on the constitutionality of
an act passed by the legislature. Thus the Court is not placed above the
Constitution, but its judges stand as the keepers and interpreters of
the superior law of the country.

Jefferson did not engage directly in a controversy with Marshall and
held his peace. But, as he was wont, he seized another opportunity to
express his views on the subject, and he did it in his letter written to
Mrs. Adams on September 11, 1804. In this, he maintained that "nothing
in the Constitution has given the judges a right to decide for the
Executive, more than to the Executive to decide for them. Both
magistrates are equally independent in the sphere of action assigned to
them." Judges believing a law to be constitutional have a right to pass
sentences. But "the Executive believing the law to be unconstitutional
were bound to remit the execution of it; because that power has been
confided to them by the Constitution." What he did not say on this
occasion, but repeated on many others, was that, the ultimate source of
authority resting in the people, it was for the people to decide at the
next election in case a conflict of interpretation should arise between
any of the three branches of the government. In case of a conflict
between the judiciary and the legislative, however, impeachment
proceedings could be initiated and judges removed in a regular and,
according to him, perfectly constitutional way.

It must be recognized here that the position taken by Jefferson was
perfectly logical, far more logical than the interpretation given out by
Marshall. Whether Jefferson's theory would have worked out
satisfactorily is quite another matter. It is only too evident that
perfectly logical constructions do not always fit the complexity and
contradictions of human affairs. The system of democracy which was
Jefferson's ideal at that time might have worked in the case of a New
England town meeting; it would have been more difficult to apply to the
government of a State. In the case of a large and growing federation of
States, it would have injected into presidential and congressional
elections constant elements of discord and bitterness. Thus the cost of
liberty would not have been eternal vigilance, but eternal strife and
political dissensions.

It may even be doubted whether Jefferson would ever have entertained
such an extreme theory if at that time he had not been moved by
immediate considerations. He had come to see in the judiciary, as it was
constituted after the appointments made by Adams, an institution
endangering the very life of the Republic. As for Marshall, who had
hurled a challenge at the executive and the legislative branches of the
government, it had to be ascertained whether some means could not be
found to remove him from office.

That such was the ultimate intent of the Republican leaders was
understood generally when proceedings were started to impeach Judge
Chase of the Supreme Court. As in the case of Pickering, the
Republicans had carefully selected the card they intended to play. Was
he not the very man who had sentenced Fries to the gallows and Callender
to jail, who had been relentless in his application of the Sedition Act
and in the prosecution of Republicans? He had finally, and this was the
immediate ground for his impeachment, bitterly criticized from the bench
the repeal of the Federal judiciary act, and predicted that the country
would be enslaved by mob tyranny and that soon "they would all establish
the worst kind of government known to man."

The impeachment proceedings took place in the Senate room elaborately
decorated for the occasion with a display of crimson, green, and blue
cloth draping the rows of benches and the sections reserved for the
heads of departments, foreign ministers, members of the House, and the
general public. The Senate convened to hear the case on February 4,
1805, and for almost a month all other business was practically
suspended. But it was far more than the fate of a single judge which was
going to be decided. On the decision of the Senate hung not only the
future of the Constitution but probably the fate of the Union. For New
England had already on several occasions threatened secession; the North
resented what was already termed "Virginia tyranny", and it was to be
feared that these feelings of disaffection might be strengthened. It was
also the most exciting ceremony the new capital had yet witnessed, and
the formalities of the proceedings, the effort to clothe them with
dignity and solemnity, presented a strange contrast with the uncouth
appearance of the city itself, with its ramshackle boarding houses, its
muddy streets, and surrounding wilderness.

The debates provided a rare occasion for an extraordinary display of
American eloquence. This is not one of the least surprises to a student
of American civilization, to discover the taste of the people as a whole
for oratory and the remarkable gift of American orators for long
speeches, even in the early days. Scarcely less surprising was the
capacity of American audiences to listen patiently for long hours and
with apparent interest to discussions and debates. It seems as if the
gift attributed by Cæsar to the Gauls of old had been transferred to the
new continent and to a people racially much different. Oratory was to a
certain extent a new art, for few occasions were offered in the colonial
times for long political speeches; but even in the early days of the
Revolution, born orators appeared and since that time have filled the
legislative halls with an inexhaustible flow of eloquence. This is said
without the least irony and merely as another illustration of the danger
of generalizing when discussing national characteristics. To the point
these speeches were, perhaps, but they were not short by any means. A
careful study of the development of the American school of oratory would
certainly repay a specialist in the history of public speaking.

During the session, the oratorical stars were Luther Martin of Maryland,
who spoke for Chase, and John Randolph, who summed up the case for the
administration. It appeared, however, when the final vote was taken,
that Jefferson had not been able to keep his party in hand. There were
thirty-four senators, of whom nine were Federalists and twenty-five
Republicans. Twenty-two votes were necessary to convict, but the
administration was able to muster only sixteen for impeachment, and on
one count Chase was proved unanimously "not guilty." For the time being
John Marshall was safe, and the acquittal of Chase was undoubtedly a
personal defeat for the President.

This wound to his _amour-propre_ was compensated by the success of the
last election. Jefferson had been reëlected without opposition; the
strength of the Federalists as a separate party had dwindled to the
vanishing point, and only three days separated him from the beginning of
his second term. But everybody understood that the matter at issue had
not been settled and that another test would have to be made. The very
day Chase was acquitted, John Randolph introduced a resolution proposing
an amendment to the Constitution, to the effect that "The judges of the
Supreme Court, and of all other courts of the United States, shall be
removed by the President on the joint addresses of both Houses of
Congress requesting the same, anything in the Constitution of the United
States notwithstanding." This was referred to a committee and, as
Congress had only three more days to sit, it was decided by sixty-eight
votes against thirty-three that the motion would be made the order of
the day for the first Monday in December.

The assault against the judiciary constitutes one of the most striking
episodes of Jefferson's first administration and has received its due
share at the hands of American historians. It must not be forgotten,
however, that even in other respects the President had no easy sailing.
The friend of Priestley, Thomas Cooper, Volney, and Thomas Paine
continued to be represented in the press and in the public as the
champion of infidelity. The President could not engage in any
controversy in order to justify himself but, according to his favorite
methods, he encouraged his friends to hit back, and he became more and
more convinced that the intrusion of the churches into politics was one
of the worst evils that could befall any country. He soon came to the
conclusion that many members of the clergy were unworthy to speak in the
name of the great teacher; that the Christian doctrine had degenerated
in their hands, and that no true religion could long exist when it was
intrusted to the priests. Hence the many expressions of his preference
for the Quakers so often found in his correspondence.

  The mild and simple principles of the Christian philosophy would
  produce too much calm; too much regularity of good, to extract from
  its disciples a support from a numerous priesthood, were they not to
  sophisticate it, split it into hairs, and twist its texts till they
  cover the divine morality of its author with mysteries, and require
  the priesthood to explain them. The Quakers seem to have discovered
  this. They have no priests, therefore no schisms. They judge of the
  text by the dictates of common sense and common morality.[422]

The indignation of the Federalists and the clergy reached a paroxysm
when it was discovered that the President had not only invited Paine to
come to America but had even promised him passage on a public vessel.
For Paine was no longer remembered as the eloquent political writer who
in prophetic accents had celebrated the uniqueness of America's position
in the world. He was the detestable atheist who had participated in the
bloody excesses of the French Revolution--a wretch unworthy of being
thus honored by a Christian nation. Once more religion was injected into
politics. The President was bitterly reproved by the New England clergy
for having refused to proclaim days of fasting and thanksgivings as his
predecessors had done, and Jefferson, who would have preferred to let
sleeping dogs lie, had to come out and explain his position on an
alliance between "Church and State, under the authority of the
Constitution."[423]

That Jefferson, who was so restive under public criticism, suffered even
more than he dared admit appears in many passages of his letters. "Every
word of mine," he wrote to Mazzei, "which they can get hold of, however
innocent, however orthodox, is twisted, tormented, perverted, and like
the words of holy writ, are made to mean everything but what they were
intended to mean."[424] The whole subject is not an easy one to treat
and cannot be discussed here; but it would be very difficult to reach a
fair estimate of internal politics during Jefferson's first
administration if that element of hostility were entirely left out. We
can only express the hope that some day it will receive due attention.
An investigation of the New England papers and Church publications of
the time would undoubtedly bring to light many hidden currents of
hostility.

But, in spite of these difficulties, the new administration went ahead
with a program of political reforms of great moment. No tradition for
the respective duties of the Cabinet members and their relation to the
President had yet been established. Under Washington's administration
letters sent to the President were referred by him to the departments
concerned to be acted upon, and letters sent to the department heads
were submitted to the President with a proposed answer. Generally they
were sent back with his approbation; sometimes an alteration was
suggested, and when the subject was particularly important it was
reserved for a conference. In this manner Washington always was in
accurate possession of all facts and proceedings in all parts of the
Union. This procedure had been impossible to follow during Adams'
administration, owing to the long and habitual absences of the President
from the seat of government, and little by little the department heads
had assumed more and more responsibility, with the result that the
government had four different heads "drawing sometimes in different
directions." This usurpation of powers and this maladministration
Jefferson meant to end. In a very courteous, but very firm manner, he
reminded the members of the Cabinet that the President had been
intrusted with a certain set of duties incumbent upon him and for which
he was responsible before the public, and that he considered it
necessary to return to the procedure followed by Washington. What had
been an informal custom was to become a regular and official routine; it
entailed an enormous expenditure of time on the part of the President, a
great flexibility of mind, and a necessity of adapting himself to many
different problems in the course of one day. To a large extent,
Jefferson is responsible for placing on the shoulders of the chief
executive the enormous load under which several Presidents have broken
down.

This was not the most conspicuous reform introduced by Jefferson in the
plan of government, yet it was one of the most important. Of no less
consequence was the reform of the financial system of the United States.
The privilege of the bank had still several years to run, but many other
modifications could be introduced at once. Hamilton had multiplied the
number of internal taxes and at the same time the number of Federal
office-holders in order to strengthen his hold on the government. These
had to be done away with, as well as the abominable excise taxes which
had created so many difficulties under the preceding administrations.
They were at best a temporary expedient, to be resorted to only in case
of war, and the Federal Government had to make an effort to return to
the more orthodox system of bringing its expenditures within the limits
of revenue raised by taxes on importations. This was perfectly
consistent with Jefferson's theory of the State rights and the general
functions of the Federal Government. To substitute economy for taxation,
to reduce the debt as rapidly as possible, to keep down the expenses for
the navy and the army,--such was the policy of the new administration,
and in his second annual message on December 15, 1802, Jefferson could
point out with pleasure that "in the department of finance the receipts
of external duties for the last twelve months have exceeded those of any
former year." To care for the Louisiana Purchase, Gallatin recommended a
loan of $11,250,000, running for fifteen years and carrying a six per
cent. interest. But in his fourth message the President declared that
"the state of our finances continues to fulfill our expectations. Eleven
million and a half dollars received in the course of the year ending on
the thirtieth of September last, have enabled us, after meeting all the
ordinary expenses of the year, to pay upward of $3,600,000 of the public
debt, exclusive of interest." Thus it was amply demonstrated that the
financial structure of the Federal Government had not been endangered by
a departure from Hamilton's policies. It is worth noting also that
Jefferson's party, at that time, stood for a strong tariff, while the
last Federalists advocated internal taxes. In that respect, at least, it
is hardly possible to say that the present-day Democrats continue the
Jeffersonian policies.

This system, however, presented many advantages in the eyes of
Jefferson. In his first message he had made one of those many
declarations, so often found in official documents of the sort, by which
men in public life are wont to define their policies in almost sibylline
terms, so as to express their own aspirations and satisfy the members of
their party without arousing undue antagonism in an influential
minority. "Agriculture," he had written, "manufactures, commerce, and
navigation, the four pillars of our prosperity, are the most thriving
when left most free to individual enterprise." But at once he had added:
"Protection from casual embarrassments, however, may sometimes be
reasonably interposed. If in the course of your observations or
inquiries they should appear to need any aid within the limits of our
constitutional powers, your sense of their importance is a sufficient
assurance they will occupy your attention." This second statement could
only mean one thing, that the President was not ready to depart entirely
and radically from Hamilton's policy of giving encouragement to
manufactures. But there is no doubt that in his opinion America was to
remain essentially an agricultural nation. He still had before him the
vision of a large country in which every citizen would live on his own
land and from this land derive most of his subsistence instead of
congregating in large cities. It was a Vergilian vision magnified a
million times; it was based also to a large extent on his own experience
at Monticello where he had proved that it was possible to manufacture
tools, to bake bricks, to make furniture, and to maintain a
comparatively large family on the products of the soil. He was not ready
to antagonize openly those who dreamed of another future for America,
and he did not believe that he had a right to do so, since his duty was
to carry out the wishes of the people.

Jefferson was not the man to take the lead in these matters, but he was
not the man either to oppose any measure to encourage manufactures and
commerce that Congress would deem proper to adopt. On this point he had
not varied since the letter he had written from Paris to Hogendorp. His
preference for "an agricultural condition" remained largely theoretical,
sentimental, and personal. He may be considered as the leader of an
agrarian party, he may have felt in sympathy with the French
Physiocrats, but when it came to practice he acted very much like Du
Pont de Nemours himself who, in spite of his theories, spent all he had
to establish a tannery and a powder mill near Wilmington, and at the end
of his days proposed to the American Government a "Plan for the
Encouragement of Manufactures in America." If it is true that during
Jefferson's administration industrial and agricultural interests clashed
for the first time in America, I fail to see that the President made any
effort to favor agriculture at the expense of industry.

When the end of his first term approached, Jefferson did not need any
coercion to remain in the saddle for another period of four years. It
had already been decided that Aaron Burr would not and could not again
be a candidate, and George Clinton was chosen as running mate of
Jefferson. Never in the history of the United States was an election so
little contested: Jefferson obtained one hundred sixty-two electoral
votes while his opponent could only muster fourteen. The Republican
Party had really become the National party and the President had been
able to achieve political unity.




CHAPTER II

PROTECTIVE IMPERIALISM AND TERRITORIAL EXPANSION


The famous Inaugural Message of Jefferson gave more space to questions
of domestic politics than to foreign problems, but it contained a clear
definition of America's attitude towards Europe--a short and terse
statement in which the President reiterated the principles which had
guided him when Secretary of State. These were the same principles that
underlay the foreign policies of the United States from the early days
of the Revolution. They had already appeared in the Plan of Treaties
drawn up by Adams in 1776; they had been solemnly proclaimed by
Washington in his Farewell Address; and they still direct to a large
extent America's attitude in her dealings with foreign nations on the
American continent as well as abroad.

These principles were presented by Jefferson as being essentially the
result of natural conditions for which the Americans themselves were not
responsible: "Kindly separated by nature and a wide ocean from the
exterminating havoc of one quarter of the globe; too high-minded to
endure the degradations of others; possessing a chosen country, with
room enough for our descendants to the hundredth and thousandth
generation", there was only one course for the American people to
follow: "commerce and honest friendship with all nations--entangling
alliances with none."

Thanks to the Republican victory, America no longer had to pay any
attention to the political convulsions which were tearing the vitals of
the Old World. The American experiment no longer depended on the issue
of the French Revolution. The Argosy had weathered the storm; America
had become the sole arbiter of her destinies, she had become, Jefferson
proclaimed, "a standing monument and example for the aim and imitation
of the people of other countries; and I join with you in the hope and
belief that they will see, from our example, that a free government is
of all others the most energetic; that the inquiry which has been
excited among the mass of mankind by our revolution and its
consequences, will ameliorate the condition of man over a great portion
of the globe."

Such a declaration should not be mistaken for a manifestation of a
missionary spirit by which Jefferson was never moved and which was
absolutely abhorrent to his nature. America was not to engage in any
crusade. She was not to preach a new gospel of liberty to the oppressed
peoples of the earth. She had proclaimed no _Déclaration européenne des
droits de l'homme et du citoyen_, as the French Revolution had
ambitiously done. She was not sending overseas to the shackled nations a
call to throw off the yoke and liberate themselves. Such declarations
would have seemed to Jefferson idle and dangerous. Every people had to
work out their own salvation; any attempt by America to help and
encourage them would only embroil her in difficulties which would retard
her own development. She could best serve the cause of humanity by
standing aloof and simply existing as an example which others, if they
had eyes to see, could not fail sooner or later to imitate. It was
essentially the doctrine which has been so often expounded by the
non-interventionists every time America has been invited to coöperate
with Europe.

This doctrine therefore was not the expression of a passing mood; it
constituted one of the fundamental principles of Americanism and had a
permanent value, because, as Montesquieu would have said, it was the
result of "the nature of things", and not a deduction drawn from an _a
priori_ principle. On the other hand, it contained a new and interesting
affirmation of the unquestionable superiority of the American people
over all the peoples of the earth, not only morally but intellectually;
and this was not forgotten either, for the "high-mindedness" of
Jefferson was echoed and reflected more than a hundred years later in
the "too proud to fight" of Woodrow Wilson. Taken in itself, this
statement was no worse than so many statements made in political
speeches; all peoples like to be told and to believe that they are a
chosen people. But it must be confessed that Jefferson drew very
dangerous conclusions from that uniqueness of America's position.

One of the earliest and frankest expressions of that naïve and almost
unconscious imperialism appears in an unpublished letter to Doctor
Mitchell. After discussing every possible subject under heaven, from
frosts to mammoth bones and electricity, Jefferson concluded with this
disquieting statement: "Nor is it in physics alone that we shall be
found to differ from the other hemisphere. I strongly suspect that our
geographical peculiarities may call for a different code of natural law
to govern relations with other nations from that which the conditions of
Europe have given rise to there."[425]

This idea was reiterated in a letter written to Short more than a year
later. In it Jefferson laid down the principle, the moral foundation of
American imperialism--a curious mixture of common sense, practical
idealism, and moralizing not to be found perhaps in any other people,
but more permanently American than typically Jeffersonian. To any sort
of arrangement with Europe he was irreducibly opposed: "We have a
perfect horror at everything connecting ourselves with the politics of
Europe." In order to protect America from the wiles of the European
diplomats, the best course was "in the meantime, to wish to let every
treaty we have drop off without renewal. We call in our diplomatic
missions, barely keeping up those to the most important nations. There
is a strong disposition in our countrymen to discontinue even these;
and very possibly it may be done." Jefferson admitted that the neutral
rights of the United States might suffer; they would undoubtedly suffer
temporarily, and one had to accept this as an unavoidable evil. But it
would be only temporary: "We feel ourselves strong and daily growing
stronger ... If we can delay but for a few years the necessity of
vindicating the laws of nature on the ocean, we shall be the more sure
of doing it with effect. The day is within my time as well as yours;
when we may say by what laws other nations shall treat us on the sea.
And we will say it."[426]

Nor was this imperialism purely theoretical. It was susceptible of
immediate applications and it manifested itself openly in a letter
written to James Monroe a few weeks later. The people of Virginia were
most anxious to get rid of a band of malefactors guilty of insurgency,
conspiracy, and rebellion. Had they been whites, the solution would have
been easy enough, but it happened that they were colored people and they
could not reasonably be sent to the northern boundary, or be provided
with land in the Western Territory. Could these undesirables be pushed
into the Spanish sphere of influence? To this solution Jefferson was
unequivocally opposed and for reasons worth considering: "However our
present situation may restrain us within our own limits," he wrote to
Monroe, "it is impossible not to look forward to distant times, when our
rapid multiplication will expand itself beyond those limits, and cover
the whole northern, if not the southern continent, with a people
speaking the same language, governed in similar forms, and by similar
laws; nor can we contemplate either blot or mixture on that
surface."[427]

Truly enough, Jefferson said at the beginning of the letter that
publication of his views might have an ill effect in more than one
quarter. I shall not even advance the theory that Jefferson's foreign
policies constituted a systematic effort to put such a program into
effect. But that such aspirations and ambitions existed in his mind and
influenced him to a certain extent cannot be denied, and they should not
be overlooked in any discussion of his attitude during the negotiations
that led to the purchase of Louisiana.

Many of Jefferson's contemporaries, and not a few American historians,
have harshly criticized him for buying Louisiana from France, when no
clause in the Constitution authorized the acquisition of new territory.
On the French side, not only historians but even Bonaparte's brother
considered that the cession, without the previous consultation of the
Chambers, of a colony recently recovered by France was an act arbitrary
and unconstitutional. Both principals have been condemned and praised by
posterity, but there is no doubt that the full responsibility for the
transaction rests not upon the peoples of France and America, but on the
President of the United States and the Premier Consul. It was remarkable
that two great minds, so divergent in their views and principles, should
meet on a common ground instead of clashing. On neither side was it a
triumph of idealism, but of that enlightened self-interest which,
according to Jefferson, directs the actions of men as well as of
nations.

Nor were they entirely unsupported by the public opinion of their
respective countries. I have already indicated in a preceding book[428]
that a friendly conspiracy seems to have been organized in France in
order to induce the First Consul, and chiefly Talleyrand, to acquiesce
in the cession. At any rate, it appears from several letters of Volney
that the Ideologists were anxious to avoid an open conflict with the
United States and, at the same time, to promote a measure which, in
their opinion, would insure the growth and prosperity of the Republican
Promised Land. Volney, himself one of the "_voyageurs_" of the
Directory, had made a trip to the West and come back fully convinced
that France could never hope to develop an empire in the Mississippi
Valley. The few scattered French colonists who remained isolated in the
Middle West were condemned to be gradually absorbed by the influx of
American pioneers and to disappear before the rising flood of American
colonization. The question of the lower valley of the Mississippi was
different, to be sure, but if the United States were thwarted in their
development, if they were hemmed in on every side by powerful neighbors,
the theory of Montesquieu that only small nations could adopt the
republican system of government would seem vindicated. It was not only
the fate of the United States which was at stake, but the fate of the
doctrine of popular government, and it was the duty of all liberals to
bend every effort to make more secure the prosperity of America.

On the other hand, as we have already seen in previous chapters, while
Jefferson was satisfied to leave Louisiana in the hands of Spain, at
least temporarily, he had always watched for a favorable opportunity to
unite the Spanish colonies to the main body of the United States. It was
not so much desire of expansion and imperialism as the conviction that
colonies were only pawns in the game of European politics; that they
could change hands at any time according to the fortunes of war; that
there existed consequently a permanent danger of seeing France recover
some day her former colonies or, still worse, to have them fall into the
hands of the British. With England, or possibly France, on the northern
border, in the Floridas, on the Gulf, and in the valley of the
Mississippi, the old dream of European domination of the North American
continent would revive. The United States would be placed in the same
position as the old colonies with reference to France. A clash could not
be avoided; the issue would have to be fought out, until one of the
adversaries should remain in full and undisputed possession of the
whole northern part of the New World.

Although the Treaty of San Ildefonso, by which France was to recover and
occupy Louisiana at the first favorable opportunity, was intended to
remain secret, rumors that some deal had been concluded greatly
disturbed the American Government. As early as March, 1801, Rufus King
had been informed in London that such a cession was contemplated and
learned that General Collot intended to leave for Louisiana with a
considerable number of followers. On June 1, King called his
Government's attention to the fact that the cession of Louisiana "might
enable France to extend her influence, and perhaps her dominion, up the
Mississippi; and through the Lakes even up to Canada." The information
caused great concern to the British Government, and Lord Hawkesbury had
acquainted the American minister with the rumors. At that time, King,
who was evidently familiar with the views of Jefferson on the matter,
had answered by quoting Montesquieu that "it is happy for trading
powers, that God has permitted Turks and Spaniards to be in the world,
since of all nations they are the most proper to possess a great empire
with insignificance." The purport of this quotation being, he wrote,
that, "we are contented that the Floridas remain in the hands of Spain,
but should not be willing to see them transferred, except to ourselves."
It was a double-edged answer, since it set at nil any hope the British
might have had of occupying Louisiana and the Floridas; and at the same
time it constituted a very accurate statement of the position maintained
by Jefferson when Secretary of State in all his dealings pertaining to
the Spanish colonies.

This policy was clearly defined in the general observations communicated
by the President to Charles Pinckney, minister in Madrid (June 9, 1801)
and in the instructions given to Livingston, hastening his departure for
France (September 28, 1801). Jefferson did not know yet what part of
the Spanish colonies was to be ceded to France and was more preoccupied
with the eventuality of the cession of the Floridas. The solution
preferred for the present was clearly the _status quo_. Should the
cession have irrevocably taken place, the rights to the navigation of
the Mississippi were to be safeguarded, and if possible France should be
induced "to make over to the United States the Floridas, if included in
the cession to her from Spain, or at least West Florida, through which
several of our rivers (particularly the important river Mobile) empty
themselves into the sea." Finally, if the cession had never been
contemplated, Livingston was instructed to induce France "to favor
experiments on the part of the United States, for obtaining from Spain
the cession in view."

The die was cast; for the first time the United States took the position
that the time had come for them to control the territory extending
between their States and the Gulf of Mexico, and to insure the peaceful
and unquestioned rights of navigation on the Mississippi. From the point
of view of international law or _droit des gens_, Madison reiterated the
doctrine of Jefferson, that it was a natural law that the States should
have access to the sea; and in this particular instance he hinted at
another principle--the application of which to the old territories of
Europe would be far-reaching--namely that the nation possessing a
certain river was entitled also to the mouth of the river. But this
again was probably in his opinion one of these "natural laws" which
applied to America only. At the end of November, Rufus King sent to
Madison a copy of the treaty between the Prince of Parma and Lucien
Bonaparte, signed at Madrid, March 31, 1801, and in December he had the
opportunity of mentioning the possibility of France paying her debts by
ceding Louisiana back to the United States, which only brought the curt
answer that "none but spendthrifts satisfy their debts by selling their
lands."

Livingston, in a letter to Rufus King, took the view that the cession
would be disastrous not only to the United States but to Spain and
England, since the French would not fail to contract alliance with the
Indians and to renew relations with "the peasantry of Canada", rendering
the possessions of Britain very precarious. He could only hope that King
would do his utmost to "induce the British ministry to throw all the
obstacles in their power in the way of a final settlement of this
business, if it is not already too late."

The British ministry refused to take the hint. Unwelcome as the passing
of Louisiana into French hands might be considered they were not
disposed to endanger the success of the negotiations shortly to be begun
at Amiens, and Rufus King was told that the subject would not even be
mentioned by Lord Hawkesbury.[429] Evidently England never intended to
draw the chestnuts out of the fire for the sole benefit of the United
States, and Livingston alone was left to face the situation. The letter
he wrote on his own initiative, unable as he was to consult the home
government, was somewhat blunt in tone. He called attention to the fact
that the arrival in Louisiana or Florida of a large body of French
troops could not fail to alarm the people of the Western Territory. He
conceded that no protest could be made under the sixth article of the
Treaty of 1778, since it had been superseded by the agreement of
September 30, 1800; but he maintained that even in the absence of a
formal treaty the clause expressed a very desirable policy, that at
least the United States wished to know exactly the boundaries of the
territory ceded by Spain. At the same time, he discreetly added that
"the government of the United States desired to be informed how far it
would be practicable to make such arrangements between their respective
governments as would, at the same time, aid the financial operations of
France, and remove, by a strong and natural boundary, all future causes
of discontent between her and the United States."

These different reports, and particularly Livingston's letter to King,
of December 30, created some perturbation in the mind of Jefferson, and
on March 16, Madison wrote the American minister in Paris "that too much
circumspection could not be employed." The great danger was that any
sort of a combination with Great Britain would have to be paid later in
kind or in territory. While Madison sent recommendations to Pinckney and
to Livingston, the clear wish of Jefferson was to keep out England as
much as possible. It was at that time that the President decided to take
a hand directly in the negotiations. At the beginning of April, 1802, Du
Pont de Nemours had written Jefferson that political as well as
commercial considerations made it imperative for him to go to France for
a short visit. Jefferson saw at once a possibility to use Du Pont as in
the past he had employed Lafayette, and asked him to come to Washington
to become acquainted "with certain matters that could not be committed
to paper."[430]

Very significantly he added: "I believe that the destinies of great
countries depend upon it, such is the crisis now existing." As Du Pont
answered that he could not possibly see the President before sailing,
Jefferson decided to explain his point of view fully in a long letter
and at the same time he expressed himself even more forcibly in a letter
to Livingston which he asked Du Pont to read before sealing it.

The two letters complete and explain each other. First of all, Jefferson
rejected as a very imperfect solution the granting free access to the
sea to the territories situated on the left bank of the Mississippi. He
bluntly declared that although America had a more natural and
instinctive friendship for France than for any other nation, it was
quite certain that the national characteristics of the two peoples were
so divergent that they could not live peacefully side by side for any
length of time. Even the cession by France of the Floridas and New
Orleans would be only a palliative which might delay but not suppress
the unavoidable conflict.[431] The only solution was for France to give
up entirely the rights she had acquired under the Treaty of San
Ildefonso and to return to the _status quo_. Any attempt by Bonaparte to
send soldiers to Louisiana would be considered as a _casus belli_, and
the President wrote significantly: "Peace and abstinence from European
interference are our objects, and so will continue while the present
order of things in America remains uninterrupted." If, on the other
hand, France insisted upon taking possession of Louisiana, it was the
declared intention of Jefferson to come to an agreement with England,
then to launch an expedition against New Orleans, to occupy the
territory claimed by France, so as to prevent any new European nation
from setting foot on the continent. That this policy of non-colonization
should apply to South America as well as to the northern continent was
evidently in the mind of the President, since he declared that after the
annihilation of the French fleet, two nations--America and Great
Britain--would rule the sea, and the two continents would be practically
"appropriated by them."

The threat was so formidable that Du Pont refused to believe that it was
seriously meant. He saw at once that if such representations were made
to the First Consul, even with proper diplomatic precautions, they would
be looked upon by him as a challenge that could not be ignored. "Give up
that country, or we shall take it", is not at all persuasive. "We will
defend it", is the answer that comes naturally to any man. Furthermore,
the old Physiocrat predicted that if the United States ever followed
such a policy, they would lose their prestige as a democratic and
peaceful nation. Jefferson would thus play into the hands of the
militaristic faction which ambitioned the conquest of Mexico; if, on
the contrary, Mexico were to be emancipated, it might become a dangerous
neighbor for the United States. He consequently urged Jefferson to
accept what he considered as a much more sensible program, namely a
compromise which would insure free access to the sea to "the territories
of the Cumberland, the Wabash and both banks of the Ohio." Finally he
warned the President against entering into such an alliance with
England, since England would never permit the United States to become a
naval power of first importance. If, however, the United States insisted
on having a free hand in the South, was it not possible, in view of the
impending war between France and England, to permit France to recover
Canada instead of Louisiana, and to tell Bonaparte: "Give us Louisiana
and at the first opportunity we shall restore Canada to you"?

Even if that were refused, if nothing could remove Jefferson's objection
to the establishment of a French colony on the northern continent, there
was still a possibility of giving satisfaction to both parties concerned
without unduly irritating the national pride of either. This was simply
for America to buy from France her claim on the Southern territory. True
to his training and doctrine, Du Pont had devised a commercial solution
to a political problem. The question of Louisiana was to be treated as a
business, with a political background to be sure, but essentially on
business terms.

The answer of Jefferson has unfortunately disappeared and was probably
destroyed by Du Pont; but another letter of the old Physiocrat permits
us to reconstruct its contents. Jefferson contended that the United
States had no money and could not afford to pay any important amount for
such a purchase. To which Du Pont answered that purchasing would be
infinitely more economical than going to war:

  The sum offered and accepted will not exclude any compensation for
  all or part of the sum which might be paid to you under the treaty.
  To agree on the price is the important thing. To arrange for the
  forms of payment, to charge against it legitimate reductions is only
  a secondary matter, which will take care of itself. All the rest of
  your instructions is easy to follow, and I shall follow them exactly.

Then proving himself to be as good a prophet as a philosopher Du Pont
added that Bonaparte would be more attracted by a frank and complete
proposal than by a compromise: "I hope it will succeed because Bonaparte
is a man of genius, and his character is much above ordinary
ideas."[432]

It is not entirely to the credit of Jefferson that, when he was thus
declaring to Du Pont that the United States could not afford to
negotiate on such a basis, Madison, on May 1, 1802, was writing to
Livingston, asking him to ascertain precisely the price at which the
Floridas, "if included in the cession would be yielded to the United
States."

The whole story of the negotiations as it appears in the Jefferson
papers and in the documents published in the Annals of Congress would be
worth retelling in detail. The evasions of the French minister
Talleyrand, the reticences of the Spanish ambassador as to the true
extent of the cession, the attempts of Rufus King to determine the
British Government to throw their influence on the side of the United
States, the blundering efforts of Livingston to place the case of his
Government before the eyes of Bonaparte, form one of the most
complicated and fascinating diplomatic mazes in which the inexperienced
and not highly skillful agents of the United States tried to find their
way. Livingston, who thought himself very adroit, was particularly
unfelicitous in his tone. The conclusion of the memoir he wrote on
August 10 and had printed for distribution to the French Government may
give an idea of his style:

  In reasoning upon this subject, I have confined myself to such
  observations as obviously presented themselves, without seeking any
  of those subtleties which may serve to mislead the judgment. I have
  candidly exposed the plainest facts, in the simplest language. If
  ever they are opposed, it will be by a contrary course. Eloquence and
  sophistry may reply to them and may obscure them; but time and
  experience will evince their truth.

Such a language may have seemed to the American minister candid and
honest, but addressed to Bonaparte and Talleyrand it was very
undiplomatic, to say the least. One cannot help feeling, on reading the
documents, that had Livingston wished to break off negotiations he would
not have expressed himself otherwise, and it is difficult to share the
opinion of Henry Adams, who claimed for the American minister most of
the credit for bringing the negotiations to a successful conclusion.

By the end of the summer 1802, it appeared that, before going any
further, France intended to take possession of Louisiana, and Du Pont
knew only too well that such a step would cause an irresistible outburst
of public opinion in the United States. He kept in constant touch with
Livingston, giving counsels of moderation and patience. He even proposed
the project of a treaty which in his opinion would give temporary
satisfaction to the United States while being acceptable to France. This
plan included the cession of New Orleans and the Floridas, reserving for
French vessels the same treatment as for American shipping; France to
keep all the territories on the right bank of the Mississippi, but the
navigation of the river to be free to both nations. Finally the United
States were to pay the sum of six million dollars for the territories
described in the first article.[433]

In the meantime things were moving fast in America. The suspension of
the right of deposit by the Spanish authorities was taxing the none too
strong endurance of the inhabitants of the western territory, and the
war party was making great progress. Madison wrote on November 27,
1802, that should the Spanish intendant prove as obstinate as he has
been ignorant or wicked, nothing can temperate the irritation and
indignation of the Western country, but a persuasion that the energy of
their own government will obtain from the justice of that of Spain the
most ample redress.[434]

In his message to Congress read on December 15, the President included a
short paragraph pregnant with significance:

  The cession of the Spanish province of Louisiana to France, which
  took place in the course of the late war, if carried into effect,
  makes a change in the aspect of our foreign relations which will
  doubtless have just weight in any deliberation of the Legislature
  connected with that subject.

This sentence could have only one meaning: that if France took
possession of Louisiana, appropriations would be in order to prevent her
from establishing herself permanently in the territory. It was a direct
threat of war. The President had apparently given up any hope of
reaching an agreement and was yielding to the war party.

On December 17 it was, on motion of Randolph:

  _Resolved_, That the President of the United States be requested to
  cause to be laid before this house such papers as are in the
  possession of the Department of State as relate to the violation on
  the part of Spain, of the Treaty of Friendship, Limits, and
  Navigation, between the United States and the King of Spain.

Jefferson complied with this request on December 22, averring that he
"was aware of the obligation to maintain, in all cases, the rights of
the nation, and to employ, for that purpose, those just and honorable
means which belong to the character of the United States."[435]

There is no doubt that the President himself had lost patience and that
the United States were rapidly drifting towards overt acts that could
only have war as a consequence. On January 4 it was moved in the House
that the President be requested to communicate all the information at
his disposal on the reported cession of Louisiana. Then quite
unexpectedly, on January 11, Jefferson sent to the Senate a message
recommending that James Monroe be appointed special envoy to France with
full powers, "jointly with Mr. Livingston to enter into a treaty or
convention with the First Consul of France, for the purpose of enlarging
and more effectually securing, our rights and interests in the river
Mississippi, and in the territories eastward thereof." The next day, the
House, on recommendation of a committee which presented a lengthy
report, voted an appropriation of "two million dollars to defray the
expenses which may be incurred in relation to the intercourse between
the United States and foreign nations."

The sudden change in Jefferson's attitude can largely be attributed to
the fact that, between December 15 and January 11, he had received a
letter sent from Paris by Du Pont de Nemours on October 4,[436]
submitting a tentative plan for a treaty and discounting the pessimistic
reports of Livingston. There is not the slightest doubt that the
President was much impressed by Du Pont's letter. On January 18, Madison
wrote to Pinckney:

  In order to draw the French government into the measure, a sum of
  money will be made part of our propositions.... From a letter
  received by the President from a respectable person, it is inferred,
  with probability that the French government is not averse to treat on
  those grounds; and that such a disposition must be strengthened by
  circumstances of the present moment.[437]

Finally Jefferson himself wrote to Du Pont that his letter had been
received with particular satisfaction, because while it held up terms
that could not be entirely yielded, "it proposed such as a mutual
spirit of accommodation and sacrifice may bring to some point of
union."[438]

The President indicated, however, that the action of Spain in suspending
the rights of deposit had rendered imperative an immediate settlement:
"Our circumstances are so imperious as to admit of no delay as to our
course; and the use of the Mississippi so indispensable, that we cannot
hesitate one moment to hazard our existence for its maintainance."
Despite this more conciliatory tone, the President did not recede from
the position he had taken previously with Du Pont. He repeated that the
country was in no position to offer such a sum as mentioned by Mr. Du
Pont (six million dollars) in order to insure the purchase of the said
territory.

In this, Jefferson was to some extent guilty of double-dealing with his
friend, or at least of not laying all his cards on the table. The
instructions given to Monroe and Livingston on March 2, 1803, specified
that "should a greater sum (than two million dollars) be made an
ultimatum on the part of France, the President has made up his mind to
go as far as fifty millions of _livres tournois_, rather than to lose
the main object." Incidentally, this passage explains how Monroe and
Livingston could feel authorized to accept the proposal to purchase the
whole territory for sixty million francs. They were not so bold as is
commonly supposed, since they were empowered by the President to go as
far as fifty million for part only of Louisiana. Whether Jefferson had
the constitutional right to promise such a sum without formal approval
of Congress is quite another matter. It is only fair, however, to recall
here that, due to the difficulty of communicating between Washington and
Paris and the urgency of the situation, it was an absolute necessity to
give considerable leeway to the plenipotentiaries and to provide for
every possible emergency. But it must also be remembered that had not
Jefferson taken at that precise time the responsibility of engaging the
resources of the United States, neither Livingston nor Monroe would have
felt authorized to sign a transaction involving six times the sum voted
by the House of Representatives. The blame or praise, whatever it may
be, must in final analysis fall entirely on Jefferson.

It is not without some interest to notice here that Livingston was
entirely unaware of the value of Du Pont de Nemours' plan. Unable to pin
down Talleyrand or Lebrun, he soon came to the conclusion that it was
impossible to treat and that he might as well leave Paris. "I see very
little use for a minister here, where there is but one will; and that
will governed by no object but personal security and personal ambition;
were it left to my discretion, I should bring matters to some positive
issue, or leave them, which would be the only means of bringing them to
an issue."[439] He maintained to the last minute that Du Pont de Nemours
had given the French government "with the best intentions, ideas that we
shall find hard to eradicate, and impossible to yield to",[440] and on
hearing that Monroe had been appointed, following receipt of Du Pont's
letter, he answered that he was much surprised that Du Pont should talk
"of the designs of this court, the price, &c., because he must have
derived these from his imagination only, as he had no means of seeing
anybody here that could give him the least information."[441]

Who was the better informed of the two it is not easy to decide. But by
a curious coincidence, while Livingston was writing this in Paris, the
ink was hardly dry on the instructions to Monroe which contained this
striking paragraph: "It is to be added that the overtures committed to
you coincide in great measure with the ideas of the person through whom
the letter of the President of April 30, 1802, was conveyed to Mr.
Livingston, and who is presumed to have gained some insight into the
present sentiments of the French Cabinet."[442]

The very same day Du Pont was able to write Jefferson that he had
several times seen Talleyrand and Lebrun and that the French Government
had decided to give every possible satisfaction to the United States. On
April 6, he added, without giving any detail, that good progress had
been made; but that he had not told everything to Livingston.

There is little doubt that the letter of Du Pont made Jefferson delay
any strong measure in the Mississippi Valley affair and stayed the hand
of the God of War. If negotiations had been broken off at that point, it
was the intention of the British government "to send an expedition to
occupy New Orleans."[443] What the consequences of such an action would
have been can easily be surmised.

The rest of the story lies outside of our province, since Jefferson had
nothing to do directly with it. Barbé-Marbois has told the dramatic
scene of Easter Sunday, April 10, 1803, when Bonaparte called in two
ministers and gave the first indication that he considered the whole
colony lost and that it might be better to give it up entirely. The next
morning the First Consul requested Marbois to act as plenipotentiary and
to see Livingston at once. When Monroe arrived, a preliminary
understanding had been reached. The treaty was concluded on May 4 and
signed four days later, although it was antedated and marked April 30.

The question of deciding whether Jefferson had foreseen the possibility
of acquiring the whole territory of Louisiana and had given to Monroe
instructions to that effect has provided his biographers, whether
friendly or unfriendly, with a nice bone to pick. It seems here that a
distinction must be established between the wishes of the President and
what he considered within the range of actual possibilities. From his
letters to Lafayette and Du Pont de Nemours, it is easily perceived that
he was unequivocally opposed to the reinstatement of France on any part
of the continent. On this point he never varied. On the other hand, he
had soon become convinced that France would never relinquish such an
enormous territory without a compensation that the United States could
not afford to pay. He limited his plans very soon to the acquisition of
the two Floridas, which he supposed had been made part of the
transaction, so as to give the United States access to the Gulf, while
taking a strong position on the Mississippi River. In his letter to Du
Pont de Nemours dated February 1, 1803, he reiterated that the United
States wanted and needed the Floridas, that "whatever power, other than
ourselves, holds the country east of the Mississippi, becomes our
natural enemy." But further he did not go. On February 27, 1803, he
wrote to Governor Harrison a letter which seems to settle the question:
"We bend our whole views to the purchase and settlement of the country
on the Mississippi, from its mouth to its northern regions, that we may
be able to present as strong a front on our western as on our eastern
border, and plant on the Mississippi itself the means of its own
defence." As for the Indians, they were either "to be incorporated with
us as citizens of the United States, or removed beyond the Mississippi."
Finally the letter written on July 29 to Livingston and Monroe is as
definite a statement as can be desired and ought to set the controversy
at rest:

  When these (your instructions and commission) were made out, the
  object of the most sanguine was limited to the establishment of the
  Mississippi as our boundary. It was not presumed, that more could be
  sought by the United States, either with a chance of success, or
  perhaps without being suspected of a greedy ambition, than the island
  of New Orleans and the two Floridas.... Nor was it to be supposed
  that in case the French government should be willing to part with
  more than the territory on our side of the Mississippi, an
  arrangement with Spain for restoring the territory on the other side,
  would not be preferred to a sale of it to the United States.... The
  effect of such considerations was diminished by no information, or
  just presumptions whatever.[444]

Whatever may have been Jefferson's satisfaction on hearing the news, he
did not write himself to the commissioners to congratulate and thank
them in the name of the nation. He was not the man to make grand
gestures. The Virginian could be as self-restrained as any New
Englander, as appears from a letter to Horatio Gates in which the two
envoys are mentioned: "I find our opposition very willing to pluck
feathers from Monroe, although not fond of sticking them into
Livingston's coat. The truth is, both have a just proportion of merit;
and were it necessary or proper, it would be shown that each has
rendered peculiar services and of important value."[445] More than that
he did not say, and probably said very little more to Monroe, his friend
and "_élève_" when he came back from France.

Congress had been called for October 17, to ratify the treaty; but
before that date, Jefferson sent letters and questionnaires all around
in order to gather any possible information on the limits, geography,
resources and condition of the inhabitants of the newly acquired
territory. In a letter to Breckenridge (August 12, 1803), he expressed
himself more freely than to any other correspondent. First of all he
admitted that he was somewhat disappointed at having being unable to
secure the Floridas. But it was only a delayed opportunity; sooner or
later Spain would engage in some war, and the realistic politician
added: "If we push them strongly with one hand, holding out a price in
the other, we shall certainly obtain the Floridas, and all in good
time." For the present, the United States, without claiming possession
of the Spanish territories, would act pretty freely: "In the meantime,
without waiting for permission, we shall enter into the exercise of the
natural right we have always insisted on with having a right of innocent
passage through them to the ocean. We shall prepare her to see us
practice on this, and she will not oppose it by force."

He had already heard many objections to the treaty; of all of them he
disposed summarily. He did not take seriously the danger mentioned by
the Federalists of seeing a fringe of States, different in interest from
the original States, form along the Mississippi and threaten the
homogeneity of the Union. If it came to the worst, it would be better
for the United States to have as neighbors along the western border a
Federation of States inhabited by a people of the same blood than a
Spanish or French dominion. Then Jefferson prophetically outlined the
development of the West as he foresaw it. The inhabited part of
Louisiana was to become a new State as soon as possible. Above Pointe
Coupée, the best procedure was probably to move the Indians across the
river and to fill the vacant territories with white colonists. "When we
shall be full on this side, we may lay off a range of States on the
western bank from the head to the mouth, and so, range after range,
advancing compactly as we multiply."

As to the constitutionality of the purchase, he admitted there was no
article of the Constitution authorizing the holding of foreign
territory, and still less contemplating the incorporation of foreign
nations into the Union. "The executives, in seizing the fugitive
occurrence which so much advances the good of their country, have done
an act beyond the Constitution." They were justified in doing it,
however, just as much as a guardian has the right to invest money for
his ward in purchasing an adjacent territory and saying to him when of
age: "I did this for your good; I pretend to no right to bind you; you
may disavow me, and I must get out of the scrape as I can: I thought it
my duty to risk myself for you." This is another instance when
Jefferson the lawyer discarded what he called "metaphysical subtleties"
to look squarely at the facts and to do his duty as he saw it, "as a
faithful servant."

The third annual message of the President was read before Congress on
October 17. Written in simple language like all the State papers of
Jefferson, it contained a graceful word for "the enlightened government
of France", and pointed out soberly the advantages that would accrue to
the United States from the purchase:

  While the property and sovereignty of the Mississippi and its waters
  secure an independent outlet for the produce of the western States,
  and an uncontrolled navigation through their whole course, free from
  collision with other powers and the dangers to our peace from that
  source, the fertility of the country, its climate and extent, promise
  in due season important aids to our treasury, an ample provision for
  our posterity, and a wide-spread field for the blessings of freedom
  and equal laws.

The President avoided any specific recommendation on the measures to be
adopted to incorporate into the Union the recently acquired territories,
resting on the wisdom of Congress to determine the "measures which may
be necessary for the immediate occupation and temporary government of
the country; for rendering the change of government a blessing to our
newly adopted brethren; for securing to them the rights of conscience
and of property; for confirming to the Indian inhabitants their
occupancy and self-government." The Senate ratified the treaty after a
two-day discussion, the members voting strictly on party lines. It came
before the House on the twenty-second. The discussion was hot and more
prolonged; doubts as to the French title to the purchase were raised;
doubts as to the constitutionality of the measure. The treaty proper was
ratified on October 25, and on November 3 acts were passed authorizing
the issue of bonds in order to pay France.

A letter of Jefferson to Livingston contains the epilogue of the
negotiations. It is another very interesting instance of the way
Jefferson knew how to handle men. Pichon, the French minister, had been
instructed by his Government to secure a clause to the ratification
providing "against any failure in time or other circumstances of
execution on the part of the United States." Jefferson took the matter
in hand himself and demonstrated to Pichon that in case the French
Government insisted upon such a proviso, the United States would insert
a similar clause of protestation "leaving the matter where it stood
before." He insisted that it was to throw on the good faith of both
nations a doubt most unpleasant to an honest man to entertain, and
concluded that he had "more confidence in the word of the First Consul
than in all the parchment we could sign." What could the Frenchman do
except to bow politely and acquiesce, and "like an able and honest
minister (which he is in the highest degree) he undertook to do what he
knew his employers would do themselves, were they spectators of all
existing circumstances, and exchange the ratifications purely and
simply." "So," concluded Jefferson, "this instrument goes to the world
as an evidence of the candor and confidence of the nations in each
other, which will have the best effects."

A last point remained to be settled. It was suspected that Spain had
entered a formal protest against the whole transaction, "since the First
Consul had broken a solemn promise not to alienate the country to any
nation." On that point Jefferson refused to express any opinion: "We
answered that these were questions between France and Spain which they
must settle together; that we derived our title from the First Consul
and did not doubt his guarantee of it." Meanwhile measures were provided
to take formal possession from Laussat after he should have received the
territory from Spain. "If he is not so disposed _we_ shall take
possession and it will rest with the Government of France, by adopting
the act as their own, then to settle the latter with Spain."[446] In
order to provide for any eventuality, the governor of the Mississippi
was ordered to move down with General Wilkinson all his troops at hand
to take formal possession.

Thus the transaction fraught with so many dangers came to what Jefferson
called in a letter to Priestley (January 29, 1804) "a happy denouement",
thanks "to a friendly and frank development of causes and effects in our
part and good sense enough in Bonaparte to see that the train was
unavoidable and would change the face of the world."

If Jefferson took liberties with the Constitution in the matter of the
purchase, he was equally broad-minded in his construction of the treaty.
One of the articles provided that the inhabitants of the territories
ceded by France "will be incorporated into the Union and admitted as
soon as possible according to the principles of the Federal Constitution
to the enjoyment of all the advantages and immunities of the citizens of
the United States" (Article III). This was precisely what Jefferson was
firmly resolved not to do. Theoretically, and according to his often
expressed views on self-government, he should have taken steps to admit
immediately the newly acquired territory into the Union and to allow the
inhabitants to decide on a constitution. Practically, he considered that
they were unfitted for self-government and, although he did not formally
declare it at the time, he was convinced that self-government could not
succeed with a population mainly French and Spanish. The letter he wrote
on the subject to Du Pont de Nemours is almost disarming in its naïveté:

  We are preparing a form of government for the Territory of Louisiana.
  We shall make it as mild and free, as they are able to bear, all
  persons residing there concurring in the information that they were
  neither gratified, nor willing to exercise the rights of an elective
  government. The immense swarm flocking thither of Americans used to
  that exercise, will soon prepare them to receive the necessary
  change.[447]

It was impossible to state more clearly that representative government
could not be granted to Louisiana as long as the inhabitants remained
essentially French. Only when checked and controlled by the "immense
swarm" of American pioneers and colonists spreading all over the
territory could they be admitted to the immunities and advantages of
American citizens. This attitude of Jefferson, which seems in flagrant
contradiction with his theories, can astonish only those who see in him
a world prophet of the democratic faith; while his only ambition was to
build an American democracy, on strictly American principles, for the
sole benefit of American citizens, true heirs and continuators of the
old Anglo-Saxon principles.

But his vision of a greater America extended even beyond the limits of
the Louisiana Purchase. In January, 1803, just one week before Monroe's
appointment as special envoy to Paris, he had sent a message to Congress
to recommend that a sum of twenty-five hundred dollars be appropriated
to send "an intelligent officer with a party of 10 or 12 men to explore
even to the Western Ocean and to bring back all possible information on
the Indian tribes, the fauna and flora of the region." The intelligent
officer was Merriwether Lewis, private secretary to the President, who
was to engage in this "literary pursuit" in a region claimed by Spain.
It was calmly assumed, however, that "the expiring state of Spain's
interests there" would render such a voyage a matter of indifference to
this nation. Jefferson made the expedition his own concern; he drew up
the most detailed instructions for the mission. He even wrote for Lewis
"a letter of general credit" in his own hand and signed with his name,
by which the captain was authorized to draw on "the Secretaries of
State, the Treasury of War, and of the Navy of the United States
according as he might find his draughts would be most negotiable, for
the purpose of obtaining money or necessaries for himself and men."[448]
Practically unlimited resources were placed at the disposal of the
expedition. Jefferson kept his former secretary minutely informed of the
new possibilities opened up by the negotiations with France, writing him
on July 4, 11, 15, November 16 and January 13. On January 22, he sent
new instructions: the United States had "now become sovereigns of the
country" Lewis was going to explore; it was no longer necessary to keep
up the pretense of a "literary pursuit", and the President felt
authorized in proposing to the Indians the establishment of official
connections, and in declaring frankly to them that "they will find in us
faithful friends and protectors." So Jefferson was no longer thinking of
the Mississippi as the ultimate frontier of the United States. He
already foresaw the time when the Empire would extend from the Atlantic
to the Pacific.

Besides providing the United States with almost unlimited possibilities
of growth, the Louisiana Purchase had eliminated the immediate danger of
a conflict with France, and the chances of remaining at peace with
Europe had considerably increased. "I now see nothing which need
interrupt the friendship between France and this country," wrote
Jefferson to Cabanis. "We do not despair of being always a peaceable
nation. We think that peaceable means may be devised of keeping nations
in the path of justice towards us, by making justice their interest, and
injuries to react on themselves. Our distance enables us to pursue a
course which the crowded situation of Europe renders perhaps
impracticable there."[449]

There remained, however, a danger point in the policies of the British
navy with regard to contraband. The United States had now to make a
strenuous effort to bring the British to abandon their "right" to search
neutral vessels on the high seas in order to impress British sailors
found on those vessels, and to use American ports as cruising stations.
Not only was this attitude of Great Britain contrary to justice but it
was also contrary to these natural laws on which rested Jefferson's
system of Americanism; above all, they were most obnoxious and
detrimental to American commerce, for "Thornton says they watch our
trade to prevent contraband. We say it is to plunder under pretext of
contraband."[450]

Meanwhile the President was receiving the most pessimistic accounts from
Monroe, lost in the maze of European intrigues, and almost losing faith
in the future security of the United States. One of his letters of the
spring of 1804 had mentioned the possibility of a dark plot against
America. France and England might forget their old differences and
operate a reconciliation at the expense of the United States; they would
form a combination to divide between them the North American continent,
France repossessing Louisiana, while England would reannex the United
States to the British dominions. A mad scheme if ever there was one, and
it is very much to be doubted that it was ever contemplated by any
responsible Frenchman. Jefferson's confidence in the remoteness of the
American continent was not disturbed for a minute by these alarming
reports. He excused Monroe on the ground that a person placed in Europe
was very apt to believe the old nations endowed with limitless resources
and power. Everything was possible, even a return of the Bourbons; but
"that they and England joined, could recover us to British dominion, is
impossible. If things are not so, then human reason is of no aid in
conjecturing the conduct of nations." Still the policy of watchful
waiting was more than ever in order. Every point of friction was to be
eliminated, one of the first measures being to accept the "Louisianais"
to full citizenship and thus bring to an end the patronage of France.
Another step was to enforce strictly the rule against British cruisers
in American harbors, so that "each may see unequivocally what is
unquestionably true, that we may be very possibly driven into her scale
by unjust conduct in the other."[451]

Thus was fixed not in theory but in practice a policy of neutrality
fraught with risks. The most apparent danger was that both belligerents
might turn against the United States. But of that Jefferson was not
afraid, as an alliance between the two hereditary enemies seemed
inconceivable. In the meantime proper preparations were to be made to
insure the security of the American flag.

The message of October 17, 1803, contained an earnest appeal to
"complete neutrality." Neutrality of fact the Government was decided to
observe, and most of all to view in a disinterested way the carnage in
Europe.

  How desirable it must be, in a government like ours, to see its
  citizens adopt individually the views, the interests and the conduct
  which their country should pursue, divesting themselves of those
  passions and partialities which tend to lessen useful friendships and
  to embarrass and embroil us in the calamitous scenes of Europe.

Then came a passage which sounds strangely familiar to those of us who
have lived through the last fourteen years:

  Confident, fellow citizens, that you will duly estimate the
  importance of neutral dispositions toward the observance of neutral
  conduct, that you will be sensible how much it is our duty to look on
  the bloody arena spread before us with commiseration indeed, but with
  no other wish than to see it closed, I am persuaded you will
  cordially cherish these dispositions in all communications with your
  constituents.

A nation neutral in speech and neutral in thought, willing to intervene
only to help the victims of the war or as an arbiter between the
belligerents, such was at that time the ideal of Jefferson as it was to
be for several years the ideal of Woodrow Wilson, and to a large degree
the permanent ideal of the United States during their whole history.




CHAPTER III

"SELF-PRESERVATION IS PARAMOUNT TO ALL LAW"


When, on the fourth of March, 1805, Jefferson began his second term, he
had a right to review with some complacency the achievements of his
first administration. To foreign affairs he scarcely granted a short
paragraph, but he pointed out with great details the suppression of
unnecessary offices, the reduction of taxes, the fact that the Federal
Government was almost entirely supported by duties levied on
importations, so that "it may be the pleasure and pride of an American
to ask, what farmer, what mechanic, what laborer, ever sees a
tax-gatherer of the United States?" The Louisiana Purchase had increased
enormously the potential riches of the country and removed a very
dangerous source of conflict. The right bank of the Mississippi was to
be settled by "our own brethren and children" and not by "strangers of
another family."

Of great interest was the long passage given to Indian affairs.
Jefferson's sympathy for the red men dated from the early days of his
youth, when he had seen the chiefs stop at the house of his father on
their way to Williamsburg. He had handsomely stood in defense of them in
the "Notes on Virginia." Now he was regarding them with the
commiseration their history began to inspire:

  Endowed with the faculties and the rights of men, breathing an ardent
  love of liberty and independence, and occupying a country which left
  them no desire but to be undisturbed, the stream of overflowing
  population directed itself on these shores, without power to divert,
  or habits to contend against, they have been overwhelmed by the
  current, or driven before it.

This was certainly a very regrettable situation, but the idea of
questioning the right of an overflowing population to occupy scarcely
populated territories did not for a moment enter Jefferson's mind. To
deny such a right would have been not only detrimental to the very
existence of the United States, but also a denial of the "right" of "our
Saxons ancestors" to settle in England. Furthermore, the President was
confronted with a certain set of facts and not with a theory. The
territory of which the Indians had so long enjoyed undisturbed
possession was growing narrower every day. With the recent acquisition
of Louisiana, it was to be foreseen that they would not be able to roam
freely much longer in the vast territories extending west of the
Mississippi. They were now "reduced within limits too narrow for the
hunter's state." The only thing they could do was to submit to new
economic conditions, to settle down and become farmers, and it was the
duty of the government "to encourage them to that industry which alone
can enable them to maintain their place in existence, and to prepare
them in time for that state of society, which to bodily comforts adds
the improvement of mind and morals."

The President had no patience with

  ... the interested and crafty individuals among them who inculcate a
  sanctimonious reverence for the customs of their ancestors; that
  whatsoever they did, must be done through all time; that reason is a
  false guide, and to advance under its counsel, in their physical,
  moral, or political condition, is a perilous innovation; that their
  duty is to remain as their Creator made them.

The attitude of these reactionaries among the Indians gave Jefferson an
opportunity to hit at one stroke the medicine men and the clergymen who
were attacking him fiercely.

  In short, my friends, among them is seen the action and
  counter-action of good sense and bigotry; they, too, have their
  anti-philosophers, who find an interest in keeping things in their
  present state, who dread reformation, and exert all their faculties
  to maintain the ascendency of habit over the duty of improving our
  reason, and obeying its mandates.

The New England and New York clergymen who had stood with the
Federalists knew exactly where they belonged.

But if the President was unwilling to let the attacks to which he had
been subjected pass entirely unnoticed, he maintained at the same time
that no official steps must be taken to repress in any way freedom of
speech and freedom of the press. In more emphatic terms than ever
before, he reasserted the fundamental doctrine he had defended against
all comers for more than twenty-five years:

  During this course of administration, and in order to disturb it, the
  artillery of the press has been levelled against us, charged with
  whatsoever its licentiousness could devise or dare. These abuses of
  an institution so important to freedom and science, are deeply to be
  regretted, inasmuch as they tend to lessen its usefulness, and to sap
  its safety; they might, indeed, have been corrected by the wholesome
  punishments reserved and provided by the laws of the several States
  against falsehood and defamation; but public duties, more urgent
  press on the time of public servants, and the offenders have
  therefore been left to find their punishment in the public
  indignation.

Thus were the Callender and the Federalist pamphleteers handed over to
the public to be dealt with, according to the merits of their cases.

The address ended with a new appeal to harmony, with the hope that
truth, reason and well-understood self-interest might enlighten the last
opponents of true republicanism. It ended also with a sort of prayer
which may or may not have expressed the religious beliefs of Jefferson
at the time:

  I shall need the favor of that Being in whose hands we are, who led
  our forefathers, as Israel of old, from their native land, and
  planted them in a country flowing with all the necessaries and
  comforts of life; who has covered our infancy with his providence,
  and our riper years with his wisdom and power, and to whose goodness
  I ask you to join me in supplications.

Jefferson had not forgotten that twenty years before he had proposed
that the seal of the United States should represent the Children of
Israel led by a pillar of light. As much as the Puritans he was
convinced that the American people was a chosen people, that they have
been gifted with superior wisdom and strength, and this belief was just
as much part of his creed of Americanism as it was the more openly
expressed doctrine of more recent presidents of the United States.

With these brilliant and reassuring prospects before his eyes, Jefferson
entered his second term. Little did he believe at that time that the
four years before him were to be the most agitated and most distressing
of his long career. The man whose fondest hope was to "secure peace,
friendship and approbation of all nations" was to begin a series of
police operations against the Barbary pirates of the Mediterranean and
was confronted, at a time, with the possibility of a war with Spain, a
war with England and a war with France. His philosophical toga was torn
to shreds by the thorns strewn along the tortuous paths of international
relations. At home he had to use all his ingenuity and resourcefulness
to keep together disaffected elements in the Republican Party, to
withstand the attacks launched in Congress by John Randolph of Roanoke,
the impulsive, erratic and dangerous leader of the discontented
Republicans. The man who had framed the Kentucky resolutions and had
stood as the advocate of States rights was reproached with using his
influence with Congress to pass the Embargo Act, "more arbitrary, more
confiscatory" than any measure ever proposed by the Federalists. The man
who had protested against the sedition bills had to repress the
seditious attempts of the former Vice President of the United States. It
seemed as if an evil genius had taken a malicious pleasure in making
every effort to test the President in every possible way, and to
confront him with the necessity of renouncing his most cherished
principles. Jefferson did not come out of the ordeal without scars and
deep wounds; but whatever may have been his deficiencies and his faults,
whatever sins he may have committed, he kept his faith in the ultimate
wisdom of public opinion and never tried to suppress by coercion the
criticism to which he was subjected.

As a matter of fact, the roseate view of the situation presented by
Jefferson in his second Inaugural Address was hardly warranted by facts.
Even before the close of the first term, Randolph, who had been the
standard bearer of the Republicans in the House, had shown signs of
discontent. He had supported the "Remonstrance of the people of
Louisiana", protesting that one of the essential provisions had been
violated and that they should be admitted at once to "all the rights,
advantages and immunities of citizens." On the other hand, Aaron Burr,
even while remaining in office, had already paved the way for the dark
and romantic machinations which were to culminate with his trial before
Marshall at Richmond.

The story of Burr's conspiracy deserves a special place among American
"_causes célèbres_." It has been told many times, and very vividly, but
only the pen of Alexandre Dumas could do justice to it. Many efforts
have been made to whitewash the memory of the chief conspirator, to
throw most of the odium on Wilkinson and on Jefferson who, according to
his enemies, would have gone out of his way to obtain the condemnation
of a man who could not be proved guilty of any overt act, although there
is no doubt that he had originated some of the most reprehensible
schemes against the safety of his country. But Americans always had a
foible for soldiers of fortune, for adventurers who dreamed of
conquering new empires; for in them they see the magnification of the
frontier spirit which for so long constituted one of the "pillars" of
American civilization.

By an extraordinary trick of heredity, this adventurer, who should have
been a Spanish conquistador, this arch plotter who had the insinuating
ways of the Florentine, the tortuous and complicated mind so often
considered as a privilege of the Europeans, was the great-grandson of
Jonathan Edwards and of pure New England descent. He had fought bravely
and enthusiastically in the Revolutionary War, he was a lawyer of no
mean achievement; but his thirst for popularity, applause and success
was beyond imagination, and this Machiavellic politician lacked in an
extraordinary degree common sense and political vision. Had he withdrawn
from the run for the presidency in time, had he gracefully accepted the
second rank in December, 1800, he would have had a great political
career before him. But to the last minute he refused to say the word
that was expected from him; he accepted without protest the votes of the
Federalists and was considered as a traitor to his party even before he
took office. As early as January, 1804, he had gone to Jefferson and,
after complaining that the President did not show him the same
friendship as before, he had offered to resign at once if he were
appointed to some foreign embassy. After Burr had left without obtaining
any definite answer, Jefferson put down on paper a complete account of
the conversation and dryly concluded:

  I should here notice, that Colonel Burr must have thought that I
  could swallow strong things in my own favor, when he founded his
  acquiescence in the nomination as Vice-President, to his desire of
  promoting my honor, the being with me; whose company and conversation
  had always been fascinating with him etc.[452]

Disappointed in this respect, Aaron Burr turned his eyes towards New
York, where he had worked so successfully during the preceding election.
The post of governor happened to be vacant, and in February Burr was
chosen by the discontented Republicans of the State to run for
governor. It seems quite certain that, if he had been elected, the
movement for secession already strong in New England would have received
a new impetus and that a desperate effort would have been made to shake
off "the rule of Virginia." When, after a savage campaign marked by
invectives, brawls and riots, Burr was finally defeated, he could and
did rightly attribute his failure to Hamilton who, from the very
beginning, opposed his candidacy. A personal encounter was decided and
the two adversaries met on the bank of the Hudson, pistol in hand, in a
duel to the death. It has always been said that Hamilton did not take
aim and fired first. Burr fired deliberately and Hamilton, fatally
wounded, fell to the ground, to die the next day.

Found guilty of murder by a grand jury, and in fact already a fugitive
from justice, Burr hid at first in Georgia and there concocted the most
extraordinary plan to effect a separation of the western part of the
United States with the help and financial assistance of England.
Although evidence was not procurable at the time of his trial, there is
no doubt that he thought the scheme feasible; that back in Washington,
and when he was presiding over the impeachment proceedings of Judge
Chase, the Vice President of the United States was prudently sounding
the delegates of the western States, ingratiating himself to them and
that the wildest dreams of empire were haunting his feverish
imagination.

As soon as the session was over, Colonel Burr started out for a tour of
the western States and, on an island of the Ohio, met by chance the
philosopher-planter Blennerhasset, the innocent victim of his plots.
Leaving Blennerhasset, Burr went to Cincinnati, Frankfort, Nashville. He
met Andrew Jackson, the uncouth son of the frontier, and Wilkinson, the
general in charge of the western territory. After a visit to New
Orleans, where he was greatly elated by the discontent of the
population, he went back to Saint Louis to discuss the situation with
Wilkinson. Whether he still adhered to the original plan of separating
the western from the eastern States is to a considerable degree
doubtful. His immediate object seems rather to have been to lead an
expedition of adventurers against Mexico, in case the war that was
threatening between the United States and Spain should break out. It
must be admitted that the plan in itself was not particularly
objectionable to the Government, but it soon appeared that this scheme
too had to be given up. After vainly attempting to secure assistance
from the British Government, Burr, changing from conqueror to farmer,
undertook to buy, with Blennerhasset, a grant of several hundred
thousand acres on the Washita River, in Northern Louisiana, in order to
establish there a model colony.

The rest of the story is well known. Rumors of a conspiracy grew in the
West without disturbing at first the security of the Federal Government.
Burr, summoned to appear before the district attorney of Frankfort,
surrendered himself, but was twice discharged and continued his
preparations for the settlement of Washita. Jefferson did not move until
he received from Wilkinson a confidential message purporting to be the
transcription of a ciphered letter sent by Burr. The President was so
alarmed that he issued at once a proclamation, warning the people that a
conspiracy had been discovered and directing the arrests of the
conspirators and the seizure of "all vessels, arms and military stores."
Wilkinson, eager to show his loyalty to the Government, arrested
"without warrant" several emissaries of Burr. One of them was released,
but two, Bollman and Swartwout, were sent out by sea to Baltimore and
thence to Washington, where they were kept in the military barracks. In
a special message to Congress, Jefferson apprised the Senate and the
House of the facts "touching an illegal combination of private
individuals against the peace and safety of the Union, and a military
expedition planned by them against the territories of a power in amity
with the United States, with the measures pursued for suppressing the
same." (January 22, 1807)

Shortly after Marshall, in Washington, had refused to indict Bollman and
Swartwout on the count of "levying war" against the United States, Burr
was finally arrested and taken under military escort to Richmond, there
to be delivered to the civil authorities after Marshall had signed a
special warrant (March 26, 1807). After long skirmishes between the
prosecution and the defense, legal moves and countermoves, Burr was
indicted under two counts,--treason and high misdemeanor. On the first
charge the jury rendered a verdict to the effect that "We of the jury
say that Aaron Burr is not proved guilty under this indictment by any
evidence submitted to us; we therefore find him not guilty."

This was a most unusual and illegal form of rendering a verdict and the
jury evidently intended to emphasize the fact that the evidence
submitted did not warrant a conviction, although they reserved their
opinion as to the real guilt of Colonel Burr. Marshall overruled
objections to the form of the verdict which threatened a reopening of
the case and decided that it would be recorded as "not guilty." Burr was
soon recommitted on the second count and declared not guilty by a second
jury. Upon which a third charge was brought in by the prosecution and
Burr summoned to appear at the session of the Circuit Court of the
United States to be held at Chillicothe in January, 1808. He never
appeared and his bond was forfeited; it is more than doubtful that he
would have been convicted.

A serious discussion of the merits of the case would necessitate a
minute analysis of all the evidence placed before the jury and cannot be
undertaken here. Several attempts have been made to rehabilitate Aaron
Burr's memory, although certain facts are so patent that they cannot be
overlooked by the most indulgent biographers. It is a curious bend of
the popular mind that the greatness of the conspiracy seems an excuse
and attenuation of the most evident guilt. There was something
apparently heroic in the ambition of that man who wanted to carve for
himself an empire in the wilderness and to plunder the treasures of the
mysterious Southwest. Then, by contrast, the obstinacy of Jefferson in
using every means in his power and in the power of the Federal
Government in order to obtain a conviction, has been represented as a
display of pettiness unworthy of the chief of a great nation. Nor is
this tendency restricted to the impulsive and emotional masses; it
creeps into the accounts of the trial given by the most judicial
historians, and I am not certain that it is entirely absent from
Beveridge's treatment of the Richmond proceedings.

Legally speaking, it is difficult to find fault with the findings of
Marshall, with the definitions he gave of "treason" and "overt act",
with his sifting of the evidence and, except in one or two cases, with
his behavior during the trial. On the other hand, Jefferson has been
accused of having unduly interfered by sending detailed instructions to
the district attorney, by coaching him on several occasions, and by
attempting directly and indirectly to arouse public opinion against a
man who was on trial for his life, but who finally could not be
convicted on any count. After such an interval of time, it is easy to
find fault with the conduct of the Executive, and it cannot be denied
that he acted in a very high-handed manner, condoned acts which were
technically illegal and maintained without sufficient proofs of Burr's
guilt that there was not "a candid man in the United States who did not
believe some one, if not all, of these overt acts to have taken
place."[453]

On the other hand, if we try to place ourselves in the atmosphere of the
time, it is equally easy to find explanations that to a large extent
justify Jefferson's attitude. It must be remembered that the President
was not unaware of Burr's intention "to form a coalition of the five
eastern States, with New York and New Jersey, under the new appellation
of the Seven Eastern States."[454] If Burr's machination with the
English minister to effect a separation of the western States were still
unknown, there was little doubt about his plans. All of Burr's ambitious
schemes failed miserably, but it is perfectly natural that the
Government should have been seriously alarmed at the time. They did not
know of Wilkinson's shameful deals with Spain, but they had every reason
to believe that a man who had already plotted a secession of the western
territory and happened to be in charge of that territory and in command
of the Federal army was scarcely to be depended upon in an emergency.
For years the West had been very restive, New Orleans was full of
discontented Creoles, and if war had not been officially declared with
both England and Spain, it was felt that it could break out at any time.
None of these considerations could be brought out before the jury, but
they amply warranted some action of the Executive. The first step taken
by Jefferson was to warn the people of the existence of a conspiracy. If
we remember again that Aaron Burr was at that time roaming at will in a
part of the country sparsely settled, where he counted many friends,
where communications with Washington were slow and rare, it is difficult
to see how the President could have done less.

After the conspirators were arrested the situation changed entirely.
They had been delivered to the civil authorities, they were to appear
before a regular court and given trial by jury; they no longer
constituted a public danger. It must be admitted that Jefferson himself
declared to his French friends, Lafayette and Du Pont de Nemours, that
Burr never had a chance to succeed and "that the man who could expect to
effect this, with American material must be a fit subject for
Bedlam."[455] This is hard to reconcile with the statement which comes
immediately after, that "the seriousness of the crime demands more
serious punishment", and particularly with the instructions sent to
George Hay. One may suspect that Jefferson saw in the trial of Burr an
opportunity to test the loyalty of the Chief Justice to the Constitution
and to the Government and allowed himself to be carried away by
political preoccupations which had nothing to do with Colonel Burr. This
appears clearly in one of the letters to Giles:

  If there has ever been an instance in this or the preceding
  administrations, of federal judges so applying principles of law as
  to condemn a federal or acquit a republican offender, I should have
  judged them in the present case with some charity. All this, however,
  will work well. The nation will judge both the offender and judges
  for themselves.[456]

This was reiterated in the instructions sent to George Hay after the
first acquittal of Burr, that no witness should be permitted to depart

  ... until his testimony has been committed to writing, either as
  delivered in court, or as taken by yourself in the presence of Burr's
  counsel.... These whole proceedings will be laid before Congress,
  that they may decide, whether the defect has been in the evidence of
  guilt, or in the law, or in the application of the law, and that they
  may provide the proper remedy for the past and the future.

The intention to scrutinize the documents to uncover any bias of
Marshall and use any such evidence against the Chief Justice is even
openly admitted: "I must pray you also to have an authentic copy of the
record made out (without saying for what) and to send it to me; if the
Judge's opinions make out a part of it, then I must ask a copy of them,
either under his hand, if he delivers one signed, or duly proved by
affidavit."[457] Who could deny after reading this that Jefferson's
intention was to push vigorously the attack against the judiciary, and
to institute impeachment proceedings against Marshall on the slightest
justification? Thus the trial of Burr became a test of strength between
the executive and the judiciary, between the President and the Chief
Justice; it was fought out in the courtroom the more fiercely as the two
antagonists were kinsmen and brought into it the obstinacy and animosity
of Southern feudists.

Marshall came out as the stanch and unshakable champion of legality, and
Jefferson did not refrain from using the arguments and reasonings
resorted to by the Federalists when the Sedition Act was passed. There
was little excuse for a man of his legal training in believing that Burr
could be convicted and punished for his "intentions" to commit a crime,
and the prosecution failed to bring in sufficient proof of Aaron Burr's
guilt. It would have been more dignified and more consistent with
Jefferson's theories if, after the conspirator was made powerless, the
President had remained silent. That, however, he could not do. Early in
October, he called back Attorney-general Robert Smith in order to
prepare a selection and digestion of the documents respecting Burr's
treason and, in his message to Congress, on October 27, if he did not
use the word treason, he still accused Burr of "enterprise against the
public peace." He assumed responsibility and claimed credit for the
measures that had permitted "to dissipate before their explosion plots
engendering on the Mississippi." He laid before Congress the proceedings
and evidence exhibited on the arraignment of the principal offenders.
Finally, he concluded that Burr's acquittal was evidence that there was
something wrong somewhere, and that the nation could not remain
defenceless against such dangers. "The framers of our constitution
certainly supposed they had guarded, as well their government against
destruction by treason, as their citizens against oppression, under
pretence of it; and if these ends are not attained, it is of importance
to inquire by what means more effectual they may be secured."

A year later, writing to Doctor James Brown about the measures of
repression taken by Wilkinson in New Orleans, Jefferson presented what
he considered a full justification of his conduct:

  I do wish to see these people get what they deserved; and under the
  maxim of the law itself, that _inter arma silent leges_, that in an
  encampment expecting daily attack from a powerful enemy, self
  preservation is paramount to all law. I expected that instead of
  invoking the forms of the law, to cover traitors, all good citizens
  would have concurred in securing them. Should we have ever gained our
  Revolution, if we had bound our hands by manacles of the law, not
  only in the beginning, but in any part of the revolutionary
  conflict?[458]

This was exactly the sort of reasoning that Jefferson had opposed so
strenuously when advanced by his political opponents. Apparently he had
completely reversed his position after getting in the saddle, which was
very illogical and perhaps very damnable, but also very human. He was
now, to use the vivid expression of a French statesman, "on the other
side of the barricade", and he saw things in a different light. But if
this episode can serve to illustrate the inconsistency of the
philosopher, it constitutes also a most striking refutation of the
accusations of Jacobinism so often launched against Jefferson; for only
the Jacobin is perfectly consistent in all circumstances. More than
thirty years had elapsed since Jefferson had copied the old maxim _fiat
justifia ruat coelum_ in his "Memorandum book" and he was still wont
to repeat it, but it had taken him less than eight years of executive
responsibility to make him admit that democracy does not work in times
of emergency. It was a most dangerous admission, but one to be expected
from a man in whom still lived the ruthless spirit of the frontier.
Pioneer communities in which unrestricted and unlimited democracy
prevails are pitiless for the outlaw who endangers the life of the
group, and are not stopped by "legal subtleties." In Jefferson there was
more of the pioneer than he himself believed. For this very reason he
was probably more completely and intensely an average American than if
he had "acted up" to the letter of the law in every circumstance.

This was by far the most dramatic of the internal difficulties that
Jefferson had to face during his second term. Burr's conspiracy obscured
the attacks against Madison led by the former spokesman of Jefferson's
party, John Randolph of Roanoke. But already, when Burr's trial was held
in Richmond, "circumstances which seriously threatened the peace of the
country" had made it a duty to convene Congress at an earlier date than
usual. Once again, as under the administrations of Washington and Adams,
foreign policies were to dominate and direct domestic policies, and once
again America was to bear the penalty of all neutrals who try to keep
out of the war in a world conflagration.




CHAPTER IV

"PEACE AND COMMERCE WITH EVERY NATION"


War is not always an unmixed curse, at least for nations who manage to
remain neutral while the rest of the world is torn by calamitous
conflicts. Europe's misfortune had been to some extent America's good
fortune. With comparatively short intermissions, France and England were
engaged in a death struggle from 1793 to 1815, and although Britannia
ruled the sea, the belligerents had to resort to neutral shipping. The
exports of the United States, which were valued at only nineteen
millions in 1791, reached ninety-four millions in 1802, and one hundred
eight millions in 1807. The imports followed approximately the same
curve for the corresponding dates, jumping from nineteen millions to
seventy-five millions in 1802 and reaching over one hundred thirty-eight
millions in 1807. If the United States had been permitted to pursue the
policy outlined by Jefferson in his messages, "to cultivate the
friendship of the belligerent nations by every act of justice and of
incessant kindness" (October 17, 1803), "to carry a commercial
intercourse with every part of the dominions of a belligerent" (January
17, 1806), a sort of commercial millennium would have been attained and
the prosperity of the United States would have been boundless. But, at
least at the beginning of the nineteenth century, neither the rights of
neutrals nor international law were observed by the belligerents, and
neutrals were bound to suffer as well as to profit by their privileged
situation.

For his conduct of foreign affairs Jefferson has been severely taken to
task, not only by many of his contemporaries but by several historians,
one of the most formidable critics being Henry Adams. During his second
administration, America suffered deep humiliations which aroused the
national spirit. In many occasions war could have and perhaps should
have been declared; the navy, which had been reduced to a minimum under
Gallatin's policy of economy, could have been expanded so as to enable
the country to protect herself against foreign insults. On matters
concerning national honor and national pride Americans alone are
qualified to pass, and I can hold no brief for Jefferson in the matter.
Perhaps it would have soothed the wounds inflicted to the _amour-propre_
of the nation if war had been declared against France, or England, or
both, and if America had taken part in the "bloody conflicts" of Europe.
It must be said, however, that one fails to see what material advantages
would have resulted for the country; in this case, as in many others,
Jefferson's conduct seems to have been directed by enlightened
self-interest. He was most unwilling to favor and help in any way
Napoleon's ambitious schemes by declaring war against England; on the
other hand, the prospect of forming a _de facto_ alliance with a country
which on so many occasions had deliberately insulted the United States
and manifestly entertained feelings of scorn and distrust toward the
young republic was equally abhorrent to him. Finally, it must not be
forgotten that by keeping out of the deadly conflict in which Europe was
engaged, the United States were able to lay the solid foundations of an
unparalleled prosperity. While the young manhood of Europe perished on
the battlefields of Napoleon, the population of America grew by leaps
and bounds, passing from 5,300,000 in 1800 to 7,250,000 in 1810. While
the farms and the factories of the Old World were left abandoned,
immense territories were put under cultivation and new industries were
developed to satisfy the demands of consumers who could no longer import
manufactured products from England. The whole life of the nation was
quickened and the industrial revolution hastened.

When, after Waterloo, Europe resumed her peaceful pursuits, America had
freed herself of economic and financial dependence from the Old World.
She had become a rich, powerful and self-supporting nation. She appeared
to the impoverished peoples of the earth as an economic as well as a
political Eldorado. Whether the price she paid for it was too high is a
question which I may be permitted to leave for others to decide.

In his second inaugural address, the President found it unnecessary to
state again the directing principles of his policies, simply declaring
that he had "acted up" to the declaration contained in his first
inaugural. Of foreign affairs he had little to say, except to reiterate
his conviction that "with nations, as well as with individuals, our
interests soundly calculated, will ever be found inseparable from our
moral duties." Yet there was a passing reference to possible
difficulties. War sometimes could not be avoided: "it might be procured
by injustice by ourselves, or by others"; and provision ought to be made
in advance for such emergencies, so as "to meet all the expenses of any
given year, without encroaching on the rights of future generations, by
burdening them with the debts of the past." The President foresaw that,
with the rapid growth of the population and the corresponding increase
in revenue raised from import taxes, it would be possible

  To extinguish the native right of soil within our limits, to extend
  those limits, and to apply such a surplus to our public debts, as
  places at a short day their final redemption, and that redemption
  once effected, the revenue thereby liberated may, by a just
  repartition among the states, and a corresponding amendement of the
  constitution, be applied, _in time of peace_, to rivers, canals,
  roads, arts, manufactures, education, and other great objects within
  each State.

One may wonder whether at that time Jefferson realized the possible
consequences of such a system. We have not to seek very far for the
exact "source" of these ideas; they were taken bodily from Hamilton's
report of manufactures. It was the same proposal to distribute subsidies
and bounties from the Federal treasury, to encourage commerce and
manufactures. Apparently what was damnable and criminal under a
Federalist administration became praiseworthy under a Republican régime.

As a matter of fact, even during Jefferson's first term, some of the
resources of the Federal treasury had to be spent in warlike activities.
Jefferson had never been able to forget the deep humiliation he had felt
when, as a minister to the Court of France, he had been forced to
negotiate with the Barbary pirates for the redemption of American
prisoners. He had been less than six months in office when he decided to
answer the new demands of the Barbary States by sending an American
fleet to protect American commerce in the Mediterranean. To this
incident he gave a large part of his first message (December 8, 1801),
and the activities of the small squadron kept in Europe for several
years, in order to blockade the pirates in their harbors, was regularly
mentioned in his subsequent messages. The tone of some passages is well
worth studying. His hope to reduce "the Barbarians of Tripoli to the
desire of peace on proper terms by the sufferings of war" (November 8,
1804); his determination to send to Europe additional forces, "to make
Tripoli sensible that they mistake their interest in choosing war with
us; and Tunis also, should she have declared war as we expect and almost
wish" (July 18, 1804)--all this reveals a warlike Jefferson very
different from the pacifist philosopher he is supposed to have been in
all circumstances.

It was irritating enough to bear the insults of British and French
vessels to the American flag in order to keep the United States out of a
European war. To yield to the demands of a band of pirates who could be
cowed by energetic action with a minimum of bloodshed and expenditure,
would have been an insufferable disgrace. The Barbarians had to be
beaten into submission, and the European powers who did not seem to be
willing to emancipate themselves from that degrading tribute could
perhaps understand at the same time that there were limits to the
forbearance of the United States.

With reference to England the situation was entirely different. The
United States had no fleet able to cope with the English fleet. The
American coasts were unprotected and the American harbors could be
bombarded from the sea without even being able to make a pretense of
resisting. A large navy could not be built in a day, and even if one had
been improvised, the odds would have been so uneven that many American
vessels would have gone down and many lives would have been lost under
the fire of the British frigates. Thus for practical reasons as well as
from philanthropic motives, Jefferson bent all his efforts to the
preservation of peace with the great countries of Europe.

Hardly three weeks after the signature of the treaty through which he
gave up Louisiana, Bonaparte declared war against England. When he
received the news, Jefferson wrote a long letter to Lord Buchan in which
he defined his policy:

  My hope of preserving peace for our country is not founded in the
  greater principle of non-resistance under every wrong, but in the
  belief that a just and friendly conduct on our part will procure
  justice and friendship from others. In the existing contest, each of
  the combatants will find an interest in our friendship. I cannot say
  we shall be unconcerned spectators of this combat. We feel for human
  sufferings, and we wish the good of all. We shall look on, therefore,
  with the sensations which these dispositions and the events of the
  war will produce.[459]

Thus spoke Jefferson in July, 1803, and Woodrow Wilson, who borrowed
more than one page from the book of his predecessor, expressed himself
in almost the same words one hundred and eleven years later. Thus,
also, would probably speak any President of the United States should a
new conflagration break out to-morrow. This, to be sure, was no
proclamation of neutrality and none was needed at the time; but had
Jefferson written one, he could scarcely have expressed himself more
forcibly than he did in a letter sent two days later to General Horatio
Gates: "We are friendly, cordially and conscientiously friendly to
England. We are not hostile to France. We will be rigorously just and
sincerely friendly to both."

But this fine declaration did not make Jefferson forget the immediate
interests of the United States, for the preoccupation uppermost in his
mind at that time was to find out how the European situation could be
used to the best advantage of his own country.

In signing the treaty France had refused to give any guarantee as to the
extent of the territory ceded under the Louisiana Purchase. Whether the
cession included West Florida, on the occupation of which Jefferson had
been so intent, was a matter of doubt. This particular point had not
been pressed during the negotiations, France, according to the old maxim
_caveat emptor_, taking the position that the question lay between the
United States and Spain, while the United States had never abandoned the
hope that they would be able to induce Bonaparte to exert pressure on
Madrid so as to enable the American Government to make the most of the
transaction. Soon after the treaty was signed, the United States found
themselves enmeshed in one of the most complicated intrigues of European
diplomacy.

While Madison and Jefferson were negotiating in Washington with the
Spanish minister Yrujo, Pinkney and later Monroe negotiated in Madrid,
sometimes at cross purposes but without ever losing sight of the main
object. Jefferson had renewed his old contention that the United States
were entitled to "all the navigable waters, rivers, creeks, bays, and
inlets lying within the United States, which empty into the Gulf of
Mexico east of the River Mississippi." As Henry Adams remarked, this was
a most remarkable provision, as "no creeks, bays, or inlets lying within
the United States emptied into the Gulf."[460] But if Jefferson's
geography was faulty, his intent was perfectly clear, and every
opportunity was to be used to round out the perimeter of the United
States. When in October, 1804, Monroe reached Paris to push negotiations
more vigorously, the plans of the United States had crystallized. They
had a beautiful simplicity: to make Spain pay the claims resulting from
the shutting-up of the Mississippi by Morales, to take immediate
possession of Western Florida and to obtain the cession of Eastern
Florida.

With the details of the diplomatic maneuvers we are not concerned here,
but rather with the remarkable proposal made by Jefferson to Madison
during the summer of 1805. Spain having declared war against England,
the President, fearful of being "left without an ally", thought
immediately of proposing "a provisional alliance with England" (August
7, 1805). This alliance was to be conditional and would become effective
only in case the United States should have to declare war against France
or Spain. "In that event," wrote Jefferson, "we should make common
cause, and England should stipulate not to make peace without our
obtaining the objects for which we go to war, to wit, the acknowledgment
by Spain of the rightful boundaries of Louisiana (which we should reduce
to a minimum by a secret article) and 2, indemnification for spoliation,
for which purpose we should be allowed to make reprisal on the Floridas
and _retain them_ as an indemnification." Jefferson added that "as it
was the wish of every Englishman's heart to see the United States
fighting by their sides against France", the king and his ministers
could do no better than to enter into an alliance and the nation would
consider it "as the price and pledge of an indissoluble
friendship."[461] There is little doubt that if, at this juncture,
Monroe had maneuvered more skillfully, if England had showed less
arrogance in her treatment of the United States, she could have secured
at least the benevolent neutrality of America. But apparently England
did not care for a benevolent neutrality. After Trafalgar, she was left
undisputed mistress of the ocean, she could enforce her own regulations
as she pleased, and she proceeded to do so.

The presidential message of December 3, 1805, had to present very
"unpleasant views of violence and wrong." The coasts of America were
infested by "private armed vessels, some of them with commissions,
others without commissions", all of them committing enormities, sinking
American merchantmen, "maltreating the crews, abandoning them in boats
in the open seas or on desert shores." The same policy of "hovering on
the coast" was carried on by "public armed vessels." New principles,
too, had been "interloped into the law of nations, founded neither in
justice nor in the usage or acknowledgment of nations"; this was an
allusion to the decision of Judge Scott in the Essex case. With Spain
negotiations had not had a satisfactory issue, propositions for
adjusting amicably the boundaries of Louisiana had not been acceded to,
and spoliation claims formerly acknowledged had again been denied.

The President concluded that, although peace was still the ultimate
ideal of the United States, there were circumstances which admitted of
no peaceful remedy. Some evils were "of a nature to be met by force
only, and all of them may lead to it." Finally specific recommendations
were made to organize the national defense: furnishing the seaports with
heavy cannon, increasing the number of gunboats, classifying the militia
so as to have ready a competent number of men "for offence or defence in
any point where they may be wanted", prohibition of the exportations of
arms and ammunition,--such were the chief measures contemplated by the
President.

In the spring of 1806, he wrote a long letter to Alexander of Russia,
who had manifested a desire to have a copy of the Constitution of the
United States. This was an appeal to the Czar, insisting that special
articles defining the rights of neutrals in time of war be inserted in
the definitive treaty of peace sooner or later to be concluded between
the European belligerents. Having taken no part in the troubles of
Europe, "the United States would have no part in its pacification", but
it was to be hoped that some one would be found "who, looking beyond the
narrow bounds of an individual nation, will take under the cover of his
equity the rights of the absent and unrepresented."[462] Unfortunately,
more than ten years were to elapse before that pacification of Europe so
earnestly hoped for by Jefferson came about, and only a week before the
British ministry had again aggravated regulations against the neutrals
by issuing orders blockading the coast of the continent (April 8, 1806).

A few weeks later, Jefferson who, yielding to the pressure of Congress,
had agreed to appoint a special envoy to help Monroe negotiate a
commercial treaty with England, sent William Pinkney of Maryland to
London. "He has a just view of things, so far as known to him," wrote
Jefferson to Monroe, but he did not deem it desirable to trust him with
special instructions. For Monroe alone he reserved the complete
exposition of the plans then brooding in his mind. The death of Pitt
would probably mark a change in the attitude of Great Britain; the
President had more confidence in Mr. Fox than in any other man in
England and relied entirely on "his honesty and good sense." Then came
an outline of the reasoning to be put forward by Monroe: "No two
countries upon earth have so many points of common interests and
friendship; and their rulers must be great bunglers indeed, if, with
such dispositions, they break them asunder." England might check the
United States a little on the ocean; but she should realize that nothing
but her financial limitations prevented America from having a strong
navy. If France provided the money, so as to equip an American fleet,
the state of the ocean would be no longer problematical. If England, on
the contrary, made such a proposition, an alliance of the two largest
fleets "would make the world out of the continent of Europe our joint
monopoly." Then Jefferson added: "we wish for neither of these
scenes--We ask for peace and justice from all nations; and we will
remain uprightly neutral in fact, though leaning in belief to the
opinion that an English ascendency on the ocean is safer for us than
that of France."

Finally, at the end of the letter, came the most extraordinarily
imperialistic proposition ever made by any nation; it was the extension
of a pet theory of Jefferson to the Atlantic Ocean. As he had claimed
for the United States the free navigation of all the streams originating
on the territory of the United States, he was ready to claim that the
great current originating from the Gulf should not be considered
differently, and he wrote: "We begin to broach the idea that we consider
the whole Gulf Stream as of our waters, in which hostilities and
cruising are to be frowned on for the present, and prohibited so soon as
either consent or force will permit us."[463]

This might be thought a visionary scheme and merely a flight of
imagination, if Jefferson had not expressed the same idea in identical
terms in a conversation with the French minister concerning the treaty
negotiated in London by Monroe and Pinkney: "Perhaps we shall obtain the
right to extend our maritime jurisdiction, and to carry it as far as the
effect of the Gulph Stream makes itself felt,--which would be very
advantageous both to belligerents and neutrals."[464]

These being Jefferson's views, it would have taken a far more successful
negotiator than Monroe to make the British Government accept them. The
treaty finally signed by the American envoys on December 1, 1806, was
far from satisfactory. As a matter of fact, the American envoys had been
caught between the hammer and the anvil. To the Fox blockade of April,
1806, Napoleon had answered by the Berlin Decree at the end of November,
placing the British islands in a state of blockade, declaring all
merchandise coming from England subject to confiscation and refusing
admission into any French port to any vessel coming either from England
or her colonies. Forbidden by England to trade with France, by France to
trade with England, the neutrals were placed in a sorry plight. Yet not
only did Monroe in his treaty recognize the right of visit and of
impressing British seamen found on board American vessels, but he gave
up the American claims to indemnity for outrages committed on American
commerce in 1805, and accepted the most humiliating conditions
concerning American trade with the French and Spanish colonies. Finally,
before Monroe could obtain the signature of the British negotiators, he
had to agree to an additional article by which he promised not to
recognize the decree of Berlin. In less than three weeks Jefferson
received Napoleon's decree, the text of the Pinkney-Monroe treaty, and
the news of Lord Howick's retaliatory order requesting that no goods
should be carried to France unless they first touched at an English port
and paid a certain duty.

In spite of the pressing request of the Senate, Jefferson refused to
communicate the text of the treaty. The explanation publicly given by
the President was that Monroe had concluded the treaty before receiving
information as to the points to be insisted upon, and that a new effort
would be made to obtain the modification of some particularly
objectionable features. "This is the statement we have given out," he
wrote to Monroe, "and nothing more of the treaty has ever been made
known. But depend on it, my dear Sir, that it will be considered as a
hard treaty when it is known." If it appeared to Monroe that no
amendment was to be hoped for, he was authorized to come home, leaving
behind him Pinkney, who by procrastination would let it die and thus
would give America more time "the most precious of all things to
us."[465]

New instructions were sent accordingly to the American envoys at the end
of May, but the problem of the relations with England became suddenly
more acute during Aaron Burr's trial.

On June 22, the _Chesapeake_ of the American navy, bound for the
Mediterranean, was hauled up in view of Cape Henry by the _Leopard_ of
the British squadron, and summons were sent to Commodore Barron to
deliver some British deserters he was supposed to have on board. Upon
Barron's refusal, the _Leopard_ opened fire and for fifteen minutes sent
broadsides into the American ship, so unprepared and unready that only
one shot could be fired in answer. The American flag was hauled down,
British officers boarded the ship and took four deserters; after which
Captain Humphreys of the _Leopard_ declared to Barron that he could
proceed on his way. The _Chesapeake_ limped back into port, and on the
twenty-fifth, Jefferson called back to Washington Dearborn and Gallatin
to consider the emergency in a meeting of the Cabinet.

What his indignation over the outrage may have been is a matter of
surmise. He did not express it either privately or publicly. To Governor
William H. Cabell, who had sent him a special message and report, he
answered diplomatically that, after consulting the Cabinet he would
determine "the course which exigency and our constitutional powers call
for.--Whether the outrage is a proper cause of war, belonging
exclusively to Congress, it is our duty not to commit them by doing
anything which would have to be retracted." But it is certain that, even
at that time, he was not ready to recommend any radical step, for he
added:

  This will leave Congress free to decide whether war is the most
  efficacious mode of redress in our case, or whether, having taught so
  many other useful lessons to Europe, we may not add that of showing
  them that there are peaceable means of repressing injustice by making
  it the interest of the aggressor to do what is just and abstain from
  future wrong.[466]

It was scarcely necessary to call the Cabinet together; three days
before the special meeting the President had already decided on a policy
of forbearance and watchful waiting. The proclamation which was issued
was moderate in tone, but Jefferson expressed more clearly in a letter
to the Vice President, George Clinton, the reasons for his moderation.

  The usage of nations requires that we shall give the offender an
  opportunity of making reparation and avoiding war. That we would give
  time to our merchants to get in their property and vessels and our
  seamen now afloat; That the power of declaring war being with the
  Legislature, the executive could do nothing necessarily committing
  them to decide for war in preference of non-intercourse, which will
  be preferred by a great many.[467]

In order to make even more certain that no precipitate step would be
taken, it was decided to issue, on August 24, a proclamation calling
Congress together, but not until the fourth Monday in October. It was
the manifest hope of the President that by that date some satisfaction
would be obtained from England with regard to the most flagrant
violations of the "_droit des gens_", and that extreme measures could be
avoided.

In the meantime new instructions had been sent to Monroe. "Reparation
for the past, and security for the future is our motto," wrote the
President to Du Pont de Nemours. Reparation for the past, at least as
far as the attack on the _Chesapeake_ was concerned, would have been
easy to obtain, but Canning refused persistently to make any promise for
the future, or to alter the policy of Great Britain with regard to visit
and impressment. For his firmness in refusing to settle the case of the
_Chesapeake_ independently, Jefferson has been most severely criticized
by Henry Adams, whose admiration for Perceval's and Canning's superior
minds is unbounded. Shall I confess that on this particular point, at
least, I should rather agree with the English biographer of Jefferson,
Mr. Hirst, who declares that "no second-rate lawyer was ever more obtuse
than Perceval, and the wit of Canning, his foreign secretary, seldom
issued in wisdom." On this occasion Great Britain was even more stupid
than she had been in 1776; she missed her great opportunity to operate a
reconciliation with the United States and to turn them against France,
without other compensation than the pleasure of outwitting the American
envoys and once more treating scornfully the younger country. The real
answer of England was given in the Orders in Council of November 11,
1807, prohibiting all neutral trade with the whole European seacoast
from Copenhagen to Trieste. No American vessel was to be allowed to
enter any port of Europe from which British vessels were excluded
without first going to England and abiding by regulations to be
determined later.

In the meantime, Jefferson was pushing fast his preparations for
defence. A detailed examination of his correspondence during the summer
and fall of that year would justify him amply from the criticism of
several American historians.[468] He still hoped for peace, or more
exactly peace remained his ideal, although he had very little hope that
Monroe would succeed in his negotiations. But nothing could be done as
long as American ships and sailors, "at least twenty thousand men",
were on the seas, an easy prey to British vessels in case war should be
declared at once. "The loss of these," wrote Jefferson quite correctly,
"would be worth to Great Britain many victories on the Nile and
Trafalgar."[469]

To judge of Jefferson's conduct at that time from our modern point of
view would be most unfair and dangerous. He could neither cable, nor
send radiograms, nor even steamships to warn American citizens in
distant ports, nor give instructions to agents of the United States all
over the world. It took months for news to cross the ocean and sometimes
a year or more to receive an answer to a letter. The geographical
isolation of the United States, their remoteness from Europe and the
slowness of communications were obvious factors of the situation, yet
they are too often neglected in judging the policy then followed by the
President. As the year advanced, Jefferson's hope of being able to
maintain peace grew fainter. There is a spirit of helplessness in a
letter he wrote to James Maury at the end of November:

  The world as you justly observe, is truly in an awful state. Two
  nations of overgrown power are endeavoring to establish, the one an
  universal dominion by sea, the other by land.... We are now in hourly
  expectation of hearing from our ministers in London by the return of
  the "Revenge." Whether she will bring us war or peace, or the middle
  state of non-intercourse, seems suspended in equal balance.[470]

The message to Congress, of October 27, contained no specific
recommendation. It was a dispassionate recital of the circumstances
which had necessitated new instructions to Monroe, a promise that
Congress would be informed of the result of the negotiations, news of
which was expected hourly, and an enumeration of the measures taken
towards the defense of the country. When the first news finally came,
the President had already decided upon the course to follow. On
December 18, 1807, he sent to Congress one of his shortest messages:

  The communications now made, showing the great and increasing dangers
  with which our vessels, our seamen, and merchandise, are threatened
  on the high seas and elsewhere, from the belligerent powers of
  Europe, and it being of great importance to keep in safety these
  essential resources, I deem it my duty to recommend the subject to
  the consideration of Congress, who will doubtless perceive all the
  advantages which may be expected from an inhibition of the departure
  of our vessels from the ports of the United States. Their wisdom will
  also see the necessity of making every preparation for whatever
  events may grow out of the present crisis.

The situation was much more clearly described in a letter to General
John Mason written approximately at the same time.

  The sum of these mutual enterprises on our national rights--wrote the
  President--is that France, and her allies, reserving for further
  consideration the prohibiting our carrying anything to the British
  territories, have virtually done it, by restraining our bringing a
  return cargo from them; and that Great Britain, after prohibiting a
  great proportion of our commerce with France and her allies, is now
  believed to have prohibited the whole. The whole world is thus laid
  under interdict by these two nations, and our vessels, their cargoes
  and crews, are to be taken by the one or the other, for whatever
  place they may be destined out of our own limits. If therefore, on
  leaving our harbors we are certain to lose them, is it not better, as
  to vessels, cargoes and seamen, to keep them at home? This is
  submitted to the wisdom of Congress, who alone are competent to
  provide a remedy.[471]

As in so many other instances the temptation is great to draw a parallel
between Jefferson's policies and the neutrality advocated by Woodrow
Wilson during his first term, and to repeat the worn-out and dangerous
adage "history repeats itself." As a matter of fact, the situation
faced by Jefferson in 1808 was entirely different from that which
confronted President Wilson from 1914 to 1917. America was not then a
rich and powerful country with unlimited resources. The people had just
emerged from a long and distressing financial crisis, for it took more
than one generation to heal the wounds of a war which had lasted six
years. The Federal Government was far from being as strong as it was
destined to become. The navy was ridiculously inadequate, not only to go
out and give battle to the English fleet, but even, to use Jefferson's
expression, to keep the seaports "_hors d'insulte_".

These facts must be kept in mind if one wishes to form a true estimate
of Jefferson's conduct and character during the calamitous years of his
second term. To criticize his policies is an easy feat for a modern
historian, for it is natural that an American of to-day should resent
Jefferson's attitude as unworthy of a great self-respecting nation.
Undoubtedly the President might have sent a warlike message to Congress
and war would have immediately followed, but on the whole the issue had
been taken out of his hands in December, 1807. The embargo, as he justly
pointed out, was no new policy and no new measure; it was simply a
recognition of a situation created by both France and Great Britain. The
only way out would have been a formal declaration of war, and one does
not quite see what this grand gesture would have accomplished. Certainly
the United States were no more in position to march into Canada in 1807
than they were in 1812, and if they had succeeded in taking possession
of the British colony, it is unlikely that Great Britain would have
accepted such a loss with equanimity. Furthermore, even if a formal
alliance had been concluded with France, the French fleet would have
been powerless to prevent the British navy from cruising on the American
coast and repeating, if they had wished, the outrages that had befallen
Copenhagen.

Another solution, favored by such a liberal historian of Jefferson as
Mr. A. J. Nock, would have been frankly to recognize the existing
situation and to leave the New England merchants free to send out their
vessels at their own risk. This would have relieved to a certain extent
the economic distress of the northern States, but whether it would have
been more honest or more dignified than the embargo is a matter of
opinion. Such a policy would have been neutral only in appearance; it
would have amounted to a tacit recognition of a British monopoly of the
American trade, since England was really the only country to which
American ships would have been permitted to go. Granting that the
embargo was "the most arbitrary, inquisitorial, and confiscatory measure
formulated in American legislation up to the period of the Civil
War",[472] I fail to see that the prestige of the United States would
have gained much by allowing their citizens to submit to the humiliating
Orders in Council of November 11, 1807. Of all policies this would have
been the most evasive, most vacillating and least dignified.

It must be furthermore remembered that though he was gifted with
remarkable foresight, Jefferson was in no position to guess that the
conflict between England and France would last for seven more years. He
believed, on the contrary, that the Titanic struggle would come, if not
to a definite close, at least to a pause, within a comparatively short
time: "Time may produce peace in Europe; peace in Europe removes all
causes of difference, till another European war; and by that time our
debt may be paid, our revenue clear, and our strength increased."[473]
This reasoning reappears in many letters written by Jefferson during the
last year of his administration. His correspondence during the months
that separated him from rest and philosophical meditation may be devoid
of dramatic interest, but a thorough perusal of it would demonstrate
that at no time during his long political career were his motives less
interested, less partisan and more truly patriotic.

At no time, either, was he more bitterly attacked. He suffered from "the
peltings of the storm" and cried out pathetically to Benjamin Rush: "Oh!
for the day when I shall be withdrawn from it; when I shall have leisure
to enjoy my family, my friends, my farm and books." But the defection of
the Republicans in Congress, the divergence of opinions in his Cabinet,
the threats of secession, the anonymous letters and the press campaign
launched against him had no power to shake his strong negative
resolution. Yet in all justice to him it may be seen that his policy was
not entirely negative.

First of all his letters show that he never considered the embargo as a
permanent cure. As early as March, 1808, writing to Charles Pinckney,
the former envoy to Spain, he declared that the effect of the embargo
would be "to postpone for this year the immediate danger of a rupture
with England." He admitted that a time would come "when war would be
preferable to a continuance of the embargo and that the question would
have to be decided at the next meeting of Congress unless peace
intervened in the meantime."[474] Under these circumstances the repeal
of the embargo voted by Congress to take effect after Jefferson's
retirement cannot be considered as a rebuke to the President. Moreover,
it appears that Jefferson had given some thought to three and not two
alternatives: 1, embargo; 2, war; 3, submission and tribute,--the third
being exactly that advocated by Mr. Nock. In Jefferson's opinion this
third solution was at once "to be put out by every American and the two
first considered."[475] Writing to Thomas Leib, earlier in the year, he
had already defined his position with regard to this solution,
recommended by the mercantile interests: "It is true, the time will
come when we must abandon it (the embargo). But if this is before the
repeal of the orders of council, we must abandon it only for a state of
war. The day is not distant, when that will be preferable to a longer
continuance of the embargo. But we can never remove that, and let our
vessels go out and be taken under these orders without making reprisal."
This is itself evidence, but it has apparently escaped many historians
as well as many contemporaries of Jefferson. If the embargo is
considered not as a permanent policy but as a political expedient and a
political experiment, the greater part of Henry Adams' arraignment of
Jefferson's political philosophy falls flat.[476] When, on the other
hand, the same writer admits that "the result was that the embargo saved
perhaps twenty millions of dollars a year and some thousands of lives
which the war would have consumed", we may be permitted to add that
Jefferson would not have granted the principle that "the strongest
objection to war was not its waste of money or even of life; for money
and life in political economy were worth no more than they could be made
to produce." If this is economic history, Heaven preserve us from
economic policies! As to the accusation that "Jefferson's system was
preaching the fear of war, of self-sacrifice, making many smugglers and
traitors, but not a single hero", I must humbly confess that one does
not see that America would have been much richer for engaging without
adequate preparation or even a fair chance to defend herself in a
useless and, in last analysis, probably inglorious war.

It is claimed, however, that the embargo caused an economic catastrophe:

  As the order was carried along the seacoast, every artisan dropped
  his tools, every merchant closed his doors, every ship was
  dismantled. American produce--wheat, timber, cotton, tobacco,
  rice--dropped in value or became unsalable; every imported article
  rose in price; wages stopped, swarms of debtors became bankrupt;
  thousands of sailors hung idle around the wharves.... A reign of
  idleness began; and the men who were not already ruined felt that
  their ruin was only a matter of time.[477]

A very pathetic picture this, made even more pitiful by the classic
quotation from the British traveler, Lambert, who visited New York in
1808 and described it as a place ravaged by pestilence. But why not
quote also from another traveler, John Mellish, who spoke of the impetus
given to manufactures and home industries?[478] Why forget to mention
Gallatin's report of 1810, pointing out that some basic industries had
been firmly established in the United States, such as iron, cotton,
flax, hats, paper, printing type, gunpowder, window glass, clocks, etc.
Who could deny, at any rate, that manufactures made enormous progress,
thanks to the embargo, and that goods formerly imported from England
began to be made in America? Even supposing that the picture drawn by H.
Adams were true, it would be necessary to admit that there was another
side to it and that a few artisans, at least, remained working steadily
at their benches.

The last annual message of Jefferson to Congress was noncommittal on the
measures to be taken. It presented first a dispassionate recital of the
negotiations carried on with France and England to bring them to rescind
the most offensive features of their orders and decrees. It recognized
that "this candid and liberal experiment had failed." It was left to
Congress to determine what course to follow:

  Under a continuance of the belligerent measures which, in defiance of
  laws which consecrate the rights of neutrals, overspread the ocean
  with danger, it will rest with the wisdom of Congress to decide on
  the course best adapted to such a state of things; and bringing with
  them, as they do, from every part of the Union, the sentiments of our
  constituants, my confidence is strengthened, that in forming this
  decision they will, with an unerring regard to the essential rights
  and interests of the nation weigh and compare the painful
  alternatives out of which a choice is to be made.

This reserved attitude Jefferson intended to maintain during the rest of
his term. "I have thought it right to take no part myself in proposing
measures, the execution of which will devolve on my successor. I am
therefore chiefly an unmedling listener to what others say."[479] But to
Doctor William Eustis he protested that "while thus endeavoring to
secure, and preparing to vindicate that commerce, the absurd opinion has
been propagated, that this temporary and necessary arrangement was to be
a permanent system and was intended for its destruction."[480] And this
seems to indicate that he was quite definite in his own mind, even if he
refrained from expressing his opinion officially.

After more than a month's deliberation in Congress, Jefferson had come
to believe that "Congress had taken their ground firmly for continuing
the embargo till June, and then war." Quite suddenly, however, the
majority, frightened by threats of secession openly made by the New
England members, and fearful of the famous Essex Junto, rallied to a
compromise. Neither the people nor Congress were for war, and that fact
had been clearly realized very early both by the French and the British
ministers; at the same time it was felt that something must be done to
relieve to some extent the financial distress of the Virginia planters
and New England merchants. The result was that Congress decided to
remove the embargo on March 4, "non intercourse with France and Great
Britain, trade everywhere else, and continuing war preparations."[481]

On the first of March, three days before the inauguration of his
successor, Jefferson signed the bill, but not without serious
misgivings. The letters he wrote at that time contain even more
convincing evidence that he did not expect the embargo to last much
longer. To General Armstrong, the American representative in Paris, he
declared on March 5 that "War must follow if the edicts are not repealed
before the meeting of Congress in May." With Short, whom he had tried
without success to have appointed Minister to Russia, he was more
explicit if no less emphatic: "We have substituted for it (the embargo),
a non-intercourse with France and England and their dependencies, and a
trade to all other places. It is probable that the belligerents will
take our vessels under their edicts, in which case we shall probably
declare war against them."[482] Finally, to Madison himself, he wrote
after reaching Monticello:

  It is to be desired that war may be avoided, if circumstances will
  admit. Nor in the present maniac state of Europe, should I estimate
  the point of honor by the ordinary scale. I believe we shall, on the
  contrary, have credit with the world, for having made the avoidance
  of being engaged in the present unexampled war, our first object.
  War, however, may become a less losing business than unresisted
  depredation.[483]

Whatever may have been the opposition to the embargo and the opposition
to Jefferson of disaffected Republicans, it is remarkable that he was
able to keep his party in hand to the last minute and to choose his
successor. Early at the beginning of his second term, he had expressed
his irrevocable intention not to become a candidate for a third term. He
was longing for his farm, his books, for the comforts of family life and
he was not in the best of health.

Not only had he been troubled by rheumatism, but "periodical headaches"
recurring at frequent intervals left him for days unable to write and
hardly able "to compose his thoughts."

The Republicans had to make a choice between three possible candidates:
George Clinton, Monroe, and Madison. The strongest argument that could
be advanced in favor of the first was that, according to a precedent
already apparently established, the Vice President was the logical
successor, the "heir apparent", as Adams had termed it, to a retiring
President. Moreover, Clinton could count on the support of the New York
Republicans and had aroused no strong antagonism against himself. It
soon became obvious, however, that the contest lay between the two
Virginians and that the Virginia dynasty would not be broken as yet.
Monroe was not without support in his native State and his candidacy had
been upheld by a Republican caucus held by Randolph and his friends at
Richmond; but another caucus of the Assembly had given a decisive
majority to Madison. On January 23, 1808, a congressional caucus held in
Washington pronounced decisively for Madison as President and George
Clinton as Vice President. But Randolph held aloof and with his friends
published a protest against the candidacy of Madison, who had
"moderation when energy was needed", whose theories of government were
tainted with federalism, "when the country was asking for consistency
and loathing and abhorrence from any compromise." The danger of a split
in the Republican Party was indeed serious, and while Jefferson
reasserted his wish not to participate in any way in the campaign, he
wrote to Monroe a long letter, deploring the situation and making an
obvious appeal to his party loyalty. He warned him particularly against
the passions that could not fail to be aroused in such a contest, and
conjured him to keep clear "of the toils in which his friends would
endeavor to interlace him."

That Monroe's _amour-propre_ was deeply wounded appears in the letter he
wrote in answer to his "chief." He complained lengthily and bitterly of
having been handicapped by the sending of Pinkney and of the criticism
to which he had been subjected on account of the treaty. Once again
Jefferson had to soothe the discontent of his friend and "_élève_",
which to a certain extent he succeeded in doing. It soon appeared,
however, that the question would solve itself, that neither Monroe nor
Clinton was strong enough to control the Republican majority. When the
results came in, the Republicans had suffered the loss of all New
England except Vermont, but Madison carried the election by one hundred
and twenty-two votes, against forty-seven to C. C. Pinckney and six for
Clinton. True enough, in several states the electors had been selected
before the full pressure of the embargo was felt, but with such a
substantial majority it is difficult to accept unreservedly Henry Adams'
view that "no one could fail to see that if nine months of embargo had
so shattered Jefferson's power, another such year would shake the Union
itself."




BOOK SIX

_The Sage of Monticello_




CHAPTER I

"AMERICA HAS A HEMISPHERE TO ITSELF"


When, after a long and fatiguing journey, Thomas Jefferson reached
Monticello in the spring of 1809, he was in his sixty-third year and had
well earned his "quadragena stipendia." But the Republic did not serve
any pension to retired Presidents. For more than twelve years he had
perforce neglected his domain, and his son-in-law, who had been in
charge of the estate for some time, was scarcely a man to be intrusted
with the administration of complicated financial interests. A large part
of Jefferson's time was necessarily spent in setting things to rights;
but the times were against him, and the embargo had proved more
detrimental to the great landowners of the South than to the New England
manufacturers. A planter whose sole revenue consisted in his crops had
the utmost difficulty in providing for a large family of dependants, and
a considerable number of slaves who had to be fed and clad, and most of
all in keeping up appearances. Jefferson was hardly freed from public
responsibilities when he had to labor under domestic difficulties which
worried him even to his death bed.

Under his direction, however, Monticello became more than ever a
self-supporting community; the slaves were taught all the necessary
trades and when, thanks to the merino sheep brought over by Du Pont de
Nemours, woolen goods of fine quality were made at Monticello, the
master of the house was proud to wear clothes of homespun which, in his
opinion, could rival the best produce of the English manufactures. Whole
books could be written, and several have been written, on Jefferson the
agriculturist, the surveyor, the civil engineer, the inventor and the
architect. There is, however, another aspect of his last years which
deserves more attention than it usually receives.

[Illustration: THOMAS JEFFERSON

_From the portrait by Kosciuszko_]

For thirty years Jefferson had lived almost constantly under the
scrutiny of the public. His utterances had been pounced upon by eager
enemies of the "cannibal press"; letters intended solely for friends had
been printed, several times in a garbled form, and during his presidency
he had been unable to communicate freely with his European friends for
fear of having his letters intercepted. At last, he could express
himself freely. He was no longer the spokesman of the country who had to
ascertain the state of public opinion before writing a message or
sending a communication to a foreign government. He could speak for
himself, without being hindered by the ever-present danger of political
repercussions, and if he did not speak much, he wrote several thousand
letters, many of which are still unpublished--an overwhelming treasure
for historians of the period. His physical strength was somewhat
impaired, but his intellectual powers were in no way diminished; never
had his mind been keener, his perception of realities clearer and his
extraordinary gift of political prophecy more accurate than during the
last fifteen years of his life. This is the period to study in order to
understand more fully his conception of Americanism, his vision of
democracy and the practical wisdom which permeated his philosophy of old
age.

His valedictory letter to Madison, written from Monticello on March 17,
1809, contained a very curious admission of the inability of the United
States to carry out war successfully with their present organization; "I
know of no Government," he wrote, "which would be so embarrassing in war
as ours. This would proceed very much from the lying and licentious
character of our papers; but also, from the wonderful credulity of the
members of Congress in the floating lies of the day."[484]

This was no passing whim of his, but a very definite and categorical
understanding of the functions devolving upon the Executive in times of
emergency. He had not forgotten his experience as Governor of Virginia,
when he had to coax necessary measures from a reluctant Assembly; his
eight years as Chief Executive of the country had only strengthened him
in the opinion that "In times of peace, the people look most to their
representatives, but in war to the Executive solely." He found a
confirmation of this theory in the state of public opinion, when he
wrote to Rodney, early in 1810: "It is visible that their confidence is
now veering in that direction: that they are looking to the executive to
give the proper direction to their affairs, with a confidence as
auspicious as it is well founded."[485]

A few months later, writing to J. B. Colvin, he took up again the same
question: "In what circumstances is it permitted for the man in charge
to assume authority beyond the law?" That he was personally interested
in the matter was evident, since he had exceeded his constitutional
powers very recently, during the Burr conspiracy. It is nevertheless
remarkable to see the champion of legality and democracy declare that:

  A strict observance of the written law is doubtless _one_ of the high
  duties of a good citizen, but it is not the _highest_. The laws of
  necessity, of self-preservation, of saving our country when in danger
  are of higher obligation. To lose our country by a scrupulous
  adherence to written law, would be to lose the law itself, with life,
  liberty, property and all those enjoying them with us; thus absurdly
  sacrificing the end to the means.[486]

To a certain extent this was a plea _pro domo sua_. If we remember that,
during the World War, the motto of America was, for more than two years,
"Stand by the President", it will be seen that Jefferson was as good a
prophet as an intelligent observer. This admission of his may seem
undemocratic, but it simply shows that the former President had a clear
perception of the permanent tendencies that direct American
consciousness; for no people are more disciplined and more ready to
follow their chosen executive than the Americans, at least on critical
occasions, and more particularly when confronted with foreign
aggression.

War was still to be avoided and considered only as the _ultima ratio rei
publicae_. On this point also, Jefferson was perfectly consistent, and,
having shed the responsibility, he did not suddenly change his attitude.
The "point of honor" was not to be estimated by the ordinary scale in
the present maniac state of Europe. But America must realize at the same
time that no ordinary treaty could insure her safety. A treaty with
England could not even be thought of; for "the British never made an
equal treaty with any nation."

With regard to France the situation was somewhat different. Some
compensation was due to America for forcing Great Britain to revoke her
orders in council. But what compensation? The acquiescence of Bonaparte
to the annexation of the Floridas? That was no price; for "they are ours
in the first moment of the first war; and until a war they are of no
particular necessity." The only territory that the United States might
covet was Cuba. "That would be a price, and I would immediately erect a
column on the southernmost limit of Cuba, and inscribe on it a _ne plus
ultra_ to us in that direction.... Cuba can be defended by us without a
navy, and this develops the principle which ought to limit our views.
Nothing should ever be accepted which would require a navy to defend
it."[487]

In the meantime, Jefferson did not miss any opportunity to justify the
embargo. Even after its repeal, he insisted that "enough of the
non-importation laws should be preserved 1st, to pinch them into a
relinquishment of impressments, and 2nd, to support those manufacturing
establishments, which their orders, and our interests, forced us to
make."[488]

To Du Pont de Nemours he wrote a long letter, stating in detail the
advantages accrued to America from the embargo, and this point is well
worth keeping in mind by those who insist on considering Jefferson as a
hundred per cent. agrarian:

  The barefaced attempts of England to make us accessories and
  tributaries to her usurpations on the high seas--he wrote to the old
  Physiocrat--have generated in this country an universal spirit for
  manufacturing for ourselves, and of reducing to a minimum the number
  of articles for which we are dependent on her. The advantages too, of
  lessening the occasions of risking our peace on the ocean, and of
  planting the consumer on our own soil by the side of the grower of
  produce, are so palpable, that no temporary suspension of injuries on
  her part, or agreements founded on that, will now prevent our
  continuing in what we have begun.[489]

So wrote the supposed agrarian to the founder of physiocracy, and this
is a _prima facie_ evidence that Jefferson was not a Physiocrat of the
first water. As a matter of fact, on this point as on so many others, he
had strong negative principles. As we have already pointed out on
several occasions, Jefferson was not so much opposed to manufactures and
industries as to mercantilism, and particularly to English mercantilism.
This corrective ought to be taken into consideration in any estimate of
the Jeffersonian democracy, and one may wonder whether some continuators
of Mr. Beard are sufficiently aware of this capital distinction.

It soon appeared to Jefferson that there was no possible way out except
war. Contrary to all expectations, the convulsions of Europe continued
and no hope of a permanent peace was in sight. The death of Bonaparte
"would remove the first and chiefest apostle of the desolation of men
and morals and might withdraw the scourge of the land. But what is to
restore order and safety on the ocean. The death of George III? Not at
all.... The principle that force is right, is become the principle of
the nation itself."[490]

As a matter of fact, Bonaparte was little to be feared. He still had the
whole world to conquer before turning his eyes towards America.

  England on the contrary is an ever-present danger not to be relied
  upon as an ally for she would make a separate peace and leave us in
  the lurch. Her good faith? The faith of a nation of merchants. The
  _Punica fides_ of modern Carthage. Of the friend of the protectress
  of Copenhagen. Of the nation who never admitted a chapter of morality
  into her political code.

Then follows a formidable indictment of the treacherous policies of
England with a curious and most interesting discrimination at the end,
for Jefferson observes that "it presents the singular phenomenon of a
nation, the individuals of which are as faithful to their private
engagements and duties, as honorable, as worthy, as those of any nation
on earth, and whose government is yet the most unprincipled at this day
known."[491]

All told, both nations could be tarred with the same brush "for," said
Jefferson, "I should respect just as much the rules of conduct which
governed Cartouche or Blackbeard as those now acted on by France or
England."[492] The only difference was that France was not in a position
to cause as much damage to American interests as her hereditary enemy
whose claim to "dominion of the ocean and to levy tribute on every flag
traversing that, as lately attempted and not relinquished, every nation
must contest, even _ad internecionem_."[493]

This detestation of English policies and English rulers did not,
however, extend to individuals. Even when war was to be declared
Jefferson took care to establish what he considered as a very necessary
distinction in a fine letter sent to James Maury, his "dear and ancient
friend and classmate":

  Our two countries are at war, but not you and I. And why should our
  two countries be at war, when by peace we can be so much more useful
  to one another. Surely the world will acquit our government from
  having sought it.... We consider the overwhelming power of England on
  the ocean, and of France on the land, as destructive of the
  prosperity and happiness of the world, and wish both to be reduced
  only to the necessity of observing moral duties. I believe no more in
  Bonaparte's fighting merely for the liberty of the seas, than in
  Great Britain's fighting for the liberties of mankind.... We resist
  the enterprises of England first, because they first come vitally
  home to us. And our feelings repel the logic of bearing the lash of
  George III, for fear of that of Bonaparte at some future day. When
  the wrongs of France shall reach us with equal effect, we shall
  resist them also. But one at a time is enough; and having offered a
  choice to the champions, England first takes up the gauntlet.[494]

Since war was declared, the only thing to keep in mind was to make it as
advantageous as possible to the United States. Thanks to the Louisiana
Purchase, France had been eliminated forever from the American
continent, but the existence of a large British province on the northern
border constituted an ever-present source of anxiety and danger for the
Union. The first war aim of the United States was consequently to expel
Great Britain from the North American continent, for as long as England
could use her continental dominion as "a fulcrum for her Machiavellian
levers" there would be no safety for the United States. On the other
hand, the war could not be carried out to a successful conclusion if
during the hostilities America were kept unable to export the surplus
of her produce. Jefferson therefore recommended that neutral vessels be
used "and even enemy vessels under neutral flag, which I should wink
at", wrote Jefferson to the President.[495]

This last recommendation may seem surprising and almost treasonable, but
Jefferson lived in close contact with farmers and planters, and he still
remembered their attitude during the Revolutionary War and knew that "to
keep the war popular we must keep open the markets. As long as good
prices can be had, the people will support the war cheerfully."

Later in the year he was able to report to the President:

  Our farmers are cheerful in the expectation of a good price for wheat
  in Autumn. Their pulse will be regulated by this, and not by the
  successes or disasters of the war. To keep open sufficient markets is
  the very first object towards maintaining the popularity of the war,
  which is as great at present as could be desired.[496]

To be correctly understood, this attitude of Jefferson advocating trade
with the enemy requires some further elucidation. As a matter of fact,
the issue was not so clear-cut as it would seem. While England was to be
considered as America's enemy on the continent, she was "fighting
America's battles" in Europe, for the ultimate triumph of Bonaparte
would have been pregnant with dangers for the Union. He consequently
advocated the exportation of grain to Great Britain:

  If she is to be fed at all events, why may not we have the benefit of
  it as well as others. I would not indeed, feed her armies landed on
  our territory, because the difficulty of inland communication
  subsistence is what will prevent their ever penetrating far into the
  country.... But this would be my only exception, and as to feeding
  her armies in the Peninsular, she is fighting our battles there, as
  Bonaparte is on the Baltic.[497]

But it must also be admitted that Jefferson considered that in war all
is fair. He had not changed much since the remote days of the Revolution
when he urged Washington to permit him to use measures of retaliation on
the British prisoners. Once again he did not scruple to recommend
measures sometimes used but seldom so frankly advocated. He would not
have hesitated to bring the war home to Great Britain and to resort to
retaliation. "Perhaps they will burn New York or Boston," he wrote to
Duane. "If they do, we must burn the city of London, not by expensive
fleets or congreve rockets, but by employing an hundred or two
Jack-the-painters, whom nakedness, famine, desperation and hardened
vice, will abundantly furnish among themselves."[498]

But the thing never to be lost sight of was the conquest of Canada and
"the final expulsion of England from the American continent." It was to
be a very simple expedition, "a mere matter of marching", and the
weakness of the enemy was to make "our errors innocent." All these
sanguine expectations were blasted to dust by the Hull disaster. Three
frigates taken by "our gallant little navy" could not balance "three
armies lost by treachery, cowardice, or incapacity of those to whom they
were entrusted." The mediation of Russia was the only hope left, but the
enemies were to remain "bedecked with the laurels of the land"--the
reverse of what was to be expected and perhaps what was to be
wished.[499]

Throughout the whole campaign Jefferson was unable to choose between
France and England, or rather between Bonaparte and England's corrupted
government. Strong as were his denunciations of English policies and
crimes, he almost foamed at the mouth when he mentioned the abominable
Corsican:

  That Bonaparte is an unprincipled tyrant who is deluging the
  continent of Europe with blood, there is not a human being, not even
  the wife of his bosom, who does not see. There is no doubt as to the
  line we ought to wish drawn between his successes and those of
  Alexander. Surely none of us wish to see Bonaparte conquer Russia,
  and lay thus at his feet the whole continent of Europe. This done,
  England would be just a breakfast.[500]

The "true line of interest" of the United States was consequently that
Bonaparte should be able to effect the complete exclusion of England
from the whole continent of Europe, in order to make her renounce her
views of dominion over the ocean. As there was no longer any hope of
expelling England completely from the American continent, it remained
"the interest of the U. S. to wish Bonaparte a moderate success so as to
curb the ambition of Great Britain."[501]

From this and many other similar passages it would follow that Jefferson
was one of the first exponents of the famous policy of the balance of
power. Although at war with England, America could not wish for a
complete defeat of her enemy which would enable the monster to pursue
his dreams of world domination. But hateful as the Corsican was, no one
could wish for an English victory which would leave Great Britain the
undisputed ruler of the ocean. Incidents of the war did wring from
Jefferson impassioned outbursts which expressed a temporary anger, but
whenever he took time to weigh the different factors in his mind, the
realistic politician emerged every time.

This appears clearly in his correspondence with Madame de Staël, who had
urged him on several occasions to make every effort to decide his fellow
countrymen to join in the battle against the oppressors of liberty. It
appears also quite significantly in his correspondence with Madison,
following the burning of the White House and the destruction by the
English soldiers of the first Congressional Library. His indignation
ran high when he learned "through the paper" that "the vandalism of our
enemy has triumphed at Washington over science as well as the arts, with
the destruction of the public library with the noble edifice in which it
was deposited." "Of that transaction, as that of Copenhagen, the world
will entertain but one sentiment," he wrote to Samuel H. Smith.[502] But
it was characteristic of the man that he thought at once of the means of
restoring the library. Books could not be procured easily from abroad
and there was no other private library in the country comparable to the
collection of books he had systematically accumulated for over forty
years. He placed his books at the disposal of Congress "to be valued by
persons named by the Library Committee, and the payment made convenient
to the public." This was not a piece of business in order to retrieve
his fortune, nor a disguised request for financial help, but simply the
act of a public-spirited citizen unable to make an outright gift and yet
unwilling to make any profit on the public treasury.

The end of the war was in sight--a war which could be considered as a
draw, in which both sides had lost heavily and neither had gained
anything:

  It is a deplorable misfortune to us. It has arrested the course of
  the most remarkable tide of prosperity any nation ever experienced,
  and has closed such prospects of future improvements as were never
  before in the view of any people. Farewell all hopes of extinguishing
  public debt! Farewell all visions of applying surpluses of revenue to
  the improvement of peace, rather than the ravages of war. Our enemy
  has indeed the consolation of Satan on removing our first parents
  from Paradise; from a peaceable and agricultural nation, he makes us
  a military and manufacturing one....[503]

It could truly be said that the war had failed. The best that could be
expected was the _status ante bellum_. "Indemnity for the past and
security for the future which was our motto at the beginning of this
war, must be adjourned to another, when, disarmed and bankrupt our enemy
shall be less able to insult and plunder the world with impunity."[504]

The news that peace had been signed did not cause him any elation, it
was "in fact but an armistice", and even when he wrote again to his dear
and ancient friend James Maury, Jefferson was careful to note that
America would never peacefully accept again England's practice of
impressment on the high seas. "On that point," he wrote, "we have thrown
away the scabbard and the moment an European war brings her back to this
practice, adds us again to her enemies."[505]

This was repeated in a letter to his old friend Du Pont de Nemours who
had asked him for his influence in order to send his grandson to the
Naval Academy:

  For twenty years to come we should consider peace as the _summum
  bonum_ of our country. At the end of that period we shall be twenty
  millions in number, and forty in energy, when encountering the
  starved and rickety paupers and dwarfs of English workshops. By that
  time your grandson will have become one of our High-Admirals, and
  bear distinguished part in retorting the wrongs of both his countries
  on the most implacable and cruel of their enemies.[506]

Yet one would be mistaken in believing that Jefferson felt against
England any deep-seated animosity, and his resentment, however
justifiable, did not last long after the close of hostilities. The fine
friendly letters he wrote to Thomas Law and James Maury at the eve of
the war were more than mere gestures. He had many friends in England, he
was imbued with English philosophy, English ideas, English law and, if
he detested the rulers and the régime, he always maintained the same
sentimental and quite natural feelings of so many Americans for the
mother country as a whole:

  Were they once under a government which should treat us with justice
  and equity--he wrote to John Adams--I should myself feel with great
  strength the ties that bind us together, of origin, language, laws
  and manners; and I am persuaded the two people would become in future
  as it was with the ancient Greeks, among whom it was reproachful for
  Greek to be found fighting against Greek in a foreign army.[507]

On the same day he wrote to the Secretary of State, James Monroe, about
the proposed inscription to be engraved in a conspicuous place on the
restored Capitol, and he had suggested that if any inscription was
considered as necessary, it should simply state the bare facts, such as:

  FOUNDED 1791. BURNT BY A BRITISH ARMY 1814. RESTORED BY CONGRESS
  1817.

But a question of more importance was whether there should be any
inscription at all. "The barbarism of the conflagration will immortalize
that of the nation.... We have more reason to hate her than any nation
in earth. But she is not now an object of hatred.... It is for the
interest of all that she should be maintained nearly on a par with other
members of the republic of nations."[508]

With regard to France, his correspondence with Du Pont de Nemours and
Lafayette offers precious and significant testimony. Much as he loathed
Bonaparte, he deplored the return of the Bourbons and the reactionary
measures of the _Restauration_. His indignation ran high when he
received

  ... the new treaty of the allied powers, declaring that the French
  nation shall not have Bonaparte and shall have Louis XVIII as their
  ruler. They are all then as great rascals as Bonaparte himself.
  While he was in the wrong, I wished him exactly as much success as
  would answer our purpose, and no more. Now that they are wrong and he
  in the right, he shall have all my prayers for success, and that he
  may dethrone every man of them.[509]

Writing to Albert Gallatin he indulged in a "poetical effusion" which
shows how deeply his feelings were stirred:

  I grieve for France ... and I trust they will finally establish for
  themselves a government of rational and well tempered liberty. So
  much science cannot be lost; so much light shed over them can never
  fail to produce to them some good in the end. Till then, we may
  ourselves fervently pray, with the liturgy a little parodied; Give
  peace till that time, oh Lord, because there is none other that will
  fight for us but only thee, oh God.[510]

When all was told, and it was realized that "the cannibals of Europe
were going to eating one another again and the pugnacious humor of
mankind seemed to be the law of his nature", the only course for the
United States to follow was to keep out of the fray as much as possible
and so to direct their policy as to give no pretext for the European
powers to intervene in the New World.

Already, in 1812, Jefferson had formulated his views in the most
unequivocal manner, when he wrote to Doctor John Crawford:

  We specially ought to pray that the powers of Europe may be so poised
  and counterpoised among themselves, that their own safety may require
  the presence of all their force at home, leaving the other quarters
  of the globe in undisturbed tranquillity. When our strength will
  permit us to give the law to our hemisphere, it should be that the
  meridian of the mid-Atlantic should be the line of demarkation
  between war and peace, on this side of which no act of hostility
  should be committed, and the lion and the lamb lie down in peace
  together.[511]

The progress of the revolt of the Spanish colonies was at first to
strengthen him in the position he had already taken.

Jefferson received the news without any elation. For a long time he had
known that the link between the Spanish and Portuguese colonies was
growing weaker. He doubted very much, however, that the colonies were
ready for self-government. There might have been some hope for Mexico,
because of her proximity to the United States: "But the others, I fear,"
he wrote to Baron Alexander von Humboldt, "will end in military
despotisms. The different castes of their inhabitants, their mutual
hatred and jealousies, their profound ignorance and bigotry, will be
played off by cunning leaders, and each be made the instrument of
enslaving the others." The important point he made was in what followed,
and Jefferson here indulged in one of his curious political prophecies,
in which he so often hit the mark:

  But in whatever government they will end, they will be _American_
  governments, no longer to be involved in the never-ceasing broils of
  Europe. The European nations constitute a separate division of the
  globe; their localities make them part of a distinct system; they
  have a set of interests of their own in which it is our business
  never to engage ourselves. America has a hemisphere to itself. It
  must have its separate system of interests; which must not be
  subordinated to those of Europe. The insulated state in which nature
  has placed the American continent, should so far avail it that no
  spark of war kindled in the other quarters of the globe should be
  wafted across the wide oceans which separate us from them and it will
  be so. In fifty years more the United States alone will contain fifty
  millions of inhabitants, and fifty years are soon gone over.... And
  you will live to see the period ahead of us; and the numbers which
  will then be spread over the other parts of the American hemisphere,
  catching long before that the principles of our portion of it, and
  concurring with us in the maintainance of the same system.[512]

For the present the situation was entirely different--and as he had done
during the Revolution with regard to France, he advocated prudence and
slowness. It was one thing for the American colonies to engage in a war
with the mother country in order to preserve the liberties they had
hitherto enjoyed, and again it was another entirely different thing for
people who had not the faintest experience of self-government to declare
their independence and suddenly to sever all connections with the past.
In addition he was fully aware that the new republics would be in no
condition to fight off foreign aggressors and thus would become an easy
prey for the unscrupulous and greedy nations of Europe. Unable to stand
on their own feet, the most natural course for South America was to fall
back on Spain. Jefferson did not visualize the "_foris familiation_" of
the colonies without a sort of moral protectorate of the mother country:
"if she extends to them her affection, her aid, her patronage in every
court and country, it will weave a bond of union indissoluble by
time."[513] At the time Jefferson did not go further, and as a matter of
fact he long held that this would have been the best solution for South
America. As late as January, 1821, he still maintained this opinion in a
letter to John Adams:

  The safest road would be an accomodation to the mother country which
  shall hold them together by the single link of the same chief
  magistrate, leaving to him power enough to keep them in peace with
  one another, and to themselves the essential power of self-government
  and self-improvement, until they will be sufficiently trained by
  education and habits of freedom to walk safely by themselves.
  Representative government, native functionaries, a qualified negative
  on their laws, with a previous security by compact for freedom of
  commerce, freedom of the press, habeas corpus, and trial by jury,
  would make a good beginning. This last would be the school in which
  their people might begin to learn the exercise of civic duties as
  well as rights. For freedom of religion they are not yet
  prepared.[514]

This was the ideal solution, but "the question was not what we wish, but
what is practicable." If consequently the new republics refused such a
compromise, another alternative could be offered:

  As their sincere friend and brother, I do believe the best thing for
  them, would be for themselves to come to an accord with Spain, under
  the guarantee of France, Russia, Holland, and the United States,
  allowing to Spain a nominal supremacy, with authority only to keep
  the peace among them, leaving them otherwise all the powers of
  self-government, until their experience in them, their emancipation
  from their priests, and advancement in information shall prepare them
  for complete independence. I exclude England from this confederacy,
  because her selfish principles render her incapable of honorable
  patronage or disinterested co-operation; unless indeed, what seems
  now probable, a revolution should restore to her an honest
  government, one which will permit the world to live in peace.[515]

This is a capital passage for it contains in germ much more than the
so-called Monroe Doctrine. What Jefferson had in mind at the time was
evidently a society of nations, which the United States would have
joined in order to guarantee the territorial integrity of the South
American republics under a Spanish mandate. For Brazil alone he
contemplated a real and immediate independence, for "Brazil is more
populous, more wealthy, and as wise as Portugal."

But in Jefferson's mind this plan was only a temporary solution. He
was firmly convinced that a time would necessarily come when all the
American republics would be drawn together by their community of
interests and institutions and coalescing in an American system,
independent from and unconnected with that of Europe, would form a
world by themselves:

  "The principles of society there and here, then, are radically
  different and I hope no American patriot will ever lose sight of the
  essential policy of interdicting in the seas and territories of both
  Americas the ferocious and sanguinary contests of Europe. I wish to
  see this coalition begun."[516]

Such, according to Jefferson, was to be the cardinal principle of
American policies for all times to come; for, as he wrote to his friend
Correa who had come back to the United States as Minister from Portugal:

  Nothing is so important as that America shall separate herself from
  the system of Europe, and establish one of her own--Our
  circumstances, our pursuits, our interests, are distinct, the
  principles of our policy should be so also. All entanglements with
  that quarter of the globe should be avoided that peace and justice
  shall be the polar stars of American societies.[517]

On the other hand, it was not advisable for the United States to
intervene directly in South America or to help the colonies to sever
their bonds from the metropolis. There is little doubt that the Spanish
colonies would never have thought of revolting if they had not had
constantly before their eyes the example of their northern neighbors.
Ill-conducted as they were, the revolutions of South America could trace
their origin directly to the American revolution and the Declaration of
Independence. It was so plain that Jefferson's French friends,
Lafayette, Du Pont de Nemours, and Destutt de Tracy expected him to
declare enthusiastically in favor of the South American republics and to
use whatever influence he still had to bring about an open intervention
of the United States in their favor. Their optimism only shows how
little they knew their American friend and how little they understood
his policy. To Destutt de Tracy he answered at the end of 1820:

  We go with you all lengths in friendly affections to the independence
  of S. America, but an immediate acknowledgement of it calls up other
  considerations. We view Europe as covering at present a smothered
  fire, which may shortly burst forth and produce general
  conflagration. From this it is our duty to keep aloof. A formal
  acknowledgement of the independence of her colonies, would involve us
  with Spain certainly, and perhaps too with England, if she thinks
  that a war would divert her internal troubles. Such a war would hurt
  us more than it would help our brethren of the South; and our right
  may be doubted of mortgaging posterity for the expenses of a war in
  which they will have a right to say their interest was not
  concerned.... In the meantime we receive and protect the flag of S.
  America in it's commercial intercourse with us, on the acknowledged
  principles of neutrality between two belligerent parties in a civil
  war; and if we should not be the first, we shall certainly be the
  second nation in acknowledging the entire independence of our new
  friends.[518]

This Jefferson pressed again even more tersely in a letter written to
Monroe almost four years later. "We feel strongly for them, but our
first care must be for ourselves."[519]

Surveying the whole situation from the "mountain-top" of Monticello, the
philosopher wondered at times "whether all nations do not owe to one
another a bold declaration of their sympathy with the one party and
their detestation of the conduct of the other?" But he soon concluded:
"Farther than this we are not bound to go; and indeed, for the sake of
the world, we ought not to increase the jealousies or draw on ourselves
the power of this formidable confederacy." After the treaty of Ghent, at
the beginning of the "era of good feeling", the United States could
reasonably count on a long period of peace; all their difficulties with
Europe had been settled, and only one possible point of friction could
be discovered. "Cuba alone seems at present to hold up a speck of war to
us. Its possession by Great Britain would indeed be a great calamity to
the United States; but such calamity could only be temporary, for in
case of war on any account, Cuba would be naturally taken by the United
States, or the island would give itself to us when able to do so."

Thus Jefferson, once again, reasserted the cardinal principle of his
policy--the policy of the United States since the early days of the
Union:

  I have ever deemed it fundamental for the United States, never to
  take active part in the quarrels of Europe. Their political interests
  are entirely distinct from ours. Their mutual jealousies, their
  balance of power, their complicated alliances, their forms and
  principles of government are all foreign to us. They are nations of
  eternal war. All their energies are expended in the destruction of
  the labor, property, and lives of their peoples ... on our part,
  never had a people so favorable a chance of trying the opposite
  system, of peace and fraternity with mankind, and the direction of
  our means and faculties to the purposes of improvement instead of
  destruction.[520]

Thus, little by little, the famous doctrine took its final shape in the
minds of both Jefferson and Monroe. Jefferson contributed to it its
historical background, the weight of his experience and authority, and
the long conversations he had with Monroe on the matter gave him an
opportunity not only to get "his political compass rectified" but to map
out for the President the course to follow. The often quoted letter
written by Jefferson to Monroe on October 24, 1823, contained little
more than what had passed between them when Monroe visited his estate in
Virginia. It was simply a reaffirmation of the fundamental maxims of the
Jeffersonian policies:--"never to entangle ourselves in the broils of
Europe--never to suffer Europe to intermeddle with cis-Atlantic
affairs."

After making a survey of all the circumstances, Jefferson could write in
conclusion:

  I could honestly, therefore, join in the declaration proposed, that
  we aim not at the acquisition of any of those possessions, that we
  will not stand in the way of any amicable arrangement between them
  and the Mother country; but that we will oppose, with all our means,
  the forcible interposition of any other form or pretext, and most
  especially, their transfer to any power by conquest, cession, or
  acquisition in any other way.

Finally, although the letters to be exchanged between the British and
American governments did not properly constitute a treaty, Jefferson
advised Monroe to lay the case before Congress at the first opportunity,
since this doctrine might lead to war, "the declaration of which
requires an act of Congress."

Whatever use has been made of the Monroe Doctrine and whether or not the
"mandate" assumed by the United States has proved irksome to several
South American republics, there is no doubt that it was not proclaimed
without long hesitation and that its promoters did not take up this new
responsibility with "_un coeur léger_." There is no doubt, either,
that it was not considered as an instrument of imperialism. It was
primarily the extension of the doctrine of self-protection already
advanced by John Adams in 1776 and since then maintained by Washington
and Jefferson himself. It was also a corollary of the theory of the
balance of power which Jefferson always kept in mind. In this he was not
only followed but urged on by all his liberal friends in Europe.

  I would not be sorry--wrote Lafayette in 1817--to see the American
  government invested by the follies of Spain, with the opportunity to
  take the lead in the affairs of her independent colonies. Unless that
  is the case or great changes happen in the European policies, the
  miseries of those fine countries will be long protracted. Could you
  establish there a representative system, a free trade, and a free
  press, how many channels of information and improvement should be
  open at once.[521]

Jefferson himself was too respectful of self-government ever to think of
interfering with the internal affairs of the new republics. On the other
hand, he was too firmly convinced of the moral, intellectual and
political superiority of his own country not to believe that a time
would come when the contagion of liberty would extend to the near and
remote neighbors of the United States. The unavoidable result of the
Monroe Doctrine and the moral mandate of America would be ultimately to
form a "Holy American Alliance" of the free peoples of the Western
Hemisphere, to counterbalance the conspiracy of Kings and Lords "called
the European Holy Alliance."




CHAPTER II

DEMOCRATIC AMERICA


Protected against foreign entanglements and having survived the
convulsions that had shattered the old structures of Europe, America was
at last free to pursue her development along her own lines. The
philosopher of Monticello could sit back, take a more disinterested view
of the situation and make a forecast of the future of his country. He
could also advise, not only his immediate successors, but the
generations to come and take up again the part of "counsellor" which had
always suited him better than the part of the executive. He believed too
much in the right of successive generations to determine their own form
of government, to attempt to dictate in any way the course to follow.
But he was none the less convinced that certain principles embodied in
the Constitution had a permanent and universal value, and during the
years at Monticello he formulated the gospel of American democracy.

As it finally emerged from the several crises that threatened its
existence, the American Government was, if not the best possible
government, at least the best government then on the surface of the
earth. It was at the same time the hope and the model of all the nations
of the world.

  We exist and are quoted--wrote Jefferson to Richard Rush--as standing
  proofs that a government, so modelled as to rest continuously on the
  will of the whole society, is a practicable government. Were we to
  break to pieces, it would damp the hopes and efforts of the good, and
  give triumph to those of the bad through the whole enslaved world. As
  members, therefore, of the universal society of mankind, and standing
  high in responsible relation with them, it is our sacred duty to
  suppress passion among ourselves and not to blast the confidence we
  have inspired of proof that a government of reason is better than a
  government of force.[522]

Some dangers, however, were threatening to disturb the equilibrium of
the country. The most pressing was perhaps the extraordinary and
unwholesome development of State and local banks, which suspended
payment in great majority in September, 1814. The deluge of paper money
and the depreciation of the currency became, for Jefferson, a real
obsession and strengthened him in his abhorrence of commercialism. He
did not cease to preach the necessity of curbing the fever of
speculation that had accumulated ruins upon ruins and the return to more
sound regulations of the banks. "Till then," he wrote to John Adams, "we
must be content to return, _quoad hoc_, to the savage state, to recur to
barter in the exchange of our property, for want of a stable, common
measure of value, that now in use being less fixed than the beads and
wampum of the Indians."[523]

His banking theories, however, had scarcely any influence upon his
contemporaries, and even Gallatin was little impressed by them. But the
evident danger of inflation turned his mind back to the days when he had
fought the Hamiltonian system and gave him once more an opportunity to
pass judgment upon his opponent of the old days:

  This most heteregeneous system was transplanted into ours from the
  British system, by a man whose mind was really powerful, but chained
  by native partialities to everything English; who had formed
  exaggerated ideas of the superior wisdom of their government, and
  sincerely believed it for the good of the country to make them their
  model in everything, without considering that what might be wise and
  good for a nation essentially commercial and entangled in complicated
  intercourse with numerous and powerful neighbors, might not be so
  for one essentially agricultural, and insulated by nature, from the
  abusive governments of the old world.[524]

From this and many other passages it might be surmised that Jefferson
still held to the old antimercantile theories that had crystallized in
his mind when he was in Europe. If this were true, the contradiction
between his conduct as President and his personal convictions would be
so obvious that his sincerity might be questioned. As a matter of fact,
on this point as on many others, he had undergone a slow evolution. He
was certainly sincere when, shortly after leaving office, he wrote to
Governor John Jay in order to make his position clearer:

  An equilibrium of agriculture, manufacture, and commerce, is
  certainly become essential to our independence. Manufactures,
  sufficient for our own consumption (and no more). Commerce sufficient
  to carry the surplus produce of agriculture, beyond our own
  consumption, to a market for exchanging it for articles we cannot
  raise (and no more). These are the true limits of manufacture and
  commerce. To go beyond is to increase our dependence on foreign
  nations, and our liability to war.[525]

This can be taken as the final view of Jefferson on a subject on which
he is often misquoted and misunderstood. That he was fully aware of the
change that had taken place in his own mind can be seen in a declaration
to Benjamin Austin, written in January, 1816. Between 1787 and that
date, and even earlier, Jefferson had seen the light and realized that
to discourage home manufactures was "to keep us in eternal vassalage to
a foreign and unfriendly people." He had no patience with politicians
who brought forth his old and now obsolete utterances to promote their
unpatriotic designs:

  You tell me I am quoted by those who wish to continue our dependance
  on England for manufactures. There was a time when I might have been
  so quoted with more candor, but within the thirty years which have
  elapsed, how circumstances changed.... Experience since has taught me
  that manufactures are now as necessary to our independence as to our
  comfort; and if those who quote me as of different opinion will keep
  pace with me in purchasing nothing foreign where an equivalent of
  domestic fabric can be obtained, without regard to the difference of
  price, it will not be our fault if we do not soon have a supply at
  home equivalent to our demand.[526]

Desirable as it was to promote the industrial development of the United
States, it was no less desirable not to encourage it beyond a certain
point. Jefferson saw quite clearly that, under existing conditions, a
great industrial growth of the country would have as an unavoidable
result the perpetuation of slavery in the South and the even more
undesirable creation of a proletariat in the North. He had always held
that slavery was a national sore and a shameful condition to be remedied
as soon as conditions would permit. He was looking forward to the time
when this could be done without bringing about an economic upheaval; but
all hope would have to be abandoned if slavery were industrialized and
if slave labor became more productive. As to the other danger of
industrialism, it was no vague apprehension; one had only to consider
England to see "the pauperism of the lowest class, the abject oppression
of the laboring, and the luxury, the riot, the domination and the
vicious happiness of the aristocracy." This being the "happiness of
scientific England", he wrote to Thomas Cooper, "now let us see the
American side of the medal":

  And, first, we have no paupers, the old and crippled among us, who
  possess nothing and have no families to take care of them, being too
  few to merit notice as a separate section of society, or to affect a
  general estimate. The great mass of our population is of laborers;
  our rich, who can live without labor, either manual or professional,
  being few, and of moderate wealth. Most of the laboring class
  possess property, cultivate their own lands, have families, and from
  the demand for their labor are enabled to exact from the rich and the
  competent such prices as enable them to be fed abundantly, clothed
  above mere decency, to labor moderately and raise their families.
  They are not driven to the ultimate resources of dexterity and skill,
  because their wares will sell although not quite so nice as those of
  England. The wealthy, on the other hand, and those at their ease,
  know nothing of what the Europeans call luxury. They have only
  somewhat more of the comforts and decencies of life than those who
  furnish them. Can any condition of society be more desirable than
  this?[527]

Once more Jefferson appears as a true disciple and continuator of the
Physiocrats and one might be tempted at first to agree entirely with Mr.
Beard on this point. But this is only an appearance. To understand
Jefferson's true meaning, it is necessary to turn to his unpublished
correspondence with Du Pont de Nemours, and particularly to those
letters written after Jefferson's retirement from public life.

The rapid industrialization of the United States had greatly alarmed the
old Physiocrat. In his opinion there was a real danger lest the national
character of the people be completely altered and the foundation of
government deeply shaken. Considering the situation from the
"economist's" point of view, Du Pont came to the conclusion that the
development of home industries in America would necessarily bring about
a permanent reduction in the Federal income, largely derived from import
duties. The government could not be run without levying new taxes and
the question was to determine what methods should be followed in the
establishment of these new taxes. If the United States decided to resort
to indirect taxation, that is to say, excise, the unavoidable result
would be the creation of an army of new functionaries, as in France
under the old régime, and the use of vexatory procedure for the
enforcement of the new system. Furthermore, according to the theories
of the Physiocrats, indirect taxation was an economic heresy, since it
was a tax on labor, which is not a source but only a transformation of
wealth. The same criticism applied _a fortiori_ to the English income
tax which constituted the worst possible form of taxation.

In the controversy which arose between Jefferson and his old friend, the
Sage of Monticello again took a middle course. First of all, he refused
to concede that the development of industries could ever change the
fundamental characteristics of the United States. They were essentially
an agricultural nation, and an agricultural nation they would remain, in
spite of all predictions to the contrary. Furthermore, the question was
not to determine theoretically what was the best possible form of
taxation, but to find out what form the inhabitants of the country would
most easily bear. That in itself was a big enough problem and could not
be solved in the abstract, since, according to Jefferson: "In most of
the middle and Southern States some land tax is now paid into the State
treasury, and for this purpose the lands have been classed and valued
and the tax assessed according to valuation. In these an excise is most
odious. In the Eastern States, land taxes are odious, excises less
unpopular."[528]

Finally, Jefferson pointed out that his friend had neglected several
important factors, one of them being "the continuous growth in
population of the United States, which for a long time would maintain
the quantum of exports and imports at the present level at least."
Consequently, for several generations, the Government would be able to
support itself with a tax on importations, "the best agrarian law in
fact, since the poor man in the country who uses nothing but what is
made within his own farm or family, or within the United States, pays
not a farthing of tax to the general government." With the
characteristic optimism of the citizen of a young, strong and energetic
country, Jefferson then added:

  Our revenue once liberated by the discharge of public debt and its
  surplus applied to canals, roads, schools, etc., and the farmer will
  see his government supported, his children educated, and the face of
  his country made a paradise by the contributions of the rich alone
  without being called on to spare a cent from his earnings. The path
  we are now pursuing leads directly to this end, which we cannot fail
  to attain unless our administration should fall into unwise
  hands.[529]

This point alone should suffice to differentiate Jefferson's system from
physiocracy, since the Physiocrats had adopted as their motto the famous
_laissez faire laissez passer_ and were certainly in favor of free
trade. How far from Du Pont Jefferson remained in other particulars may
be gathered from his "Introduction" and notes to the "Political Economy"
of Destutt de Tracy, the translation and publication of which he
supervised and directed. In it he paid homage to the founders of the
science of political economy, and particularly to Gournay, Le Trosne and
Du Pont de Nemours, "the enlightened, philanthropic and venerable
citizen, now of the United States." But he pointed out that the several
principles they had discussed and established had not been able to
prevail, "not on account of their correctness, but because not
acceptable to the people whose will must be the supreme law. Taxation
is, in fact, the most difficult function of the government, and that
against which their citizens are most apt to be refractory. The general
aim is, therefore, to adopt the mode most consonant with the
circumstances and sentiments of the country."

This is Jefferson's final judgment on the Economists. Another
confirmation of his lack of interest in principles and theories not
susceptible of immediate application may be seen in it. In matters of
government, the important question, after deciding what should be done,
was to determine how much could be done under the circumstances, and if
a particular piece of legislation was turned down by the public will or
only reluctantly accepted, to bide one's time and wait for a more
favorable occasion. Even when doubting the wisdom of a popular verdict,
it was the duty of the public servant to do the public will. Thus in
this correspondence are revealed the two sides of Jefferson's character,
or to speak more exactly, the two parallel tracks in which his mind ran
at different times.

At the bottom of his heart, he believed that many of the economic
doctrines of Du Pont were fundamentally sound; but he also knew that the
citizens of the United States were not ready to accept the truth of
these principles, and he did not feel that, as an executive, he had the
right to attempt to shape the destinies of his country according to his
own preferences. Thus he laid himself open to the reproach of
insincerity, or at least of inconsistency, for on many occasions one may
find a flagrant contradiction between his public utterances and the
private letters he wrote to his friends. For this reason, Du Pont de
Nemours was never fully able to understand his American friend. This
difference between the French theorician and the American statesman will
appear even more clearly in the letters in which they exchanged views on
democracy and discussed the conditions requisite for the establishment
of a representative government.

Jefferson's opinion of the French people with regard to the form of
government they should adopt had never varied since the earliest days of
the Revolution. Every time he was consulted by his friends on the
matter, he invariably answered that they could do no better than to
follow as closely as possible the system of their neighbors and
hereditary enemies, the British. This answer, which recurred
periodically in his correspondence, was made particularly emphatic in
1801, when he again warned Lafayette that France was not ready to enjoy
a truly republican government. He went on by categorically stating that
what was good for America might be very harmful to another country and
that even in America it was neither desirable nor possible to enforce at
once all the provisions of the Constitution. Thus, in a few lines, he
defined his policies more clearly than any historian has ever done; he
analyzed that curious combination of unwavering principles and practical
expediency so puzzling to those once called by Jefferson himself "the
closet politicians."

  What is practicable--he said--must often control what is purely
  theory and the habits of the governed determine in a great degree
  what is practicable. The same original principles, modified in
  practice to the different habits of the different nations, present
  governments of very different aspects. The same principles reduced to
  form of practice, accommodated to our habits, and put into forms
  accommodated to the habits of the French nation would present
  governments very unlike each other.[530]

Thirteen years later his opinion had not varied one iota. Reviewing the
situation in France after the return of the Bourbons, he wrote to Du
Pont de Nemours:

  I have to congratulate you, which I do sincerely, on having got back
  from Robespierre and Bonaparte, to your ante-revolutionary condition.
  You are now nearly where you were at the Jeu de Paume, on the 20th of
  June 1789. The King would then have yielded by convention freedom of
  religion, freedom of the press, trial by jury, habeas corpus and a
  representative legislation. These I consider as the essentials
  constituting free government, and that the organization of the
  executive is interesting, as it may ensure wisdom and integrity in
  the first place, but next as it may favor or endanger the
  preservation of these fundamentals.[531]

The same note reappears constantly in the letters written by Jefferson
to his French friends, but a rapid survey of his correspondence with Du
Pont de Nemours may serve to make his position even more definite.

When, in December, 1815, Du Pont was invited by "the republics of New
Grenada, Carthagenes and Caracas" to give his views on the constitution
they intended to adopt, he drew up a plan of government for the
"Equinoctial republics" and sent it for approval to the Sage of
Monticello. Faithful to the principles of the Physiocrats, he had
divided the population into two classes: the real citizens or landowners
and the "inhabitants", those who work for a salary, possess nothing but
personal property, can go any day from one place to another, and make
with their employers contracts which they can break at any time. These
were entitled to protection, peaceful enjoyment of their personal
property, free speech, freedom of religion, habeas corpus, and such
natural rights, but Du Pont refused them any participation in the
government; for only those who "owned the country" should have the right
to decide how it was to be administered. To give the ballot to a
floating population of industrial workers, unattached to the soil, who
had nothing to sell except their labor, was "to brew a revolution, to
pave the way for the Pisistrates, the Marius, the Caesars, who represent
themselves as more democratic than they really are and than is just and
reasonable, in order to become tyrants, to violate all rights, to
substitute for law their arbitrary will, to offend morality and to
debase humanity."[532]

This was a doctrine which Jefferson could not accept, for it was in
direct contradiction to the tenets he had formulated early in his life
and held to during all his career. Because he had read Locke, and more
probably because he was trained as a lawyer, he opposed the contractual
theory of society to this economic organization. He maintained that
society was a compact, that all those who had become signatories to the
compact were entitled to the same rights, and consequently should have
the same privilege to share equally in the government, except, and this
proviso was important, when they freely agreed to delegate part of their
powers to elected magistrates and representatives.

This was the theory, the inalienable principle to be proclaimed in a
bill of rights, the necessary preamble to any constitution. In practice,
however, various limitations to universal suffrage were to be
recognized. One could not even think of granting the ballot to minors,
to emancipated slaves or to women. It did not follow either that, all
citizens being endowed with the same rights, they were equally ready to
exercise the same functions in the government. Men are created equal in
rights but differ in intelligence, learning, clear-sightedness and
general ability. In other words, there are some natural _aristoi_, and
John Adams brought Jefferson to this admission without any difficulty.
If this fact be accepted, the next step is to recognize that "that form
of government is the best, which provided the most effectually for a
pure selection of these natural _aristoi_ into offices of the
government." It was the good fortune of America that all her
constitutions were so worded as "to leave the citizens the free election
and separation of the aristoi from the pseudo-aristoi, of the wheat from
the chaff. In general, they will elect the really good and wise. In some
instances, wealth may corrupt, and birth blind; but not in a sufficient
degree to endanger society."[533]

According to this theory, the real function of the people is not to
participate directly in all governmental activities, but to select from
among themselves the most qualified citizens and the best prepared to
administer the country. In a letter to Doctor Walter Jones, who had sent
him a paper on democracy, Jefferson made his position even more definite
by establishing a very important distinction which gives more than any
other statement his true idea of a progressive democracy--an ideal to
be striven for, not a condition already reached:

  I would say that the people, being the only safe depository of power,
  should exercise in person every function which their qualifications
  enable them to exercise, consistently with the order and security of
  society; that we now find them equal to the election of those who
  shall be invested with their executive powers, and to act themselves
  in the judiciary, as judges in questions of fact; that the range of
  their powers ought to be enlarged....[534]

In these circumstances, Jefferson's reluctance to encourage both his
French and Spanish friends to establish at once a government modeled on
the American government in their respective countries, is perfectly
intelligible. Of all the nations of the earth, England alone could
"borrow wholesale the American system."

  They will probably turn their eyes to us, and be disposed to tread in
  the footsteps, seeing how safely these have led us into port. There
  is no part of or model to which they seem unequal, unless perhaps the
  elective presidency, and even that might possibly be rescued from the
  tumult of the elections, by subdividing the electoral assemblage into
  very small parts, such as of wards or townships, and making them
  simultaneous.[535]

As for the other nations, they were no more qualified to exercise the
duties of a truly representative government than were the inhabitants of
New Orleans at the time of the purchase. The French, in particular, had
proved in several instances that they could not be intrusted with the
administration of their own affairs.

  More than a generation will be requisite--he wrote to
  Lafayette--under the administration of reasonable laws favoring the
  progress of knowledge in the general mass of the people, and their
  habituation to an independent security of person and property, before
  they will be capable of estimating the value of freedom, and the
  necessity of sacred adherence to the principles on which it rests for
  preservation. Instead of that liberty which takes root and growth in
  the progress of reason, if recovered by mere accident or force, it
  becomes, with an unprepared people, a tyranny still, of the many, the
  few, or one.[536]

From these declarations, to which many other similar passages could be
added, a capital difference between the idealism of Jefferson and the
idealism of the French philosophers becomes quite obvious. The author of
the Declaration of Independence had proclaimed that all men are born
free and equal, but he never thought that women, Indians and newly
enfranchized slaves should be admitted to the same rights and privileges
as the other citizens. In like fashion, although representative
government remains the best possible form of government, he found it
desirable that some people, who are still children, should not be
granted at once the full enjoyment of their natural rights. Thus
self-government, which had become a well established fact and a reality
in America, should remain for other peoples a reward to be obtained
after a long and painful process of education. It could be hoped that
some day, after many disastrous experiments and much suffering, the
peoples of Europe and South America might deserve the blessings enjoyed
by the American people. But nothing was further from the character of
Jefferson than to preach the gospel of Americanism to all the nations of
the world. Instead of considering as desirable a close imitation of the
American Constitution by the newly liberated nations, he maintained that
each people should mold their institutions according to their own habits
and traditions. Far from being a Jacobin, a wild radical, or a "closet
philosopher", this practical politician had come to the conclusion that
each people have the government they deserve, and that durable
improvements can come only as a result of the improvement of the moral
qualities of every citizen--from within and not from without. Such a
moderate conclusion may surprise those who are accustomed to damn or
praise Jefferson on a few sentences or axioms detached from their
context; but, after careful scrutiny of the evidence, it seems difficult
to accept any other interpretation.

Comparatively perfect as it was, the government of the United States
presented certain germs of weakness, corruption and degeneracy. The Sage
of Monticello did not fail to call his friends' attention to some of the
dangers looming up on the horizon. As he had warned them against
inflation, he opposed the formation of societies which might become so
strong as "to obstruct the operation of the government and undertake to
regulate the foreign, fiscal, and military as well as domestic affairs."
This might be taken already as a warning against lobbying. He was fully
aware that a time might come when the speeches of the Senators and
Representatives "would cease to be read at all" and when the Legislature
would not enjoy the full confidence of the people. He deplored the law
vacating nearly all the offices of government nearly every four years,
for "it will keep in constant excitement all the hungry cormorants for
office, render them as well as those in place sycophants to their
Senators, engage in eternal intrigue to turn out and put in another, in
cabale to swap work, and make of them what all executive directories
become, mere sinks of corruption and faction."[537]

Serious and pressing as these dangers were, they could be left to future
generations to avoid, but at the very moment he wrote another fear
obsessed his mind:

  The banks, bankrupt laws, manufactures, Spanish treaty are nothing.
  These are occurrences which, like waves in a storm, will pass under
  the ship. But the Missouri question is a breaker on which we lose the
  Missouri country by revolt, and what more God only knows. From the
  Battle of Bunker's Hill to the treaty of Paris, we never had so
  ominous a question.... I thank God that I shall not live to witness
  its issue.[538]

No New Englander had done more to promote the cause of abolition than
Jefferson; on two occasions he had proposed legislative measures to put
an end to the scourge of slavery and he had never ceased to look for a
solution that would permit the emancipation of the slaves without
endangering the racial integrity of the United States. But this was no
longer a question of humanity. What mattered most was not whether
slavery would be recognized in Missouri or not. Slavery had become a
political question; it had created a geographical division between the
States, and the very existence of the Union was at stake. As on so many
other occasions, the old statesman had a truly prophetic vision of the
future when he wrote to John Adams early in 1820:

  If Congress has the power to regulate the conditions of the
  inhabitants of the States, within the States, it will be but another
  exercise of that power to declare that all shall be free. Are we then
  to see again Athenian and Lacedemonian confederacies? To wage another
  Peloponesian war to settle the ascendency between them? Or is this
  the tocsin of merely a servile war? That remains to be seen; but not,
  I hope, by you or me.[539]

The whole question was fraught with such difficulties that Jefferson
refused to discuss the abolition of slavery with Lafayette when the
Marquis paid him a last visit at Monticello. With his American friends
he was less reserved. When, as early as 1811, James Ogilvie asked him to
suggest an important and interesting subject for a series of lectures he
intended to deliver in the Southern States, Jefferson could think of
nothing more momentous than a discourse "on the benefit of the union,
and miseries which would follow a separation of the States, to be
exemplified in the eternal and wasting wars of Europe, in the pillage
and profligacy to which these lead, and the abject oppression and
degradation to which they reduce its inhabitants."[540]

Jefferson has so long been represented as the champion of State rights,
he stood so vigorously against all possible encroachments of the States'
sovereignty by the Federal Government, that we have a natural tendency
to forget this aspect of his policies and to see in him only the man who
inspired the Kentucky resolutions. It must be remembered, however, that
he never ceased to preach the necessity of the union to his fellow
countrymen, that when President he lived in a constant fear of secession
by the New England States, that he stopped all his efforts in favor of
abolition lest he should inject into the life of the country a political
issue which might disrupt national unity. While he claimed that
theoretically the States had a right to secede, he could no more
consider actual secession than he would have approved of any man
breaking the social compact in order to live the precarious life of the
savage.

From these dangers nothing could preserve the United States except what
Du Pont de Nemours called once "the cool common sense" of their
citizens. It was the only foundation on which to rest all hopes for the
future, for American democracy is not a thing which exists on paper, it
is not a thing which can be created overnight by law, decree or
constitution, it is not to be looked for in any document. "Where is our
republicanism to be found," wrote Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval. "Not in
our constitution certainly, but merely in the spirit of our people.
Owing to this spirit, and to nothing in the form of our constitution all
things have gone well."[541]

One of the most reassuring manifestations of this spirit was seen in the
willingness of the people to choose the best qualified persons as their
representatives, executives and magistrates. But if the Republic was to
endure, it was necessary to enlighten and cultivate the disposition of
the people, and it was no less important to provide a group of men
qualified through their natural ability and training, to discuss and
conduct the affairs of the community. Thus Jefferson was induced to take
up again in his old days one of his pet schemes, the famous bill for the
diffusion of knowledge.

As a matter of fact, he had never abandoned it completely, and its very
purpose had been explained already in the "Notes on Virginia":

  In every government on earth there is some trace of human weakness,
  some germ of corruption and degeneracy.... Each government
  degenerates when trusted to the rulers of the people alone. The
  people themselves are therefore its only safe depositories. And to
  render even them safer, their minds must be improved to a certain
  degree. This is not all that is necessary, though it be essentially
  necessary.

During his stay in Europe, Jefferson had become acquainted with great
universities, particularly those of Edinburgh and Geneva, and after
coming back to America he shifted somewhat the emphasis. It was not so
immediately necessary to improve the minds of all the citizens as to
form an _élite_, a body of specialists who might become the true leaders
of the nation. This seems to have been the object of his plan, to bring
over to America the whole faculty of the University of Geneva to
establish a national university at Richmond or in the vicinity of
Federal City. This scheme was only defeated because of the opposition of
Washington who, with great common sense, realized how incongruous it
would be to call National University an institution where the teaching
would be conducted entirely in a foreign language and by foreigners.

Even after this plan had failed, Jefferson did not give up his ambition
to establish somewhere in America and preferably in Virginia, an
institution of higher learning. On January 18, 1800, he wrote to Joseph
Priestley to ask him to draw up the program of a university "on a plan
so broad, so liberal, and modern, as to be worth patronizing with the
public support. The first thing is to obtain a good plan."

Priestley sent him, in answer, some "Hints Concerning Public Education"
which have never been published and probably did not arouse any
enthusiasm in Jefferson. The English philosopher had simply taken the
main features of the English system, placing the emphasis on the ancient
languages and excluding the modern: "For the knowledge of them as well
as skill in fencing, dancing and riding is proper for gentlemen
liberally educated, and instruction in them may be procured on
reasonable terms without burdening the funds of the seminary with
them." He ended with a very sensible piece of advice:

  Three things must be attended to in the education of youth. They must
  be _taught_, _fed_, and _governed_, and each of these requires
  different qualifications. In the English universities all these
  offices are perfectly distinct. The _tutors_ only teach, the
  _proctors_ superintend the discipline, and the _cooks_ provide the
  victuals.[542]

At the same time Jefferson had sent a similar request to Du Pont de
Nemours. Curiously enough, the Frenchman manifested little enthusiasm
for the proposal of his friend. To establish a university was all very
well, but first of all one had to provide solid foundations and to place
educational facilities within the reach of the great mass of
citizens--the university being only the apex of the pyramid. On this
occasion Du Pont reminded Jefferson that he had expressed himself to
such an intent some fifteen years earlier in his "Notes on Virginia",
which developed the excellent view that colleges and universities are
not the most important part of the educational system of the State:

  All knowledge readily and daily usable, all practical sciences, all
  laborious activities, all the common sense, all the correct ideas,
  all the morality, all the virtue, all the courage, all the
  prosperity, all the happiness of a nation and particularly of a
  Republic must spring from the primary schools or Petites Ecoles.[543]

By July, 1800, Du Pont de Nemours, who had already proposed a similar
scheme to the French Government, had completed his manuscript and sent
it to Jefferson at the end of August. This was more speed than Jefferson
had expected, and Du Pont's plan was far too elaborate and too
comprehensive to be of immediate value. "There is no occasion to
incommode yourself by pressing it," wrote Jefferson, "as when received
it will be some time before we shall probably find a good occasion of
bringing forward the subject."[544]

During his presidency, Jefferson had had to lay aside all his plans and
postpone any action for the organization of public education in his
native State until after his retirement. In the meantime, he read and
studied the project of Du Pont de Nemours and corresponded with Pictet
of Geneva; he had in his hands several memoirs of Julien on the French
schools, and he looked everywhere for precedents and suggestions. His
views were finally formulated in a "Plan for Elementary Schools" sent to
Joseph C. Cabell from Polar Forest, on September 9, 1817. The act to be
submitted to the Assembly of Virginia was far more comprehensive than
the title indicates. It provided for the establishment in each county of
a certain number of elementary schools, supported by the county and
placed under the supervision of visitors; the counties of the
commonwealth were to be distributed into nine collegiate districts, and
as many colleges, or rather secondary schools, instituted at the expense
of the literary fund, "to be supported from it, and to be placed under
the supervision of the Board of Public Instruction."

"In the said colleges," proposed Jefferson, "shall be taught the Greek,
Latin, French, Spanish, Italian and German languages, English grammar,
geography, ancient and modern, the higher branches in numeral
arithmetic, the mensuration of land, the use of the globes, and the
ordinary elements of navigation."

A third part of the act provided for

  ... establishing in a central and healthy part of the State an
  University wherein all the branches of useful sciences may be taught
  ... such as history and geography, ancient and modern; natural
  philosophy, agriculture, chemistry, and the theories of medicine;
  anatomy, zoölogy, botany, mineralogy and geology; mathematics, pure
  and mixed, military and naval science; ideology, ethics, the law of
  nature and of nations; law, municipal, and foreign; the science of
  civil government and political economy; languages, rhetoric,
  belles-lettres, and the fine arts generally; which branches of
  science will be so distributed and under so many professorships, not
  exceeding ten as the Visitors shall think most proper.

Finally, in order "to avail the commonwealth of those talents and
virtues which nature has sown as liberally among the poor as among the
rich, and which are lost to their country by the want of means of their
cultivation", the visitors would select every year a certain number of
promising scholars from the ward schools to be sent to the colleges and
from the colleges to be sent to the University at the public expense.

This was essentially the Bill for the Diffusion of Knowledge proposed to
the Assembly in 1779. Jefferson had incorporated in it such
modifications as he may have borrowed from Du Pont de Nemours, but
essentially the plan was his own. That Jefferson himself was perfectly
aware of it appears in a short mention of the fact that "the general
idea was suggested in the 'Notes on Virginia.' Quer. 14."[545]

It was soon realized that neither the Assembly nor the public were ready
for such a comprehensive scheme. Part of the plan had to be sacrificed,
if a beginning was to be made at all. Jefferson did not hesitate long;
the elementary schools could be organized at any time without much
preparation or expense; secondary education was taken care of after a
fashion in private schools supported from fees; but nothing existed in
the way of an institution of higher learning. Young Virginians had to be
sent to the northern seminaries, there "imbibing opinions and principles
in discord with those of our own country." The university was the thing,
and, in order to provide sufficient funds to start it, Jefferson
proposed that subsidies from the literary fund to the primary schools be
suspended for one or two years. In his opinion this measure did not
imply any disregard of primary education, and Jefferson vehemently
protested to Breckenridge that he had "never proposed a sacrifice of the
primary to the ultimate grade of instruction"; but, "if we cannot do
everything at once, let us do one at a time."[546]

The fight in which Jefferson engaged to obtain recognition for his
project, to have Central College or, as it was finally to be called, the
University of Virginia, located near Monticello, where he could watch
its progress and supervise the construction of its buildings, has been
told many times and does not need to be recounted here.[547]

On the board of visitors with Jefferson were placed James Madison, James
Monroe, Joseph C. Cabell, James Breckenridge, David Watson and J. H.
Cocke. Jefferson was appointed Rector of the University at a meeting
held on March 29, 1819, at a time when the university had no buildings,
no faculty, no students and very small means. Everything had to be done
and provided for. It would have been possible to put up some sort of
temporary shelter, a few ramshackle frame houses, but Jefferson wanted
the university to endure and he remembered that he was an architect as
well as a statesman. It was not until the spring of 1824 that he could
announce that the buildings were ready for occupancy--the formal opening
was to be held at the beginning of the following year--but the master
builder could be proud of his work. The university was his in every
sense of the word: not only had he succeeded in arousing the interest of
the public and the Assembly in his undertaking, but he had drawn the
plans himself with the painstaking care and the precision he owed to his
training as a surveyor. He had selected the material, engaged the stone
carvers, the brick layers and the carpenters, and supervised every bit
of their work. After his death he would need no other monument.

Then, as everything seemed to be ready, a new difficulty arose. Ever
since 1819, the visitors had been looking for a faculty. Ticknor, with
whom Jefferson had gotten acquainted through Mrs. Adams, had refused to
leave Cambridge although disgusted with the petty bickerings of his
colleagues. Thomas Cooper had proved inacceptable, and the very mention
of his name had aroused such a storm among the clergy that the
appointment had to be withdrawn. After a long and fruitless search for
the necessary talents at home, Jefferson and his fellow members on the
board of the university decided to procure the professors from abroad.
This time, however, they were not to repeat the mistake of the proposed
transplantation of the University of Geneva. Several prominent Frenchmen
suggested by Lafayette were turned down as too ignorant of the ways of
American youth and the language of the country. There remained only one
place from which satisfactory instructors could be obtained; this was
England. Their nationality did not raise any serious objection, for, to
the resentment of the War of 1812 had succeeded the "era of good
feeling", and Francis Walker Gilmer was commissioned to go to England
in order to consult with Dugald Stewart and to recruit a faculty from
Great Britain, "the land of our own language, habits and manners."[548]

Eighteen months later, the Rector declared the experiment highly
successful, and the example likely to be followed by other institutions
of learning.

  It cannot fail--wrote Jefferson--to be one of the efficacious means
  of promoting that cordial good will, which it is so much the interest
  of both nations to cherish. These teachers can never utter an
  unfriendly sentiment towards their native country; and those into
  whom their instruction will be infused, are not of ordinary
  significance only; they are exactly the persons who are to succeed to
  the government of our country, and to rule its future enmities, its
  friendships and fortunes.[549]

Thus after fifty years, Jefferson was able to make real his educational
dream of the Revolutionary period, to endow his native State with an
institution of higher learning in which the future leaders of the nation
would be instructed. They would no longer have to be sent abroad to
obtain the required knowledge in some subjects; nor would they have to
study in "the Northern seminaries", there to be infected with pernicious
doctrines; above all, they would be preserved from any sectarian
influence during their formative years; for no particular creed was to
be taught at the university, although the majority of the faculty
belonged to the Episcopal Church.

The University of Virginia was the last great task to which Jefferson
put his hand, an achievement of which he was no less proud than of
having written the Declaration of Independence. To bring it to a
successful conclusion this septuagenarian displayed an admirable
tenacity, a resourcefulness, a practical wisdom, a sense of the
immediate possibilities and an idealistic vision, the combination of
which typifies the best there is in the national character of the
American people. It would take many pages to study in detail Jefferson's
educational ideas, as he expressed them in the minutes of the board and
in his many letters to John Adams, Thomas Cooper and Joseph Cabell. The
most remarkable feature of the new institution was that, for the first
time in the history of the country, higher education was made
independent of the Church, and to a large extent the foundation of the
University of Virginia marks the beginning of the secularization of
scientific research in America. Its "father" certainly gave some thought
to the possible extension of the educational system that had finally won
recognition in his native Virginia, to all the States in the country;
but he was too fully aware of the difficulties to follow his old friend
Du Pont de Nemours and to propose a Plan for a National Education. At
least he "had made a beginning", he "had set an example", and he built
even better than he knew. The man who wished to be remembered as the
"father of the University of Virginia" was also, in more than one sense,
the father of the State universities which play such an important part
in the education of the American democracy.




CHAPTER III

THE PHILOSOPHY OF OLD AGE


Old people are often accused of being too conservative, and even
reactionary. They seem out of step with the younger generations, and
very few preserve enough resiliency to keep in touch with the ceaseless
changes taking place around them. But a few men who, born in the second
half of the eighteenth century, lived well up into the nineteenth, were
able to escape this apparently unavoidable law of nature. After
witnessing political convulsions, commotions and revolutions, they clung
tenaciously to the faith of their younger days. They refused to accept
the view that the world was going from bad to worse; they looked
untiringly for every symptom of improvement and thought they could
distinguish everywhere signs foretelling the dawn of a new era. The
growing infirmities of their bodies did not leave them any illusion
about their inevitable disappearance from the stage and they were not
upheld by any strong belief in personal immortality. But however
uncertain and hazy may have been their religious tenets, they had a
stanch faith in the unlimited capacity of human nature for improvement
and development. They believed in the irresistible power of truth, in
the ultimate recognition of natural principles and natural laws, in the
religion of progress as it had been formulated by the eighteenth-century
philosophers. Thus, rather than follow the precept of the ancient poet
and unhitch their aging horses, they had anticipated the advice of the
American philosopher by hitching their wagon to a star.

Du Pont de Nemours, experimenting with his sons to develop American
industries in order to make America economically independent from
Europe; Destutt de Tracy, almost completely blind, dictating his
treatise on political economy and appearing in the streets of Paris
during the glorious days of 1830; Lafayette, yearning and hoping for the
recognition of his ideal of liberty during the Empire and the
_Restauration_--all of these were more than survivors of a forgotten
age. Even to the younger generations they represented the living
embodiment of the political faith of the nineteenth century. It is not a
mere coincidence that most of them were friends and admirers of the Sage
of Monticello, whose letters they read "as the letters of the Apostles
were read in the circle of the early Christians."

Jefferson could complain that "the decays of age had enfeebled
the useful energies of the mind",[550] but he kept, practically
to his last day, his alertness, his encyclopædic curiosity and
an extraordinary capacity for work. A large part of his time was
taken by his correspondence. Turning to his letter list for 1820 he
found that he had received no less than "one thousand two hundred and
sixty-seven communications, many of them requiring answers of elaborate
research, and all of them to be answered with due attention and
consideration."[551] I may be permitted to add that a large part of the
letters he received as well as those he wrote deserve publication and
would greatly contribute to our knowledge of the period.

Among them essays and short treatises on every possible subject under
heaven will be found. With Du Pont de Nemours, Jefferson discussed not
only questions of political economy, education and government, but the
acclimation of the merino sheep, the manufacturing of woolen goods and
nails, the construction of gunboats and the organization of the militia.
With Madame de Tessé, Lafayette's aged cousin, he resumed the exchange
of botanical views, interrupted by his presidency and the continental
blockade. He undertook to put together the scraps of paper on which he
had scribbled notes during Washington's and Adams' administrations and
compiled his famous "Anas"; he wrote his "Autobiography", furnished
documents to Girardin for his continuation of Burke's "History of
Virginia"; he answered queries on the circumstances under which he had
written the Declaration of Independence, the Kentucky Resolution, on his
attitude towards France when Secretary of State and President; he
criticized quite extensively Marshall's "History of Washington" and one
of his last letters, written on May 15, 1826, was to inform one of his
friends of the facts concerning "Arnold's invasion and surprise of
Richmond, in the winter of 1780-81."[552]

His interest in books was greater than ever; he had scarcely sold his
library to Congress when he undertook to collect another, going
systematically through the publishers' catalogues, writing to
booksellers in Richmond, Philadelphia, New York and even abroad,
requesting his European friends to send him the latest publications and
asking young Ticknor to procure for him, in France or Germany, the best
editions of the Greek and Latin classics. He drew up the plans for the
University of Virginia and supervised the construction of the building.
Between times he took upon himself the task of rewriting entirely the
translation of Destutt de Tracy's "Review of Montesquieu" and directed
the printing of his treatise on "Political Economy." After writing
letters, regulating the work of the farm, he spent several hours on
horseback every day and during the balance of the afternoon read new and
old books, played with his grandchildren, walked in the garden to look
at his favorite trees, listened to music and, during the fine weather,
received the visitors who flocked to Monticello by the dozens. Some were
simply idlers coming out of curiosity, many were old friends who stayed
for days or weeks; but all were welcomed with the same affable courtesy
and the same generous hospitality, according to the best traditions of
old Virginia.

  They came from all nations, at all times--wrote Doctor Dunglison--and
  paid longer or shorter visits. I have known a New England judge bring
  a letter of introduction and stay three weeks. The learned abbé
  Correa, always a welcome guest, passed some weeks of each year with
  us during the whole time of his stay in the country. We had persons
  from abroad, from all the States of the Union, from every part of the
  State--men, women, and children.... People of wealth, fashion, men in
  office, Protestant clergymen, Catholic priests, members of Congress,
  foreign ministers, missionaries, Indian agents, tourists, travellers,
  artists, strangers, friends.[553]

No sound estimate of the extraordinary influence exerted by Jefferson
upon the growth of liberalism can be made at the present time. It would
require separate studies, careful investigation and the publication of
many letters, safely preserved but too little used, which rest in the
Jefferson Papers of the Library of Congress, and with the Massachusetts
Historical Society. I have already printed Jefferson's correspondence
with Volney, Destutt de Tracy, Lafayette and Du Pont de Nemours; many
other letters, no less significant, remain practically unknown. He
encouraged his European friends, Correa de Serra, Kosciusko, the Greek
Coray, to keep up their courage, to hope against hope. To all of them he
preached the same gospel of faith in the ultimate and inevitable
recognition throughout the world of the principles of American
democracy. This was not done for propaganda's sake, for no man would
deserve less than Jefferson the dubious qualification of propagandist.
The many letters written to his American friends on the same subject
clearly show that this was his profound conviction and almost his only
_raison d'être_. His was not an over-optimistic temperament; he did not
fail to notice all "the specks of hurricane on the horizon of the
world." Yet, all considered, and in spite of temporary fits of
despondency, his conclusion on the future of democracy can be summed up
in the words he wrote to John Adams at the end of 1821:

  I will not believe our labors are lost. I shall not die without a
  hope that light and liberty are on a steady advance. We have seen
  indeed, once within the record of history, the complete eclipse of
  the human mind continuing for centuries ... even should the cloud of
  barbarism and despotism again obscure the science and liberties of
  Europe, this country remains to preserve and restore light and
  liberty to them. In short, the flames kindled on the 4th of July
  1776, have spread over too much of the globe to be extinguished by
  the feeble engines of despotism; on the contrary, they will consume
  these engines and all who work them.[554]

Jefferson felt such a dislike for unnecessary controversies that he was
apt to adopt the tone and the style of his correspondents and apparently
to accept their ideas, so that many contradictions can be found in these
letters. To a chosen few only he fully revealed his intimate thoughts
and without reticence, without fear of being betrayed, communicated his
doubts, his hopes and his hatred. The letters he wrote to Short,
Priestley, and Thomas Cooper are most remarkable in this respect. But
with none of them did he communicate so freely as with his old friend
John Adams. The correspondence that passed between them during the last
fifteen years of their lives constitutes one of the most striking and
illuminating human documents a student of psychology may ever hope to
discover. To those who have had the privilege of using the manuscripts
to follow month by month the palsied hand of Adams until he had to cease
writing himself and dictated his letters to a "female member of his
household", it seems unthinkable that the wish expressed by Wirt in
1826,--to see the correspondence between the two great men published in
its entirety,--should not have received its fulfillment.

They had been estranged for a long time, and no word had passed between
them for more than ten years after Adams' sulky departure from
Washington on the morning of March 4, 1801. At the beginning of 1811,
Doctor Benjamin Rush made bold to deplore "the discontinuance of
friendly correspondence between Mr. Adams and Mr. Jefferson." Jefferson
answered quite lengthily, giving a long account of his difficulties with
Adams, including the letter written by Abigail Adams in 1802, but adding
that he would second with pleasure every effort made to bring about a
reconciliation. However, he did not entertain much hope that Doctor Rush
would succeed, for he knew it was "part of Mr. Adams' character to
suspect foul play in those of whom he is jealous, and not easily to
relinquish his suspicions."[555]

It was not until the end of the same year that Jefferson took up the
subject again, having heard that during a conversation Adams had
mentioned his name, adding: "I always loved Jefferson, and still love
him." This was enough, and it only remained to create an opportunity to
resume the correspondence without too much awkwardness; but "from this
fusion of sentiments" Mrs. Adams was "of course to be separated", for
Jefferson could not believe that the woman wounded in her motherly pride
had forgotten anything. This was no insuperable obstacle, however: "It
will only be necessary that I never name her" wrote Jefferson.[556]

Adams took the first step, and, knowing how much Jefferson was
interested in domestic manufactures, sent him a fine specimen of
homespun made in Massachusetts. Jefferson could but acknowledge the
peace offering, which he did most gracefully, without mentioning Mrs.
Adams.[557] But he was too much of a Southern gentleman to hold a
resentment long even against a woman of such a jealous disposition. Two
months later he sent for the first time the homage of his respects to
Mrs. Adams, after which he never forgot to mention her. On two occasions
he even wrote her charming letters, in the same friendly tone as he had
used with her twenty-five years earlier, when he used to do shopping for
her in Paris. On hearing of her death on November 13, 1818, he sent to
his stricken old friend a touching expression of his sympathy:

  Will I say more where words are vain, but that it is of some comfort
  to us both, that the term is not very distant, at which we are to
  deposit in the same cerement our sorrows and suffering bodies, and to
  ascend in essence to an ecstatic meeting with the friends we have
  loved and lost, and whom we shall still love and never lose
  again.[558]

Quite naturally, as the circle of his friends grew narrower and one
after the other were called by death, Jefferson's thoughts turned to the
hereafter. In his youth he had apparently settled the problem once for
all; but the solution then found was scarcely more than a temporary
expedient. It may behove a young man full of vigor, with a long stretch
of years before him, to declare that "the business of life is with
matter" and that it serves no purpose to break our heads against a blank
wall. There are very few men, if they are thinking at all, who can
entirely dismiss from their minds the perplexing and torturing riddle,
as the term grows nearer every day. Such an ataraxia may have been
obtained by a few sages of old, but it is hardly human, and Jefferson,
like Adams, was very human. This is a subject, however, which I cannot
approach without some reluctance. Jefferson himself would have highly
disapproved of such a discussion. After submitting silently to so many
fierce criticisms, after being accused of atheism, materialism, impiety
and philosophism by his contemporaries, he hoped that the question would
never be broached to him again. With those who tried to revive it, he
had absolutely no patience.

  One of our fan-coloring biographers--he wrote once--who paint small
  men as very great, inquired of me lately, with real affection too,
  whether he might consider as authentic, the change in my religion
  much spoken of in some circles. Now this supposed that they knew what
  had been my religion before, taking for it the word of their priests,
  whom I certainly never made the confidants of my creed. My answer
  was: "Say nothing of my religion. It is known to my God and myself
  alone. Its evidence before the world is to be sought in my life; if
  that has been _honest and dutiful_ to society, the religion which has
  regulated it cannot be a bad one."[559]

Unfortunately the controversy is still going on and at least a few
points must be indicated here. The simplest and to some extent the most
acceptable treatment of the matter was given a few years after his death
by the physician who attended him up to the last minutes:

  It is due, also, to that illustrious individual to say, that, in all
  my intercourse with him, I never heard an observation that savored,
  in the slightest degree, of impiety. His religious belief harmonized
  more closely with that of the Unitarians than of any other
  denomination, but it was liberal, and untrammelled by sectarian
  feelings and prejudices.[560]

But Doctor Dunglison's declaration is somewhat unsatisfactory and
misleading, for Jefferson once gave his own definition of Unitarianism.
From a letter he wrote to James Smith in 1822 it appears he was not
ready to join the Unitarian Church any more than any other:

  About Unitarianism, the doctrine of the early ages of Christianity
  ... the pure and simple unity of the Creator of the universe, is now
  all but ascendant in the Eastern States; it is dawning in the West,
  and advancing towards the South; and I confidently expect that the
  present generation will see Unitarianism become the general religion
  of the United States.... I write with freedom, because, while I claim
  a right to believe in one God, if so my reason tells me, I yield as
  freely to others that of believing in three.[561]

On the other hand, one might easily be misled by some declarations of
Jefferson to his more intimate friends. "I am a materialist--I am an
Epicurian," he wrote on several instances to John Adams, Thomas Cooper
and Short, with whom he felt that he could discuss religious questions
more freely than with any others. Rejecting the famous _Cogito ergo sum_
of Descartes, he fell back when in doubt on his "habitual anodyne": "I
feel therefore I exist." This in his opinion did not imply the sole
existence of matter, but simply that he could not "conceive _thought_ to
be an action of a particular organisation of matter, formed for the
purpose by its Creator, as well as that attraction is an action of
matter, or magnetism of loadstone." Then he added: "I am supported in my
creed of materialism by the Lockes, the Tracys and the Stewarts. At what
age of the Christian Church this heresy of immaterialism or masked
atheism, crept in, I do not exactly know. But a heresy it certainly is.
Jesus taught nothing of it."[562]

In the same sense he could write to Judge Augustus S. Woodward: "Jesus
himself, the Founder of our religion, was unquestionably a Materialist
as to man. In all His doctrines of the resurrection, he teaches
expressly that the body is to rise in substances."[563]

His definition of Epicurism would seem equally remote from the popular
acceptation, and certainly Jefferson was never of those who could
deserve the old appellation of _Epicuri de grege porcus_; for his
Epicurus is the philosopher "whose doctrines contain everything
rational in moral philosophy which Greece and Rome have left us."[564]

All through the year 1813 and on many occasions after that date, Adams
tried to draw him out on the question of religion. "For," as he said,
"these things are to me, at present, the marbles and nine-pins of old
age; I will not say beads and prayer books." But Jefferson could not
have declared, as did his old friend: "For more than sixty years I have
been attentive to this great subject. Controversies between Calvinists
and Arminians, Trinitarians and Unitarians, Deists and Christians,
Atheists and both, have attracted my attention, whenever the singular
life I have led would admit, to all these questions."[565]

Not so with Jefferson, who felt a real abhorrence for theological
discussions and considered them as a sheer waste of time. They belonged
to a past age and were to be buried in oblivion lest they create again
an atmosphere of fanaticism and intolerance; at best, they could be left
to the clergy. But tolerant as he was, there were certain doctrines
against which Jefferson revolted even in later life, as he probably did
when a student at William and Mary:

  I can never join Calvin in addressing _his God_. He was indeed an
  atheist, which I can never be; or rather his religion was dæmonism.
  If ever man worshipped a false God, he did. The God described in his
  five points, is not the God whom you acknowledge and adore, the
  Creator and benevolent Governor of the world; but a dæmon of
  malignant spirit.

But right after this virulent denunciation comes a most interesting
admission. If Jefferson's God was not the God of Calvin, he was just as
remote from the mechanistic materialism of D'Holbach and La Mettrie as
he was from Calvinism and predestination. Leaving aside all questions
of dogmas and revelation he held that:

  When we take a view of the universe, in its parts, general or
  particular, it is impossible for the human mind not to perceive and
  feel a conviction of design, consummate skill, and indefinite power
  in every atom of its composition. So irresistible are these evidences
  of an intelligent and powerful Agent, that of the infinite numbers of
  men who have existed through all time, they have believed, in the
  proportion of a million at least to a unit, in the hypothesis of an
  eternal pre-existence of a Creator, rather than in that of a self
  existing universe.[566]

From this passage, it would seem that Jefferson founded his belief in
the existence of God on the two well-known arguments: the order of the
Universe and the general consensus of opinion. If it were so, he would
follow close on the steps of the English deists of the school of Pope.
But religion to him was something more than the mere "acknowledgement"
and "adoration of the benevolent Governor of the world";

  It is more than an inner conviction of the existence of the Creator;
  true religion is morality. If by _religion_ we are to understand
  _sectarian dogmas_, in which no two of them agree, then your
  exclamation on that hypothesis is just, "that this would be the best
  possible of all possible worlds, if there were no religion in it."
  But if the moral precepts, innate in man, and made a part of his
  physical constitution, as necessary for a social being, if the
  sublime doctrines of philanthropism and deism taught us by Jesus of
  Nazareth, in which we all agree, constitute true religion, then,
  without it, this would be, as you again say, "something not fit to be
  named even, indeed, a hell."[567]

On this point as on so many others Jefferson is distinctly an
eighteenth-century man. One of the pet schemes of the philosophers was
to prove that there is no necessary connection between religion and
morality. It was an essential article of the philosophical creed from
Pierre Bayle to Jefferson, and long before them, Montaigne had filled
his "Essays" with countless anecdotes and examples tending to prove this
point. But Jefferson went one step farther than most of the French
philosophers, with the exception of Rousseau. Morality is not founded on
a religious basis; religion is morality. This being accepted, it remains
to determine the foundation of morality. In a letter written to Thomas
Law during the summer of 1814, Jefferson examined the different
solutions proposed by theologians and philosophers and clearly indicated
his preference.

"It was vain to say that it was truth; for truth is elusive,
unattainable, and there is no certain criticism of it." It is not either
the "love of God", for an atheist may have morality, and "Diderot,
d'Holbach, Condorcet, are known to have been the most virtuous of men."
It is not either the _to kalon_, for many men are deprived of any
æsthetic sense. Self-interest is more satisfactory, but even the
demonstration given by Helvétius is not perfectly convincing. All these
explanations are one step short of the ultimate question.

  The truth of the matter is, that Nature has implanted in our breasts
  a love of others, a sense of duty to them, a moral instinct, in
  short, which prompts us irresistibly to feel and succour their
  distresses. It is true that these social dispositions are not
  implanted in every man, because there is no rule without exceptions;
  but it is false reasoning which converts exceptions into the general
  rule. Some men are born without the organs of sight, or of hearing,
  or without hands. Yet it would be wrong to say that man is born
  without these faculties. When the moral sense is wanting, we endeavor
  to supply the defect by education; by appeals to reason and
  calculation, by presenting to the being so unhappily conformed other
  motives to do good. But nature has constituted utility to man the
  social test of virtue. The same act may be useful and consequently
  virtuous in a country which is injurious and vicious in another
  differently circumstanced. I sincerely then believe, with you, in the
  general existence of a moral instinct. I think it is the brightest
  gem with which the human character is studded, and the want of it is
  more degrading than the most hideous of the bodily deformities.[568]

The test of morality then becomes, not self-interest, as Helvétius had
maintained (and Jefferson reproved Destutt de Tracy for having accepted
this theory), but general interest and social utility. This is almost
the criterium of Kant and one would be tempted to press this
parallelism, if there was any reason to believe that the Philosopher of
Monticello had ever heard the name of the author of "Practical Reason."
On this point, as on so many others, Jefferson differs radically from
Rousseau, who admitted also a benevolent governor of the world and the
existence of a moral instinct, but who would have strenuously denied
that this moral instinct was nothing but the social instinct. Jefferson,
on the contrary, is led to recognize the existence of morality, chiefly
because, man being a social being, society cannot be organized and
subsist if it is not composed of moral beings.

  Reading, reflection and time have convinced me that the interests of
  society require the observation of those moral precepts in which all
  religions agree, (for all forbid us to murder, steal, plunder or bear
  false witness,) and that we should not intermeddle with the
  particular dogmas in which all religions differ, and which are
  totally unconnected with morality. In all of them we see good men,
  and as many in one as another. The varieties of structures of action
  of the human mind as in those in the body, are the work of our
  Creator, against which it cannot be a religious duty to erect the
  standard of uniformity. The practice of morality being necessary for
  the well-being of society, he has taken care to impress its precepts
  so indelibly on our hearts that they shall not be effaced by the
  subtleties of our brain.[569]

This was stated more humorously by John Adams after they had treated the
subject exhaustively in a series of letters: "Vain man, mind your own
business. Do no wrong--; do all the good you can. Eat your canvasback
ducks, drink your Burgundy. Sleep your siesta when necessary, and TRUST
IN GOD."[570]

This being the case, it remained to determine whether man could not find
somewhere a code of morality that would express the precepts impressed
in our hearts. In his youth, Jefferson had copied and accepted as a
matter of course the statement of Bolingbroke that:

  It is not true that Christ revealed an entire body of ethics, proved
  to be the law of nature from principles of reason and reaching all
  duties of life.... A system thus collected from the writings of the
  ancient heathen moralists, of Tully, of Seneca, of Epictetus, and
  others, would be more full, more entire, more coherent, and more
  clearly deduced from unquestionable principles of knowledge.[571]

In order to realize how far away Jefferson had drawn from his
radicalism, it is only necessary to go back to his "Syllabus of an
Estimate of the Merit of the Doctrines of Jesus, compared with those of
others", written for Benjamin Rush, in 1803, after reading Doctor
Priestley's little treatise "Of Socrates and Jesus compared."[572] There
he had declared that

  His moral doctrines relating to kindred and friends, were more pure
  and perfect than those of the most correct of the philosophers, and
  ... they went far in inculcating universal philanthropy, not only to
  kindred and friends, to neighbors and countrymen, but to all mankind,
  gathering all into one family, under the bonds of love, charity,
  peace, common wants and common aids. A development of this head will
  evince the peculiar superiority of the system of Jesus over all
  others.

Jefferson had been won over to Christianity by the superior social value
of the morals of Jesus. In that sense, he could already say, "I am a
Christian, in the only sense in which He wished any one to be, sincerely
attached to His doctrines, in preference to all others."

This profession of faith made publicly might have assuaged some of the
fierce attacks directed against Jefferson on the ground of his
"infidelity", and yet even at that time he emphatically begged Doctor
Rush not to make it public, for "it behoves every man who values liberty
of conscience for himself ... to give no example of concession,
betraying the common right of independent opinion, by answering
questions of faith, which the laws have left between God and himself."
To a certain extent, however, his famous "Life and Morals of Jesus",
compiled during the last ten years of his life[573] may well be
considered an indirect and yet categorical recantation of Bolingbroke's
haughty dogmatism. Age, experience, observation had mellowed the Stoic.
He was not yet ready to accept as a whole the dogmas of Christianity,
but the superiority of the morals of Jesus over the tenets of the
"heathen moralists" did not any longer leave any doubt in his mind.

Whether after the death of the body something of man survived, was an
entirely different question--one that human reason could not answer
satisfactorily. It cannot even be stated with certainty that he would
have agreed with John Adams when the latter wrote: "_Il faut trancher le
mot._ What is there in life to attach us to it but the hope of a future
and a better? It is a cracker, a rocket, a fire-work at best."[574]

He never denied categorically the existence of a future life, but this
life was a thing in itself, and after all, it was worth living.
Altogether this world was a pretty good place, and when John Adams
asked him whether he would agree to live his seventy-three years over
again, he answered energetically: "Yea.--I think with you," he added,
"that it is a good world on the whole; that it has been framed on a
principle of benevolence, and more pleasure than pain dealt to us.... My
temperament is sanguine. I steer my bark with Hope in the head, leaving
Fear astern. My hopes, indeed, sometimes fail, but not oftener than the
foreboding of the gloomy."[575] His old friend was far from attaining
such an equanimity and could not help envying the Sage of Monticello
sailing his bark "Hope with her gay ensigns displayed at the prow, Fear
with her hobgoblins behind the stern. Hope springs eternal and all is
that endures...." But Jefferson was bolstered up in his confident
attitude by the intimate conviction that he had done good work, that he
had contributed his best to the most worthy cause and that he had not
labored in vain.

This was not only a good world, but it was already much better than when
he had entered it. He had

  ... observed the march of civilization advancing from the sea coast,
  passing over us like a cloud of light, increasing our knowledge and
  improving our condition, insomuch as that we are at that time more
  advanced in civilization here than the seaports were when I was a
  boy. And where this progress will stop no one can say. Barbarism has,
  in the meantime, been receding before the steady step of
  amelioration; and will in time, I trust, disappear from the
  earth.[576]

Scarcely two weeks before he died--and this is practically his last
important utterance--he recalled in a letter to the citizens of the city
of Washington who had invited him to attend the celebration held for the
fiftieth anniversary of the Declaration of Independence, how proud he
was that his fellow citizens, after fifty years, continued to approve
the choice made when the Declaration was adopted. "May it be to the
world," he added, "what I believe it will (to some parts sooner, to
others later, but finally to all) the signal of arousing men to burst
the chains under which monkish ignorance and superstition had persuaded
them to bind themselves, and to assume the blessings and security of
self-government."[577]

This faith in the ultimate recognition of the ideals, which he had
defined with such a felicity of expression half a century earlier, was,
even more than any belief in personal immortality, "the rocket" that
John Adams thought so necessary to attach us to this life. It was a real
religion, the religion of progress, of the eighteenth century which had
its devotees and with Condorcet its martyr. Strengthened by the intimate
conviction that he would be judged from his acts and not "from his
words", he saw the approach of Death without any qualms, and he turned
back to his old friends of Greece and Rome, for "the classic pages fill
up the vacuum of _ennui_, and become sweet composers to that rest of the
grave into which we are sooner or later to descend."[578] On many
occasions he expressed his readiness to depart: "I enjoy good health,"
he wrote once to John Adams; "I am happy in what is around me, yet I
assure you I am ripe for leaving all, this year, this day, this
hour."[579] It took almost ten years after these lines were written for
the call to come. Most of his biographers have dealt extensively with
the remarkable vigor preserved by Jefferson even to his last day. For
several years after his retirement he remained a hale and robust old
man. But he felt none the less the approaching dissolution and watched
anxiously the slow progress of his physical limitations. His letters do
not completely bear out on this point the statement made by Mrs. Sarah
Randolph in her "Domestic Life of Thomas Jefferson."

At seventy-three he was still remarkably robust and, with the minuteness
of a physician, described his case in a letter to his old friend Charles
Thomson:

  I retain good health, am rather feeble to walk much, but ride with
  ease, passing two or three hours a day on horseback.... My eyes need
  the aid of glasses by night, and with small print in the day also; my
  hearing is not quite so sensible as it used to be; no tooth shaking
  yet, but shivering and shrinking in body from the cold we now
  experience; my thermometer having been as low as 12° this morning. My
  greatest oppression is a correspondence afflictingly laborious, the
  extent of which I have been long endeavoring to curtail. Could I
  reduce this epistolary corvée within the limits of my friends and
  affairs ... my life would be as happy as the infirmities of age would
  admit, and I should look on its consummation with the composure of
  one "_qui summum nec metuit diem nec optat_."[580]

This remarkable preservation of his faculties he attributed largely to
his abstemious diet. For years he had eaten little animal food, and that
"not as an aliment so much as a condiment for the vegetables", which
constituted his principal diet. "I double however the Doctor's glass and
a half of wine, and even treble it with a friend, but halve its effects
by drinking the weak wines only. The ardent wines I cannot drink, nor do
I use ardent spirits in any form."[581]

Yet he had to admit to Mrs. Trist in 1814 that he was only "an old
half-strung fiddle",[582] and as he advanced in age the "machine" gave
evident signs of wearing out. The recurrence of the suffering caused by
his broken wrist, badly set in Paris by the famous Louis,[583] and still
worse the very painful "disury" with which he was afflicted[584] gave
him many unhappy hours. To die was nothing, for as he wrote then in his
old "Commonplace Book", "I do not worry about the hereafter, even if
now the doom of death stands at my feet, for we are men and cannot live
forever. To all of us death must happen."[585] But "bodily decay" was
"gloomy in prospect, for of all human contemplation the most abhorrent
is a body without mind. To be a doting old man, to repeat four times
over the same story in one hour", if this was life, it was "at most the
life of a cabbage."[586] He was spared this affliction he dreaded so
much, and when Lafayette visited him in November, 1824, the Marquis
found him "much aged without doubt, after a separation of thirty-five
years, but bearing marvelously well under his eighty-one years of age,
in full possession of all the vigor of his mind and heart."[587] Six
months later, when Lafayette took his final leave, Jefferson was weaker
and confined to his house, suffering much "with one foot in the grave
and the other one uplifted to follow it."

Death was slowly approaching, without any particular disease being
noticeable; after running for eighty-three years "the machine" was about
to "surcease motion." The end has been told by several contemporaries
and friends. No account is more simple and more touching in its
simplicity than the relation written by his attending physician, Doctor
Dunglison:

  Until the 2d. and 3d. of July he spoke freely of his approaching
  death; made all arrangements with his grandson, Mr. Randolph, in
  regard to his private affairs; and expressed his anxiety for the
  prosperity of the University and his confidence in the exertion in
  its behalf of Mr. Madison and the other visitors. He repeatedly, too,
  mentioned his obligation to me for my attention to him. During the
  last week of his existence I remained at Monticello; and one of the
  last remarks he made was to me. In the course of the day and night of
  the 2d of July he was affected with stupor, with intervals of
  wakefulness and consciousness; but on the 3d the stupor became
  almost permanent. About seven o'clock of the evening of that day he
  awoke and, seeing me staying at his bedside, exclaimed, "Ah, Doctor,
  are you still there?" in a voice, however, that was husky and
  indistinct. He then asked, "Is it the Fourth?" to which I replied,
  "It will soon be." These were the last words I heard him utter.

  Until towards the middle of the day--the 4th--he remained in the same
  state, or nearly so, wholly unconscious to everything that was
  passing around him. His circulation, however, was gradually becoming
  more languid; and for some time prior to dissolution the pulse at the
  wrist was imperceptible. About one o'clock he ceased to exist.[588]

A few days before he had taken his final dispositions and seen all the
members of his family. He was not a man to indulge in a painful display
of emotions, but he told his dear daughter Martha that "in a certain
drawer in an old pocket book she would find something for her." It was a
piece of paper on which he had written eight lines "A death bed adieu
from Th. J. to M. R." There was no philosophism nor classical
reminiscence in it; it was the simple expression of his last hope that
on the shore

"_Which crowns all my hopes, or which buries my care_" he would find
awaiting him "two seraphs long shrouded in death", his beloved wife and
his young daughter Maria.

He was buried by their side in the family plot of Monticello. According
to his wishes no invitations were issued and no notice of the hour
given. "His body was borne privately from his dwelling by his family and
servants, but his neighbors and friends, anxious to pay the last tribute
of respect to one they had loved and honored, waited for it in crowds at
the grave." A typically American scene, without parade, without speeches
and long ceremonies--almost a pioneer burial in a piece of land
reclaimed from the wilderness.




INDEX


  Absolutism, evils of, 203

  Adams, Abigail, Jefferson shops for, 160;
    the "New England Juno", 323;
    and Jefferson, 382, 383, 386, 518, 519

  Adams, Henry, his criticism of Jefferson's conduct of foreign
          affairs, 409, 440, 441, 453, 459, 460, 464

  Adams, John, Jefferson's correspondence with, 23, 482, 490, 503, 512,
          517, 521, 526, 529;
    his first impression of Jefferson, 59;
    on committee of Continental Congress appointed to answer Lord
          North's "Conciliatory Proposition", 62;
    assists in framing resolution instructing colonies to form
          governments, 66;
    his part in Declaration of Independence, 69, 70;
    on committee to suggest United States seal, 86;
    appointed Minister Plenipotentiary to negotiate treaties of Commerce
          with foreign nations, 152, 162;
    his wines, 160;
    in favor of loose association of States, 196;
    and the Barbary pirates, 206;
    Jefferson gives estimate of, 248;
    his quarrel with Jefferson, 259-261;
    reëlection of, as Vice-President, 273;
    elected President, 319;
    attempts reconciliation with Jefferson, 321, 322, 325;
    inaugural address, 321, 322;
    not a party man or party leader, 323;
    a complicated and contradictory figure, 323;
    action in XYZ case, 325, 331, 336-338, 348, 355;
    nominated for Presidency in 1800, 362;
    changes in his Cabinet, 368;
    in election of 1800, 367-369;
    "midnight" appointments, 373, 374;
    refuses to welcome successor, 375;
    reconciliation with Jefferson, 518, 519;
    his study of religious controversies, 522;
    on life, 527

  Adams, John Quincy, removed from office by Jefferson, 382, 383

  Adams, Samuel, 359, 361

  Addison, Judge, deposition of, by Senate of Pennsylvania, 384

  Albemarle resolutions, 45-47

  Alexander I of Russia, 448

  Algiers, 206

  Alien Bills, 340, 342-347

  Aliens, their right to hold real property denied, 151

  Allen, Ethan, declaration concerning, drafted by Jefferson, 65

  American civilization, underlying ideas of, 85.

  American imperialism, 398-400

  American public education, first charter of, 95-100

  American Revolution, remonstrance in House of Burgesses, 38;
    articles of association directed against British merchandise, 38;
    as to causes of, 42;
    effect of passage of Boston Port Bill, in Virginia, 43, 44;
    proposal to form Congress, 44;
    declaration of mutual defence, 45;
    resolutions adopted by freeholders of Albemarle County, Va., 45-47;
    resolutions adopted by Assembly of Fairfax County, 45-47;
    regulation of American commerce, 46;
    doctrine of expatriation, 47, 50;
    first Continental Congress, 54;
    second Continental Congress, 59;
    Lord North's "Conciliatory Proposition" answered, 62;
    independence not at first aimed at, 63-65;
    colonies instructed to form governments, 66;
    Declaration of Independence, 69-71;
    treatment of prisoners in, 109-112.
    _See also_ British colonies

  Americanism, cardinal principles of, 52, 61;
    creed of, formulated by Jefferson, 62, 120;
    Jefferson's conception of, when he wrote "Notes on Virginia", 136;
    practical idealism a tenet of, 275;
    pure, 334, 335;
    definition of, 352;
    Jefferson's system of, 423, 428, 468

  Armstrong, Gen. John, American representative in Paris, 462

  Arnold, Benedict, 108

  "Arrears of Interest, Report on", Jefferson, 146

  Articles of Confederation, discussion of, in Congress, 80;
    defects in, 145, 146, 195, 197

  "Assumption" of the State debts, 250-255

  _Aurora_, journal, 311, 313, 343, 354

  Austin, Benjamin, 491


  Bache's _Aurora_, 311, 313, 343, 356

  Balance of power, 476

  Bank Bill, Hamilton's, 255-258

  Bannister, J. B., Jr., letter to, 172

  Barbary pirates, 205-207, 428, 443

  Barbé-Marbois, secretary of French legation in United States, 118, 414

  Bastille, capture of, 235

  Bayard, James A., nominated plenipotentiary to French Republic, 373,
  374

  Bellini, letter to, 173

  Berlin Decree, 450

  Beveridge, Albert J., his "Life of Marshall", 384, 385, 434

  Bill for a General Revision of the Laws, Virginia, 90

  Bill for Amending the Charter for William and Mary, 98, 99, 105, 106

  Bill for Proportioning Crimes and Punishments, Virginia, 93-95

  Bill for Religious Freedom, Virginia, 89, 100-103, 106, 365

  Bill for the more General Diffusion of Knowledge, Virginia, 95-99,
  105, 505, 508

  Bill of Rights, 198-201, 204

  Bill on the Naturalization of Foreigners, 89

  Bill to Abolish Entails, Virginia, 88, 89

  Bingham, Mrs., 160

  Bishop, Samuel, appointed collector of New Haven, 381

  Blennerhasset, Harman, and the Burr conspiracy, 431, 432

  Bolingbroke, Henry St. John, his influence on Jefferson, 21, 23,
  26, 31

  Bollman, and the Burr conspiracy, 432, 433

  Bonaparte, his projected invasion of England, 336;
    Jefferson's opinion of, 359, 475, 476;
    precedent established by, 360

  Boston Port Bill, 43

  Brazil, 483

  Breckenridge, James, on board of visitors of University of
  Virginia, 509

  Breckenridge, John, letters to, 370, 371, 416

  British colonies, contractual theory of government of, 45, 46;
    regulation of commerce of, 46, 47;
    rights of, 48-53.
    _See also_ American Revolution

  Brunswick, Duke of, defeat, 273

  Buchan, Lord, letter to, 444

  Budget, presented by Jefferson, 146

  Buffon, G. L. L. de, theory of, concerning
  animals in America, 121, 122

  Burke, "History of Virginia", 12, 515

  Burlamaqui, Jean Jacques, quotation from, 73

  Burnaby, English tourist, quoted on Virginia colonists, 42

  Burr, Col. Aaron, letters to, 332, 354;
    nominated for Vice-Presidency (1800), 362;
    in the 1800-election, 369-373;
    his presence in government an annoyance to Jefferson, 382;
    conspiracy, 429-439;
    duel with Hamilton, 431

  Burwell, Rebecca, and Jefferson, 16, 17


  Cabanis, P. J. G., 161;
    letter to, 422

  Cabell, Joseph C., 507;
    on board of visitors of University of Virginia, 509;
    letters to, 512

  Cabell, Gov. William H., 451

  Cabinet, the President's, in Washington's time, 247;
    Adams's, 322, 323, 368;
    relation to President, 392

  Callender, 356, 427;
    employed by Jefferson, 361;
    Jefferson's interest in, 363;
    his pamphlet, "The Prospect Before Us" ("History of the
          Administration of John Adams"), 382

  Calonne, Charles Alexandre de, 178, 182

  Calvinism, 522

  Canning, George, 453

  Capital, of United States, seat of, 252, 253

  Capitol, at Washington, the new, question of putting inscription
  on, 479

  Caracas, constitution of, 498

  Carleton, Guy, governor of Canada, 111

  Carmichael, 198, 211, 226, 263, 276, 288

  Carr, Dabney, death, 40, 41

  Carr, Peter, 21, 175

  Carrington, Edward, letters to, 196, 213, 219

  Carthagenes, constitution of, 498

  Cary, Col. Archibald, 139

  _Ceres_, sailing-vessel, 153, 159

  Champion de Cicé, Archbishop of Bordeaux, 235

  Charlottesville, Va., war prisoners at, 109

  Chase, Judge Samuel, impeachment of, 387-389

  Chastellux, Chevalier de, friend of Jefferson, 154

  _Chesapeake-Leopard_ affair, 451-453

  Church, Mrs., 298, 299

  Church of England, in Virginia, 90, 103

  Cincinnati, Society of the, 152, 306

  Clay, Rev. Mr. Charles, subscription for support of, 103-105

  Clinton, George, Vice-President, 395, 463, 464

  Cocke, J. H., on board of visitors of University of Virginia, 509

  Collot, Gen., 402

  Colvin, J. B., letter to, 469

  Comité du Commerce, 178, 183

  Commerce, one of the great causes of war, 83;
    Treaty of, 143, 144;
    Gallo-American, 181-184;
    Report of Jefferson on Privileges and Restrictions of, 302

  Commercial monopolies, 151, 152

  Commercial treaties, 149-152

  Committees of safety, 54

  Confederation, Treaty of Commerce, 143, 144;
    defects in, 145, 146, 195, 197;
    monetary system, 146, 147;
    new States, 148; slavery, 148, 149;
    hereditary titles, 148, 149;
    commercial treaties, 149-152.
    _See also_ Articles of Confederation; United States

  Congress, first proposal for, 44.
     _See also_ Continental Congress

  Congressional election, _see_ Election

  Congressional Library, destroyed by English, 476

  Constitution of United States, 195-202

  Continental Congress, First, 54, 83;
    Second, 59;
    of the Confederation, 143-152

  Contraband, 151, 152, 422, 423

  Cooper, Thomas, 510; letters to, 492, 512, 521

  Coray, Mr., 516

  Corny, M. de, 234

  Corny, Madame de, 161, 245, 246, 274, 298, 299

  Correa de Serra, 484, 516

  Coxe, Tench, letters to, 304, 371, 372

  Crawford, Dr. John, letter to, 480

  Crimes and punishments, in Virginia, 93-95

  Cuba, 470, 485

  Cutting, letter to, 225


  Dalrymple, Sir John, his "Essay Towards a General History of Feudal
  Property", 30

  Dandridge, Mr., 14

  Danville, Duchesse, 274

  Deane, Silas,
    quoted on Southern delegates to first Continental Congress, 42;
    elected commissioner to France, 87

  Dearborn, Henry, Secretary of War in Jefferson's Cabinet, 374

  Debts of United States, foreign, domestic, and State, 250-255, 258

  "Déclaration Européenne des droits de l'homme et du citoyen",
  Lafayette, 232-234

  Declaration of Independence, the story of, 69-71;
    origin of, 71-74, 77;
    as literature, 72;
    "the pursuit of happiness" in, 75-76;
    highest achievement of eighteenth-century philosophy, 76;
    suggests tone of Greek tragedy, 77

  Declaration of Rights of 1774, 73

  Declaration on Violation of Rights, adopted by First Continental
  Congress, 83

  Dejean, Lieut., 111

  _Democrat_, sailing-vessel, 294

  Democratic societies, 306, 334

  De Moustier, letter to, 254

  Destutt de Tracy, A. L. C., meeting with Jefferson, 161;
    letter to, 484;
    his "Political Economy", 495;
    living embodiment of political faith of nineteenth century, 514

  Dexter, Samuel, Secretary of War in Adams's Cabinet, 368;
    Secretary of the Treasury in Adams's Cabinet, 374

  Dickinson, John, in Continental Congress, 60;
    letter of, 361

  Dictator, proposition for appointment of, 127, 128

  Douglas, Dr., clergyman, 5, 20

  Duane, William, flogged, 355;
    letter to, 475

  Dumas, financial agent of the United States at the Hague, 185, 187,
  197, 209, 252, 253, 289

  Dunbar, William, discussions with Jefferson, 371

  Dunglison, Dr., on visitors at Monticello, 516;
    on Jefferson's religious belief, 520;
    his account of Jefferson's death, 531

  Dunmore, John Murray, Earl of, governor of Virginia, 43, 44, 54, 55,
  66

  Du Pont de Nemours, Pierre S., Jefferson's association with, 215;
    his "Plan of a National Education", 358, 506, 507, 512;
    theories and practice of, 395;
    correspondence with Jefferson, 405-409, 411, 414, 415, 420, 452,
          471, 478, 493, 497, 498, 514;
    and the Louisiana problem, 407-409, 412-415;
    never fully understood Jefferson, 496;
    draws up plan of government for the "Equinoctial republics", 498;
    living embodiment of political faith of nineteenth century, 513, 514


  Edwards, Jonathan, 430

  Election, of 1792, 272, 273;
    of 1796, 316-319;
    of 1800, 363-373;
    of 1804, 389, 395

  Ellsworth, Oliver, appointed Plenipotentiary to France, 355

  Embargo of 1807, 428, 456-462, 470, 471

  "Encyclopédie Méthodique", 160, 214

  English, their monopoly of the American market, 326, 327

  Entails, abolished in Virginia, 88, 89

  Epicurism, 521

  Eppes, Mrs., sister of Mrs. Jefferson, 153

  Equinoctial republics, 498

  Essex case, 447

  Estaing, Admiral d', 206

  Euripides, 22, 24

  Eustis, Dr. William, letter to, 461

  Excise tax, 254, 255, 393;
    revolt against (Whisky Insurrection), 305, 306;
    Jefferson's bitterness against, 306, 307

  Expatriation, doctrine of, 47, 50, 89, 107


  Fairfax resolutions, 45-48

  Farmers-general, 177-181

  Farming taxes, 177-181

  Fauquier, Dr., of Floirac, 12

  Fauquier, Gov. Francis, his intimacy with Jefferson, 12, 13

  Federal Government, prerogatives of, 83

  _Federalist_, the, 200

  Federalists, their power broken, 355, 362;
    in election of 1800, 367-373, 389;
    in Jefferson's administration, 380, 381

  Feudal system, abolishment of, in Virginia, 88, 89

  Fleming, William, letters to, 78, 79;
    on committee on religion, 89

  Florida, Western and Eastern, 445, 446

  Foster, Dwight, Senator, makes offer to Jefferson, 373

  Fox blockade, 450

  France, educational system of, 98;
    colonizing designs of, feared, 207;
    difficulties with, 288, 323-325, 331-342, 440, 447-462.
    _See also_ French Revolution

  Franklin, Benjamin, on committee of Continental Congress appointed
          to answer Lord North's "Conciliatory Proposition", 62;
    his part in Declaration of Independence, 69, 70;
    on committee to suggest United States seal, 86;
    elected commissioner to France, 87;
    Jefferson's view of, 122;
    appointed Minister Plenipotentiary to negotiate treaties of
          commerce, 152, 162;
    interview with Jefferson, 247

  Franklin, William Temple, papers entrusted to, by Benjamin Franklin,
  247

  Free ports, 182

  Freedom of speech, 427

  Freedom of the press, importance of, 203, 427

  Freedom of thought, Jefferson's understanding of, 103

  Freeholders, rights of, 52

  French constitution, 143

  French debt, of United States, 176, 177, 181, 182, 184-193

  French Revolution, Declaration of June 23, 1793, 76;
    Declaration of May 29, 1793, 82;
    Assembly of the Notables, 219-222, 225;
    convocation of States-General, 227, 229;
    National Assembly, 231, 232;
    capture of the Bastille, 235;
    defeat of Duke of Brunswick, 273;
    becomes international issue, 279;
    flight of king, 282;
    execution of king, 287

  Freneau, Philip, his paper, the _National Gazette_, 261-263, 269

  Fry, Joshua, professor in William and Mary College, 5


  Gallatin, Albert, defies excise law, 305;
    speech of, 311;
    letter to, 480

  Gates, Horatio, letters to, 416, 445

  _Gazette of the United States_, attacks Jefferson, 268, 269

  Geismer, Baron de, 110, 163

  Generations of men, rights of, 234

  Genêt, Citizen Edmond C., the case of, 288-297

  Gerry, Elbridge, letters to, 325, 351-353;
    appointed envoy extraordinary to France, 333

  Ghent, Treaty of, 485

  Giles, William B., and Jefferson, 311;
    letters to, 307, 309, 436

  Gilmer, Francis Walker, and Jefferson, 253;
     sent to England to recruit faculty for University of Virginia, 511

  "Government by the people", 237

  Granger, Gideon, letter to, 363

  Great Britain, United States debt to, 186-193;
    her hatred of United States, 208, 209;
    and France, war between, 288, 440, 447-462;
    her navy, policies of, in regard to contraband and impressment,
          422, 423

  Greene, William, letter to, 356


  Hamilton, Alexander,
    quarrel with Jefferson, 127, 255-258, 263, 265, 266, 268-271;
    Secretary of the Treasury, 247;
    Jefferson gives estimate of, 248;
    Reports of, 249;
    his Bank Bill, 255-257;
    his actions supported by Washington, 271;
    attitude toward England, 290;
    and Whisky Insurrection, 306;
    would encourage American manufactures, 327, 443;
    his plans of administrative reorganization, 349, 350;
    in election campaign of 1800, 367, 368;
    duel with Burr, 431

  Hamilton, Gov., of Kaskakias, 111

  Hammond, George, British minister to United States, 291, 292

  Hardy, Samuel, delegate to Congress from Virginia, 140

  Harrison, Gov., letters to, 145, 415

  Hawkesbury, Lord, 402, 404

  Hawkins, Col. Benjamin, discussions with Jefferson, 358;
    letter to, 364

  Hay, George, 436

  Helvétius, Madame, 161, 215

  Henry, Patrick, and Jefferson, 14, 15, 26, 27, 37, 63;
    his study of the law, 28;
    after passage of Boston Port Bill, 43;
    and Jefferson's "Summary View", 47;
    speech at second Virginia Convention, 54;
    opposes Bill to Abolish Entails, 89;
    seconds motion for appointment of dictator, 127;
    appointed Plenipotentiary to France, 355

  Hereditary titles, in the Confederation, 148, 149

  Hervey, John, guardian of Jefferson, 8

  Hobbes, Thomas, 82

  Holland, United States debt to, 187-193

  Hopkinson, Francis, 200

  Hopkinson, Mrs., 153

  Houdetot, Madame d', 161, 274

  Howe, Lord, negotiations of Franklin with, 247

  Howick, Lord, 450

  Humboldt, Baron Alexander von, letter to, 481

  Humphreys, Col. David, secretary of legation in Paris, 153, 159, 223,
  228


  Immigration, Jefferson's views of, 123-125

  Impeachment, the Republican understanding of, 385, 387

  "Implied powers", doctrine of, 256

  Impressment, of British sailors on neutral vessels, 423;
    an issue of the War of 1812, 478

  Income tax, 494

  Indians, 7;
    study of customs and languages of, 99;
    atrocities of, in American Revolution, 111;
    eloquence of, 121;
    affairs of, treated in Jefferson's second inaugural, 425-427

  Industrialism, dangers of, 492

  Isham, Mary, 3


  Jackson, Andrew, 431

  Jacobins, _see_ Republicans

  Jay, John, letters to, 223, 224, 231, 234, 236, 239.
    _See also_ Jay treaty

  Jay, Gov. John, letter to, 491

  Jay treaty, 305, 307, 308, 316, 324

  Jefferson, Lucy Elizabeth, daughter of Thomas Jefferson, 139;
    death, 163

  Jefferson, Martha, daughter of Thomas Jefferson,
    her account of Mrs. Jefferson's death, 138;
    date of birth, 139;
    accompanies father to Europe, 153, 159;
    marriage, 246;
    at Monticello, 300;
    Jefferson's farewell message to, 532

  Jefferson, Mary, daughter of Thomas Jefferson, 139, 161;
    joins father in Paris, 163

  Jefferson, Peter, father of Thomas Jefferson, 4, 5

  Jefferson, Mrs. Peter, _see_ Randolph, Jane

  Jefferson, Thomas, birth, 3;
    ancestry and parentage, 3-5;
    "Autobiography", _see_ below;
    schooling, 5-7;
    early reading, 6;
    life at Shadwell, 6-8;
    at William and Mary College, 8-17;
    oratorical ambitions, 14;
    influence of Patrick Henry upon, 14, 15, 26, 27, 37;
    love episode with Rebecca Burwell, 16-18;
    commonplace books, 19, _see also_ below;
    change in religious belief, 19-24;
    distrust of women, 22;
    his system of morality, 24-26, _see also_ Morality;
    influence of Greek Stoics upon, 26;
    studies law, 27-31;
    his revindication of the Saxon liberties, 31, 32;
    his acquaintance with languages and books, 33;
    practices law, 34, 36;
    life as farmer at Shadwell, 34, 35;
    his "Garden Books", 35, 39;
    his scorn of rhetoric, 36, 37;
    character of his mind, 37;
    in House of Burgesses, 38;
    his library, 39;
    marriage, 39, 40;
    life at Monticello, 41;
    after passing of Boston Port Bill, 43, 44;
    his declaration of mutual defence, 45;
    writes Albemarle resolutions, 45-47;
    his doctrine of expatriation, 47, 50, 89, 107;
    drafts instructions to Virginia delegates to first Continental
          Congress, 47, 53;
    his "A Summary View of the Rights of British America", 48-53;
    his discussion of land tenures, 49;
    speaks as pioneer, 52, 53;
    in second Virginia Convention, 54;
    delegate to second Continental Congress, 54, 55, 64;
    his part of "Declaration of the Cause of Taking Up Arms", 59-62;
    his answer to Lord North's "Conciliatory Proposition", 62;
    influence of Greek and Latin orators on his style, 63;
    his view of independence, 63-65;
    his absence from Congress during preliminary steps to Declaration of
          Independence, 66;
    appointed Lieutenant and Commander in chief of the Militia of the
          County of Albemarle, 66;
    drafts constitution for Virginia, 66-69;
    and the Declaration of Independence, 69-78;
    resigns from Congress and enters Virginia Legislature, 78, 79;
    his view of the social compact and liberty, 80-82, 85, 204, 365,
          498;
    his philosophy of natural and civil rights, 80-85, 106, 204, 346,
          365;
    his conception of state sovereignty, 82, 83;
    his views on property, 84, 85;
    his suggestion for United States seal, 86;
    the source of his political philosophy, 87;
    refuses post of commissioner to France, 87, 88;
    birth of son, 88;
    his part in revision of laws of Virginia, 88-103;
    starts subscription for Rev. Charles Clay, 103-105;
    his doctrine of government, 105-107;
    as Governor of Virginia, 107-114;
    his attitude toward British prisoners, 109-112;
    a stern, but little observed, trait in his character, 111-113;
    nearly taken by the British, 113;
    charges against his conduct as governor, 114, 115;
    impatient at public criticism, 115;
    refuses new appointment to European post, 115, 116;
    his determination to return to private life, 116-118, 153;
    his description of natural scenery, 120, 121;
    his studies in natural history, 121, 122;
    his answer to Abbé Raynal, 122, 123;
    his views on immigration, 123-125;
    his combination of faith and pessimism in reference to government,
          125, 126;
    his view of the best government, 126, 127;
    his opposition to dictator, 127, 128;
    his belief in efficacy of universal suffrage, 129, 130;
    his pessimism as regards human nature and human society, 130;
    his views of slavery and the Negro, 131, _see also_ Slavery;
    his view of American civilization as agricultural, 132;
    advises peace and preparedness, 133, 134;
    his ideal picture of America, 135, 136;
    death of his wife, 137, 138;
    appointed Plenipotentiary to Europe, but appointment canceled, 139,
          140;
    delegate to Congress (June, 1782 to July 5, 1784), 140, 143-152;
    founds American monetary system, 147;
    appointed Minister Plenipotentiary to negotiate treaties of commerce
          with foreign nations, 152;
    his qualifications for European task, 153-155;
    his quarters in Paris, 159;
    his views of Paris, 160;
    his friends and acquaintances at Paris, 161, 162;
    rooms in Carthusian Monastery, 163;
    his travels in Europe, 164-171;
    advises against sending youth to Europe, 172;
    compares Europe with America, 173-175;
    his duties at Paris, 176;
    and foreign debts, 176, 177, 181-193;
    and the tobacco trade, 177-181;
    his efforts to promote Gallo-American commerce, 181-184;
    puts all questions on a practical basis, 194;
    his views on the American Constitution, 195-202;
    his political philosophy, 203-205;
    his management of the problem of the Barbary pirates, 205-207;
    his fear of French, English, and Spanish designs in New World,
          207-211;
    his belief in policy of isolation for United States, 211, 212;
    originates policy of watchful waiting, 214;
    his attitude toward French Revolution, 215-237;
    draws up "Charter of Rights for the King and Nation", 230;
    his emendations and corrections to Lafayette's "Déclaration
          Européenne des droits de l'homme et du citoyen", 232-234;
    his house made the scene of French committee meeting, 235-237;
    how far he believed in "government by the people", 237, 238;
    on the French people, 238-240;
    asserts one standard of morality for nations and individuals, 240,
          241;
    accepts post of Secretary of State, 245, 246;
    pays respects to Franklin, 247;
    the "Anas", 248, 251, 295, 515;
    his attitude toward United States debts, 250-255;
    quarrel with Hamilton, 255-258, 263, 265, 266, 268-271;
    his opposition to Bank Bill, 255-258;
    his theory of State rights, 257, 365;
    his quarrel with Adams, 258-261;
    reaches an impasse, 264;
    his proposed changes in Virginia Constitution, 264, 265;
    his indictment of Hamilton's system, 265-267;
    urges Washington to run a second time for Presidency, 267;
    attacked by _Gazette of the United States_, 268, 269;
    becomes leader of new party, 269;
    his fears of a monarchy, 271, 272, 344;
    letters to French friends, 274;
    his practical idealism, 275, 381, 382;
    efforts to obtain New Orleans, 276-278;
    becomes sympathetic with republican government in France, 278-280,
          282, 285-287;
    his efforts to obtain commercial privileges with West Indies,
          280-282;
    cautious in action, 283;
    his principles as to recognition of foreign governments, 284, 286;
    and the war between England and France, and Citizen Genêt, 287-297;
    resigns Secretaryship, 297;
    in retirement at Monticello, 298-320;
    his admiration for Madame de Corny, 298, 299;
    avoids politics, 299-303;
    his Report on the Privileges and Restrictions of the Commerce of the
          United States, 302;
    hopes for avoidance of war with Great Britain, 303-305;
    views on current political events, 308-313;
    writes indiscreet letter to Mazzei, 312, 333;
    pen-portrait of, 314, 315;
    chosen Vice-President, 320;
    attempted reconciliation with Adams, 321, 322, 325;
    desires peace with Europe, 324, 326, 337, 339, 343;
    his "Parliamentary Manual", 325;
    his view of manufactures, 327, 329;
    forms certain political conclusions, 334, 335;
    his self-mastery, 339, 340;
    opposed to break in the Union, 340, 341;
    newspaper war against, 341, 343;
    his share in Kentucky and Virginia nullification resolutions, 345;
    luminous exposition of his doctrine (program of the Democratic
          party), 351, 352;
    as political leader, 352-362;
    nominated for Presidency (1800), 362;
    in the campaign, 363-368;
    in the election, 368-373;
    inauguration, 375;
    inaugural address, 379;
    his removals from office, 380, 381;
    his attack on the judiciary, 383-390, 436;
    reëlected (1804), 389, 395;
    convinced of the evil of the intrusion of churches into politics,
          390;
    hostility to, 390, 391;
    his relation to Cabinet members, 392;
    his reform in financial system of United States, 393;
    his attitude toward agriculture and manufactures, 394, 395;
    his imperialist views, 398-400, 449;
    and Louisiana Purchase, 405-421;
    sends Lewis on Western exploring expedition, 421, 422;
    his policy in war between England and France, 424, 440, 441, 444,
          447-462;
    his second inaugural address, 425-428, 442;
    the ordeal of his second term, 428, 429;
    inconsistency of his conduct in Burr case, 437-439;
    tries to obtain the Floridas, 445, 446;
    offers alliance with England, 446;
    writes to Alexander of Russia concerning rights of neutrals, 448;
    imperialistic proposition of, 449; his letters, 468, 514, 516;
    his views of Executive and Congress, 468-470;
    opposed to English mercantilism, 471;
    his detestation of English policies and rulers, 470-473;
    his ideas on War of 1812, 473-478;
    offers library to Congress, 477;
    his feeling for England as distinguished from English government,
          479;
    opinions on affairs of Europe and South America, 479-486;
    and the Monroe Doctrine, 483, 486-488;
    formulates the gospel of American democracy, 489;
    economic and banking theories of, 490-496;
    his view of best government for France, 496, 497;
    his theory of the function of the people in a democracy, 499-502;
    sees germs of national weakness in United States government,
          502-505;
    his services to education (University of Virginia), 505-512;
    his interests, 514-516;
    his conclusion on the future of democracy, 517;
    reconciliation with Adams, 518, 519;
    his later religious views, 519-528;
    his faith in ultimate recognition of ideals, 528, 529;
    his last years and death, 529-532

    "Autobiography", references to, 4, 53, 80, 88, 91, 93, 105, 108,
          148, 236;
      quoted on proposal for Congress, 44;
      on expatriation, 47;
      on Jefferson's retirement from Congress, 79;
      on simplification of statutes, 92;
      on self-government of the people, 106;
      on method of composition used in "Notes on Virginia", 119;
      on attendance at Congress, 143;
      on Committee of Congress, 145;
      on Jefferson's duties in Paris, 176;
      picture of events preceding French Revolution in, 224;
      on refusal of invitation to attend meeting of French committee,
          235;
      the writing of, 515

    "Commonplace Book", 19, 39;
      law matters in, 28-30;
      provincialism in, 32;
      Kames quoted in, 45, 84;
      on rights of Dominion of Virginia, 46;
      passages from James Wilson in, 73;
      Montesquieu and Beccaria copied in, 94;
      extracts on history of Common Law in, 101;
      on death, 530, 531;
      other references to, 47, 49

    "Literary Bible", 19, 21, 22, 25, 26, 41;
      provincialism in, 32;
      Milton in, 40

    "Notes on Virginia", references to, 69, 98, 100, 101, 103, 153,
          164, 169, 171, 215, 425, 508;
      publication of, 118-120;
      contents of, 120-136;
      memorandum on new constitution for Virginia in, 141;
      on value of education, 505

  Jones, Prof. Hugh, his description of Williamsburg, 8

  Jones, Paul, 207

  Jones, Dr. Walter, letter to, 499

  _Journal de Paris_, imprisonment of chief editor of, 217

  Judiciary, assault on, under Jefferson, 383-390, 436

  Judiciary Act of 1801, repeal of, 384


  Kaims (Kames), Henry Home, Lord, his "Historical Law Tracts", 29, 30;
    on mutual defence, 45;
    his distinction of "property" and "possession", 84, 85;
    referred to, 304

  Kant, Immanuel, criterium of, 525

  Keith, Mary, wife of Thomas Marshall, 4

  Kentucky nullification resolutions, 345-347

  Kercheval, Samuel, letter to, 234, 504

  King, Rufus, 402-405, 408

  Knox, Gen. Henry, Secretary of War under Washington, 247

  Kosciusko, 516


  Lafayette, Marquis de, his plan for a "declaration of the rights of
          man and the citizen", 76;
    sent to arrest Arnold, 108;
    friend of Jefferson, 154;
    his family and friends, 161;
    and the tobacco monopoly, 177-179;
    efforts of, in commercial transactions, 181, 182;
    and the Barbary pirates, 206;
    advice of Jefferson to, 220;
    Jefferson sends "Charter of Rights for the King and Nation" to, 230;
    letters of, 232;
    his "Déclaration Européenne des droits de l'homme et du citoyen",
          232-234;
    brings about committee meeting in Jefferson's house, 236;
    letters to, 274, 283;
    living embodiment of political faith of nineteenth century, 514;
    his final leave-taking of Jefferson, 531

  Lambert, British traveler, 460

  Lamothe, Lieut., 111

  Land Office, ordinance concerning establishment of, 149

  Land tenures, origin of, 49

  "La Peyrouse's voyage to the South Seas", 207

  La Rochefoucauld-Liancourt, visits Monticello, 313-315, 327

  Latude, Jean Henri de, 219

  Law, Thomas, letters to, 478, 524

  Law, and free institutions, in Saxon society, 31, 32

  "Law of nature", 23

  League of Nations, 330

  Lee, Arthur, delegate to Congress from Virginia, 140

  Lee, C., appointed judge by Adams, 374

  Lee, F. L., of Virginia Assembly, 43

  Lee, Richard H., of Virginia Assembly, 43;
    on committee of continental Congress appointed to answer Lord
          North's "Conciliatory Proposition", 62;
    assists in framing resolution instructing colonies to form
          governments, 66;
    mentioned, 79

  Lee, Thomas Ludwell, appointed reviser of laws of Virginia, 90-92

  Leib, Dr., 311, 343; letter to, 458

  Lewis (Merriwether) and Clark (William) Expedition, 421, 422

  Liberty, Jefferson's definition of, 82

  Lincoln, Abraham, Gettysburg address, 77

  _Little Sarah_, British prize, 294

  Livingston, Edward, member of Congress from New York, 368

  Livingston, Robert R.,
    on committee to prepare Declaration of Independence, 69;
    letters to, 362, 368, 419;
    United States Minister to France, 374;
    and Louisiana, 402-416

  Lobbying, 502

  Locke, John, his "Treatise on Civil Government", 30;
    and the Declaration of Independence, 71, 72;
    his hypothesis of society, 82, 84, 204

  Logan, Dr., idealistic pacifist, 341

  Logan Law, 350

  Louis XVI, Jefferson's pen-portrait of, 222, 229;
    flight of, 282;
    execution of, 287

  Louisiana Purchase, 393, 400-421

  "Louisianais", acceptance of, to citizenship, 423


  McGregory, letter to, 365

  McHenry, James,
    Secretary of War in Cabinets of Washington and Adams, 323, 336;
    dismissed by Adams, 368

  Madison, Bishop, discusses religion with Jefferson, 358

  Madison, James, disapproves of Jefferson's determination to withdraw
          from public life, 117;
    delegate to Congress, 140;
    Jefferson's correspondence with, 198, 222, 231, 234, 239, 240, 291,
          302, 303, 306, 307, 335, 337, 338, 347, 351, 355, 462, 468,
          476;
    urges Jefferson to accept post of Secretary of State, 246;
    Jefferson's unofficial representative in Congress, 250, 251;
    Bank Bill opposed by, 255;
    speeches, 257;
    his copy of "The Rights of Man", 258;
    accompanies Jefferson on trip, 259;
    objections to, as Minister to France, 321, 322;
    envoy to France, 324;
    silent on French dispute, 339;
    recommends Virginia nullification resolutions, 345;
    letter of, 411;
    election of, to Presidency, 464;
    on board of visitors to University of Virginia, 509

  Madrid, Treaty of, 403

  Mann, Thomas, letter to, 308

  Manufactures, Hamilton's Report on, 249, 266;
    Hamilton's view of, 327;
    Jefferson's view of, 327-329;
    change in Jefferson's view of, 491, 492

  "Marbury versus Madison", 384, 385

  Marshall, John, ancestry, 3;
    appointed envoy extraordinary to France, 333;
    returns from France, 341;
    Secretary of State in Adams's Cabinet, 368;
    administers oath to Jefferson, 375;
    head of Federalists, 381;
    his decision in "Marbury versus Madison", 384, 385;
    asserts power of Supreme Court to declare law unconstitutional, 385,
          386;
    findings of, in Burr conspiracy case, 433, 434, 436, 437;
    his "History of Washington", 515

  Marshall, Thomas, family of, 4

  Martin, Luther, in Chase impeachment case, 389

  Mason, George, resolutions written by, 45, 46, 48;
    "Virginia Bill of Rights" written by, 73;
    appointed reviser of laws of Virginia, 90-93;
    mentioned, 251

  Mason, John, letter to, 455

  Mason, Stephens Thompson, letter to, 344

  Mason, Thomas, 307

  Mathews, Col. George, 112

  Maury, James, letters to, 454, 473, 478

  Maury, Rev. Dr., schoolmaster, 6, 20, 63

  Mazzei, Philip, neighbor and friend of Jefferson, 35; letters to, 321,
  333, 391

  Mellish, John, traveler, 460

  Mercer, John F., delegate to Congress from Virginia, 140, 273

  Mexico, 481

  Middlemen, in tobacco trade, 177-181

  "Midnight judges", 373, 374, 385

  Milton, John, his accusations against female usurpations, 22;
    quotation from, 40

  Mint, Hamilton's Report on Establishment of, 249

  Mississippi, navigation of, 276

  Missouri question, 502, 503

  Mitchell, Dr., unpublished letter to, 390

  Monocrats, 273, 306, 316

  Monroe, James, disapproves of Jefferson's determination to withdraw
          from public life, 117;
    delegate to Congress from Virginia, 140;
    Jefferson's correspondence with, 217, 251, 260, 290, 301-303, 316,
          317, 354, 357, 363, 373, 399, 463, 485, 486;
    on Washington's proclamation of neutrality, 293;
    sent as special envoy to France to negotiate for Louisiana, 411,
          413, 415, 416;
    his fear of alliance of Great Britain and France against United
          States, 423;
    negotiates, with Pinkney, treaty with England, 448-450;
    considered for Presidency in 1808, 463, 464;
    on board of visitors to University of Virginia, 509

  Monroe Doctrine, 483, 486-488

  Montaigne, M. E. de, 130

  Montesquieu, Baron de, 233

  Monticello, the building of, 34, 39;
    life at, 41;
    Jefferson in retirement at, 298-320;
    a self-supporting economic unit, 327, 467;
    visitors to, 515

  Montmorency, 234

  Montmorin, Minister, 220, 237, 274, 278

  Morality, and religion, 24, 25, 523-525;
    test of, 525;
    code of, 526

  Morellet, Abbé, translator of "Notes on Virginia", 118;
    meets Jefferson, 161, 215

  Morocco, Emperor, treaty with, 312

  Morris, Gouverneur, his accusation against Jefferson, 224;
    letters to, 254, 263, 286, 293, 294, 295;
    Minister to France, 283;
    letters from, 284;
    conduct as Minister to France, 323;
    offers to use political influence for Jefferson, 372

  Morris, Robert, Financier of U. S., 146, 179

  Mutual defence, 45, 84

  _National Gazette_, foundation of, 261-263

  Natural Bridge, description of, 120, 175

  Necker, Jacques, 229, 231

  Negro, Jefferson's view of status of, 131

  Nelson, Gen., elected governor of Virginia, 113

  Nelson, Thomas, Jr., letter to, 66

  Neutrality, Washington's proclamation of, 289, 293;
    Jefferson's policy of, 424

  New Granada, constitution of, 498

  _New London Bee_, 368

  New Orleans, Jefferson's efforts to obtain, 276-278

  Nicholas, George, his charges against Jefferson, 114, 115, 127;
    proposes dictator 127;
    his share in Kentucky and Virginia nullification resolutions, 345

  Nicholas, Robert C., 28

  Nicholas, Wilson C.,
    his share in Kentucky and Virginia nullification resolutions, 345;
    refutes Federalists, 357

  Nicholson, Joseph N., member of Congress, 372

  Nock, A. J., historian of Jefferson, 457, 458

  Non-Intercourse Act, 461

  North, Lord, his "Conciliatory Proposition", 54;
    Jefferson's answer to his "Conciliatory Proposition", 62

  Nullification resolutions, 345-347


  Ogden, John, arrest of, 354

  Ogilvie, James, 502

  Oratory, American school of, 388, 389

  Orders in Council (Nov. 11, 1807), 453, 457

  Otis, H. G., nominated District Attorney by Adams, 374


  Page, John,
    Jefferson's correspondence with, 15, 16, 19, 20, 38, 78, 166;
    on committee on religion, 89

  Paine, Thomas, his "Common Sense", influence of, 60;
    letter to, 227, 228;
    his "The Rights of Man", 258-261;
    Jefferson's regard for, resented, 390, 391

  Paradise, Comtesse Barziza, Lucy, 162

  Parsons, Theophilus, nominated Attorney-General, 373

  "Parson's Case", 15

  Patowmac River, 120

  Pendleton, Edmund, letters to, 78, 87, 88;
    opposes Bill to Abolish Entails, 89;
    appointed reviser of laws of Virginia, 90;
    appeal of Jefferson to, 353;
    congratulates Jefferson, 362

  Physiocrats, 142, 233, 328, 395, 471, 493-495, 498

  Pichon, French chargé at The Hague, 354;
    Minister in Washington, 419

  Pickering, Judge, impeachment of, 384

  Pickering, Timothy, in Cabinets of Washington and Adams, 323, 336;
    dismissed by Adams, 368

  Picket, F. J., of Geneva, 507

  Pinckney, Charles, Minister to Spain, 402;
    letter to, 458

  Pinckney, Charles Cotesworth,
    his treatment by the French Directory, 324, 325, 331;
    appointed envoy extraordinary to France, 333;
    nominated for Vice-Presidency (1800), 362;
    candidate for President (1808), 464

  Pinckney, Thomas, Minister to Great Britain, 290;
    letter to, 331

  Pinkney, William, and Monroe, negotiate treaty with England, 448-450

  Politics, foreign and domestic, 248

  Presidential election, _see_ Election

  Priestley, Joseph, letters to, 358, 420, 517;
    befriended by Jefferson, 366;
    his "Hints Concerning Public Education", 506;
    his treatise, "Of Socrates and Jesus compared", 526

  Privateering, 151, 152

  Privateers, outfitted and commissioned by Genêt, 291, 292

  "Proclamation announcing ratification of definitive treaties, Draft
  for", 144

  Property, the right to, 83-85, 233;
    and possession, distinction between, 85

  _Prospect_, 361

  Protestants, edict on, 224

  Public opinion, 203, 204, 301, 429

  "Pursuit of happiness", as a right, 75, 76


  Raleigh Tavern, Williamsburg, Va., 9, 17, 23, 44

  Randolph, Edmund, letters to, 115, 117, 254, 300;
    Attorney-General under Washington, 247, 255, 256, 292;
    opinion of, attacked by Jefferson, 309

  Randolph, Jane, mother of Thomas Jefferson, 3, 4;
    death, 65, 78

  Randolph, John, 28;
    removes to England, 63, 64, 107

  Randolph, John, of Roanoke, refutes Federalists, 356;
    in Chase impeachment case, 389;
    "Resolution" of, on judiciary, 390;
    leader of discontented Republicans, 428;
    his "Remonstrance of the people of Louisiana", 429;
    his attacks on Madison, 439

  Randolph, Peyton, 28, 47, 63;
    president of first Continental Congress, 54;
    recalled from Congress, 54

  Randolph, Mrs. Sarah, her "Domestic Life of Thomas Jefferson", 529

  Randolph, Thomas Mann, Jr., marries Martha Jefferson, 246;
    letters to, 251, 262, 263, 293;
    at Monticello, 301

  Randolph, William, 3

  Raynal, Abbé,
    his application of theory of Buffon to American settlers, 122;
    answer of Jefferson to, 122, 123

  Religion, and morality, 24, 25, 523, 527

  Religious freedom, in Virginia, 89, 90, 100-103

  Republicans, in election of 1792, 273

  Richmond, Va., establishment of Free Public Library at, 99

  Riedesel, Maj.-Gen. Baron de, 110

  Rights, natural and civil, 80-85, 204, 233, 346

  Rochefoucauld, Comtesse de la, 162

  Rochefoucauld, Duc de La, 274

  Rodney, Caesar A., letter to, 469

  Rotation in office, 502

  Rousseau, Jean Jacques, his hypothesis of society, 82, 84;
    on morality, 525

  Rush, Benjamin, 458;
    deplores estrangement of Jefferson and Adams, 518;
    Jefferson writes "Syllabus of an Estimate of the Merit of the
          Doctrines of Jesus, compared with those of others" for,
          526, 527

  Rush, Richard, letter to, 489

  Rutledge, letters to, 225, 309, 317, 330, 334, 335


  Saint Étienne, Rabaud de,
    Jefferson sends "Charter of Rights for the King and Nation" to, 230

  San Ildefonso, Treaty of, 402

  Santo Domingo, and Government of the United States, 283, 285

  Sedgwick, Theodore, speaker of the House, 373

  Sedition Law, 342-347, 383

  Seward, W. W., letter to, 212

  Shadwell, Jefferson estate, 3, 7, 8, 28, 32, 34, 35;
    burning of, 38, 39

  Shaw, Samuel, consul at Canton, 289

  Sherman, Roger, on committee to prepare Declaration of Independence,
  69

  "Shirt-sleeve" diplomacy, 178

  Short, William, private secretary of Jefferson, 153, 159;
    studies French, 161;
    correspondence with Jefferson, 275-277, 280, 282, 285, 288, 398,
          462, 517, 521;
    transferred to the Hague, 283;
    rebuked by Jefferson, 286

  Skelton, Bathurst, 39

  Skelton, Martha, married to Jefferson, 39, 40;
    death, 137, 138;
    grave and inscription, 138

  Slavery,
    Jefferson's attitude toward, 119, 131, 142, 148, 152, 492, 503;
    in the Confederation, 148, 149

  Small, Dr. William, professor in William and Mary College, his
  intimacy with Jefferson, 11-13, 63

  Smith, Rev. Cotton Mather, his accusation against Jefferson, 363

  Smith, James, letter to, 520

  Smith, Robert, Attorney-General, 437

  Smith, Samuel H., letters to, 343, 477

  Smith, Col. W. S., 287, 288

  Social compact, Jefferson's view of, 45, 46, 80-82, 85, 204, 365, 498

  Society, man and, conflict between, 107;
    contractual and physiocratic doctrines of, 141, 142

  South America, _see_ Spanish colonies

  Spanish colonies in America, 209-211; revolt of, 481-485

  Sprigg resolution, against war with France, 337, 338

  Staël, Madame de, Jefferson's correspondence with, 476

  State rights, Jefferson's theory of, 257, 365

  State sovereignty, Jefferson's conception of, 82, 83

  State universities, 512

  States, provision for new, 148, 149

  Stewart, Dugald, 5, 11

  Stoddart, Benjamin, Secretary of the Navy in Adams's Cabinet, 374

  Stuart, Archibald, 264

  Suffrage, universal, 129, 130;
    limitation of, 499

  Sullivan, Francis Stoughton, his "An Historical Treatise of the Feudal
  Laws and the Constitution of the Laws of England", 30

  Supreme Court, Jefferson's attitude toward, 346;
    Marshall's doctrine of the powers of, 385, 386

  Swartwout, and the Burr conspiracy, 432, 433


  Tariff, and the French debt, 181;
    belief and practice in, 212, 213;
    advocated by Jefferson's party, 394

  Tarleton, Col. Sir Bannastre, attempts to capture Legislature and
  Governor of Virginia, 113

  Taxation, forms of, 493, 494

  Taylor, John, letter to, 347;
    efforts to secure appointment of dictator, 356

  Taylor, Keith, appointed judge by Adams, 374

  Tazewell, H., letter to, 308

  Ternant, French Minister to United States, 287, 290, 291

  Tessé, Madame de, 161, 170, 221;
    correspondence with, 514

  Thomson, Charles, letter to, 530

  Ticknor, George, 510

  Tobacco monopoly, 177-181

  Tott, Madame de, 162

  "Transfers", problem of, 181

  Treaties, _see_ Commercial treaties

  Treaty of Alliance with France (1778), 211, 212

  Treaty of Commerce, with Great Britain, 143, 144

  Trial by jury, 237

  Tripoli, war with, 443

  Trist, Mrs., 163, 216, 530


  Unger, Louis de, German officer, 110

  Unitarianism, 520

  United States, suggestions for seal of, 86;
    proclaimed as one nation, 144, 150;
    establishment of monetary system of, 146, 147;
    provision for new States, 148;
    foreign debts, 176, 177, 181, 182, 184-193;
    western lands, sale of, 188;
    Constitution, 195-202;
    desire of isolation, 211;
    often accused of hypocrisy in foreign dealings, 213;
    has tried to combine political aloofness and industrial and
          commercial development, 330;
    relation to foreign nations, 396;
    neutrality of, in war between England and France, 424, 440;
    imports and exports of, at beginning of nineteenth century, 440;
    population of, at beginning of nineteenth century, 441.
    _See also_ American Revolution; Articles of Confederation;
          Declaration of Independence; Louisiana Purchase

  University of Geneva, 505

  University of Virginia, 509-512


  Vans Murray, American Minister at The Hague, 349, 354

  Vans Murray-Pichon papers, 354, 355

  Venable, 356

  Vergennes, Charles G., Count de, 178, 185, 206

  Virginia, family life in, before the Revolution, 4;
    books in, 5;
    religion in, 6;
    plantation life in, 35, 41;
    House of Burgesses, 38, 54;
    temper of colonists of, 42;
    Constitution (1776), drafted by Jefferson, 67-69;
    revision of laws of, 88-107;
    ideas on new constitution for, 140-143;
    Jefferson proposes changes in constitution, 264.
    _See also_ American Revolution; Shadwell; Williamsburg

  Virginia Bill of Rights, 73, 74, 76, 83, 100

  Virginia Convention, first, 47, 53;
    second, 54

  Virginia nullification resolutions, 345-347

  Virginia Company of Comedians, 34

  Volney, Constantin F. C. B., Count de, 319, 339, 340, 366, 400, 401


  Walker, Col., guardian of Jefferson, 10, 11

  War of 1812, 473-478

  Washington, D. C., in 1800, 362

  Washington, George, presides over Assembly of Fairfax County, 45;
    and Jefferson, differ as regards treatment of British prisoners,
          112;
    Jefferson's view of, 122, 139;
    his wines, 160;
    his Cabinet, 245-247;
    urged by Jefferson to run a second time for Presidency, 267;
    distressed at dissensions in Cabinet, 269;
    supports Hamilton's actions, 271;
    reëlection of, 272;
    letter to, 304;
    harsh words of Jefferson against, 311

  Watchful waiting, policy of, advocated by Jefferson, 214, 423, 452

  Watson, David, on board of visitors to University of Virginia, 509

  Wayles, John, father-in-law of Jefferson, 39

  West Indies, commerce with, 151, 280-282, 295, 329;
    Jefferson opposed to change of ownership of, 303

  Western lands, sale of, 254

  Whisky Insurrection, 305, 306

  White House, burned by English, 476

  Wilkinson, James, and the Burr conspiracy, 429-435, 438

  William and Mary College, 8-11;
    reorganization of, 98, 99;
    transformation of, 358

  Williamsburg, Va., society in, 8, 9, 34

  Williamson, Hugh, discussions with Jefferson, 371

  Wilson, James, and the Declaration of Independence, 73, 76

  Wilson, Woodrow, political aloofness and industrial development
          conspicuous in his position, 330;
    his phrase, "too proud to fight", 398;
    neutrality of, 424;
    his hope of preserving peace, 444;
    his situation in 1914-1917 compared to that of Jefferson in 1808,
          455, 456

  Wistar, Caspar, discussions with Jefferson, 371

  Wolcott, Oliver,
    Secretary of the Treasury under Washington and Adams, 323, 336

  Woodward, Augustus S., letter to, 521

  Wythe, George, professor in William and Mary College, and Jefferson,
          12, 13, 27, 28, 34, 63;
    appointed reviser of laws of Virginia, 90-93;
    congratulates Jefferson, 362;
    mentioned, 310, 325


  XYZ Case, 337.
    See _also_ France




FOOTNOTES:


[1] To Mrs. Bingham, Paris, February 7, 1787, Memorial Edition, VI, 81.

[2] To Jefferson Randolph, November 24, 1808, Memorial Edition, XII,
197.

[3] To John Adams, June 11, 1812. Memorial Edition, XIII, 160.

[4] "Domestic Life of Thomas Jefferson", by S. N. Randolph. New York,
1857, p. 27.

[5] "Notes on Virginia." Query XV.

[6] "Autobiography." Memorial Edition, I., 3.

[7] November 24, 1808. Memorial Edition, XII, 197.

[8] William Wirt Henry: "Life of Patrick Henry." New York, 1891, vol. I,
p. 41.

[9] January 20, 1763. Memorial Edition, IV, 6.

[10] July 15, 1763. _Ibid._, IV, 8.

[11] "The Commonplace Book of Thomas Jefferson." Paris, Baltimore, 1927.
"The Literary Bible of Thomas Jefferson." Paris, Baltimore, 1928.

[12] To John Page, Shadwell, July 15, 1763. Memorial Edition, IV, 10.

[13] Mary Newton Stanard: "Colonial Virginia." Philadelphia, 1917, p.
306.

[14] To Peter Carr. Memorial Edition, VI, 258.

[15] "Samson Agonistes", v, 1025.

[16] See also "Commonplace Book", p. 330, and "Writings." Memorial
Edition, XV, 239, March 14, 1820.

[17] "Hecuba", 592, in "Literary Bible of Thomas Jefferson."

[18] "Hecuba", 306.

[19] Bolingbroke, in "Literary Bible."

[20] Stanard, p. 240.

[21] These memoranda are in the Jefferson Coolidge Collection of the
Massachusetts Historical Society.

[22] To Wirt, August 5, 1815. Memorial Edition, XIV, 335.

[23] "Autobiography." _Ibid._, I, 6.

[24] Randall, "Life of Jefferson", I, 16, _n._

[25] "Paradise Lost", 1. 4, v., 337.

[26] To John Page, February 21, 1770. Memorial Edition, IV, 17.

[27] June 9, 1770, and June 6, 1773. The diplomas are preserved in the
Jefferson papers of the Library of Congress.

[28] Quoted by Stanard, p. 163.

[29] Quoted by T. N. Page, p. 147.

[30] "Autobiography", p. 10.

[31] "Autobiography." Memorial Edition, I, 11.

[32] This passage has been overlooked by Randall, and naturally by Mr.
Hirst, who follows Randall very closely here as elsewhere. Hirst, p. 69.
The Fairfax resolutions did not recognize the right of the British
Parliament to regulate the commerce of the colony; they admitted the
_expediency_ but denied the _right_ of such a procedure.

[33] George Mason, I, 393.

[34] See "Commonplace Book", 229-257.

[35] "Commonplace Book", p. 135.

[36] Stanard, p. 250.

[37] To John Randolph, Attorney-general, August 25, 1775. Memorial
Edition, IV, 28.

[38] Jefferson Papers, Library of Congress.

[39] August 31, 1775.

[40] November 29, 1775. Memorial Edition, IV, 31.

[41] Jefferson Papers. Library of Congress.

[42] The full text will be found in the Ford Edition, II, 7.

[43] See "Life of G. Mason", I, Appendix.

[44] "Journals of Congress", V, 425.

[45] _Ibid._, V, 431.

[46] "Autobiography." Memorial Edition, I, 25.

[47] "Life and Correspondence of G. Mason", I, 438.

[48] To Thomas Nelson, May 16, 1776. Memorial Edition, IV, 253.

[49] "Writings", Ford, II, 41.

[50] Ford, II, 61.

[51] "Journals of Congress", July 12, V, 546 and August 20, V, 674.

[52] "Journals of Congress", October 14, 1774, I, 67.

[53] See "Commonplace Book", 107, 111 _et ff._

[54] "Journals of Congress", V., 517.

[55] August 13, 1776. Ford, II, 78.

[56] Ford, II, 91, October 11, 1776.

[57] Randall, I, 196.

[58] Ford, II, 79.

[59] Concerning the opposition he encountered, see "Autobiography."
Ford, I, 54.

[60] "Autobiography", _Ibid._, I, 58.

[61] "Life and Correspondence of George Mason", I, 276.

[62] "Life and Correspondence of George Mason", I, 277.

[63] Note for the biography of John Saunderson, Esq., August 31, 1820.
"Autobiography", Appendix A. Ford, I, 107.

[64] Monticello, November 1, 1778. Memorial Edition, I, 216.

[65] "Notes on Virginia", Query XVII.

[66] "Commonplace Book", p. 362.

[67] This seems to be the first draft of the document; another copy in
the Jefferson Coolidge Collection presents few variants, the most
important being found in the second sentence which reads, "Yet desirous
of encouraging and supporting the Calvinistical Reformed Church, and of
deriving" etc. The list of names appended to that second version is
considerably longer and besides the original signers includes fourteen
other supporters of the Reverend Charles Clay.

[68] "Autobiography." Memorial Edition, I, 73.

[69] See my edition of the Jefferson-Lafayette Correspondence, Paris and
Baltimore, 1929.

[70] Jefferson to General Philips. Quoted by Randall, I, 235.

[71] See his letter dated from Paris, November 20, 1789.

[72] To Baron de Riedesel, July 4, 1779. Ford, II, 245.

[73] July 17, 1779. _Ibid._, II, 247.

[74] July 22, 1779. _Ibid._, II, 249.

[75] October 1, 1779. Ford, II, 258.

[76] October 8, 1779. _Ibid._, II, 261.

[77] _Ibid._, II, 263.

[78] To The Virginia Delegation in Congress, October 27, 1780. To
Colonel Vanmeter, April 27, 1781. _Ibid._, III, 24.

[79] "A Diary kept by Th: J. from Dec. 31. 1780 to Jan. 11. 1781 and
more general Notes of subsequent transactions during the British
invasion." Jefferson Papers. Library of Congress.

[80] Jefferson Papers. Library of Congress.

[81] Lafayette transmitted the letter on June 26, 1781, but Jefferson
did not receive it until the beginning of August. _Ibid._

[82] To E. Randolph, September 16, 1781. Jefferson Papers. Library of
Congress.

[83] June 11, 1782. Randall, I, 376.

[84] The story of the publication has been told by P. L. Ford in a most
scholarly edition of the "Notes on Virginia" in the "Writings" of
Jefferson.

[85] June 7, 1785. Memorial Edition, V, 3.

[86] To Arch. Stuart, September 8, 1818. Ford, III, 231, _n._

[87] Iliad XXII, 389.

[88] "Domestic Life", p. 67.

[89] To Chastellux, November 26, 1782, in Randall, I, 1782.

[90] "Autobiography", Memorial Edition, I, 76.

[91] January 22, 1783. _Ibid._, IV, 215.

[92] To Madison, May 7, 1783. Ford, III, 329.

[93] This point appears even more clearly in Jefferson correspondence
with Du Pont de Nemours, to appear shortly.

[94] "Report on letters from the Ministers in Paris." December 20, 1783.
Ford, III, 355.

[95] Ford, III, 377.

[96] February 1, 1784. Ford, III, 393.

[97] Ford, III, p. 430.

[98] See Ford, III, 407 and 429.

[99] _Ibid._, III, 476.

[100] March, 1784. _Ibid_, III, p. 428.

[101] To George Washington, April 16, 1784. Ford, III, 466 and 470.

[102] To James Madison, February 20, 1784. _Ibid._, III, 403.

[103] To Mrs. Trist, Paris, August 18, 1785. "Domestic Life", 79.

[104] See G. Chinard, "Les Amitiés américaines de Madame d'Houdetot."
Paris, 1923.

[105] May 24, 1785, November 12, 1785, etc. Massachusetts Historical
Society.

[106] Chinard, "Trois Amitiés Françaises de Jefferson." Paris, 1927.

[107] Most of her letters to Jefferson are in the Jefferson Coolidge
Collection of the Massachusetts Historical Society.

[108] April 6, 1785. "Domestic Life", p. 80.

[109] Diary of Martha. _Ibid._, p. 74.

[110] _Ibid._, p. 84.

[111] April 11, 1787. Jefferson Papers. Library of Congress.

[112] May 4, 1786. Memorial Edition, V, 303.

[113] _Ibid._, XVII, 153.

[114] Nismes, March 20, 1787.

[115] To J. Bannister, Junior, October 15, 1785. Memorial Edition, V,
185.

[116] To Bellini, September 30, 1785. Memorial Edition, V, 153.

[117] To Crevecoeur, January 15, 1787. Memorial Edition, VI, 53.

[118] To Carmichael, December 26, 1786.

[119] To Skipwith, July 28, 1787. Memorial Edition, VI, 187.

[120] August 10, 1787. _Ibid._, VI, 262.

[121] Jefferson to the Governor of Maryland. June 16, 1785. Memorial
Edition, V, 8.

[122] To Messrs. French and Nephew. July 13, 1785. Memorial Edition, V,
34.

[123] August 15, 1785. _Ibid._, V, 68.

[124] Jefferson Papers. Library of Congress, Feb. 20, 1786.

[125] Lafayette's letter. March 18, 1786. _Ibid._

[126] To the Governor of Virginia, January 24, 1786. Memorial Edition,
V, 253.

[127] To James Ross, May 8, 1786. Memorial Edition, V, 321.

[128] To James Ross, May 8, 1786. _Ibid._, V, 329.

[129] For a brief but satisfactory treatment see W. K. Woolery. "The
Relation of Thomas Jefferson to American Foreign Policy, 1783-1793."
Baltimore, 1927.

[130] Letter to Lafayette, July 17, 1786. Library of Congress.

[131] July 9, 1786. Memorial Edition, V, 357.

[132] To Washington, August 14, 1787. Memorial Edition, VI, 277.

[133] _Ibid._, VII, 478.

[134] July 30, 1785. Memorial Edition, V, 45.

[135] To Jay, August 14,1785. Memorial Edition, V, 65.

[136] To John Jay, April 23, 1786. _Ibid._, V, 300.

[137] To T. Pleasants, May 8, 1786. _Ibid._, V, 324.

[138] To Jay, September 26, 1786. _Ibid._, V, 426.

[139] To Jay, September 26, 1786. Memorial Edition, V, 426; to Adams,
July 17, 1787. _Ibid._, VI, 173; to James Madison, August 2, 1787.
_Ibid._, VI, 215.

[140] To J. Adams, July 17, 1787. Memorial Edition, VI, 173.

[141] To John Jay, August 6, 1787. _Ibid._, VI, 248.

[142] December 21, 1787. Memorial Edition, VI, 394.

[143] To Dumas, February 12, 1788. _Ibid._, VI, 429.

[144] To Adams, February 6, 1787. _Ibid._, VI, 419. To The Commissioners
of the Treasury, Feb. 7, 1788. _Ibid._, VI, 421.

[145] March 16, 1788. Memorial Edition, VI, 438.

[146] To the Commissioners of the Treasury, March 29, 1788. _Ibid._, VI,
433.

[147] _Ibid._, VI, 447 and 445.

[148] To the Honorable, The Board of the Treasury, May 16, 1788.
Memorial Edition, VII, 9.

[149] To John Jay, May 23, 1788. _Ibid._, VII, 22; To the Commissioners
of the Treasury, September 6, 1788. _Ibid._, VII, 136.

[150] To James Madison, November 18, 1788. _Ibid._, VII, 186.

[151] To John Jay, March 12, 1788. Memorial Edition, VII, 296.

[152] To John Jay, May 9, 1788. _Ibid._, VII, 345.

[153] To John Jay, September 19, 1789. Memorial Edition, VII, 471.

[154] To John Langdon, September 11, 1785. Memorial Edition, V, 129.

[155] To John Adams, February 23, 1787. Memorial Edition, VI, 97.

[156] To James Madison, June 20, 1787. _Ibid._, VI, 132.

[157] August 4, 1787. Memorial Edition, VI, 227.

[158] September 10, 1787. _Ibid._, VI, 295.

[159] To John Adams, November 13, 1787. Memorial Edition, VI, 370. See
also letter to Colonel Smith, written the same day. _Ibid._, VI, 372.

[160] December 11, 1787. _Ibid._, VI, 380.

[161] December 20, 1787. Memorial Edition, VI, 393.

[162] To Donald, February 7, 1787. Memorial Edition, VI, 425.

[163] To Carmichael and to Colonel Carrington, May 27, 1787. _Ibid._,
VII, 27, 29.

[164] To Carmichael, August 12, 1787. _Ibid._, VII, 124; to James
Madison, November 18, 1788, _Ibid._, VII, 183; to General Washington,
December 4, 1788, _Ibid._, VII, 223.

[165] To Colonel Humphreys, March 18, 1789. Memorial Edition, VII, 324.

[166] Jefferson to Monroe, May 10, 1786. Memorial Edition, V, 327.

[167] To Major General Greene, January 12, 1786. _Ibid._, V, 246.

[168] "Autobiography", _Ibid._, I, 97 and July 11, 1786, _Ibid._, V,
364.

[169] See my edition of the Jefferson Lafayette correspondence, chapter
II. Paris, Baltimore, 1929.

[170] "Memoirs", II, 148.

[171] To John Jay, August 14, 1785. Memorial Edition, V, 63.

[172] To Baron Geismer, September 6, 1785. Memorial Edition, V, 128.

[173] To John Langdon, September 11, 1785. _Ibid._, V, 131.

[174] To Count Hogendorp, October 13, 1785. _Ibid._, V, 182.

[175] To John Page, May 4, 1786. Memorial Edition, V, 306.

[176] To Dumas, May 6, 1786. _Ibid._, V, 309.

[177] To John Jay, May 4, 1787. Memorial Edition, VI, 119.

[178] To Carmichael, May 27, 1788. Memorial Edition, VII, 27.

[179] To Count Hagendorf, October 13, 1785. Memorial Edition, V, 181.

[180] November 12, 1785. Memorial Edition, V, 202.

[181] December 21, 1787, Memorial Edition, VI, 396; see also letter to
John Jay, May 4, 1787. _Ibid._, VI, 122.

[182] See "Les Amitiés Françaises de Madame d'Houdetot." Paris, 1925.

[183] To Mrs. Trist. Paris, August 18, 1785. "Domestic Life", p. 79.

[184] To James Monroe, April 15, 1785. Ford, IV, 59.

[185] To Abigail Adams, June 21, 1785. _Ibid._, IV, 59.

[186] To Mrs. Adams, July 7, 1785. Ford, IV, 68.

[187] To George Wythe, August 13, 1786. _Ibid._, IV, 268-269.

[188] To Mrs. Maria Cosway, October 12, 1786. Ford, IV, 323.

[189] November, 1786. _Ibid._, IV, 328.

[190] To Edward Carrington. January 16, 1787. _Ibid._, IV, 357.

[191] To J. Jay, January 9, 1787. Memorial Edition, VI, 45.

[192] January 16, 1787. Memorial Edition, VI, 56.

[193] February 23, 1787. _Ibid._, VI, 99.

[194] February 28, 1787. Memorial Edition, VI, 101.

[195] March 20, 1787. Memorial Edition, VI, 105.

[196] To James Madison, June 20, 1787. _Ibid._, VI, 134.

[197] August 5, 1787, Memorial Edition. VI, 235.

[198] _Ibid._, VI, 247.

[199] To Washington, August 14, 1787. _Ibid._, VI, 276.

[200] August 14, 1787. _Ibid._, VI, 279.

[201] To John Adams, August 30, 1787. Memorial Edition, VI, 287.

[202] October 8, 1787. _Ibid._, VI, 338.

[203] To William Rutledge, February 2, 1788. _Ibid._, VI. 417.

[204] To De Moustier, May 17, 1788. Memorial Edition, VII, 13.

[205] July 18, 1788. _Ibid._, VII, 81.

[206] July 24, 1788. Memorial Edition, VII, 87.

[207] To Colonel Monroe, August 9, 1788. _Ibid._, VII, 113.

[208] August 12, 1788. _Ibid._, VII, 124.

[209] To Cutting, August 23, 1788. _Ibid._, VII, 131.

[210] To Short, November 2, 1788. Memorial Edition, VII, 159.

[211] To Washington, December 4, 1788. _Ibid._, VII, 228.

[212] To Doctor Currie, December 20, 1788. _Ibid._, VII, 259.

[213] To Shippen, March 11, 1789. _Ibid._, VII, 291.

[214] March 17, 1789. Memorial Edition, VII, 317.

[215] _Ibid._, VII, 321.

[216] To Lafayette, May 6, 1788. Memorial Edition, VII, 334. To
Carmichael, May 8, 1788. _Ibid._, VII, 337.

[217] To John Jay, May 9, 1789. _Ibid._, VII, 345.

[218] To Crevecoeur, May 20, 1789. Memorial Edition, VII, 368.

[219] To Madison, June 18,1789. Memorial Edition, VII, 386.

[220] To John Jay, June 24-25, 1789. Memorial Edition, VII, 395.

[221] _Ibid._, VII, 268.

[222] "Letters of Lafayette and Jefferson." Paris, Baltimore, 1929.

[223] Memorial Edition, VIII, 454.

[224] To J. Jay, July 19, 1789. Memorial Edition, VII, 409 and to James
Madison July 22. _Ibid._, VII, 424.

[225] Manuscript. Library of Congress, July 20, 1789.

[226] Jefferson Papers. Library of Congress, probably August, 1789.

[227] September 20, 1789. Memorial Edition, VII, 474.

[228] "Autobiography", I, 156.

[229] To M. l'Abbé Arnoud, Paris, July 19, 1789. Memorial Edition, VII,
422.

[230] To Madison, August 28, 1789. Memorial Edition, VII, 448.

[231] To John Jay, September 19, 1789. _Ibid._, VII, 467.

[232] To James Madison, January 30, 1787. Memorial Edition, VI, 70.

[233] To James Madison, August 28, 1789. Memorial Edition, VII, 448.

[234] "Trois amitiés françaises de Jefferson", p. 188.

[235] Madison to Washington. January 4, 1790.

[236] Washington to Jefferson. January 21.

[237] "Autobiography", p. 161.

[238] "Trois amitiés françaises de Jefferson", p. 195. February 28,
1790.

[239] "Autobiography." Memorial Edition, I, 103.

[240] Memorial Edition, I, 274.

[241] March 28, 1790. Memorial Edition, VIII, 9.

[242] June 13, 1790. _Ibid._, VIII, 36.

[243] June 20, 1790. Memorial Edition, VIII, 43.

[244] June 23, 1790. Memorial Edition, VIII, 47.

[245] To Gilmer, June 27, 1790. _Ibid._, VIII, 53.

[246] _Ibid._, VIII, 63.

[247] November 26, 1790. Memorial Edition, VIII, 107.

[248] December 3, 1790. _Ibid._, VIII, 109.

[249] February 4, 1791. Memorial Edition, VIII, 123.

[250] "Writings", VI, 19-43.

[251] To the President of the United States. Memorial Edition, VIII,
192. May 8, 1791.

[252] Memorial Edition, VIII, 208.

[253] _Ibid._, VIII, 223.

[254] Jefferson Papers. Library of Congress, January 2, 1793.

[255] August 24, 1791. Memorial Edition, VIII, 229.

[256] August 30, 1791. Memorial Edition, VIII, 241.

[257] To John Adams, August 30, 1791. _Ibid._, VIII, 245.

[258] December 23, 1791. Memorial Edition, VIII, 275.

[259] March 1, 1792. Memorial Edition, I, 292, "Anas."

[260] May 23, 1792. Memorial Edition, VIII, 341.

[261] September 9, 1792. Memorial Edition, VIII, 408.

[262] To Thomas Pinckney, December 3, 1792. Memorial Edition, VIII, 443.

[263] To Doctor George Gilmer, December 15, 1792. _Ibid._, VIII, 444.

[264] _Ibid._, VIII, 445.

[265] April 6, 1790. Memorial Edition, VIII, 19.

[266] April 2. Memorial Edition, VIII, 11.

[267] July 26, 1790. Memorial Edition, VIII, 65.

[268] To Carmichael, August 2, 1790. Memorial Edition, VIII, 70.

[269] To Short, August 10, 1790. Memorial Edition, VIII, 79.

[270] To Gouverneur Morris, August 12, 1790. _Ibid._, VIII, 85.

[271] To Colonel Mason, February 4, 1791. Memorial Edition, VIII, 123.

[272] To the President of the National Assembly, March 8, 1791. Memorial
Edition, VIII, 37.

[273] To W. Short, April 25, 1791. _Ibid._, VIII, 185.

[274] See also my edition of the "Letters of Lafayette and Jefferson",
chapter III. Paris, Baltimore, 1929.

[275] To W. Short, July 28, 1791. Memorial Edition, VIII, 217.

[276] July 30, 1791. _Ibid._, VIII, 225.

[277] To Edward Rutledge, August 25, 1791. _Ibid._, VIII, 234.

[278] To Short, November 24, 1791. Memorial Edition, VIII, 261.

[279] To Short, January 28, 1792. _Ibid._, VIII, 297.

[280] March 10, 1792. _Ibid._, VIII, 311.

[281] To Lafayette, June 16, 1792. Memorial Edition, VIII, 381.

[282] November 7, 1792. _Ibid._, VIII, 437.

[283] November 20, 1792. Memorial Edition, VIII, 441.

[284] January 3, 1793. Memorial Edition, IX, 9.

[285] To G. Morris, March 12, 1793. Memorial Edition, IX, 37.

[286] To ----, March 18, 1793. _Ibid._, IX, 45.

[287] "Anas", February 20, 1793.

[288] To Messrs. Carmichael and Short, March 23, 1793. Memorial Edition,
IX, 55.

[289] March 21, 1793. Memorial Edition, IX, 49.

[290] To C. W. Dumas, March 23, 1793. _Ibid._, IX, 57.

[291] To E. P. Van Berckel, April 23, 1793. To Morris, Pinckney and
Short, April 26, 1793. Memorial Edition, IX, 68-69.

[292] April 27, 1793. _Ibid._, IX, 70.

[293] May 5, 1793. _Ibid._, IX, 75.

[294] May 7, 1793. _Ibid._, IX, 79.

[295] To Ternant, May 3, 1793. Memorial Edition, IX, 74.

[296] May 15, 1793. _Ibid._, IX, 89.

[297] May 19, 1793. Memorial Edition, IX, 98.

[298] June 6, 1789. _Ibid._, IX, 115.

[299] June 13, 1789. Memorial Edition, IX, 123.

[300] Jefferson Papers. Library of Congress, June 24, 1793.

[301] _Ibid._ Library of Congress, June 27, 1793 and Writings of J.
Monroe, I, 261.

[302] To J. Madison, July 7, 1793. Ford, VII, 436.

[303] To James Madison, August 25, 1793. Memorial Edition, IX, 211.

[304] To Madison, September 1, 1793. _Ibid._, IX, 211.

[305] Jefferson Papers. Library of Congress, 15832.

[306] December 31, 1793. Memorial Edition, IX, 277.

[307] December 13, 1793. _Ibid._, IX, 279.

[308] Angelica Church to Jefferson, August 19, 1793. Chinard, "Trois
Amitiés Françaises", p. 155.

[309] Jefferson Papers. Library of Congress, February, 1794.

[310] "Amitiés françaises", p. 161.

[311] February 3, 1794. Memorial Edition, IX, 279.

[312] Jefferson Papers. Library of Congress, February 15, 1794.

[313] December 16, 1793. Memorial Edition, III, 261-283.

[314] Jefferson Papers. Library of Congress, March 3, and March 11,
1794.

[315] April 3, 1794. Memorial Edition, IX, 281 and Manuscript Library of
Congress, March 16.

[316] April 24, 1794. Jefferson Papers, Library of Congress.

[317] May 1, 1794. Memorial Edition, IX, 285.

[318] May 14, 1794. Memorial Edition, IX, 287.

[319] September 7, 1794. _Ibid._, IX, 291.

[320] December 28, 1794. Memorial Edition, IX, 293.

[321] April 27, 1795. _Ibid._, IX, 301.

[322] April 27. _Ibid._, IX, 305.

[323] See S. F. Bemis. "Jay's Treaty." New York, 1923.

[324] August 30, 1795. Memorial Edition, IX, 307.

[325] September 21, 1795. _Ibid._, IX, 309.

[326] November 30, 1795. Memorial Edition, IX, 313.

[327] March 21, 1796. Memorial Edition, IX, 329.

[328] January 16, 1796. _Ibid._, IX, 319.

[329] To James Madison, March 6, 1796. _Ibid._, IX, 323.

[330] March 19, 1796. Memorial Edition, IX, 326.

[331] To James Madison, March 27, 1796. _Ibid._, IX, 330.

[332] April 9, 1790. Memorial Edition, IX, 334.

[333] April 24, 1796. Memorial Edition, IX, 335.

[334] June 19, 1796. _Ibid._, IX, 339.

[335] To Jonathan Williams, July 3, 1796. Memorial Edition, IX, 347.

[336] December 17, 1796. Memorial Edition, IX, 351.

[337] To Rutledge, December 27, 1796. Memorial Edition, IX, 353.

[338] To Madison, January 1, 1797. Memorial Edition, IX, 357.

[339] James Madison to Jefferson, January 15, 1797. "Works", VI, 303.

[340] January 22, 1797. Memorial Edition, IX, 370.

[341] April 9, 1797. _Ibid._, IX, 380.

[342] June 24, 1797. Memorial Edition, IX, 408.

[343] May 29, 1797. Memorial Edition, IX, 389.

[344] June 15, 1797. To James Madison, Memorial Edition, IX, 397.

[345] June 17, 1797. Memorial Edition, IX, 400.

[346] June 21, 1797. _Ibid._, IX, 405.

[347] To Colonel A. Campbell, September 1, 1797. Memorial Edition, IX,
419.

[348] June 24, 1797. Memorial Edition, IX, 409.

[349] January 3, 1798. _Ibid._, IX, 431.

[350] February 22, 1798. Memorial Edition, IX, 444.

[351] March 15, 1798. _Ibid._, X, 6.

[352] March 21, 1798. Memorial Edition, X, 9.

[353] To Madison, March 29, 1798. _Ibid._, X, 17.

[354] March 27, 1798.

[355] To Madison, April 12, 1798. Memorial Edition, X, 27.

[356] April 12, 1798. _Ibid._, X, 28.

[357] April 12, 1798. Memorial Edition, X, 29.

[358] To Madison, April 26, 1798. _Ibid._, X, 31.

[359] See Chinard, "Volney et l'Amérique." Paris, Baltimore, 1923.

[360] To Madison, April 26, 1798. Memorial Edition, X, 33.

[361] To Madison, May 31, 1798. Memorial Edition, X, 43.

[362] To John Taylor, June 1, 1798. Memorial Edition, X, 45.

[363] To Madison, June 21, 1798. Memorial Edition, X, 49-53.

[364] August 22, 1798. Memorial Edition, X, 61.

[365] October 11, 1798. _Ibid._, X, 62.

[366] To Madison, November 17, 1798. Memorial Edition, X, 62.

[367] December 11, 1821. _Ibid._, XV, 351.

[368] See pp. 80-82.

[369] November 17. Memorial Edition, X, 63.

[370] November 26, 1798. _Ibid._, X, 63.

[371] To James Madison, January 3, 1799. Memorial Edition, X, 67.

[372] Madison to Jefferson, June 26, 1799. Jefferson Papers. Library of
Congress.

[373] January 16, 1799. Memorial Edition, X, 69.

[374] To Elbridge Gerry, January 26, 1799. Memorial Edition, X, 77-78.

[375] January 29, 1799, Memorial Edition, X, 87 and Jefferson Papers,
Library of Congress, February 14, 1799.

[376] To Madison, February 5, 1799. Memorial Edition, X, 95.

[377] John Ogden to Jefferson, February 7, 1799. Jefferson Papers.
Library of Congress.

[378] February 11, 1799. _Ibid._

[379] To Madison, February 19, 1799. Memorial Edition, X, 111.

[380] To Bishop James Madison, February 27, 1799. _Ibid._, X, 122.

[381] Jefferson Papers. Library of Congress, February 26, 1799.

[382] Jefferson Papers. Library of Congress. To Bishop Madison, March
12, 1799.

[383] _Ibid._ Callender to Jefferson, August 10, 1799. From Richmond.

[384] _Ibid._ Marked received December 11, undated.

[385] August 18, 1799. Memorial Edition, X, 125.

[386] Jefferson Papers. Library of Congress. To Callender, undated,
unsigned.

[387] To Madison, November 22, 1799. Memorial Edition, X, 133.

[388] January 12, 1800. Memorial Edition, X, 136.

[389] Priestley's answer, never hitherto published, will be found in my
volume on "Jefferson and the Physiocrats."

[390] March 14, 1800. Memorial Edition, X, 110.

[391] Jefferson Papers. Library of Congress, February 11, 1800.

[392] To Henry Innis, January 23. Memorial Edition, X, 143.

[393] To T. M. Randolph, February 2, 1800. _Ibid._, X, 151.

[394] February 26, 1800. Memorial Edition, X, 153.

[395] To Madison, March 8, 1800. _Ibid._, X, 157-159.

[396] To P. N. Nicholas, April 7, 1800. Memorial Edition, X, 163.

[397] Jefferson Papers. Library of Congress. Callender to Jefferson,
February 10 and March 15, 1800.

[398] March 18, 1800. Jefferson Papers. Library of Congress.

[399] _Ibid._

[400] April 30, 1800. Memorial Edition, X, 163.

[401] Jefferson Papers. Library of Congress, May 26, 1800.

[402] _Ibid._, August 14, 1800.

[403] March 14, 1800. Memorial Edition, X, 160.

[404] Jefferson Papers. Library of Congress, Benjamin Rush to Jefferson,
August 22, 1800.

[405] September 23, 1800. Memorial Edition, X, 173.

[406] December 14, 1800. Memorial Edition, X, 176.

[407] December 18, 1800. Memorial Edition, X, 183.

[408] Memorial Edition, X, 188.

[409] January 10, 1800. _Ibid._, X, 188.

[410] February 3. Memorial Edition, X, 197.

[411] February 15, 1801. Memorial Edition, X, 201.

[412] February 18, 1801. Memorial Edition, X, 203.

[413] _Ibid._, X, 206.

[414] To Thomas Lomax, February 25, 1801. Memorial Edition, X, 211.

[415] To Thomas Lomax, February 25, 1801. Memorial Edition, X, 210.

[416] March 7, 1801. Memorial Edition, X, 218.

[417] To Doctor Benjamin Rush, March 24, 1801. _Ibid._, X, 241.

[418] To Elias Shipman and others, July 12, 1801.

[419] June 13, 1804. Memorial Edition, XI, 28.

[420] A. J. Beveridge: "Life of Marshall", II, 51-53 and Appendix.

[421] "Life of Marshall", II, 51-222; McMaster, "History of the People
of the United States", Vol. III.

[422] To Elbridge Gerry, March 20, 1801. Memorial Edition, X, 251.

[423] To the Attorney-general, January 1, 1802. _Ibid._, X, 305.

[424] July 18, 1804. _Ibid._, XI, 38.

[425] Jefferson Papers. Library of Congress, June 13, 1800.

[426] To W. Short, October 3, 1801. Memorial Edition, X, 288.

[427] November 24, 1801. _Ibid._, X, 294.

[428] "Volney et L'Amérique." Paris and Baltimore, 1923.

[429] King to the Secretary of State, January 1, 1802.

[430] Jefferson Papers, Library of Congress, April 21, 1802.

[431] Jefferson Papers. Library of Congress, April 25, 1802.

[432] May 12, 1802. Manuscript, Library of Congress.

[433] Jefferson Papers. Library of Congress. Du Pont de Nemours to
Jefferson, October 4, 1802.

[434] Annals of Congress, p. 1059.

[435] _Ibid._, p. 286.

[436] Jefferson Papers. Library of Congress, marked received December
31.

[437] Annals of Congress. Appendix, p. 1065.

[438] Jefferson Papers. Library of Congress, February 1, 1803.

[439] To James Madison, January 24, 1803. Annals of Congress, p. 1066.

[440] To the Secretary of State, March 24, 1803. _Ibid._, p. 1083.

[441] To Madison, March 3, 1803. _Ibid._, p. 1083.

[442] March 2, 1803. Annals of Congress, p. 1098.

[443] King to Livingston, May 7, 1803. _Ibid._, p. 1803.

[444] Annals of Congress, p. 1167.

[445] July 11, 1803. Memorial Edition, X, 402.

[446] Memorial Edition, X, 424.

[447] Jefferson Papers. Library of Congress, January 19, 1804.

[448] July 4, 1803. Memorial Edition, X, 398.

[449] July 12, 1803. _Ibid._, X, 404.

[450] To Madison, August 25, 1803. Memorial Edition, X, 412.

[451] To James Madison, August 15, 1804. Memorial Edition, XI, 45.

[452] "Anas", January 26, 1804.

[453] To W. B. Giles, April 20, 1807. Memorial Edition, XI, 187.

[454] To Gideon Granger, March 9, 1814. Memorial Edition, XIV, 113.

[455] To Lafayette, July 14, 1807. _Ibid._, XI, 277.

[456] To William B. Giles, April 20, 1807. Memorial Edition, XI, 187.

[457] To George Hay, September 4, 1807. _Ibid._, XI, 360.

[458] October 27, 1808. Memorial Edition, XII, 183.

[459] Memorial Edition, X, 399.

[460] H. Adams, II, 257.

[461] To James Madison, August 27, 1805. Memorial Edition, XI, 86.

[462] April 19, 1806. Memorial Edition, XI, 103.

[463] To Colonel James Monroe, May 4, 1806. Memorial Edition, XI, 106.

[464] Turreau to Talleyrand, December 12, 1806, in H. Adams, III, 424.

[465] To Monroe, March 21, 1807. Memorial Edition, XI, 167.

[466] June 29, 1807. Memorial Edition, XI, 256.

[467] July 6, 1807. _Ibid._, XI, 258.

[468] See particularly his letters to Cabell, August 11, 1807, and to
Dearborn, August 28. Memorial Edition, XI, 318, 342.

[469] To John Page, July 17, 1807. Memorial Edition, XI, 285.

[470] November 22, 1807. _Ibid._, XI, 397.

[471] Memorial Edition, XI, 401. This may be simply a draft of the
message written on a sheet of paper which happened to bear the name of
General Mason. See Henry Adams, IV, 168.

[472] A. J. Nock, "Jefferson", p. 266. New York, 1926.

[473] To John Taylor, January 6, 1808. Memorial Edition, XI, 413.

[474] March 30, 1808. Memorial Edition, XI, 23.

[475] To Governor Charles Pinckney. November 8, 1808. _Ibid._, XII, 190.

[476] Henry Adams, IV, chapter XII, "The Cost of Embargo."

[477] Henry Adams, IV, 277.

[478] Walter W. Jennings, "A History of economic progress in the United
States", p. 160, New York, 1926.

[479] To Doctor George Logan, December 27, 1808. Memorial Edition, XII,
219.

[480] January 14, 1809. _Ibid._, XII, 227.

[481] To Thomas Mann Randolph, February 7, 1809. _Ibid._, XII, 248.

[482] March 8, 1809. Memorial Edition, XII, 264.

[483] March 17, 1809. _Ibid._, XII, 266.

[484] Memorial Edition, XII, 267.

[485] February 10, 1810. Memorial Edition, XII, 357.

[486] To J. B. Colvin. September 20, 1810. _Ibid._, XII, 422; see also
letter to Cæsar Rodney, September 25. _Ibid._, XII, 426.

[487] To Madison, April 27, 1809. Memorial Edition, XII, 275.

[488] To Madison, April 19, 1809. Memorial Edition, XII, 271.

[489] June 28, 1809. _Ibid._, XII, 293.

[490] To Rodney, February 10, 1810. Memorial Edition, XII, 357.

[491] To Governor John Langdon, March 5, 1810. _Ibid._, XII, 373.

[492] To Thomas Cooper, August 6, 1810. _Ibid._, XII, 401.

[493] To Thomas Law, January 15, 1810. _Ibid._, XII, 439.

[494] April 25, 1812. Memorial Edition, XIII, 145.

[495] June 29, 1812. Memorial Edition, XIII, 173.

[496] August 5, 1812. _Ibid._, XIII, 183.

[497] _Ibid._, XIII, 206.

[498] October 1, 1812. Memorial Edition, XIII, 187.

[499] To William Duane, April 4, 1813. _Ibid._, XIII, 231.

[500] To Thomas Leiper, January 1, 1814. Memorial Edition, XIV, 45.

[501] To John Clark, January 27, 1814. _Ibid._, XIV, 79.

[502] September 21, 1814. Memorial Edition, XIV, 191.

[503] To William Short, November 28, 1814. _Ibid._, XIV, 214.

[504] To Correa de Serra, December 27, 1814. Memorial Edition, XIV, 221.

[505] To William H. Crawford, February 25, 1815. _Ibid._, XIV, 243, and
June 15, 1815. _Ibid._, XIV, 312.

[506] December 1, 1815. _Ibid._, XIV, 369.

[507] October 16, 1816. Memorial Edition, XIV, 85.

[508] October 16, 1816. _Ibid._, XVI, 80.

[509] To Thomas Leiper, June 14, 1815. Memorial Edition, XIV, 311; and
to John Adams, August 10, 1815. _Ibid._, XIV, 343.

[510] October 16, 1815. _Ibid._, XIV, 355.

[511] January 2, 1812. _Ibid._, XIII, 117.

[512] December 6, 1813. Memorial Edition, XIV, 22.

[513] To Don Valentino de Torunda Corunda, December 14, 1813. Memorial
Edition, XIV, 31.

[514] To John Adams, January 22, 1812. Memorial Edition, XV, 309.

[515] To Lafayette, May 14, 1817. _Ibid._, XV, 117.

[516] To W. Short, August 4, 1820. Memorial Edition, XV, 263.

[517] October 24, 1820. _Ibid._, XV, 285.

[518] Jefferson Papers. Library of Congress. December 26, 1820, and
Chinard, "Jefferson et les Idéologues." Paris, Baltimore, 1925, p. 203.

[519] Jefferson Papers. Library of Congress, July 18, 1824.

[520] To Monroe, June 11, 1823. Memorial Edition, XV, 455.

[521] Jefferson Papers. Library of Congress. December 10, 1817.

[522] October 20, 1820. Memorial Edition, XV, 284.

[523] About the economic and banking theories of Jefferson, I can only
indicate here some points more fully treated in my book on "Jefferson et
les Idéologues." Paris, Baltimore, 1925.

[524] To William H. Crawford, June 20, 1816. Memorial Edition, XV, 27.

[525] April 7, 1809. _Ibid._, XII, 271.

[526] January 9, 1816. Memorial Edition, XIV, 387.

[527] To Thomas Cooper, September 10, 1814. Memorial Edition, XIV, 179.

[528] Jefferson Papers. Library of Congress. April 15, 1811.

[529] Jefferson Papers. Library of Congress. April 15, 1811.

[530] Jefferson Papers. Library of Congress. January 18, 1802.

[531] _Ibid._ February 28, 1815.

[532] Jefferson Papers. Library of Congress. December 12, 1815.

[533] October 28, 1813. Memorial Edition, XIII, 396.

[534] January 2, 1814. Memorial Edition, XIV, 46.

[535] To John Adams, October 16, 1816. _Ibid._, XVI, 85.

[536] To Lafayette, February 14, 1815. Memorial Edition, XIV, 245.

[537] To James Madison, November 29, 1820. Memorial Edition, XV, 295.

[538] December 10, 1819. Memorial Edition, XV, 233.

[539] To John Adams, January 22, 1821. _Ibid._, XV, 309.

[540] August 4, 1811. Memorial Edition, XIII, 68.

[541] July 12, 1816. _Ibid._, XV, 32.

[542] Jefferson Papers. Library of Congress. May 8, 1800.

[543] Jefferson Papers. Library of Congress. April 21, 1800.

[544] _Ibid._, July 26, 1800.

[545] To Thomas Cooper, January 16, 1814. Memorial Edition, XIV, 60.

[546] February 15, 1821, Memorial Edition, XV, 315.

[547] The latest account is the monumental "History of the University of
Virginia" by Professor Philip Alexander Bruce, New York, 4 vols., 1920.
See also the excellent study of Herbert B. Adams, "Thomas Jefferson and
the University of Virginia", United States Bureau of Education. Circular
of information No. 1, 1888.

[548] To Richard Rush, April 26, 1824. Memorial Edition, XVI, 31.

[549] To the Honorable J. Evelyn Denison, M. P., November 9, 1825.
_Ibid._, XVI, 129.

[550] To John Brazier, August 24, 1814. Memorial Edition, XV, 207.

[551] June 27, 1822. _Ibid._, XV, 387.

[552] Memorial Edition, XVI, 173.

[553] Doctor Dunglison's Memorandum, in "Domestic Life", p. 402.

[554] September 12, 1821. Memorial Edition, XV, 334.

[555] January 16, 1811. Memorial Edition, XIII, 9.

[556] December 5, 1811. _Ibid._, XIII, 114.

[557] January 21, 1812. _Ibid._, XIII, 123.

[558] Memorial Edition, XV, 174.

[559] January 11, 1817. Memorial Edition, XV, 97.

[560] February 21, 1825. "Domestic Life", p. 423.

[561] To James Smith, December 8, 1822. Memorial Edition, XV, 410.

[562] To John Adams, August 15, 1820. _Ibid._, XV, 269-276.

[563] March 24, 1824. _Ibid._, XVI, 17.

[564] October 31, 1819. Memorial Edition, XV, 219.

[565] July 13, 1813. _Ibid._, XIII, 319.

[566] To John Adams, April 11, 1820. Memorial Edition, XV, 427.

[567] To John Adams, May 5, 1817. _Ibid._, XV, 109.

[568] June 13, 1814. Memorial Edition, XIV, 141.

[569] To James Fishback, September 27, 1809. _Ibid._, XII, 315.

[570] May 26, 1817. Memorial Edition, XV, 122.

[571] See my edition of "The Literary Bible of Thomas Jefferson." Paris,
Baltimore, 1928, p. 58.

[572] April 21, 1803. Memorial Edition, X, 379.

[573] See the introduction of Doctor Cyrus Adler, in the Congressional
Edition reproduced in the Memorial Edition, XX.

[574] May 3, 1816. Memorial Edition, XV, 10.

[575] April 6, 1816. Memorial Edition, XIV, 467.

[576] To William Ludlow, September 6, 1824. _Ibid._, XVI, 75.

[577] June 24, 1826. Memorial Edition, XVI, 181.

[578] To John Brazier, August 24, 1819. _Ibid._, XV, 207.

[579] August 1, 1816. _Ibid._, XVI, 56.

[580] January 9, 1816. Memorial Edition, XIV, 385.

[581] To Doctor Vine Ulley, March 21, 1819. _Ibid._, XV, 187.

[582] Jefferson Papers. Massachusetts Historical Society, March 5, 1814.

[583] _Ibid._, To Short, December 17, 1822.

[584] _Ibid._, To Samuel Smith, October 22, 1825.

[585] "Literary Bible", p. 36. Paris, Baltimore, 1928.

[586] To John Adams--August 1, 1816. Memorial Edition, XV, 56, and
June 1, 1822. _Ibid._, XV, 371.

[587] November 8, 1824, "Mémoires", VI, 183.

[588] "Domestic Life", p. 425.






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